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Abstract 
 
Communal Strife in Bihar 1946-1992 
 
The occurrences of communal riots went side by side with the Indian National 
Movement and frequently occurred even after independence. Communalism and 
communal riots in India is essentially a modern phenomenon which was fomented by 
the British through their “divide and rule” policy. Communal riots in large measure 
sprang from elite conflicts over jobs, business, political powers etc. 
In Bihar communal riots frequently occurred even long before the 
independence i.e. communal disturbances reached their climax in Bihar between the 
1888 and the 1893, the districts worst affected being Arrah, Saran, Gaya and Patna.  
By 1880s and 1890s there were two major issues, over which communal riots 
were erupted, were the cow-protection movements and Devnagari-Urdu (Hindi-Urdu) 
controversy. On the one hand Hindu activists not only speak of the protection of cow 
even the Gau Rakshini Sabha courts punished sale of cow to butchers by imposing 
fine or social boycott. On the other hand the Muslim revivalists insisting on the 
necessity of cow-slaughter on Bakr-Eid which resulted in large scale riots between 
June to July, 1893 in Saran, Gaya and Patna. 
The 1920s made for a new conjuncture in the world of Indian politics. The 
masses entered the organized national movement on an unprecedented scale. At the 
same time, however the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements acted as a catalyst 
in certain other ways to participate those compounds in Indian politics that had 
handed down to us as nationalism and communalism. 
A national leadership that might already had been perturbed by the devastating 
Hindu attacks on the Muslims of Shahabad and Katarpur on the Bakr-Eid of 1917 and 
1918 respectively, but had brushed them aside as being of little consequence in the 
context of the immediate political agenda and the emerging unity among the Hindu 
and Muslim nationalist politicians was thrown into consternation by some of the event 
of the next few years. Muslim communalism flourished in the 1920s in colonial India 
on the basis of “Islam in danger”. The Muslim massive agitation and political issue 
during 1920s were the issue of fate of the khalifa, the Mopillah rising in Malabar. 
The Hindu-Muslim movements like shuddhi and sangathan and tabligh and 
tanzim, and the spate of Hindu-Muslim riots from 1923 onwards. As we have been 
observed, Hindu and Muslim political mobilization had been seen in the past as 
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necessary even inevitable at least in the early stages of the building of an Indian 
nationalism. Such communitarian mobilization now came to be regarded by more and 
more nationalist observers as a distorted and distorting tendency. Hindu and Muslim 
politics with all their divergent aspect became from the 1920s the chief flogging horse 
of Indian nationalism divisive primitive and in a far more general nationalist 
judgment. 
All the main controversies, which first embittered the Hindu-Muslim relation 
and later divided the two communities (Hindu and Muslim), were the cow question, 
Ramlila and Moharram processions and on other religious occasions, music before 
mosque and also the question of representation in services, in municipalities and 
councils, joint and separate electorates, safeguards and redistribution of provinces and 
federal, as opposed to a unitary basis of the constitution. 
By 1930s and 1940s, the importance of enlightened leadership was thus being 
stressed on all sides as the critical ingredient that was required in the bid to advance 
the backward peoples of India. It had taken great leaders like Chandragupta Maurya, 
Ashoka, Akbar to actualize the dream of Indian unity in the past, and they had done so 
in the great states and empire that they established. It would take great leaders like 
Nehru and Patel to realize the newly desired unity of India. 
All these circumstances encouraged the identity based political mobilization to 
determine the extent of exclusion and inclusion of the community in license permit 
raj. Any application for license-permit to start an industry in any state or region 
accompanied hectic political lobbying and the politicians in turn introduced religious 
or caste symbols to mobilize the community and stake their claims for share in power. 
In fact urban middle classes were the torch bearer of communal consciousness in the 
both communities which further polarized Hindu-Muslim relations. 
The Hindu-Muslim religious conflicts worsened by 1946 i.e. the recurrence of 
frequent communal riots at village Pauthoo (Gaya district) and at Benibad in 
Muzaffarpur district started on 27th September, 1946. 
This work consists of four major chapters including “Introduction”. The 
introductory chapter deals with the gradual intrusion of communalism in all walks of 
social, political, economic and cultural life, formation of communal organizations and 
communal movements, i.e. cow-protection movement, Hindi-Urdu controversy which 
erupted to accumulate politico-economic power and grab government job 
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opportunities and transformed into the conflicts between the Hindus and the Muslims. 
The anti-cow-slaughter movement peaked up in 1893, when in Basantpur in Saran 
district, one of the most furious and well organized riots of late 19th century broke out 
and Hindus attacked the Muslim villages assaulting butchers as well as low-status 
Hindus viewed as complicit in marketing beef. Cow-slaughter movement was 
employed by the agitators both as local trade networks and powerful religious 
symbols to divide Hindus from Muslims as well as the British. Anand Yang Anand in 
his paper “Sacred Symbols and Sacred Space Rural India: Community Mobilization 
in the “Anti-Cow Killing” Riot of 1893” (1980) argued that the patterned behavior of 
the crowd show that mobilization of large numbers of people at Basantpur was 
achieved through the networks of hats (local marketing systems). In another village 
Hindu crowds attempted to kill Muslims and to rob their homes but were forced to 
withdraw when met by gunfire from posted military police. Rioting, looting, and 
murder were widespread in the districts of Shahabad, Gaya and Patna during Bakar-Id 
in September 1917. The September 1917, in Shahabad riot was one of the ferocious 
incidents of communal riots that ignited over the issue of cow-slaughter. In Shahabad 
district in October 1917, for instance, the immediate issue was cow-protection. Crowds 
of up to 50,000 Hindu peasants attacked Muslim villages. 
Second chapter, “Communal Riots in Bihar: 1946-47”, deals with the riots 
between 1946 and 1949. It explores the communal polarization of politics during 
1938 to 1946. Though this process of communal schism finally resulted in partition of 
India, but communal carnages continued in India still today. These riots were and are 
the outcome elite manipulation of the masses to attain economic accumulation and 
accumulation of political power. Though these elitist classes emerged as the champion 
of their respective community but factually they are only loyal to them. With Jinaah’s 
call for “Direct Action Day” on 16th August, 1946 as reaction the Great Calcutta 
(Kolkata) Killings took place which unleashed the ferocious communal riots in Bihar. 
There was already communally ripe situation in Bihar and riots were going on and the 
places like Patna, Gaya, Monghyr and Palamau districts were engulfed in the 
communal riots in March, 1946. A serious communal riot took place in Patna on 18th 
may, 1946, in Benibad the tensed situation was at its verge and riots were ignited. On 
25th October, 1946 complete hartal at Chapra was observed and on 26th October, 
1946, some Muslim shops were attacked by the Hindus form the villages north of 
Chapra. Riots spread to, Jehanabad, Khodaibagh, Jalalpur, Nabazar, in fact, almost all 
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over Bihar. These riots were ceased only when Jawaharlal Nehru responded these 
riots with the weapon of secularism and threatened the communally mad masses to 
machine-gunning, aerial attacks and bombing and surprisingly the situation was under 
control. Gandhi also threatened to go on fast if the riots would not be stopped. There 
had been no serious occurred except on 19th November, 1946 in Monghyr. In 1946, 
October-November, in which 30,000-50,000 Muslims were killed according to the 
Muslim Leagues estimate, except some places police remain as silent spectators. In 
1947, March onwards riots again reared its head. Warisalganj (Gaya), Kutubpur 
(Poonpoon, Police Station), Behrawan (Poonpoon, Police Station), etc. were the scene 
of communal riots. By June people were fed up with communal riots. They supposed 
that Pakistan scheme should be either dropped or immediately granted. In Bhabhuna 
town communal incidents took place in July, 1947, where RSS members were 
responsible for igniting the riots, as they wanted to drive Muslims out. On 22nd 
August, 1947, communal riot took place over the issue of bringing down the flag of 
India. On 25th October, 1947, riots took place in Tirhut division, Sitamarhi sub-
division, Singhachauri, village Mehsaul, Police Station Runisyedpur, over the issue of 
cow-sacrifice on Bakra-Eid. 
Third chapter, “Communal Riots in Post-Independence Bihar till 1967”, 
focuses on the role of administration, intelligentsia, press and the major riots till 1967. 
This chapter explores Government handling of riots and role of police and armed 
forces as well as how they use communal issues to attain their power. Communalism 
became active in the 1960s, gaining in strength as seen in rising communalization of 
Indian society. In 1950s itself, there was a series of communal riots. Seven communal 
incidents takes place in 1954, nine in 1955, eight in 1956, six in 1957, eight in 1958, 
twelve in 1959, eight in 1960, twenty two in 1961, five in 1962 and ten in 1963, but 
these were not of serious in nature. In April, 1959 riot broke out in Sitamarhi over the 
cow-slaughter, 7 Muslims were killed and 657 Muslims were injured. A number of 
Hindus were also injured. In March, 1964 riots broke out in the Tribal belt. Which 
mainly comprise to tribal belt comprising the district of Ranchi and Singhbhum. In 
these riots, 409 Muslims, 16 Hindus and 3 unidentified were killed and 262 Muslims, 
27 Hindus and 9 unidentified were injured. In August 22-29, 1967, at Ranchi-Hatia 
riots were ignited over the language controversy when an anti-Urdu procession was 
allegedly stoned near a cinema hall and riot were continued over nearly a week and 
took a heavy toll of life. Considerable damage to private property was also caused 
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although a detailed assessment has not so far been made. On 13th October, 1967, riots 
broke out in Sursand, when Durga procession was brick-batted while it was passing 
through Muslim locality. About 20 persons were killed on 13th October, 1967; riots 
were ignited over false rumour of gun injury of Hindu during Mahabiri Jhanda 
procession. 35 Muslim houses and 2 Hindu houses were burnt. 47 Muslims and 2 
Hindu families were affected. 144 Cr, P. C. was implemented to the affected areas. 
The communal tension generated by the clash between the Hindus and Muslims at 
Sursand, turned out to be explosive on October 15, 1967 when some Muslims set fire 
to a few Hindu houses.  On 13th December, 1967 riots occurred at Bhagalpur. 
By mid 1960s there was chaotic situation in political arena of India in general 
and Bihar in particular. There was transfer of power from the Congress to other new 
emerging parties, comprising upper Other Backward Castes and other lower section of 
the society and other emerging parties. This was done because the lower castes like 
koeries, Kurmis, Yadava etc. among the Hindu community and ajlaf, ashraf and arzal 
among the Muslims, stated asserting their share in power and politics. The new 
emerging parties used the sensitive issues as elevator to rise to the power. In all these, 
anti-social elements played very crucial role in engineering and escalating the 
disturbances. Anti-social elements were patronized by the politicians and capitalists 
(trading communities) of the society. Thus for the first time in the year 1967 a large 
number of members of non-Congress were installed in the Bihar legislature.  
Moreover, during this period increasingly, communal violence has been pre-
planned and well organized and of longer duration some of the communal riots have 
had lasted for weeks and even for months. Rioters were also provided with ample 
funds, firearms and other destructive materials. During the period of the Janata 
government, there was an increase in communal violence because of the strong 
influence of the RSS and Jan Sangh in Janata Party and the Government. It is 
evidence that in Bihar incidents Jan Sangh was the main player. They instigated the 
working and laborers class to indulge in hooliganism for this they had assured them of 
financial backing. The CPI, the CPM and the SSP have all assured Jan Sangh of being 
responsible for the incidents. 
Fourth chapter “Major Riots in Bihar: 1968-1992”, deals with the major riots 
during this period. By mid 1960 there were major changes took place during this 
period. Bharatiya Janata Party was born in 1977. Many, including Jayprakash 
Narayan genuinely believed that the members of the Jan Sangh, after merging with 
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the Janata Party, had shed their communalism totally. In 1980, neither Janata rhetoric 
nor Gandhian Socialism came to the rescue of the anti-politicians and goonda 
elements. It was in the political vacuum of this decade that the ideology of 
communalism spread. During 1971-1981, political parties searching for new strategies 
to dethrone the ruling Congress party. Thus caste and religion based politics started 
surfacing. Populist slogans and religious considerations became common to woo the 
minorities. Muslim Law Board was formed to protect the personal law based on 
Shariat. Hindus started demanding the Uniform Civil Code. After 1977 Shah Bano 
case, Meenakshipuram conversions, opening of Babri Masjid for Hindus etc. all these 
issues communally charged the atmosphere of whole India. On 15th April, 1970, riots 
broke out in Chaibasa when a bomb was hurled on Ramnavami procession, while it 
was passing through Bari Bazar. 23 Muslim and a tribal were killed. 42 Hindus and 
14 Muslims were injured. On 17th April, 1970, riot spread to Cakradharpur. The 
Jamshedpur riots of April 1979 arose over the route for taking out Ramnavami 
procession. The city has experienced communal conflicts since 1964. Communal 
organizations have been active, especially with the Akharas. In April, 1981 
Biharsharif, riots occurred over a quarrel in a toddy shop owned by a Harijan. The 
trouble erupted in the Gagandiwan village having a majority Muslim population. 
There was also traditional rivalry between the Hindus and Muslims over a piece of 
cemetery land which both claimed as their own. Intelligence machinery was failed 
and the District Administration misleading the higher authorities by not providing a 
correct assessment. The police did not take effective action to control the clash, which 
ended in rioting. The spread of false rumors affected the other villages in Biharsharif. 
The hold of the RSS and the Jammat-e-Islami in these areas further increased the 
violence. The Bhagalpur riots of 1989 refer to the violence between the Hindus and 
the Muslims in the Bhagalpur district of Bihar, India. The riots started on 24 October 
1989, and the violent incidents continued to happen for 2 months. The violence 
affected the Bhagalpur city and 250 villages around it. Over 1,000 people (around 900 
of which were Muslims were killed, and another 50,000 were displaced as a result of 
the violence. It was the worst Hindu-Muslim violence in independent India. Satyendra 
Narain Sinha, the then Chief Minister of Bihar, accused Congress of having “fanned” 
communal riots in Bhagalpur in 1989 which left over 1000 people, mostly Muslims, 
dead. Ghazala Jamil’s illustration of Muzaffarnagar Riot (2013) in her recent paper, 
“Internally Displaced Muslims of the Western Uttar Pradesh” had many similarities 
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with the Bhagalpur riots of 1989. Like Bhagalpur riots in Muzaffarnagar too atrocities 
done to the Muslims, huge losses fall upon the Muslims. There was displacement of 
the entire Muslim population even in the villages (of Muzaffarnagar) which were not 
affected by communal violence since people fled out of fear. The same thing had 
happened during the Bhagalpur riot (1989), in that was graver in nature. That 116 
people were butchered in Logain Village (Bhagalpur) and buried in a field and 
cauliflowers were planted to hide the evidences and in that rioters were accompanied 
by the police officials. During October, 2-9, 1992, Communal riots broke out in 
Sitamarhi particularly in the town of Sitamarhi and in the village of Riga. Clashes 
started on October 2 when a Durga Puja procession shouting slogans such as Jai Shri 
Ram near a mosque was stopped by some Muslim youths. Brick-batting took place. 
On October 4, the Puja Samiti decided that the Durga idol was to be immersed in a 
by-pass pool after passing through a Muslim-dominated area. On October 8, the 
Durga procession commenced. Members from several akharas (traditional physical 
training centers) present in the procession shouted anti-Muslim slogans. Violence 
started between armed marchers and Muslim youths. The police fired, killing one 
Hindu and one Muslim. The media reported 50 deaths. Official sources put the death 
toll at 48, which included 41 Muslims, three Hindus, and four unidentified persons. 
But unofficially the actual death figure might amount to 65, of whom 58 were 
Muslims and seven, Hindus. Riots also took place in the village of Riga after a rumor 
spread that a ten-year-old Hindu girl had been brutally attacked and killed by Muslims 
in Sitamarhi. 
Moreover in post-independence India the rioters had focused their communal 
attacks on the economic life of the Muslims as they had been able to establish 
themselves in traditional crafts. The rapacious commercialization created such an 
atmosphere in which communal riots had uprooted a large number of Muslims from 
even the marginalized livelihood that sustains them. Thus, the flourished power-loom 
sector of Muslims were severely undermined in Bhiwandi riots (1970), in Jabalpur 
their bidi industry was destroyed, in Moradabad riots (1980) undermined their brass-
based crafts, in the Aligarh riot (1978) Muslim importance in the lock-making 
industry was badly affected, in the Meerut riot (1987) Muslim’s livelihood from 
weaving and brassware were destroyed and Muslim weavers were affected in the 
Bhagalpur riots (1989). Even Airban Mitra and Debraj (2014) also suggested that all 
around the world there is an economic component to Hindu-Muslim riots. They also 
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asserted that the Hindu group have largely been the aggressors in Hindu-Muslim 
violence sans also that the Hindu-Muslim violence driven by instrumental, 
specifically economic considerations. 
This study throw light on the riots of Bihar, 1946-92 and social, economic and 
political processes in Colonial period and after independence in Bihar, as well as 
focuses on how economically backward Muslims began to rise in power politics. This 
study also focuses on the role of the Administration before and during, and after the 
riots. Most often riots occurred before and immediately after the elections which 
made it clear that the most of the riots were the result of elites’ and politicians’ 
manipulations that left the victims in misery with horrific results. It argues that 
specific concepts of what constituted loyal citizens, Partition violence and legitimate 
victim-hood critically influenced the establishment of post-Partition Bihar. Through 
the study of border politics, violence and refugee rehabilitation, this work explores the 
official and unofficial processes, which sought to produce national identities of 
Hindus and Muslims as Indians and Pakistanis. These conflicting attempts to 
homogenize national identities in religious terms were contested in the post partition 
period, as identities based on region, language and culture competed for primacy 
which resulted in horrific riots. 
Moreover, in case of failure in handling the riots firmly, no commissions were 
instituted to inquire into their role during the riots in handling the riots. If the 
commissions were made, there were no evidences that any official was penalized. 
Rehabilitation and relief works were often carried by the non-governmental 
communal organizations to assert their strong base among their respective 
communities. 
This study also revealed that the in pre-independent India though there was 
involvement of criminal elements in the riots but we could not find any evidence of 
their political patronage. While in post-independent India criminal elements were 
thoroughly patronized by the politicians who were engaged in igniting the riots, what 
we see in Bhagalpur riots (1989) that the two criminal groups- Sallan group and 
Ansari group- were patronised by Bhagwat Jha Azad and Shiv Chandra Jha, both 
were former chief ministers of Bihar of two factions of the ruling Congress. 
This study also reveals that no administrator has been penalized for failure in 
handling or for having played partisan roles. Rioters have largely been left 
unpunished. Criminals got active political patronage. In the Sitamarhi-Riga riots of 
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1992, the state demonstrated and testified that if there is a political will for firm 
handling of riots then control and prevention was possible. Even though, the very 
same regime (willfully?) miserably failed in maintaining a general law and order in 
Bihar. 
 
 
COMMUNAL STRIFE IN BIHAR  
1946-1992 
 
THESIS  
 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF  
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
In  
History 
 
BY 
GHAUSIA PARVEEN 
 
 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF  
DR. MOHAMMAD SAJJAD 
(ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR) 
 
 
CENTER OF ADVANCED STUDY 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH, INDIA (202002) 
2015 
Centre of Advanced Study 
 
 
Department of History 
A.M.U., Aligarh 
Date:…………   
 
 
Dr. Mohammad Sajjad 
        (Associate Professor) 
 
 
 
 
 
Certificate  
 
 
This is to certify that the thesis “Communal Strife in Bihar          
1946-1992” by Ghausia Parveen, to the best of my knowledge, is the original 
research work of the candidate, and is suitable for submission to the 
examiner for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.  
 
 
 
 
Dr. Mohammad Sajjad 
(Supervisor) 
Acknowledgements 
This work would not have been accomplished without the support and guidance of several 
people. First of all I wish to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to Dr. 
Mohammad Sajjad for his supervision of this thesis. He is a tremendous source of guidance 
and encouragement. His curiosity and interest in Bihar riots and politics has greatly 
inspired me. He generously spent time reading this work and made many useful comments 
for its improvement, and tolerated my delayed completion of thesis. Though I work hard 
but it is he who always gave me valuable suggestions and mailed many articles which 
quietly add value to this work and also encouraged me in his own way by rebuking I 
would like to thank members of the Center of Advanced Study, Department of History. 
I am indebted to Sujata Mishra, Head librarian of the Vidhan Sabha Library, Patna, who 
allowed me to study there without hassles and also thanks to The Directors and other staff 
of the Vidhan Sabha Library (Patna), A. N. Sinha Library (Patna), S. N. Sinha Library 
(Patna), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Patna), Jawahalal Nehru Memorial 
Museum and Library (New Delhi) for their cooperation. 
I am also grateful to the library staff of the C. A. S. Department of History (A.M.U.) and 
the Maulana Azad Library (A.M.U.), for their friendly and helpful attitude.  
I am indebted to my Ammi (Sajda Begum) and Papa (Haji Mohammed Nurul Bashar), 
sisters (Rukhsana baji, Husn-e-Ara baji, Shaban baji, Shaheen baji, Khurshida baji and 
Rashida, Shahida Bhabhi and Fatima Bhabhi), brothers (Badrudduza bhaiyya, 
Shamshudduha bhaiyya, Nurul Huda, Nazmul Huda, Arif, Adil and Asim, Safiullah 
Bhaijaan, Sajid Bhaijaan, Afaq Bhai, Altaf Bhai and Arafat Bhai), and niece and 
nephews (Laiba, Laraib, Kashif, Jasiya, Uzair, Umar, Huzaifa, Amaad, Ayesha, Amraan, 
Izzah, Hammad, and Khadija) for their patience, moral support, encouragement in fact all 
kind of support availed by them during the stressful period when this thesis was in 
preparation. 
I would also like to thank my seniors- Seema, Samreen, Almas and Monica and my friends- 
Majida, Nishat, Shama Falak, Shama Parveen, Mehnaz Ara, Indu, Shabenoor, Sumaiya, 
Gulshan, Smareen and Hala, and my juniors- Saba, Sana Sumaiya and Shama for their 
friendly and supportive gesture. 
I dedicate this work to my parents and to the memory of my Dadi Amma.  
TABLE OF CONTENT 
Pages   
Acknowledgment  
Chapter- 1 Introduction       1-45 
Chapter- 2 Communal Riots in Bihar: 1946-47    46-85 
Chapter- 3 Communal Riots in Post-Independence India Till 1967 86-144 
Chapter- 4 Major Riots in Bihar: 1968-1992    145-218 
 Chaibasa Riots (1970) 
 Jamshedpur Riots (1979) 
 Biharsharif Riots (1981) 
 Bhagalpur Riots (1989) 
 Sitamarhi Riots (1992) 
Conclusion         219-230 
Glossary          231-232 
Bibliography         233-258 
1 
 
Chapter- 1 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this work is to provide an analysis of communal riots in Bihar1 under 
colonial administration (pre-independence) and in independent India and its 
administrative handling, role of different organizations, political parties, role of press, 
and different issues from the Hindi-Urdu controversy to the Babari mosque and Ram 
Janambhoomi controversy. This work also deals with, wherever necessary, and to the 
limit that the scope of this study permits, political uses of religion in general, to serve 
as background to the study. 
Communalism is essentially a modern phenomenon. It is not only a trend 
which transmitted from one generation to other generation but it is both a modern 
phenomenon and an ideological product. Communalism in India has a prolonged 
history. Assuming it as a problem mainly between Hindus and Muslims is misleading. 
However to some extent, in the context of communalism in India, it is essentially true. 
It is therefore, important to define communalism for the purpose of this study because 
the violent communal riots are the extreme form of communalism. It is fact that 
communalism is an ideology but riots are the violent manifestation of communal 
ideology. Hussain Shaheen, categorises communalism as “software”2 and riots as 
“hardware”.3 Communalism has been defined as fraudulent interruption of religion 
into politics. Here it is important to make it clear, why and how religion intrudes in 
politics and why they use this key to unlock the treasure of power. 
Arguably, the religion consists of the inner development of the individual, the 
evolution of this consciousness in a certain direction which is considered good but 
taking out religion in public sphere proved dangerous for the society that is according 
to Jawaharlal Nehru, inner (consciousness) and outer (society) changes and 
developments influenced each other equally.4 
                                               
1 Bihar is a landlocked territory in eastern India, surrounded by Nepal in the north, West Bengal in the 
east, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in the west, and Orissa in the south., Cf., Ghanshyam Shah, 
“Revolution, Reform, or Protest? A Study of the Bihar Movement-I”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. XII, No. 15, April 9, 1977, p. 606. 
2 Software means something that cannot be touched; likewise communalism also can not be touched as 
it is an ideology and human psychosis. 
3 Hardware is something that we can touch and feel. As riots are extreme form of communalism, it 
means human ideology of hatred is turned into practice o violence. 
4 S. Gopal and Uma Iyengar (eds.), The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru, Oxford University 
Press (hereafter OUP), New Delhi, 2003, p. 135. 
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Most people are spiritually and emotionally attached with their religion. 
Religion is the essence of a human. “No man can live without religion”, Gandhiji has 
written somewhere. “There are some who in egotism of their reason declare that they 
have nothing to do with religion. But that is like a man saying that he breaths, but that 
he has no nose.”5 
Romain Rolland in his work, Life of Ramakrishna (1929), wrote: 
“… many souls who are who believed they are free from all 
religious beliefs, but who in reality live immersed in a state of super-
rational consciousness, which they term Socialism, Communism, 
Humanitarianism, Nationalism and even Rationalism. ...the life of 
existing society, and even higher than the life of humanity as a 
whole.”6 
It is intolerance of another’s belief and religious observances which becomes a 
problem. Events and conflicts made it clear that intolerance of another’s religion was 
prevalent that often led to conflict. Passion and prejudice displace sanity and reason, 
and every kind of progress was becoming most difficult. There can be no effective 
peace in India (even in any other country which have diverse communities) till the 
spirit of intolerance is excised. A conflict frequently arises between persons of 
different faiths on the most trivial and non-essential matters e.g. blowing of the 
sankh7, music before mosques, etc.8 
The British ruled India by their ‘divide and rule’ policy as Monstuart 
Elphinstone in his minute of 14th May, 1859 stated that, “Divide et impera was the old 
Roman motto, and it should be ours”9, thus it is clear from Elphinstone’s minute that 
British Government adopted the policy of Divide and rule by switching their favours 
from Hindus to Muslims and from Muslims to Hindus, and the same policy had been 
adopted in India by those who wanted to accumulate the economic and political 
power in their hands. In these they got foreign assistance (aid). Quite often, the rioters 
are basically the agents of capitalists and feudalist groups. Communalism is a product 
of political strategy than of religious hostilities. In this context, Karl Marx was right 
who considered religion as misapprehension which eases the pain produced by 
                                               
5 Gopal and Iyengar (eds.), The Essential Writings…, p. 136. 
6 Gopal and Iyengar (eds.), The Essential Writings…, p. 137. 
7 Blowing sankh and listening sound of sankh is prohibited in Islam. 
8 Gopal and Iyengar (eds.), The Essential Writings…, pp. 138-139. 
9 Monstuart Elphinstone, minute of 14th May, 1859, cited from W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India: A 
Social Analysis, Minarva Book Shop, Anarkali, Lahore, 1943, p. 190. 
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exploitation and opperession.10 Besides, innocent masses are incapable to realize that 
the so-called leaders are often their exploiters, who used religion to keep them away 
from realizing the real issues of economic deprivation by creating the evil spirit of 
communalism.11  
V. M. Tarkunde illustrates communalism as “unprincipled politics at the top, 
identified with a collectivity at the bottom”.12 The Communalists generate differences 
among the masses by using religion and then religion is used to disguise the social 
needs, aspirations, conflicts arising in non-religious field.13 Thus, K. M. Ashraf 
(1903-62) aptly describes communalism as ‘Mazhab ki siyasi dukandari’ (political 
trade in religion).14 
Communalism is not a new thing for the people of India. Almost every person 
is aware of this notion, which is basically an ideology connected with the psyche of 
the masses. This notion can easily be understood in terms of Hindu-Muslim conflicts, 
with religion playing key role used by the elitist groups and politicians as peoples 
have emotional and spiritual attachments with their religion and as the main vamp 
economy and politics use religion as their trump card to achieve their gains. Some 
groups and parties manipulate the masses for their selfish ends by using tools like 
religion, politics, economy etc. The Hindu-Muslim communal problem therefore 
refers to the religious antagonism that exists between these two groups. 
It is time to look at some commonplace assumptions about how the Muslims 
came to inhabit India in such large numbers- after all the world’s largest Muslim 
population lives in South Asia. The notion that most of those who converted to Islam 
in medieval India did so to escape the oppressive Hindu caste system.15 
Communalism is essentially a modern phenomenon, as said by Jawaharlal 
Nehru, in his book Discovery of India, (1946) “British policy was inclined to be pro-
                                               
10 M. Haralambos and R. M. Heald, Sociology: Theme and Perspective, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, 1980, p. 460. 
11 Vinod K. Chopra, Partition Stories: Mapping Community, Communalism and Gender, Anamika 
Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 2009, p. 32. 
12 “Psychology of Communalism”, The Hindu, 24th March, 1993; cited from Chopra, Partition 
Stories…, p. 32. 
13 Chopra, Partition Stories…, p. 32. 
14 Bipan Chandra et al., India’s Struggle for Independence (1857-1947), Penguin Books, 1989, p. 413; 
also see, Chopra, Partition Stories…, p. 32. 
15 Harbans Mukhia, “Muslim Puzzle” The Times of India, 29th November 2006, New Delhi, p. 16. 
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Hindu and anti-Muslim, except in the Punjab, where Moslems took more easily 
western education than elsewhere… the Hindus had an economic advantage.”16  
Later, it was elaborated by Bipan Chandra in his Communalism in Modern 
India (1984) also mentioned by W.C. Smith17 (1943), communalism in a large measure 
sprang up from elite conflicts over jobs, business and political favours or power. The 
communal tension had its genesis under colonial rule, which fostered communalism by 
religious division that was ‘divide and rule’. Communal differences, particularly the 
differences between Hindus and Muslims, could be exploited with advantage, was 
realized quite early in the nineteenth century. W. C. Smith wrote that the most 
important fact in the Indian political situation was the division between Hindus and 
Muslims. He gave two main causes for the existence of the communal spirit of which 
this division is the outward sign. The first reason is economic. He traces everything 
back to an economic cause. The great majority of the people, both Hindu and Muslim, 
are miserably poor; but there was a wealthy capitalist class who mostly, were Hindus. 
Naturally, poor people were in conflict with the capitalists who exploit them. Thus 
there were Hindu-Muslim clashes occurred over the issue. Second reason was British 
Imperialism, with its technique of communal electorates and its “Divide and Rule” 
policy. In his zeal for “assumptions”, however, he ignores the fact that as long ago as 
the Lucknow Pact of 1916 the Congress and the Muslim League agreed on separate 
electorates as part of their plan for communal peace. It is unfortunate for Smith’s 
“Divide and Rule” theory that one who should knows one thing of the subject, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, should have stated to a Press conference on 27 September 1945 at 
Bombay that the Communal problem is not one created by the British. Mr. Smith in a 
fit of absent mindedness when he had, for the moment, forgotten that every event must 
have an economic cause had actually stumbled on one of the main reasons for the 
Hindu-Muslim division. He overlooked neither the political demands of the Muslim 
League nor its brown shirt methods of agitation. He claimed that in the 1930s the 
League initially propagated a fascist ideology with which it caught the aggressive 
frenzy and religious bigotry of the middle classes. “The Muslim League throve on 
attack. It was anti-Hindu, anti-Congress, anti-‘one free India’. It attacked the Hindu 
                                               
16 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India,The Signet Press, Calcutta, 1946, p. 342. 
17 Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis. 
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with fervour, fear, contempt and bitter hatred. It would seek out, air and emphasise the 
differences between the two communities’.”18  
Jawaharlal Nehru in his book The Discovery of India, (1946) wrote that, apart 
from religious, political and economic issues, tendency to go into past strained the 
relation between Hindus and Muslims.19 He itself, paints the British India and Afghan 
period (the period of chaos where might passed as right, where brutal bloodshed of 
kafirs who refused to be converted was the only ideal and Jizya tax was imposed on 
Hindus) as the darkest period of Indian history. Nehru believed that India was 
awakened and modernized only under their umbrella, most importantly, freed from 
the self-forged chains of slavery and superstitions. The state of unconsciousness 
awaken under the British, not under the Afghans, India recovered her lost confidence 
and stimulated up Cultural renaissance and political movement for freedom started. It 
is quite ironical Nehru on one Hand criticizes the British on the other hand favoured. 
Nehru wrote that intellectual struggle and strain of 1938 further deteriorated the 
Hindu-Muslim relation. The real problems remain problems of individual and social 
life, of harmonious living, of a proper balancing of an individual's inner and outer life, 
of an adjustment of the relations between individuals and between groups, of a 
continuous becoming some thing better and higher, of social development, of the 
ceaseless adventure of man. Nehru had foreseen that the mingling of religion with 
politics was dangerous and suicidal for a country like India with multidimensional 
cultural heritage. In the same analysis Nehru felt that the very dynamics involved in 
the process of change would facilitate further adaptation and progress. He could 
foresee that conflict was inevitable and had to be faced. 
“Till the end of the 19th century, it was the Muslims who were singled out for 
official disfavour.”20 The exclusion of the Muslims from army and the higher posts of 
administration were necessary for the safety of the British rule;21 but this policy ruined 
the Muslims. So the war of 1857 resulted in complete annihilation of Muslims, 
political power in India.22  
                                               
18 Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, p. 317. 
19 Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 341. 
20 A. K. Najmul Karim, “The Concept of Islamic Community and Modern Theories of Nationality: The 
Emergence of Pakistan”, in The Islamic Review, August, 1955, p. 9. 
21 Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 342. 
22 Sarfaraz Hussain, Hindu Muslim Conflict, Centre for South Asian Studies, Lahore, 1997, p. 21, also 
see Tariq Hameed Bhatti (Abstract), “Political Legacy of the Muslims in India: An Overview”, in 
Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 18, Issue- 2, 2011, P. 226. 
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 But C.A. Bayly23 (1998) negates with these arguments and mention that such 
riots also occurred in pre-colonial days. Bayly wrote in his book that, there is not 
much justification for the view that ‘communal conflict’ spread into countryside only 
in the twentieth century. The ‘land wars’ of eighteenth century which saw the rise of 
agrarian Sikh and Hindu peasantry against Muslim rural gentry were apparently no 
more or less ‘communal’ than the riots in eastern UP in the 1920s or eastern Bengal in 
the 1930s and 1940. 
Religious differences were more likely to become communal conflicts when 
they coincided with shift in political and economic power. Conflict between Hindu 
and Sikh peasantry and Muslim gentry or between Muslim peasantry and Hindu 
gentry did not inevitably lead to polarization on communal lines. Preconditions are 
not the same as causes. But in the context of severe crises such as those attendant on 
Mughal decline, early colonial rule or the Depression of the 1930s they provided pre-
existing lines of social fracture. 
 Whereas scholars like Sandria Freitag24 (1990) propound that taking religion 
out in the public sphere was the major cause of such strifes. Hindu-Muslim behavior 
drasticallu changed in case of violence occurred as a result of clashing religious 
festivals in Indian cities. Freitag sees the period 1880-1930 as the crucial one when 
‘religious’ conflict over the boundaries of local practice during festivals became 
abstracted to a new form of group identity in which affiliation, not practice, was the 
justification of the strife. 
Around four theories of religious Strife/riots which have been offered by Paul 
R. Brass, Asghar Ali Engineer, Ashutosh Varshney and Steven I. Wilkinson. 
Paul R. Brass (2003)25 explains such conflicts in the light of elite 
manipulation. He further elaborates that the causes of riots underlying basis in 
economic or class difference, and specific policies and political tactics persuaded by 
the central and state governments. Thus Brass explains riots as outcome of elite 
manipulation i.e. political production of violence. 
Asghar Ali Engineer links communalism to the conflict of elites of community 
and to their class interest. Communalism describe as a tool to mobilize the masses for 
                                               
23 C. A. Bayly, The Origin of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the 
Making of Modern India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998. 
24 Sandria Freitag, Collective  Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of 
Communalism in North India Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990. 
25 Paul R. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 2003. 
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or against, by raising appeal on communal lines. Engineer further explains that, “It is 
the product of formation of socio-economic causation into religious one.” Thus he 
emphasizes on the economy as strong factor behind riots. 
Ashutosh Varshney26 in his book, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindu and 
Muslims in India (2003), emphasizes on the ‘local factors’ as root cause of the riots. A 
focus on local-level mechanisms of peace and violence, supplemented by state level 
factors, makes the greatest sense. Hindu-Muslim violence in India tends not to be 
spread evenly throughout the length and breadth of a given state. Even the most 
violent states have more towns and cities that are peaceful than are violent. Moreover 
villages on the whole have very few Hindu-Muslim riots. Riots are heavily 
concentrated in some cities and towns, and the best insights are gained by focusing on 
the local-level mechanisms than on macro-level causes. In support of his finding he 
questioned that, why do some towns and cities repeatedly have riots, whereas other do 
not? This question is unanswerable if we concentrate on state-level factors alone. 
Steven I. Wilkinson (2004)27, relates the riots with vote politics. He argues 
that, riots in India are the product of incentives at the local level and the state level. At 
the local level the most important cause of riots is the intensity of electoral 
competition. Where political competition is most intense, parties that represent elites 
within ethnic groups, use anti-minority protests, demonstrations and physical attacks 
that precipitate riots in order to encourage members of their wider ethnic category to 
identify with their party and the ‘majority’ identity to rather than a party that is 
identified with economic redistribution or some ideological agenda. 
G. R. Thursby (1975)28, does not attempt to discuss the entire phenomenon of 
communalism, but rather limits his study to a brief span of 1923-28 and concentrated 
upon Arya Samaj-Muslim relations, primarly in north India. Riots in the 1920s, 
following the collapse of the Hindu-Muslim alliance during the Khilafat, Non-
cooperation movement of 1919-22, and in provocation most likely to provoke the 
riots in that period: anti-cow slaughter movement, music before mosque and 
coincidence of festival dates. There were patterns of conflict, but violence was still 
difficult to predict. Much dependent on local customs and whether it was followed or 
                                               
26 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, Yale University 
Press, New Heaven, 2002. 
27 Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004. 
28 G. R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict, and 
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flaunted, and much depended on the overall atmosphere of communal relations, 
which, in the mid-1920, was very volatile indeed. He also discusses the British 
responsibility for communal division. 
Gyanendra Pandey (1990)29, drawing on the discourse theories of Foucault has 
shown how colonial narratives about communal riots created a timeless image of 
Hindu and Muslims locked in perennial, irrational conflict. 
According to Gyanaendra Pandey (1990)30 and Mushirul Hasan (1981)31, the 
pre-existing political groups, with Hindu religious leanings, increased the feeling of 
insecurity among the Muslim community. Thus to gain Muslims over the side of 
Congress, Muslim Mass Contact program (1937-1939) was launched. K.M. Ashraf 
(1903-62) was placed to lead this movement among the Muslims. In NWFP and the 
Punjab, Muslim Mass Contact Programme was taken up by the Ahrars, the Khudai 
Khidmatgars, and the Socialist groups. This movement significantly impacted upon 
various groups in UP, Delhi, Bihar, and Bengal. Congress’ limited efforts for the 
movement resulted in its failure. Local Congress leaders showed their interested in 
Muslim mass contact until it not encroaches in their own interests. The right-wing 
elements within the Congress also opposed this movement vehemently.32 
Suranjan Das (1991)33 in his work on Bengal deals with the circumstances 
between two partitions 1905 and 1947. Bengal occupies an important position in the 
history of Hindu-Muslim divide.  This province not only has large concentration of 
Muslims but also it witnessed the first articulation of a political among these people. 
It is no wonder that in 1906 The Muslim League was born in Decca in the eastern part 
of the province, where an enthusiastic Muslim leadership had already distanced from 
the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress and was fighting for a share of 
political power- a process which ended in the partition. He further argues that the 
Bengali workers and peasants were not hostile to their Hindu or Muslim brethrens but 
all of a sudden situation changed with the partition they became hostile to each other. 
                                               
29 Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Oxford University 
Press, Delhi, 1990. 
30 Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India. 
31 Mushirul Hasan, “The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign: An Attempt at Political Mobilisation” in 
EPW, Vol. XXI, No. 52, 27 December 1986, pp. 2273-2282. 
32 B. R. Nanda, Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1995, p. 
131. 
33 Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-47, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991. 
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Thus holds that, all the outbreaks were intimately connected with developments in 
institutional politics centering on the Pakistan movement. 
On the other hand, Joya Chatterji (1995)34 disagrees with the opinion of 
Suranjan Das and claims that, it was Hindu communal mobilization on the part of the 
Bengal Congress and Hindu Mahasabha which increasingly unified in the face of 
Muslim League’s challenge and made partition inevitable. Midnapore, Kharagpur and 
Burdwan, were the Hindu-majority districts and a stronghold of bhadralok politics. In 
these Hindu-majority districts the vehement bhadralok resisted the introduction of 
qurbani (especially cow-slaughter) because bhadralok assumed the performance of 
cow-sacrifice in Hindu-dominated localities, as the symbol of Muslims’ rising status 
and their greater political influence.35 She emphasizes the communalization of Hindu 
‘bhadralok’ politics, after the Communal Award (1932), which served as the main 
impetus for Partition. The bhadralok movement was avoided by the Muslims of 
Bengal. But by 1930s-40s, bhadralok through their cultured and enlightened class, 
progress and modernity, asserted their demand for continuance to dominate Bengal 
and also partitioned Bengal. This self-perception promoted a powerful sense of 
cultural superiority over the Muslims of Bengal, who were numerically superior. 
Under Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyaya, Hindu tribes were also politically mobilization. 
Poona Pact accelerated the communal zeals of shuddhi and sangathan. 1930s onwards 
Hindu Mahasabha became very active in organizing the campaign among Hindus for 
the partition of Bengal in 1946-47. Partition is generally believed to have been a 
consequence of Hindu-Muslim separatist politics in Bengal. 
Political developments between 1937 and 1947 further deteriorated relations 
between the two communities. According to Anil Seal36 and Ayesha Jalal37, 
introduction of separate electorates deprived the Muslim politicians from engaging 
with a wide electorate. After 1937 communalism acquired a popular base. With the 
growth of the national movements the Congress emerged as the dominant political 
force in the elections of 1937. In the United Provinces and in Bihar, Bengal and the 
                                               
34 Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition 1932-1947, Cambridge 
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Punjab, threatened by the Congress and the Left, various dominant groups of landlord, 
merchants and moneylenders, shifted their allegiance to communal forces.  
The Lahore Resolution of 1940 raised voice for “Pakistan”, and by 1947 
partition was accepted by the Congress. According to Ayesha Jalal (1985), Jinnah did 
not want Partition, he only wanted to preserve Muslims’ interests in the minority 
provinces of UP and Bihar by mobilizing the Muslims in the majority provinces of 
Bengal and Bihar. This was only achieved by raising the cry of ‘Islam in danger’. In 
the general elections of 1946-47 the Congress did extremely well in the Hindu 
constituencies, but it failed to substantiate its claims to represent the Muslims of 
India. The Muslim League attracted the majority of the Muslim votes at the center and 
the provinces. However, Communalism intensified in the 1940s, and restricted the 
choices for national leaders. The call for Direct Action by the League in 1946 resulted 
in riots in Noakhli which spread to the other parts of the country and proved as the 
final jerk to united India. 
Although Akhilesh Kumar (1991)38 in his work was unable to throw light on 
the political context of the riots, he put serious attempt to understand, interpret and 
expose communal riots, their roots in Bihar during the colonial period. This study 
suggests that communal riots are a perverted form of class struggle. Religion shrouds 
the real issues and communal colours were given to class conflict by vested interests. 
His work also focuses on the emerging lower castes, and the role of RSS and 
communal problem throughout the period. 
Jitendra Natayan (1992)39 in his work Communal Riots in India (A Case Study of an 
Indian State) focuses only on the Hindu-Muslim riots in post Independence Bihar. 
This is more like a report than a holistic analytical historical account.  His study is 
based on the relationships between the two communities. His study focuses on five 
major riots- Ranchi-Hatia riot (1967), Sursand Riot (1967), Jamshedpur Riot (1979), 
Biharsharif Riot (1981) and Bhagalpur Riot (1989) in post-independence Bihar. He 
illustrated the issues behind riots, crucial roles played by the politicians and political 
parties. Except these five major riots Narayan was unable to illustrate many other riots 
such as Sitamarhi riot (1959), Rampur Khas, (in Belsand of Sitamarhi Sub-Division in 
Muzaffarpur district) riot (1967), Bhagalpur Riot (1967), Chaibasa riots (1970), 
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Communal Riots in Giridih in February, 1980, Lohardagga riot (1986) and most 
importantly the Sitamarhi riot of October 1992, thus my study will incorporate all 
these riots along with the major riots in Bihar in colonial period as well as in post 
independence Bihar in the light of many unused primary sources such as police files, 
Home-Political Files, CID papers etc., to look into the similarities or differences in 
administrative handling of the riots in colonial and post-independence period. 
  
Economic and Political Background of Communal Riots in Bihar40 
Communalism is not a sudden occurrence; it grows gradually and springs up 
over the economic and political processes. Efforts for achieving political and 
economic power and resistance to colonial challenges dragged the freedom fighters 
into politics. Thus in winning the causes of their respective communities, separatist 
politics developed which the British government accelerated by introducing the policy 
of ‘divide and rule’ and provided a path for the smooth running of communalism by 
passing many Acts on communal line, such as, Act of 1909, Act of 1919, Communal 
Award(1932), Act of 1935, etc. Apart from these, we find the Muslim League 
(founded in 1906), the Hindu Mahasabha, Gorakshini Sabha, Tilak’s Ganpati festival, 
Akali Dal, Tableegh and Tanzeem etc., which served as communal agencies. As I 
would argue in my subsequent chapter, quite often, these organizations got enough 
prodding and encouragement from the colonial state. 
Communal parties and groups are those that were structured around the 
communal ideology. It was seen by the Muslim League leadership and M. A. Jinnah 
in 1937 when they were forced to put another chip of communal ideology, religion, 
militancy and extremism into their programme and propaganda or face disintegration 
                                               
40 Topographically, Bihar can be divided into three parts- North Bihar Plain, South Bihar Plain, and 
Chhota-nagpur Plateau- this division also roughly corresponds to different economic activities of the 
people. The alluvial soil of North Bihar makes the land fertile, but it is flooded annually by the waters 
of the Ganga and several other rivers, big and small South Bihar, except for a few isolated hills on the 
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and one of the richest mineral belts in India, is prone to famines, as is the barren hilly area of South 
Bihar. Bihar is rich in minerals, producing 46 per cent of the country's coal, 45 per cent of bauxite, 82 
per cent of copper and 88 per cent of kyanite. It has capital-intensive industrial units such as the steel 
complexes at Bokaro and Jamshedpur, the heavy engineering complex at Ranchi and the refinery at 
Barauni. And yet, Bihar is one of the poorest states of the .country. Its agricultural output per acre is 
lower than the all-India average. Its per capita income was Rs. 215 in 1968-69 and was estimated at Rs. 
225 in 1973-74, the lowest among all the states of the country. The average growth rate of per capita 
income was a mere 0.26 per cent from 1961-62 to 1968-69. Almost three-fourths of its population lived 
below poverty line, i.e., their per capita monthly consumer expenditure was Rs. 20 or less., Cf., 
Ghanshyam Shah, “Revolution, Reform, or Protest? A Study of the Bihar Movement-I”, Economic and 
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of the Muslim League and Muslim Communalism. It is said that even Nehru used to 
put up Muslim candidates in Muslim majority areas and Brahmins in Brahmin 
‘dominated’ areas and Yadavas in Yadva ‘dominated’ areas. Therefore he was also a 
communalist Nehru was not a pure secularist and all those who do this sort of a thing 
are communalist. 
In Gandhi’s analysis the liberals failed because their entire efforts were 
confined to the educated middle class, and extremists also failed because throughout 
in their efforts Hindu fundamentalism remained the basis of their movement and thus, 
the second major community the Muslim, were isolated from the main current of 
Indian Nationalism.41 Leaders like Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose and many others had 
opted Hinduism as the medium for their propaganda and co-relate the progressive 
actions of the militant nationalism with Hindu revivalism. During the period 1922-
1923, communal tension increased because of the ‘Shuddhi’ movements in which 
even the Congress leaders were actively participating and again made alive those 
communal issues which were buried into grave by anti-Rowlett Bill agitation, Non-
Cooperation movements specially by working class movements of that time. 
Relationship between rich and poor in the nineteenth century (in colonial 
society) Bihar were not only maintained by legal system, police forces and prisons but 
it was also maintained by a number of social institutions such as rais, rajas, taluqdars 
and zamindars these estate’s functionary body, in 1791, consisted of one manager and 
other petty officials- 3 writers, 1 podar (cashier), 6 village clerks, 10 peons and 10 
public pleaders. But this was changed by 1871-1874 when professional administration 
was introduced to Hathwa, and Europeans and Bengalis were recruited to staff the 
new bureaucracy. By 1890s Bengali occupied all the major positions. Anyhow raj’s 
principal officials usually gained rank through their families’ long-standing 
association with Hathwa.42 Victory in Battle of Plassey (1757)43 and Battle of Buxar 
(October, 1764) changed the whole political mechanism in these regions.44 Amils 
were appointed to collect outstanding balance.45 Hathuwa Raj was a zamindari 
                                               
41 Raghwa Nand Kumar, Communalism and Separatism in Pre-Independent India, Janaki, Ptna, 1990, 
pp. 33-34. 
42 Anand Yang Anand, The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793-
1920, Oxford University Press (henceforth used as OUP), New Delhi (henceforth used as ND), 1989, 
pp. 124-125. 
43 The British victory at the battle of Plassey in 1757 opened the door for the East India Company to 
become complete masters of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. 
44 Anand Yang, The Limited Raj, pp. 2-61 
45 Anand Yang, The Limited Raj, p. 63. 
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belonging to Bhumihar Brahmins which encompassed 1,365 villages, was inhabited 
by more than 391,000 people, and produced an annual rental of almost a million 
rupees. Because Hathwa was the hub, it was the seat of the raja's residential palace, 
and Hathwa and its nearby villages housed most of the key retainers of the estate. In 
addition to the estate Kachcheri (office), located in the Hathwa cluster of villages, 
were the estate manager's bungalow, the Diwan's house, the Hathwa Eden School, the 
post office, the Raj dispensary, and the temple called Gopal mandir.46 Hathwa (in 
Saran) emerged as the centre for the Company’s administration and it became more 
important during the festival of Dussehra that marked as the beginning of agricultural 
year and most importantly tenants paid the first installments of their rent.47 By the 
1840s Hathwa was described as having large "bazaars" and haats (biweekly markets). 
Fort, palace and bazaar, all the markets reflecting and exercising the power and 
authority of this great estate were thus in place by the early nineteenth century. An 
early twentieth century account describes Hathwa as an impressive standard market, 
its shops offering a range of agricultural and consumer goods and its specialists 
providing a variety of services. The presence of schools and temples further 
accentuated its centrality in the locality. Its salience and its value to the estate can also 
be quantified, the estate collected Rs. 1,400 per annum as professional tax from 
traders stationed there.48 Hathwa and its bordering villages was also the site of haats 
(periodical marketplace) and a number of temples which together control the social, 
economic, and religious networks into the farthest reaches of the great estate. 
Headquarters of raja’s assistant surgeons and the estate amla were in adjacent village 
of Gopalpur most of them were Maharaja’s fellow castemen, Bhumihar Brahmins. 
Others were, of social backgrounds that identify the estate’s important functionaries, 
Bengalis, Kayasthas and Muslims.49 
Ashok Majumdar also argues that, hats were also used to popularize the ideas 
and hat-meetings were also going on in rural areas of Kakwadip (Bengal). In Bengal 
“the work by Kisan Samities brought a few changes in the villeges. The hat-meeting 
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California Press, California, 1998, pp. 69-194. 
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helped to raise the consciousness of peasants above petty castes and communal 
issues.”50 There was nepotism in recruitment for zamindari administrative position 
this resulted in sharper distinction among different social and economic categories. 
This culture change springs from a number of sources. Urbanisation, indus-
trialisation, contact with non-tribals outside the tribal area and in the tribal village, 
social welfare agencies, missionary activities, ‘hats’ and markets, education and 
community development projects are the main sources.51 The identities of Saran’s 
creditors further explain biased pattern of money-lending as well as considerable 
village-level control, most of them were thikadars and petty maliks. In “ordinary” 
thikadari and khas system of management of large zamindars and petty maliks 
(proprietos), the actual structure of control were often diffuse and arbitrary, but this 
made little difference in basic pattern of control because most estate had accessible 
connections in the body of village controllers.52 
Saran was hard hit by famine in 1873-1874. Thus people were compelled to 
flee to elsewhere for food. Between 1889 and 1892 eighty-three raiyats (most of them 
were small tenant holders) were reported to have deserted the Hathwa indigo areas. 
This migration created economic imbalances.53 
Permanent Settlement multiplied the assets of Zamidars and ryots were 
deteriorating to a great extent. Thus in second half of the 19th century in Bihar there 
was sharp distinction between rich and poor. Zamindars were backed by the police54, 
thus exploitation prevailed.55 British effort to extend their reach to local control 
institutions can be seen in the campaign to revitalize the qanungo-patwari and 
experiment with chaukidari system.56 
The fall of Husseypur raja and the rise of Hathwa maharaja and all these 
culminated in collective violence (by the tenants) against their masters because the 
system of the local society was not shaped only by the manipulations of competent 
                                               
50 Ashok Majumdar, Peasant Protest in Indian Politics, NIB Publishers, New Delhi, 1993, p. 226. 
51 Sashishekhar Jha, “Tribal Leadership in Bihar” in EPW, Vol. III, No. 5, April 13, 1968, p. 603. 
52 Anand Yang, The Limited Raj, pp. 155-176. 
53 Anand Yang, The Limited Raj, p. 183. 
54 Aditya Prasad Jha, “Political History of Bihar”, Cf., K.K Datta (ed.), Comprehensive History of 
Bihar, Vol. III, Part. 1, K.P. Jayaswal, Research Institution, Patna, 1976, p. 191. 
55 This is fact that they employed Indians, though not on high official posts, in order to gain their favors 
and  they were very low paid employees in comparison to the English Officials, on the other hand they 
gain their supports in favor of English East India Company, because of this favourism the British were 
able to suppress the Revolt of 1857, and also upper section of society (mostly people under umbrella of 
British government) hardly looked into the deplorable condition of lower section of the society.  Cf., 
Hitendra Patel, Communalism and theIntelligentsia, pp. 28-29. 
56 Anand Yang, The Limited Raj, pp. 227-230. 
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coadjutors but also by a pattern of colonial rule determined by the policies of political 
and economic pragmatism formulated in London and Calcutta. Another great estate 
emerged on the Hathwa line was Darbhang raj. In few instances that collective action 
and violence endured beyond the typically brief lapses into violence and centered on 
issue that extended beyond village boundaries, solidarity was generated by village-
level and local controllers uniting with ordinary peasants over concerns that affected 
them generally. These type of collective action we can see in 1890s and 1920s (in 
Bihar), during cow protection movement, in which use of fundamental symbols 
fostered a sense of group identity among Hindu inhabitants, all these charged them 
with “Spirit of lawlessness” which turned into collective violence.57 
Anirban Mtra and Debraj58 (2014) in their work make it clear that all around 
the world there is an economic component to Hindu-Muslim riots. The growing 
economic tension and encounters such as an accident, an assault or confrontation, an 
isolated murder or rape etc., across members of different religious groups. These 
encounters were used by the power hungry section (the aggressors) of the society to 
take advantage of the situation and frame the situation as a religious conflict in which 
members of the other religion can be targeted, thus these situation boiled over into 
larger conflicts or riots.59 Mitra and Debraj also asserted that the Hindu group have 
largely been the aggressors in Hindu-Muslim violence and also that the Hindu-
Muslim violence driven by instrumental, specifically economic considerations.60 
By 18th and 19th centuries the social separatism between the two groups was taken for 
granted. Various conflicts of interests became apparent, which led to the social 
organizations of communal identities and modern communalism rides on various 
issues, major issues cow-slaughter, Music before mosque, Suddhi Sangathan by Arya 
Smajis and Tabligh and Tanzim, and Hindi-Urdu controversy.61 
Anti-Cow Slaughter Movement 
Since the late nineteenth century, there have been numerous movements of 
“Hindu” political mobilization which have taken a variety of forms. These include the 
                                               
57 Anand Yang, The Limited Raj, pp. 231-237. 
58 Anirban Mitra and Debraj, “Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim 
Violence in India” in, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 122, No. 4, August 2014, pp. 719-765. 
59 Mitra and Debraj, “Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in 
India”, pp. 720-721. 
60 Mitra and Debraj, “Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in 
India”, p. 722. 
61 Peter Heehs, Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism: Essays in Modern Indian History, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi, 1998, p.129. 
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Gaurakshini (Cow Protection) Sabhas formed in the 1890s, which agitated for laws 
preventing cow slaughter in India from time to time.62 Cow-slaughter was one of the 
focal reasons behind the Hindu agitation and violence against Muslims. Mughal rulers 
like, Babur, Akbar and the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar banned Cow-
slaughter.63 
By the end of nineteen century and two decades of the 20th century i.e. 1880s 
to 1917, cow was a big issue behind the communal riots. The strained relation 
between Hindus and Muslims resulted in the partition of India on communal line. The 
practice of cow slaughter by Muslims in connection with the festival Bakar –Eid (Eid-
ul-Azha)64 was common in North India throughout the 19th and early part of 20th 
century,65 and it led to friction and sometimes to Hindu-Muslim riots.66 The animal of 
sacrifice was not specified so the selection of kine (cattle/cow) as the animal of choice 
in North India since up to seven men properly share as joint patron in offering a 
camel, buffalo, or cow, and since the cost of a cow generally was lower than seven 
times that of a goat or sheep available for non-joint offering. And among the Hindus 
cow was and is an animal of great reverence. So the practice of cow protection by 
Hindus, on the other hand, has an ancient doctrinal basis in the Indian religious 
tradition.67 Anti-cow-slaughter also became a challenge for the British rule as well.68 
The earliest occurrence of a major campaign by Hindus against cow slaughter 
took place in the 1880s, when conflict over the issue became an important factor in 
                                               
62  Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, Orient Longman, Hydrabad, 1990, p. 15. 
63 Zeenath Kausar, “Communal Riots in India: Hindu-Muslim Conflict and Resolution”, in Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602000601141323, accessed on 20/01/2013, p. 
354. 
64 The festival is observed during the Muslim pilgrimage month (Zilhijjah) and commemorates the 
exemplary sacrificial acts of Abraham and Muhammad (sm), but it is binding on all of the faithful and 
not just pilgrims. It is warranted by scriptures and tradition that each adult male who can afford it 
should undertake to offer an animal sacrifice. Cf., Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, 
p.76 
65 Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, p.76. 
66 Rajendra Prasad, Autobiography, National Book Trust, New Delhi, p. 579. 
67  Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, 1975, p.76. 
68  Abolition of sati and Age of consent bill were opposed by the orthodox Hindus. Thus Act XX of 
1863 provided for withdrawal from any involvement with religious endowments, and this principle was 
repeatedly reaffirmed. In 1880, for example, Ashley Eden proposed in Bengal to place all endowments 
under the Board of Revenue, with the assistance of ‘native’ committees- the purpose was to preserve 
public trusts from fraud and mismanagement. The more senior officials at the centre, however, insisted 
that such interference was unthinkable. According to C.U. Aitchison, it would be resented sooner or 
later by the Indians, and would place an impossible burden on religious consciences of the officials. W. 
Strokes blamed the foolish bigotry of “God-fearing men” but preferred to do nothing even though the 
result would be that in ‘20 or 30 years there will be no Native endowments at all. Cf., Peter Robb, “The 
Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1919” in Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1986, p. 289. 
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communal and political life across much of British Indian. Early in 1882 news was 
received of the commencement of an agitation for the cow protection in the Punjab, 
started by Arya Samaj of Calcutta and supported by Maharaja of Benares.69 Gerald 
Barrier mentions 15 major riots of this type in Punjab between 1883 and 1891, and 
ssuch disturbances reached their sclimax in eastern U.P. and Bihar between 1883 and 
1893, the districts worst affected being Ballia, Benares, Azamgarh, Gorakhpur, Arrah, 
saran, Gaya and Patna.70 
The cow-protection movement proceeds along three main lines. First, there 
was mobilization of supporter through propaganda activities such as speeches, chain 
letters, and publication of pamphlets by establishing an organizational base viz. a 
patia (leaflet) was circulated in Shahabad in course of Hindu attacks upon Muslims in 
the district at Bakra-Eid of 1917, that was “Patia chala Gau lok se. Hindu bhai ke pas 
minti [vinat] hai ke Gau dharam jata hai. So ka kasoor hai ke dusre ke hath se marta 
hai…”71 
Voluntary associations for the purpose, and by linking already existing 
traditionalist and reformist organizations to the cause. Third, there was collection of 
signatures to be affixed to “monster” petitions, demanding legal prohibition of the 
slaughter of cows. The last was the chief strategy of the cow protection proponents.72 
Francis Robinson assumes that cow-protection was an urban phenomenon. 
John McLane assumes that it was produced by the Hindu leaders of the Congress.73 
The cow protectionists in Punjab were ‘very generally’ congressmen. The 
Gaurakshini Sabha in the Central Provinces was backed by Mahratta Brahmin 
pleaders, the same men who patronized the Congress. In U.P. the heartland of 
Aryavarta, prominent Congressmen, backed by wealthy traders, bankers and 
landowners campaigned for the outlawing of cow-slaughter as well as for the 
recognition of Devanagri as an official script in courts and government offices. Ram 
                                               
69  Prior to 1882, however, in September 1881, a dispute arose between Hindus and Muslims of Multan 
regarding the possession of a temple as well. When matters came to deadlock, the agitation was 
commenced against the sale of beef, which led to serious rioting. Cf., Syed Sifarish Husain, Partition: 
End Product of the Trend, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, p. 204. 
70  Sumit Sarkar, Modern India; 1885-1947, Macmillan India LTD., New Delhi, 1983, p. 60. 
71 Gyanendra Pandey, The Gyanendra Pandey Omnibus, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2008, p. 
283. 
72 Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, 1975, p. 77. 
73 Robb, “The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1919”, p. 
291. 
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Charan Das74 was actively involved in cow protection movement.75 Then a Gujrati 
mill owner had organized a cow-protection society in Bombay in 1893, while an 
additional aggravating factor was Tilak’s reorganization of Ganpati festival on a 
sarvajanik or community basis.76 
Anti-Cow killing agitation also become a challenge for the British 
Government so the officials of the central government in India grew alarmed at the 
extent of popular support gained by the movement, and they ordered their district 
officers to act directly but to use their influence with local Indian leaders to 
discourage it. District officers also were directed to assure Muslims that their interests 
in the situation would be safeguarded, so that they need not to take direct action 
themselves in opposition to the movement. Swami Dayanand’s pamphlet “Ocean of 
Mercy for the Cows” (Gokarunanidhih), which set forth a rationalistic, economic 
argument in support of the cause, was circulated widely. Although the cow protection 
movement of the 1880s ostensibly was a respectable effort to attain social legislation 
by making known the wishes of great number of Her Majesty’s subject in India, the 
Government of India was suspicious of it on two grounds. First, there was a suspicion 
that the movement had a seditious component. Second, it was correlated with a 
growing antipathy between the two major religious communities of northern India and 
so was likely to be a threat to the public order. Government efforts were aimed at 
halting the progress of the movement altogether. While they succeeded in eliminating 
cow agitation in a few areas, however, in many others the movement continued to 
function but in secret.77 
In 1882, a year before his death, Dayanand had set up a committee in Calcutta 
in co-operation with the Maharaja of Benares to seek all-Indian Hindu involvement in 
an agitation to prevent cow-killing.78 
                                               
74 Ram Charan Das, who served on three Congress reception committees, was actively involved in cow 
protection movement  and in all the conferences and societies which culminated in the formation of the 
Hindu Sabha, and ultimately in the All-India Hindu Mahasabha., cited from, Mushirul Hasan, 
Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1991, p. 
24 
75 Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930, p. 24. 
76 Sarkar, Modern India: 1885-1947, p. 60. 
77 Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, pp. 77-78. 
78 Religious wars had been preached among Sikhs in revenge for ‘cow-killing’ and attacks had been 
occurred in the 1970s. Most recently Kukas or Namdharis, a puritanical Sikh sect, had been involved in 
several disturbances, including rising in 1869 and 1872, partly on the same issue. They were again 
involved in late 1880s. 
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In June 1883, ill feeling between Hindu and Muslim was aroused at Jagadhari, 
Ambala district, and in the following month agitation became active in Lahore and a 
slight disturbance was reported from Kapurthala. In 1883 a serious disturbance took 
place at the time of Bakar-Eid at Delhi, Bombay and Benares which dramatized the 
“triangular” character of communal relation between Hindu, Muslim and the British 
government.79 
At Berhampur Cattle Fair in Shahabad district, Bengal, a mob of Hindu 
villagers, in April 1888, forcibly drove off Dome cattle sold by a Muslim to 
Commissariat contractor. Maharaja of Darbhanga was active in this matter by 1888 
because the Muslims as a body refused to attend the National Congress of 1886, and 
in consequence of a general impression that it was Mr. Justice Mahmud of the Northe 
West Province, High Court, who ruled that a “Brahmini Bull” is not property within 
the meaning of Indian Penal Code. By the early 1890s the British had come to 
conclusion- their way of justifying the shift in attitude- that the movement was ‘no 
longer’ aloof from politics. The movement became ‘political’ in official eyes after the 
split between the vegetarians, who favored radical tactics including preaching and the 
re-admission of converts, and the non-vegetarians, who were associated chiefly with 
educational reform and Dayanand Anglo-Vedic college. Indian newspapers published 
subscription lists headed by the leading landowners of Bihar, the Maharaja of 
Darbhanga, Hatwa and Bettiah, while Dumraon and Benares were reported also to be 
sympathetic. In Central Provinces it was supported by Maratha Brahman pleaders and 
the commercial castes. In the Punjab in 1889; rumour claimed that a Russian invasion 
of India would put an end to cow-killing; a Calcutta newspaper accused the British of 
inciting Muslims to insult the Hindu religion in order to divide and rule.80  
             In August 189081, strained relations between Hindus and Muslims 
were reported from Rajshay district and at Darbhanga a disturbance took place on the 
                                               
79 In June 1883, ill feeling between Hindu and Muslim was aroused at Jagadhari, Ambala district, and 
in the following month agitation became active in Lahore and a slight disturbance was reported from 
Kapurthala. In October 1883 a serious disturbance took place at delhi and the peace of the city was 
threatened for some days. In 1883 at the time of Bakar-Eid there were Hindu-Muslim disturbances in 
several major cities of India, including Bombay and Benares which dramatized the “triangular” 
character of communal relation between Hindu, Muslim and the British government. In 1884 the 
number of cow sacrifice at the Eid rose from 25 or 30 to 170 and in 1886 it increased between 400 and 
450. Cf., Sarkar, Modern India; 1885-1947, p. 60 
80 Robb, “The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1919”, p. 
289. 
81 On the instigation of Gopalanand Swami, a member of the Benaras Gorakshini Sabha, a riot of 
serious nature broke out on the occasion of cttle fair in the Berhampore village. On 30th March 1891 
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day of the Eid; the Hindus on this occasion being the aggressor. Ill feeling also 
manifested at Patna and Dinapur, the ill feeling between the Hindu and Muslim 
communities arising out of the cow question still continued. On the May 8th, 1891 
there was again a riot at Berahampur Cattle Fair in Shahabad district. A crowd of 
Hindus armed with Lathis attacked the butchers taking cattle for the commissariat at 
Dinapur. Then a riot occurred at Gaya on 18 July 1891, on the occasion of Eid. The 
District Magistrate reported later, that the Gyawals, have agents all over India to carry 
and propagate the issue. In December 1892, members of the Gaurakshini Sabha held a 
meeting at Nagpur, which was also attended by some of the Congress delegates and 
visitors and collections, were made on the behalf of the movement. 
 On the whole, the year 1892 may be said to have been one of little agitation 
and the movement generally was reported to be suffering for want of fund. In March 
the agitation was reported to be very active in Ballia district of NWP. In April, after a 
lull of some months, there was the recrudescence of activity in the Bombay 
presidency.  
The tension was mounting in the eastern districts of the NWP, where ill-
feeling between Hindu and Muslims was ‘acute’. Riot at the Behrampur fair had 
become virtually annual event. Trouble occurred, too, in Patna and Gaya, in the latter 
case among ‘the lower classes…assisted by the bad characters of the town. There, by 
May 1893, hardly a day passed without rioting or the threat of it. Villages of North 
India, the conflict at Basantpur in Saran (now Siwan) district in Bihar involved 
religion in particular, the symbolic significance of cow (As Hindus give reverence to 
cow and Muslims preferred cow for sacrifice on religious occasions. Moreover, the 
cow as a sacred symbol also threatened the authority of the British Raj).82 The anti-
cow-slaughter movement took a serious turn in 1893, when in Basantpur, one of the 
most fierce and well organized riots of late 19th century,83 broke out and Hindus 
attacked the Muslim villages assaulting butchers as well as low-status Hindus viewed 
                                                                                                                                       
peace was disrupted at Nurnagar (Chapra). The processions organized and led by Hindus alienated the 
Muslim community and on the other hand any act by the Muslim community was assumed by the 
Hindu community as a challenge. In 1893 Nawada, Gaya and Aurangabad became centers of 
communal antagonism. On 25th March, 1893 a trouble broke out at Katia Taur (Aurangabad). 
 
82  Anand Yang Anand, “Sacred Symbols and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in 
the “Anti-Cow Killing” Riot of 1893” in Comprehensive Studies in Society and History, Vol. XXII, 
No. 4, October, 1980, p. 578. 
83 Mohammad Sajjad, Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours, Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, p. 
90. 
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as complicit in marketing beef. Cow-slaughter movement was employed by the 
agitators both as local trade networks and powerful religious symbols to divide 
Hindus from Muslims as well as the British.84 Anand Yang Anand (1980) argued that 
the patterned behavior of the crowd show that mobilization of large numbers of 
people at Basantpur was achieved through the networks of hats (local marketing 
systems).85 
The close-up analysis of the Basantpur riot of 1893 that was based on using 
sacred symbol of cow shows that the issue of the cow divided not only Hindus and 
Muslims, but also the former from the British; it has also indicated that “communal” 
conflict is complex and does not merely reflect polarized identities. Thus sacred 
“symbol” and “sacred space”86 separated both groups with longstanding experience of 
one another, Hindus and Muslims, as well as relative strangers, the Hindus and the 
British.87 
In 1893 viceroy Lansdowne considered the agitation more dangerous than 
1857 because it supplied the whole of the disloyal elements and British insisted on 
neutrality was to have long life. In 1902 petitions on cow-protection were dismissed 
on non-interference had been made in 1888. Policy did change, in directions 
determined by identification of the cow-protection movement with politics. First the 
British began to treat Muslim festivals as occasions for special precautions. In 1894 
troops were moved for the Bakar-Eid from Faizabad to Gorakhpur, Azamgarh to 
Ballia and from Benares to Ghazipur. In Bihar they were kept in readiness at 
Bankipur where the Patna Commissioner, too, was expected to remain, in telegraphic 
communication if necessary with district officers who were also staying at their 
headquarters.88  
The issue of cow agitation receded from prominence after the early 1890s. 
Again a serious riot broke out in March 1895 in Mathurapur, a village near Sheohar, 
                                               
84 Yang, “Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the “Anti-Cow 
Killing” Riot of 1893”, p. 578; also see, Robb, “The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and 
Religious Change in India, 1880-1916”, p. 304. 
85 Yang, “Sacred Symbols and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the “Anti-Cow 
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88 Gyan Pandey, “Rallying Round the Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpuri Region, 1888-1917” in 
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on the occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr when the Muslims were intended to sacrifice a cow, a 
crowd of hundreds of Hindus from the neighbouring villages attacked the Muslims. 
This riot was an outcome of the anti-cow-slaughter agitation which was launched by 
the Gaurakshini Sabhas which was escalating in Eastern UP and Bihar by 1890s.89 
The renewal of cow agitation in this period was correlated with upsurge of inter-
communal violence, too. In January 1909, a serious riot broke out near Calcutta when 
Muslims sacrificed a cow in public and a joint police and military force fired on 
rioters in the attempt to restore order.90 
In Bihar Gaurakhshini Sabha was financed by Maharaja of Darbhanga.91 
Thursby has noted that, Hindu opposition to cow-slaughter was intense in Bihar. In 
addition to the United Provinces92, Hindu opposition to cow-slaughter was intense in 
Bihar.93  This Movement achieved a good base among the masses. Thus due to the 
cow-protection movement during the Bakra-Eid of 1911 at many places situation was 
so tense that riots took place sporadically.94 In Muzaffarpur district there was a riot in 
July 1911, when Hindus threatened to desecrate a mosque in retribution for slaughter 
of cows by Muslims. The Patna district was of the scene of two serious Hindu-
Muslim Disturbances in October 1916, during Bakar-Eid. In one village a mob of 
Hindus attempted to prevent the sacrifice despite the presence of the District 
                                               
89 L. S. S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers, Muzaffarpur, Bengal Secretariat Press, Calcutta, 1907, 
p. 33.; also see, Mohammad Sajjad, Contesting Colonialism and Separatism: Muslims of Muzaffarpur 
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94 Prasanna Kumar Chaudhary and Shrikant, Bihar Mein Samajik Parivartan Ke Kuch Aayam (1912-
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Magistrate and armed police. The Muslims, however, refrained from its performance 
due to their own numerical weakness as well as the obvious inadequacy of the police 
assigned to protect them. In another village Hindu crowds attempted to kill Muslims 
and to rob their homes but were forced to withdraw when met by gunfire from posted 
military police. Rioting, looting, and murder were widespread in the districts of 
Shahabad, Gaya and Patna during Bakar-Id season in September 1917. The 
September 1917, in Shahabad riot was one of the ferocious incidents of communal 
riots that exploded over the issue of cow-slaughter.95 In Shahabad district in October 
1917, for instance, the immediate issue was cow-protection. Crowds of up to 50,000 
Hindu peasants attacked Muslim villages. They were apparently influenced by 
widespread rumours that British rule was collapsing. Rioting crowds shouted Angrez 
ka raj uthh gaya and German Ki Jai.96 
Numerically dominant Hindus attacked Muslim villages and engaged in 
wholesale looting and destruction of property, desecration of mosques, and theft of 
cattle. 
Unlike, Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) and Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928), 
Gandhi wanted to win over the Muslims with love and started the best way and the 
only way to save cow is to save Khilafat.97 Gandhi succeeded to some extent in 
enlisting Muslims support in favour of cow protection. Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) 
and Shaukat Ali (1873-?) renounced eating beef. The All India Muslim League had 
already passed a cow-protection resolution in 1919. Nizam of Hydrabad also stopped 
cow-slaughter. In Bihar, Gandhiji’s wish attracted support and many Muslims of 
Phulwarisharif gave up eating beef. However Maulana Abul Mohasin Mohammad 
Sajjad (1880-1940), the Naib Amir-i-Shariat, Bihar and a resident of Gaya, did not 
subscribe to the decision of the Muslim League. He asserted that he had joined Non-
cooperation only for the sake of Khilafat. He also demanded separation of Khilafat 
from Non-cooperation. In a sense, the cow-Khilafat formula provided an opportunity 
to come to the front. Maula Mohammad Abdul Bari Firangi Mahal (1878-1926), 
banned the cow-slaughter in Firangi Mahal on Bakra-Eid festival for the Hindu-
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Muslim unity and appealed to the Muslims also to abandone coslaughter.98 A 
movement seeking segregation of Khilafat and Non-cooperation was started by some 
Ulema in Bihar. This movement also considered cow-slaughter as Muslims’ religious 
right. Maulana Sajjad issued a fatwa declaring that Muslims should not make any 
compromise on their right in the matter of cow-sacrifice merely to further Hindu-
Muslim unity.99 In fact, relations between the two communities badly strained in 
Bihar as elsewhere in India in the first half of 1923 and gone down to a lamentable 
extent in 1924.100 
Process of political evolution expressed itself along diverse lines, viz. (1) 
closer attention of the Government to the local problems of Bihar, (2) official 
recognition of Hindi as the language of Bihar, (3) growth of press and public platform 
in Bihar, (4) extension of opportunities for employment of Biharis in Bihar, and (5) 
eventual separation of Bihar from Bengal. 
After the indigo disturbances of 1860 in Bengal101, a protective wing was 
formed in North Bihar under the European managers of the Bettiah estate. Whch 
compel the ryots for indigo cultivation. Europeans’ favoured policies for 
aboriginals102 created suspicion among the Zamindars and non-aboriginal populace.103 
The turn in the British attitude towards the Muslims was to a large extent the 
result of the Wahabi104 trials which took place at Patna in 1865 and 1870-71. The 
Wahabi revealed to the British that there was a general feeling of hostility towards the 
British rule among the Muslims masses of India and that this feeling had been largely 
fanned by their religious teachers. W. W. Hunter in his book Indian Musalmans: Are 
They Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen (1871) explored about the 
reason behind the Muslims’ resentment against the Britishers. Exclusion of the 
Muslim intelligentsia from higher ranks in Government of their country owing to the 
induction of the European personnel and decline in their strength and influence in 
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public services owing to the substitute of English for Persian as the official language 
were the main factor behind the discontentment among the Muslims. Hence the 
British Government started favouring Muslims to win-over the educated sections of 
the Indian Muslims to the side of British-raj. 
In 1859 Bihar had no political organization or a college of its own. An 
educated middle class, which had sprung up elsewhere with the growth of English 
education was yet unborn in Bihar. 
In last three decades of 19th century different caste sabhas began to organize, 
to take up their grievances. The Kayasthas started a new trend by organizing caste 
associations which led the formation of other caste organizations- Pradhan Bhumihar 
Brahman sabha was formed in 1889 at Patna it was followed by Surajpuri Brahman 
Sabha (1905), Rajput Sabha (1906), Revani Kahar Sabha (1906), Marwari 
Youngmen’s Assiciation (1907), Khatri Youngmen’s Association (1907), Dusadh 
Sabha (1911), Gope Jatiya Mahasabha (1912), Keot Sabha (1912), Kurmi Sabha 
(1912) etc.105 
It is true that behind the communal problems in India, some economic reasons 
could always be traced, but the economic factor behind communalism has been over 
emphasized. The leadership of the Indian National Congress thought that economic 
programmes for mass uplift would appeal to Indian Muslims and therefore they 
minimized the Hindu-Muslim concordat for the solution of the cultural problem. 
Indian political parties based primarily on economic programmes, such as Bengal 
Proja Party, the Punjab Unionist Party, the Indian Communist Party, also made the 
same mistake by minimizing importance of the cultural problem. It is true, behind the 
demand for all religious, political or cultural rights is the economic cause, but, 
whenever out of such an economic background the demand for those rights arises, it 
gains its own momentum. Such forces become more powerful than the economic 
forces which created them. Therefore, the calculation which is based on economic 
determinism might be wrong for political solutions. Thus the Indian communal 
problem became an acute cultural problem and the Indian political leadership failed to 
solve such a cultural problem, because they overemphasized the economic factor. 
Beni Prasad says: 
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They (the Congress leaders) expected their economic 
programmes to rally the Muslim masses to their political creed ant thus 
to create a nation-wide party above all sectarian and 
denominationalism. They were not Marxists, but like many other 
socialists and non-socialists, they had been influenced by the 
materialist conception of history - the economic determinism… 
Unilinear ways of thinking may wrap the Indian socialist’s judgement 
on internal as well as external affairs. It was an over-simplification of 
the Maxian analysis to conclude in 1937 that an appeal to the economic 
interest would under all circumstances push aside the appeal in the 
name of religion, culture or politics.106 
Underlying economic cause behind the Hindu-Muslim riot was not the issue of 
cow slaughter. The political development of economy in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century endangered the communal peace.  
The frequency of riots increased during the 1920s and every province was 
affected, Bihar and Bengal being the worse victim.  We see that there were frequent 
riots occurred in Bihar. On 21 November, 1912 in Bengusarai village, in October, 
1917 riot did take place in Shahabad etc. The Hindus concerned in these disturbances 
are a very strong community, an official reported on 29th September 1917, the day 
after first out break of rioting. Thus the Bakra-Id riot of Shahabad and Gaya show 
more than anything else the extreme we have come for want of popular responsibility 
and popular Government. 
New militant organizations of Hindus-- shuddhi and Sangathan-- launched by 
the Arya Samaj and Tanzeem and Tabligh among the Muslims added to the scale of 
communal violence.107 In Bihar it was Jagat Narain Lal (1896-1966) who pitched the 
Suddhi campaign.108 He was a member of both the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha. 
Petty incidents on the occasion of the Bakr-Id and Ran Navmi festivals, calculated to 
provoke the outbreak of the violent disturbances in Patna, Bhagalpur, Shahabad and 
also at several places. The question of cow slaughter was giving way to the problem 
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of music before mosque. In rural areas communal riots were chiefly organized and 
financed by the land lords and zamindars for their own interest. 
Peasant and zamindars relation between 1921- 1925 were strained out. There 
were instances of encounters (violent and non- violent) between peasants of the 
Yadava, Kurmi, and Koiri castes and their zamindars who were upper-caste Hindus 
and Muslims.109 Hetukar Jha (1977)110 also focused on strained relation of peasant 
and zamindars. He argues that it was the economic and social oppression rather than 
economic prosperity that led the peasants of lower castes in general and of the Yadava 
caste in particular to rise in revolt against the upper castes and Muslim zamindars. 
   Later the zamindars and landlords were replaced by the politically ambitious 
groups who played the same role to make their political fortunes out of communal 
tension. Ministers were appointed on communal lines. Throughout the period of 
dyarchy in Bihar, of the two ministers, one was selected from the Muslim community 
and other from the Hindu community. Under such arrangement, Muslim Minister was 
expected to serve the Muslim interests while the Hindu Minister was that of Hindus. 
In the 1920s the leading Bihar Congressmen were also members of the Hindu 
Mahasabha (HMS). As many Congress leaders were also the member/leader of Hindu 
Mahasabha, much later Rajendra Prasad wrote retrospectively that he found nothing 
wrong in joining the HMS session in 1922, for even the Muslims of Gaya had found 
anything wrong in it.111 Jagat Narain Lal, a leading Congrss worker in Bihar, was 
inclined towards Hindu sangathan and took part in the activities of Hindu Mahasabha. 
As there was no ban against a Congressman (till 1938) being a member of the 
Mahasabha; quite a number of Congressmen were actually its members and its 
activities were not considered unconstitutional.112 It is ironical that on one hand Nehru 
criticized the Hindu Mahasabha that the comjunal organizations must be treated 
equally whether it was Hindu, Muslim or Sikh,113 on the other hand Congress leaders 
were engaged in cultural-cum-communal activities. 
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Mass movement in Bihar after the 1920s, nationalist and peasant, raised on the 
crest of waves created largely by rich peasants and small landholders, in short, the 
village-level controllers. And although an active Kisan Sbha sprang up to champion 
the rights the raiyats, even instigating a “subaltern rebellion” in 1942, the peasant 
movement, subordinated to the elitist-dominated nationalist movement, was 
ultimately mitigated by the interest of the Congress. From around 1919, the 
membership of the Congress broadened. Merchants and businessmen, particularly 
Marwaris began to participate in the movement. Rich peasants and small landlords 
were also associating with the Congress.114 Peasants’ emergence as political force 
came in the wake of a worldwide rise of rich peasants in the late nineteenth century 
due to development of the markets and an international economy probably is not 
coincidental. In the mid 1920s the Arya samaj campaigned to make Hindus give up 
participating in Muharram procession, which were subsequently reported to be held 
on a much reduced scale. The Gaya Hindu Mahasabha tried to stop the Hindus from 
joining Muharram activities and encouraged to plan taking out Akhara during 
Dussehra festival.115 
There were a number of riots have had takes place in Bihar viz. Aurangabad 
riot (July 25, 1937), Nagarnausa (in Nalanda district) riot (September, 1937), Rajpura 
(in Giridih) riot (November 9, 1937), Karanpura (Hazaribgh now in Jharkhand) riot 
(October 20, 1937), Khairatia (West Champaran) riot (November 30, 1937), Lalpura 
(Muzaffarpur) riots (November, 1937), Chakbayas riot (December, 1937). 
 After 1937, British shifted from balanced to uncontrolled communalism. They 
encouraged total communal division, gave virtually open support to the Muslim 
League especially in its anti-Congress role and tolerated its efforts to acquire a mass 
character.116 The coming of Jinnah in Bihar caused considerable communal tension in 
the province. A communal riot that did take place on 7th May 1939 in Gaya was 
consequent to the Jinnah’s arrival.  In Bihar a League Committee set up under S.M. 
Shareef reported in March, 1939 that local Muslims suffered such atrocities in the 
hands of the Congress Ministry that they would “have to decide soon whether they 
should migrate from this province or face annihilation. League as the sole 
representative of the Muslims, that Congress should only speak for Hindus, that 
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‘Vande mataram’ as national anthem must be dropped, that Urdu must be adopted as 
the national language of India and that Coalition Ministries must be formed in 
Congress ruled provinces. 
Hindu-Muslim political rivalry became acute after the 1937 election when first 
Krishak Praja Party and the Muslim League particularly became the mouthpiece of 
Muslim separatism.117 The competition for government jobs, desire for economic 
superiority and for political power became the most important factors of this rivalry. 
The tension in the agrarian scene which had predominantly Muslim peasants and 
Hindu zamindars became a catalyst in this communal politics because of ‘reckless and 
irresponsible speeches delivered by Muslim League leaders in huge gathering 
attended by illiterates’. Muslim League propaganda against Congress misrule in Bihar 
and UP particularly vitiated the situation. The two Parties started to drift apart on the 
communal issue. In Bengal this drift was more pronounced as Muslims were mainly 
peasants but the zamindars supported by the Congress were mostly Hindus.118 
Likewise in Bihar, gradual development of communal feelings, mutual 
misunderstanding and suspicion took Congress and Muslim League in Bengal poles 
apart. Muslim League propaganda against Congress ‘as a Hindi organization’ started 
to catch the imagination of the rural Muslim poor and the hiatus between Hindus and 
Muslims increased. The economic causes of rural tension only added to this drift, 
aided by the superior attitude of caste Hindus towards Muslim peasants. 
Communalism started to raise its ugly head in the rural Bengal and political parties 
began to pander to this dangerous trend.119 Even in case of Namsudra and Muslim 
sharecroppers against Bhadralok jotedars and zamindars of Jessore in early 20th 
century, the provincial Congress remained hostile and tried to give a communal 
colour to the peasants.120 Music before mosque was another cultural issue that 
embittered the relation between Hindu and Muslim. 
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Music before Mosques and Communal Riots 
Music before mosque also played a crucial role in igniting the riots. Specifically, 
“music before mosque riots” arose following the deliberate display of a musical 
procession, usually accompanying a Hindu festival, in front of a mosque, causing 
offense and, very often, resulted in riots.121 This issue also assumed as a phenomenon 
developed during the Colonial period, possibly because of change in economy and 
society. However, the occurrence of music before mosque riots has not been only 
limited to the colonial era alone. Although it was formally ended in 1947, this kind of 
communal violence still occurs in India, though far less frequently.122 
Early analyses of music before mosque riots were dominated by the “fundamental 
incompatibility”, that the “Hindu religion,” understood as a monolithic belief system, 
required the musical sound along with prayer in order to appease the gods, whether it 
is in form of blowing Sankh or bhjan-kirtan etc. Hindus’ religious rituals obliged 
them to perform the prayers with musical instruments, and it is in direct conflict with 
“Islam,” again understood as a monolithic belief system, which asserts the moral 
indecency of music and thereby forbid its performance Islam.123 
Theory of “fundamental incompatibility” fails to recognize the 
centuries before colonial period when countless festival processions occurred 
seemingly without incident. These riots, driven by music, had a generative effect on 
the way in which these communities were being formed or reformed. Religious 
affiliations, unprivileged as markers of social identification before the period I'm 
interested in, became the basis for the production of boundaries defining and 
separating political communities. Music, or new and differing attitudes towards it, 
came to represent a point of differentiation between “Hindu” and “Muslim” 
communities, as well as a point upon which these identifications expanded to become 
national communities of shared political ideas, and not just local communities of 
shared theological beliefs.124 These riots laid the foundation for the imagining of a 
national, politicized community of Hindus. Through this phenomenon, boundaries 
were generated and reinforced. Communal riots involving music represent a kind of 
effervescence, generating and shaping new forms of social identifications. Music 
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before mosque violence was therefore a popular, “All India” phenomenon at a time 
when few cultural forms infused the entirety of India's vast geography. Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak was a central figure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalist 
movement. By most contemporary accounts, he was also a Hindu fundamentalist with 
strong anti-Muslim tendencies. Tilak's determined to bring the Hindu community 
together and provide a sense of Hindu solidarity. Tilak invented the Ganapatifestival 
in Maharashtra that also alienated the Muslims from his programmes.125 Songs 
written for Ganpati Utsav urged Hindus to boycott the Muharram, in which they had 
freely participated before (the reformist journal Sudharak even commented in 1898 
that Muharram had been much more of a national festival than Ganapati), and some of 
them were openly inflammatory: ‘What boon has Allah conferred upon you/That you 
have become Mussalman today? Do not be friendly to a religion which is alien…. The 
cow is our mother, do not forget her’.126 
Blowing shankh127 and noise of  arti deliberately preferred to perform 
at the time of azan and namaz create tensed atmosphere.128 Bettiah in Bihar and 
Orissa was the scene of communal violence associated with a Mahabir Dal procession 
in August 1927. the procession had been organized three years earlier when the 
Hindus following the promotings of Arya Samaj speeches, began to boycott Muslims’ 
Muharram celeberations. The procession angered the Muslims because the symbols 
used in the procession misrepresented the Muharram and other respects. Although 
authorities insisted to change the symbols, Muslims remained angered. Processionists 
turned into a lane where a mosque was situated, leaving the main route, but their path 
were blocked by the armed Muslims thus fighting started. 
Government-ordered restrictions on procession grew increasingly. By 1920s local 
societies, affiliated with Arya Samaj, were engaged in celebrating the anniversary of 
the founding of organization and anniversaries of its prominent leaders by musical 
procession through towns. Between 1923 and 1928 there were a number of cases 
when permissions were not granted to take out processions even many processions 
were halted by the local officials.  
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Communal formation and conflict are not merely the reflection of cultural ‘givens’ 
and ‘primordial sentiments ‘. This perception was shaped by the belief that the newly 
created Indian National Congress, composed largely of Western-educated, “middle 
class” Hindus was recruiting religion to generate popular support. Other observers, 
however, claimed to see the hand of various Hindu orthodox and reformist 
organizations such as the Sanatan Dharma and the Arya Samaj behind the agitation. 
Still others blamed the upwardly mobile trading castes, especially the Marwari. 
Having reaped the economic benefits of Pax Britannica, they were said to be 
bankrolling the cause of Hindu orthodoxy to also enhance their social status. Its 
beginnings lay in the early 19th century efforts by orthodox Hindu and Muslim 
religious groups to develop a “community” identity in the face of the growing 
reformist movements within their respective religions. Subsequently, this emphasis on 
community identity entered the competitive arena of the British Raj (“rule”) and 
linked up with the drive for preferment by Hindu and Muslim elites, to generate 
religious tensions and “the communalization of culture and politics.”129 
In view of Sandria Freitag Hindu-Muslim conflict was not unprecedented. Although 
dispute may have increased in number and intensity towards the turn and of the 
century, they were not originally inter-communal, but grew out of competition within 
the same religious community.130 By 1920s another factor for communal riots was 
suddhi-sangathan and tanzim and tabligh movements started structuring in Indian 
society. 
Shuddhi- Sangathan and Tabligh-Tanzim 
From 1925, another important cause of the communal riots was religious conversion, 
as Arya Samaj launched a Shuddhi movement (purification of converted Hindus). 
Major riots took place in 1925 in Calcutta and in 1928 in Bombay and in 1930 in 
Kanpur. In all these riots a large number of Muslims were killed and their property 
was destroyed. Schermerhorn, on the basis of the Indian Statutory Commission, listed 
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112 communal riots from 1923 to 1927, and pointed out that the number increased in 
the 1930s. By 1945 riots over these issue reached to its peak point.131   
Reform movements such as the “Wahabi” Movement132 among Muslims and Shuddhi 
among Hindus with their militant overtones made the role of religion more vulnerable 
to communalism. Reforms, at times, were seen as a process of insulating one 
community from the influence of another religious community. At long last, Ayub 
Khan leaves the sweeping generalizations of the usual secularist discourse behind to 
get down to specifics. It is about the murder of Swami Shraddhananda (1856-1926), a 
leader of the movement for Hindu Sangathan (self-organization) and Shuddhi 
("purification", conversion to Hinduism), applied on a sizable scale to the Malkana 
Rajputs, a community that had been islamized under duress in centuries past but 
wanted to return to its Hindu roots. The Muslims on their part intensified their 
perennial effort of Dawah, missionary activities. Hindu militant organisations, helped 
in constructing and negotiating a Hindu identity in the region, in the specific context 
of the sangathan (community defence) and shuddhi (reconversion from Islam to 
Hinduism and reclamation of lower castes into the Hindu caste hierarchy) 
movements.133 
The Arya Samaj leader Shradhhananda (1856-1926) became active in 
Shuddhi work only after discovering “Dai-e-Islam”, the so-called ‘secret’ pamphlet of 
Khwaja Hasan Nizami (1879-1955), which called upon Muslims to engage in Dawah 
work.134 It doesn't mention the fact that the activities of Khwaja Hasan Nizami and 
other protagonists of the Tabligh and Tanzim movement were a reaction to the 
massive conversion efforts of Arya Samaj. Swami Dayanand assumes it as the 
Muslim reaction of the day was not merely against the shuddhi and sangathan 
movements, but rather was part of a sinister plot hatched years earlier.135 The years of 
the Khilafat- Non-Cooperation agitation (1920-22) marked a brief phase of Hindu-
Muslim unity. There was a resurgence of communalism post-1922. The League once 
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again became active; the Hindu Mahasabha was revived in 1923. The shuddhi and 
Sangathan movements among the Hindus and the tanzeem and tabligh movements 
among the Muslims, for communal consolidation and religious conversion emerged 
forcefully. The formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925 was 
another landmark in communal politics. The Congress efforts to negotiate with Hindu, 
Muslim, and Sikh communal leaders in the form of the Indian National Pact (1923), 
the C.R. Das Pact (1923), and the Nehru Report (1928) proved a complete failure. By 
negotiating with communal leaders, the Congress legitimized their politics and made 
them respectable. Likewise, Gandhi’s ‘Ram-Rahim’ approach and his initiative in the 
form of fasts did not improve deteriorating communal relations. His mentor, Madan 
Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946), was the moving spirit behind the Hindu revitalization 
movement. He was connected with the Prayag Hindu Samaj, the Sanatan Dharm 
Mahasammelan and the Suddhi Sabha, which enabled him to forge close links with 
those influential groups who share his undaunting enthusiasm for suddhi, sngatha, 
Hindi, the cow and the Hindu sabha.136 
Hindi-Urdu Conflict 
The Hindi-Urdu controversy became a community based issue in the later half 
of the 18th century. In 1837, the Government of India replaced Persian, which also 
known as Hindustani, with Urdu as court language.137 Kayasthas, Khtaris and 
Kashmiri Brahmans were the major Hindu communities having strong ties with 
Urdu.138 The most immediate reason for the controversy was believed to be the 
contradictory language policy in North India in the 1860s. While the then government 
encouraged both Hindi and Urdu as a medium of education in school, it discouraged 
Hindi or Nagari script for official purposes. This policy gave rise to conflict between 
students educated in Hindi or Urdu for the competition of government jobs, which 
eventually took on a communal form.139 Several Hindi movements were formed in the 
late 19th and early 20th century such as Nagari Pracharini Sabha formed in Banaras in 
1893, Hindi Shifty Sammelan in Allahabad in 1910, Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar 
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Sabha in 1918 and Rashtra Bhasha Prachar Samiti in 1926.140 The Hindi movements 
had strong anti-Muslim overtones which accelerate the process of the identification 
language and religion in which several organisations and Hindi press played crucial 
role.141 Shyamsundar Das, one of the founders of the Nagari Pracharini Sabha of 
Benaras, wrote about the situation of Hindi in early 1890s: 
Hindi’s condition was very bad at this time. That it had even survived 
was a cause for surprise. ...To even utter the name of Hindi was 
considered to be a crime. …Hindi speakers were considered to be 
yokels.142 
The supporters of Hindi responded to this situation in inconsistent ways. They 
invoked the literary heritage of sister languages like Braj Bhasha and Avadhi and 
Bihari dialects like Maithili, Magahi and Bhojpuri.143 
The caste-ridden social structure offered opportunities to the British to 
provoke non-Brahmins against Brahmins and forward castes against backwards and 
vice-versa, thus, this controversy was encouraged in 1881 when Hindi in Devanagari 
script replaced Urdu in Persian script as the official language which created 
communal bitterness between Hindus and Muslims in U. P. and Bihar.144 They 
submitted 118 memorials signed by 67,000 people to the Education Commission in 
several cities. The proponents of Hindi argued that the majority of people spoke Hindi 
and therefore introduction of Nagari script would provide better education and 
improve prospects for holding Government positions. They also argued that Urdu 
script made court documents illegible, encouraged forgery and promoted the use of 
complex Arabic and Persian words. 
By that time Muslims were far behind than that of other communities of 
Bengal in respect of English education and other privileges, but in Bihar (before 1912 
Bihar was Part of Bengal presidency) condition of Muslims was not as bad as in 
Bengal. In view of privileged position of Muslims in Bihar in order to safeguard 
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Muslims’ interests in general, G. Campbell (1871-74) did not accept the view of 
Government of India for imparting higher education to the Muslims through their own 
languages, namely, Persian, Arabic and Urdu.145 
The Muslim intelligentsia became more conscious of the educational and 
political backwardness of their community and they became more determined in 
asserting their claims. The Government thus succeeded in inducing them to think that 
the backwardness of Muslims was due to the competition of the Hindus, particularly 
of the Bengalis, and that the British Government was anxious to help them if they put 
forward their claims against the Hindus.146 
Pro-Turkish foreign policy of the British Government under Disraeli, which 
was intended on one hand to check the Russian designs and on the other hand to 
project the British Government as the protector of Islam in the eyes of Muslims. In 
this projection of Britishers was popularized by Nawab Ameer Ali of Barh (1810-
1879) with his National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta which had several 
branches in Bihar. Like Sir Syed Ahmed (1817-1898) of Aligarh and Abdul Lateef 
(1823-1893) of Calcutta were of the opinion that, “he was never tired of expounding 
the British advantages of British rule in India”147 among his co-religionists and 
inculcating upon them the shaking off their old exclusive attitude and taking 
enthusiastically to modern education.148 The British Government also made him a 
Nawab and a companion of the newly created order of the Indian empire. Ameer Ali 
died in November, 1879. After his death a memorial was submitted to the 
Government in 1882 by National Mohammedan Association, in which it was stated 
that, they (Muslims) looked to the British sovereign as the protector of Islam.149 All 
these measures tended to sharpen all those latent social and political forces which led 
to the shaping of Bihari People into a distinct political entity and eventually to 
creation of Bihar as a separate province. 
The Muslims along with few Bihari Hindus of Kayastha caste held all the 
offices to which access was assured by the knowledge of Urdu and Persian, the 
Bengali immigrants monopolized all those offices for which English was required. 
The All India Kayastha Conference was inaugurated about the same time as the 
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Indian National Congress.150  Thus non-teaching of Hindi was assumed as reason for 
the backwardness of Bihar. In 1862, E. T. Dalton proposed an outright substitution of 
Hindi, whether written in Nagree or Kaithi Script and Urdu in Persian script151 in 
Lohardagga (the present districts of Ranchi and Palamau) and Hazaribagh. The 
measure led to the introduction of Hindi, both in the courts and schools, in Chota 
Nagpur. But the condition of other parts of Bihar continued to remain same on the old 
footing.152 
On 30 September 1872 Hindi was introduced as medium of instruction in 
Bihar by Director of Public Divison and Commission of Patna and Bhagalpur. In 
April, 1874 Government of Richard Temple, directed that knowledge of Hindi should 
be compulsory for the post of police officers and amals in the courts. This created 
bitter controversy among the Persian-educated people, mostly Muslims and 
Kasyasthas, they submitted several petitions in the name of people of Bihar and 
requested to revoke the introduction of Nagri script in the Government offices. The 
cause of Hindi was championed by the Bihar Bandhu153. It also presented to the 
Government, in April, 1875, what they called a Memorial from the people of Bihar, 
praying that Hindi in Nagri script might be exclusively recognized as the court and 
official language.154 To promote Hindi, Maharaja of Darbhanga announced a number 
of annual cash prizes ranging from Rs. 100 to Rs. 200/- for best books in Hindi on 
different subjects.155 
By 1880 both Nagri and Kaithi were promoted though, Ashley Eden, ordered 
the exclusive use of Nagri or Kaithi.156 With all these on going process Persian-
educated intelligentsia continued to oppose it. Formidable opposition came from the 
National Mohammedan Association in their famous memorial to the Viceroy in 1882 
made the vacation of Hindi as official language in Bihar a special grievance. 
Opposition to Hindi was going on, in 1891 during his visit to Arrah, Sir Charles 
Elliot, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, pleaded that the Urdu language 
written in Persian script should be recognized as the court language in Bihar. There 
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was also a suggestion from official quarters to introduce Roman script for writing 
Hindi in Bihar offices.157 
As Bihar was educationally backward and the result was that the Biharis, with 
the exception of the Mohammedans, were virtually excluded from the public services 
in their own area. Advantage was taken by Bengalis (English-educated). As before the 
advent of Bengalis such offices in Bihar were mostly held by Muslims, therefore, they 
raised first the slogan of ‘Bihar for Biharis’. The British Government and the Anglo-
Indian Community were also not too happy with Bengalis’ this advancement.158 
S. W. Fallon, the then Inspector of School for Bihar, proposed to start a 
vernacular newspaper with initiative of Government in Bihar so that they find clue to 
know the public mind. And that newspaper might serve as organ for expressing the 
legitimate feelings, wishes and opinion of the more sensible, well-disposed and 
influential portion of every section and interest of every community. But Fallon’s 
proposal did not meet to an approval.159 
In 1868 the first beginning of social and political consciousness appeared 
among the Muslim aristocracy, when in 1868, some leading Muslim gentlemen of 
North Bihar formed an association, Bihar Scientific Society, at Muzaffarpur. This 
association also started a bi-monthly journal, Akhbarul-Akhiyar in Urdu. It was a non-
political body with the aim of diffusion of knowledge, which in effect meant 
popularization of European education. Imad Ali, a subordinate Judge employed at 
Tirhut (Muzaffarpur), was the Founder-Secretary of this organization. Though 
members of this organization were Muslims, some leading Hindu zamindars of North 
Bihar provided financial aid. Though this organization and its journal had little 
influence it had tendency to catch the eyes by presentation of a different point of view 
from the Bengalis. In 1870 Government declared new education policy in their own 
vernacular language which was opposed by Bengalis when this Society held a 
meeting in July, 1870, to present an Address of thanks to Governor General at 
Muzaffarpur. The enthusiastic Secretary forwarded with the Address “the entire 
proceeding of the meeting with a pointed reference to the difference of the opinion 
expressed by the Bengali Baboos.”160 
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The National Mohammedan Association of Ameer Ali (1849-1928), which 
also wanted to bring the Muslims closer to British rule, established its branches in 
several district and towns of Bihar. Likewise, the educated Kayasthas of Bihar also 
showed their capacity for organization during this period. The pioneers among them 
were two public-spirited men from the district of Shahabad, Munshi Peary Lal and 
Harbans Sahay. The former, an inhabitant of village Gopalpur in pargana Sasaram, 
was a veteran social reformer. He had served for sometime as a Munsif in the North-
Western provinces, but had given up this job to devote himself completely to the task 
of creating public opinion for eradication of some evil social practices among 
Kayastha community in particular and Hindus in general. He had moved from place to 
place in North-West provinces, enlisted the support of all sections of people including 
the Lt. Governor of N.W.P., and established an organization for propagation of his 
ideals named, the Sudder Anjuman-i-Hind. From the N.W.P., the movement gradually 
penetrated into the district of Shahabad, where Harbans Sahay, a young and brilliant 
lawyer of Arrah seriously took up its cause and established a branch of the Sudder 
Anjuman-i-Hind at Arrah in 1868. In 1872 Government of Bengal instructed the 
Director Publi Instructor and Commissioners of Patna and Bhagalpur that no student 
would be taught in Urdu until he acquired the complete knowledge in Hindi, thus 
Urdu impounded only to the Muslim maktabs.161 Movement for Hindi was backed by 
Dalton, Campbell, G. A. Garrierson (the then Collector of Patna) and the Inspectors of 
School Bhudeb Mukhopadyay (1827-94) who came to Bihar in 1877 to join his 
services; voluntary associations like the Arrah Nagri Pracharni Sabha, Lakhiasarai 
Hindi Sabha, Bhagalpur Hindi Sabha, the Kharagvilas Press; the Hindi newspaper 
Bihar Bandhu (1875); and the financial and other kind of support to the cause of 
Hindi was provided by the rajas of Darbhanga, Gidhaur and the Banaili Raj etc. thus 
movement for Hindi achieved phenomenal success. This movement was not only a 
movement for language, it was an anti-Urdu cum anti-Muslim movement. Hindi’s 
Supporters showed their communal bias while they approaching the colonial 
government in tender tone and became critical in their writings about Urdu and 
Muslims.162 
On the other hand the Urdu press and Muslim elites of Patna offered only 
weak retaliation or criticism to the antipathy of colonially induced marginalization of 
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Urdu. Shah Mohsin Ali of Munger submitted a petition through which he opposed the 
policy of confining Hindi student to Hindi and Muslims to Urdu. Memorandum sent 
by the Qasid (an Urdu weekly of Patna, 18 January 1877) and the Central National 
Mohammaden Association was also declined. Thus the British Government’s policy 
to given the employment prospects associated with language politics reveals the 
government’s objectives to communalising the language concern of two major 
religious communities.163 The Muslim political attentiveness of Muslims reserved 
pace with spread of modern education in Bihar. The initial phase of the political 
beginning of the Muslims evolved around the Hindi-Urdu controversy In January 
1881, the government replace Urdu, and introduce Hindi as court language. It 
presented a serious threat to the educated elite among the Muslims as well as the 
Hindu caste of scribes- the Kayasthas who were well versed in both Urdu and 
Persian164. The controversy, therefore, did not create a sharp communal divide along 
religious lines, unlike in UP where, during the same period, the same issue, created 
sharp socio-political cleavages between the Hindus and Muslims.165 About 
communalism Tasadduq Ahmed Khan (1885-1935), in a Political Conference in 1931, 
Mirzapur said: 
Ek firqah ki Firqahwariyat dusre firqah ya qaum ko firqahwariyat ki janib 
dhakelti hai aur mota’di marz ki tarah samaj me failti chali  jati hai. Yeh mulk ki 
ghulami se bhi zyadah nuqsandah hai aur azadi ki raah me sang-i-giran aur sab se 
badi rukawat hai.166 
The caste-ridden social structure of India provided opportunities to provoke 
non-Brahmins against Brahmins and forward castes against backwards. By helping 
the diwans to replace Urdu by Hindi in law courts British were succeeded in 
promoting communal bitterness between Hindus and Muslims.167 
Another problematic development in the Bengal body politic was the Hindu-
Muslim rivalry and gradual alienation of the Muslim masses (i.e. peasants) from 
Congress for socio-economic reason. First, the Krishak Praja Party (1937-1943) was 
founded in 1936 by Fazlul Haq (1872-1962) and then the Muslim League (1943-47), 
founded in 1906, which represented the Muslim masses in Bengal, as the Congress 
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started declining to take up their cause and always remained in opposition during 
1937-47 period.168 In the 1937 elections, the Krishak Praja Party won 35 seats and 
emerged as a strong party.169 One of the most important Congress leaders of the rural 
construction group Satish Chandra Dasgupta (1900-1983), known as Bengal’s 
Gandhi, attacked the faction-ridden leadership of the Calcutta elite for succumbing to 
the politics of violence and communal hatred without any mass contact.170 The middle 
class professionals, generally pro-Congress, invested in land, to buy their way into 
rent receiving class. Thus the economic interest of the long-entrenched Hindu middle 
class of Bhadralok clashed with a newly emerging Muslim middle class gradually 
leading to mass communalism.171 
A Brief Introduction about the Present Study: 
This work has been divided into four major chapters including “Introduction”. 
Second chapter, “Communal Riots in Bihar: 1946-47”, deals with the riots between 
1946 and 1949. This chapter also explores the communal polarization of politics 
during 1938 to 1946. Though this process of communal schism finally resulted in 
partition of India, but communal carnages continued in India still today. These riots 
were and are the outcome elite manipulation of the masses to attain economic 
accumulation and accumulation of political power. Though these elitist classes 
emerged as the champion of their respective community but factually they are only 
loyal to them. With Jinaah’s call for “Direct Action Day” on 16th August, 1946 as 
reaction the Great Calcutta (Kolkata) Killings took place which unleashed the 
ferocious communal riots in Bihar. Though there was already communally ripe 
situation in Bihar and riots were going on in places like Patna, Gaya, Monghyr and 
Palamau districts which were engulfed in the communal riots in March, 1946. A 
serious communal riot took place in Patna on 18th May, 1946. In Muzaffarpur’s 
Benibad the tensed situation was at its verge and riots were ignited. On 25th October, 
1946 complete hartal at Chapra was observed and on 26th October, 1946, some 
Muslim shops were attacked by the Hindus form the villages north of Chapra. Riots 
spread to, Jehanabad, Khodaibagh, Jalalpur, Nabazar, in fact, almost all over Bihar. 
These riots were ceased only when Jawaharlal Nehru responded these riots with the 
weapon of secularism and threatened the communally mad masses to machine-
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gunning, aerial attacks and bombing and surprisingly the situation was under control. 
Gandhi also threatened to go on fast if the riots would not be stopped. There had been 
no serious occurred except on 19th November, 1946 in Monghyr. In 1946, October-
November, in which 30,000-50,000 Muslims were killed according to the Muslim 
Leagues estimate, except some places police remain as silent spectators. In 1947, 
March onwards riots again reared its head. Warisalganj (Gaya), Kutubpur (Poonpoon, 
Police Station), Behrawan (Poonpoon, Police Station), etc. were the scene of 
communal riots. By June people were fed up with communal riots. They supposed 
that Pakistan scheme should be either dropped or immediately granted. In Bhabhuna 
town communal incidents took place in July, 1947, where RSS members were 
responsible for igniting the riots, as they wanted to drive Muslims out. On 22nd 
August, 1947, communal riot took place over the issue of bringing down the flag of 
India. On 25th October, 1947, riots took place in Tirhut division, Sitamarhi sub-
division, Singhachauri, village Mehsaul, Police Station Runisyedpur, over the issue of 
cow-sacrifice on Bakra-Eid. 
Third chapter, “Communal Riots in Post-Independence Bihar till 1967”, deals 
with the role of administration, intelligentsia, press and the major riots till 1967. This 
chapter explores Government handling of riots and role of police and armed forces as 
well as how they use communal issues to attain their power. Role of press (especially 
vernacular press), effect of history writing and role of electronic media has been 
elaborayed in this chapter. Seven communal incidents takes place in 1954, nine in 
1955, eight in 1956, six in 1957, eight in 1958, twelve in 1959, eight in 1960, twenty 
two in 1961, five in 1962 and ten in 1963, but these were not of serious in nature. In 
April, 1959 riot broke out in Sitamarhi over the cow-slaughter, 7 Muslims were killed 
and 657 Muslims were injured. A number of Hindus were also injured. In March, 
1964 riots broke out in the Tribal belt. Which mainly comprise to tribal belt 
comprising the district of Ranchi and Singhbhum. In these riots, 409 Muslims, 16 
Hindus and 3 unidentified were killed and 262 Muslims, 27 Hindus and 9 unidentified 
were injured. In August 22-29, 1967, at Ranchi-Hatia riots were ignited over the 
language, which lasted for a week. 12 Hindu, 98 Muslims and 46 unidentified were 
killed. 36 Hindus, 79 Muslims and 16 unidentified were injured. On 13th October, 
1967, riots broke out in Sursand, when Durga procession was brick-batted while it 
was passing through Muslim locality. About 20 persons were killed on 13th October, 
1967; riots were ignited over false rumour of gun injury of Hindu during Mahabiri 
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Jhanda procession. 35 Muslim houses and 2 Hindu houses were burnt. 47 Muslims 
and 2 Hindu families were affected. 144 Cr, P. C. was implemented to the affected 
areas. On 13th December, 1967 riots occurred at Bhagalpur. 
Fourth chapter “Major Riots in Bihar: 1968-1992”, deals with the major riots 
during this period. By mid 1960s there were major changes took place during this 
period. Bharatiya Janata Party was born in 1977. Many, including Jayprakash 
Narayan genuinely believed that the members of the Jan Sangh, after merging with 
the Janata Party, had shed their communalism totally. In 1980, neither Janata rhetoric 
nor Gandhian Socialism came to the rescue of the intrusion of crime in politics. It was 
in the political vacuum of this decade that the ideology of communalism spread. 
During 1971-1981, political parties were searching for new strategies to dethrone the 
ruling Congress party. Thus caste and religion based politics started surfacing. 
Populist slogans and religious considerations became common to woo the minorities. 
Muslim Law Board was formed to protect the personal law based on Shariat. Hindus 
started demanding the Uniform Civil Code. By 1980s the Shah Bano case, 
Meenakshipuram conversions, opening of Babri Masjid for Hindus etc., issues 
communally charged the atmosphere of the country. Inflow of petro-dollars and Gulf 
money that facilitated the Muslim affluence in this decade, reflected in colorful 
mosques, Muslims’ involvement in other businesses and their intrusion in political 
power-game, also caused communal tension. On 15th April, 1970, riots broke out in 
Chaibasa (headquarters of the Singhbhum District, now in Jharkhand which became a 
separate province out of Bihar in November 2000) when a bomb was hurled on the 
Ramnavami procession, while it was passing through Bari Bazar. As many as 23 
Muslims and tribals were killed. 42 Hindus and 14 Muslims were injured. On 17th 
April, 1970, riot spread to Cakradharpur, a town near Jamshedpur (Tatanagar). The 
Jamshedpur riots of April 1979 arose over the route for taking out Ramnavami 
procession. The city had experienced communal conflicts since 1964. Communal 
organizations have been active, especially with the Akharas. In April, 1981 
Biharsharif, riots occurred over a quarrel in a toddy shop owned by a Harijan. The 
trouble erupted in the Gagandiwan village having a majority Muslim population. 
There was also traditional rivalry between the Hindus and Muslims over a piece of 
cemetery land which both claimed as their own. Intelligence machinery was failed 
and the District Administration misleading the higher authorities by not providing a 
correct assessment. The police did not take effective action to control the clash, which 
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led to rioting and pogroms. The spread of false rumors affected the other villages in 
Biharsharif. The hold of the communal organizations like the RSS and the Jammat-e-
Islami in these areas further increased the violence. The Bhagalpur riots of 1989 refer 
to the violence between the Hindus and the Muslims in the Bhagalpur district of 
Bihar, India. The riots started on 24 October 1989, and the violent incidents continued 
to happen for 2 months. The violence affected the Bhagalpur city and 250 villages 
around it. Over 1,000 people (around 900 of which were Muslims) were killed, and 
another 50,000 were displaced as a result of the violence. It was the worst Hindu-
Muslim violence in independent India. The All India Secretary of BJP, J. P. Mathur 
accused the Congress of having “fanned” communal riots in Bhagalpur in 1989 which 
left thousands of people, mostly Muslims, dead.172 Like the Bhagalpur riots (1989), in 
Muzaffarnagar riots (2013) too, atrocities done to the Muslims, huge losses fell upon 
the Muslims. There was displacement of the entire Muslim population even in the 
villages (of Muzaffarnagar) which were not affected by communal violence since 
people fled out of fear as Ghazala Jamil has reported in her paper (2014).173 The same 
thing had happened during the Bhagalpur riot (1989), in that was graver in nature. 
That 116 people were butchered in Logain Village (Bhagalpur) and buried in a field 
and cauliflowers were planted to hide the evidences and in that rioters were 
accompanied by the police officials as demonstrated by Warisaha Farasat.174 During 
October, 2-9, 1992, Communal riots broke out in Sitamarhi particularly in the town of 
Sitamarhi and in the village of Riga. Clashes started on October 2 when a Durga Puja 
procession shouting slogans such as Jai Shri Ram near a mosque was stopped by 
some Muslim youths. Brick-batting took place. On October 4, the Puja Samiti decided 
that the Durga idol was to be immersed in a by-pass pool after passing through a 
Muslim-dominated area. On October 8, the Durga procession commenced. Members 
from several akharas (traditional physical training centers) present in the procession 
shouted anti-Muslim slogans. Violence started between armed marchers and Muslim 
youths. The police fired, killing one Hindu and one Muslim. The media reported 50 
deaths. Official sources put the death toll at 48, which included 41 Muslims, three 
Hindus, and four unidentified persons. But unofficially the actual death figure might 
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amount to 65, of whom 58 were Muslims and seven, Hindus. Riots also took place in 
the village of Riga after a rumor spread that a ten-year-old Hindu girl had been 
brutally attacked and killed by Muslims in Sitamarhi. 
To sum up this introductory chapter, this is now submitted that this study 
throws light on the riots of Bihar, 1946-92 and social, economic and political 
processes in colonial period and after independence in Bihar, as well as focuses on 
how economically backward Muslims rose to power in the marginalized power 
politics and rise of lower class and caste which led to breakdown in Brahmanical 
order of the society. There was breakdown in administration also which failed to 
provide better condition to the lower class and caste and economically marginalized 
section of the society. This study also focuses on the role of the administration before 
and during the riots, criminal justice system etc. This study illustrate that during 
Colonial period and after independence the administrative handling of the riots was 
almost similar although the police forces were dispatched but the communal biases 
among the police made it difficult to curb the riots rapidly. Even ‘divide an rule’ 
policy of the British, was adopted by the Indian leaders and communal parties (in 
post-independence India) to win over their community or caste or class to their side to 
acquire more power in their hands. Most often riots occurred before and after the 
elections which made it clear that the most of the riots were the result of elites’ and 
politicians’ manipulations that left the victims in misery with horrific results. 
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Chapter- 2 
Communal Riots in Bihar: 1946-1947 
 
Most often communal riots occur because of previously existing multi-causal factors 
like social problem, economic problem, possibly psychological problem and political 
problem.1 Whatever, the background, it should be apparent that the atmosphere which 
contributes to a riotous situation develops over a period of time which has been  
 In the 1920s the leading Bihar Congressmen were also members of the Hindu 
Mahasabha (HMS). Much later Rajendra Prasad wrote retrospectively that he did not 
fiund anything wrong in joining the HMS session in 1922, for even the Muslims of 
Gaya had found anything amiss in it.2 As there was no ban against a Congressman (till 
1938) being a member of the Mahasabha; quite a number of Congressmen were 
actually its members and its activities were not considered unconstitutional.3 At the 
1925 Muzaffarpur session of the Bihar Provincial Hindu Mahasabha (BPHMS), Shri 
Krishna Sinha (1887-1961) asked if it not angered every Hindu to see their 
untouchable co-religionists being converted to Christianity and Islam.4 Mahavir, a 
weekly founded and edited by Jagat Narain Lal (1896-1966) frequently carried 
vociferously devisive articles.5 
By the 1930s the movements for political assertiveness impacted adversely 
upon the Hindu-Muslim relation in India. In the 1920s and the 1930s movements for 
assertion of religious identities (Hindi-Urdu controversy6, anti-cow slaughter 
movement, music before mosques, the shuddhi-sangathan and the tabligh-tanzim 
movements)7 as well as caste identities—demand of Kshatriya status by the 
Intermediate castes of Shudra varna of Hindus like Yadavas, Kurmis, Koeris- 
worsened the Hindu-Muslim relations in all aspect of life. 
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Besides these issues the caste based conflicts sharpened from the 1920s 
onwards among the Hindu community with the first Legislative Council election8. But 
it was intertwined with the communalism and casteism, people of a particular caste or 
community provided special favours to the people of their respective caste as against 
to the people of other caste.9 In Bihar politics, caste had played an important role. 
Emergence of the British rule changed the socio-economic and politico-administrative 
establishment of India. During the British rule there was dominance of Bengali, 
Kayastha and Muslims in bureaucracy and zamindari was dominated mainly by the 
Bhumihars, Rajputs, Brahmans and Kayasthas.10 By the early twentieth century, 
although sporadic and localized, caste and class politics started in the cities and towns 
across north India.11 By the early twentieth century many movements were launched 
by the upper Shudras to claim Kshatriya status for themselves, included a wide range 
of less populous communities viz. Kahars (palanquin bearers and household servants), 
Tantis (weavers), Sonars (golsmiths), Malis (flower-gardener), Tambulis (betel-
leaftraders), Kalwars (distillers), and many others.12 Kshatriya reform gave 
opportunity to other communities to organize, to espouse a group identity, and 
perhaps most significantly, to express their views.13 During the freedom struggle, the 
Yadavas, the Kurmis and the Koeris in Bihar underwent a process of considerable 
politicisation. They became conscious of the vast strength that would naturally accrue 
to them in the process of the incorporation of democratic institutions in the province. 
In this process, for morale-boosting the Yadavas and the Kurmis began to register 
themselves as Kshatriya during the census of 190114 and also claim that they were 
Kshatriyas in olden times and due to certain adverse political and economic factors 
they were reduced to their present inferior social status. 
In addition, sporadic peasants’ claims to Kshatriya had been started in late 
eighteenth century in Awadh and early nineteenth century in Bihar. These caste 
assertion were institutionalized by organizing caste associations, which combined the 
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demand for high (usually Kshatriya) status with a potent Vaishnava rhetorical content. 
Goala peasant-pastoralists, who played as social elite during cow-protection 
agitation,15 organized primarily in opposition to the cow-slaughter during Muslim 
festivals, the cow-protection movement represented an important phase of growing 
political and cultural activism in late nineteenth century India. This activism was 
evident as well as in mobilizational systemic of the early Indian National Congress 
and the increased competition between Hindu and Muslim elites for power, thus, on 
the national level elite’s competition for acquiring power for them became intertwined 
with popular religious practice at the regional level and a combination that ultimately 
erupted in communal riots in the Gangetic heartland over the issue of cow-slaughter.16 
This controversy peaked between 1892 and 1893, when in Basantpur (Siwan, Saran) 
in Bihar one of the most ferocious and well organized riots of late 19th century17 broke 
out. The Hindus attacked Muslim villages assaulting butchers as well as low-status 
Hindus who were viewed as complicit in marketing beef. These well organized 
masses were organized through the local marketing system. Cow-slaughter movement 
was employed by the agitators both as local trade networks and powerful religious 
symbols to divide Hindus from Muslims as well as the British.18 Thus urban leaders 
of the Indian National Congress viewed it as an opportunity to develop rural base, 
despite the refusal of Congress leaders to allow the Congress to support the cow-
protection movement.19 
The renewal of cow agitation in this period was correlated with upsurge of 
inter-communal violence too.20 Thus due to the cow-protection movement during the 
Bakr-Eid of 1911 at many places situation was so tense that at many places riots took 
place sporadically.21 This Movement achieved a good base among the masses with the 
joining of the cow-protection movement by the Gop Jatiya Mahasabha (organization 
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of Gwalas22). Then in 1916, in Patna and Gaya district and in September 1917, in 
Shahabad, ferocious incidents of communal riots took place over the issue of cow-
slaughter.23 In Shahabad district in October 1917, for instance, the immediate issue was 
cow-protection. Crowds of up to 50,000 Hindu peasants attacked Muslim villages. 
They were apparently influenced by widespread rumours that British rule was 
collapsing. Rioting crowds shouted Angrez ka raj uthh gaya and German Ki Jai.24 
Hetukar Jha in his paper25 emphasized that it was the economic and social 
oppression rather than economic prosperity that led the peasants of lower casts in 
general and of the Yadav caste in particular to rise in revolt against the upper caste 
zamindars. Thus this conflict was further intertwined with the economic tension and 
the role of administration that was very clearly explained by Qudrtullah Shahab (the 
then SDM of Bhagalpur district) in his book Shahabnama (1999), the role played by 
the police and RSS in Bhagalpur riots during the 1940s.26 Kumar Indradev Narain 
(Chief Activist of Bhagalpur wing of RSS) criticized the politics of All India Muslim 
League and warned barrister Nurul Hasan, if League did not abandon the demand for 
Pakistan, it would become difficult for Muslims to survive in India.27 There started a 
dispute over the land for factory of Seth JhanJhaniya and Muslims started fleeing 
from Nathnagar28 out of fear. When Qudrattulla Shahab asked Nurul Hasan, he told 
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that whenever a deal of land arose, to get the land on desired price they (seth and 
broker) instigated the peasents to start agitation that gradually turned political in 
nature and Kumar Indra Dev Narain sent his goondas to attack the Muslims.29 
Normally it was a dispute about silk factory, but it often took political and 
communal turn. Suddenly Nathnagar was overcrowded by the outsiders who roam 
around markets all the day and at night they used to drink, shouting and playing drum 
in front of mosque at the time of taraweeh30 prayers, thus after enquiring Qudaratullah 
Shahab prepared a detailed report in order to prevent the outbreak of riots, in his 
report he suggested these points- 1. Section 144 should be imposed in Nathnagar; 2. 
Arms belonging to every license holder of Nathnagar be deposited at the police 
station; 3. The entry of Kumar Inderdev Singh and Sat Narayan Panday into 
Nathnagar should be denied for some time; 4. The gangs of lathi-men from 
Darbhanga, Bardwan and Monghyr be disbanded and sent out of Nathnagar; 5. At 
Nathnagar police station, a unit of the mounted military police to be posted 
immediately to assist the local police. But his report was avoided by DIG, Collector 
and Commissioner and also the charge of Nathnagar was taken off from Qudaratullah 
Shahab.31 And on the very next day riots broke out in Bhagalpur, resulted in an 
unprecedented carnage. It was the blood of defenceless Muslims that had been spilled 
on the streets of Nathnagr. It was the armed and intoxicated lathi-men who had 
attacked the worshippers praying taraweeh at the mosque. According to official 
reports, four Muslims were martyred and one girl was kidnapped in the riot. 32 
The Yadavas, the Kurmis and the Koeris had formed the Triveni Sangh in 
Bihar on 30 May, 1933 under the leadership of Chaudhary J. N. P. Mehta, Sardar 
Jagdev Singh Yadav and Dr. Shivpujan Singh at Kargahar of Shahabad district.33 This 
was a move for obtaining increasing share of political and economic power through 
social solidarity.34 The growing sense of self-consciousness and self-respect among 
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31 Shahab, Shahabnama, pp. 178-183 
32 Shahab, Shahabnama, p. 186. 
33 Chaudhary and Shrikant, Bihar Mein Samajik Parivartan…, p. 113 
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51 
the lower castes and OBCs brought them in conflict with the Savarn Hindus.35 From 
1932 onwards, Harijan Sevak Sangh was active for the assertion of low caste status in 
Bihar. Jagjivan Ram (1908-86) came from a Chamar (leather worker) family36 who 
emerged as a leader of the low castes and OBCs. He joined Congress in 1930. He was 
promoted by the Congress as a counterweight to the growing influence of Dr. 
Ambedkar.37 Indrani Jagjivan Ram38 wrote in her memoir39 that Jagjivan Ram itself 
faced social discrimination40 thus Jagjivan Ram wanted to create a ‘space’ for the 
dalits in the politics of Bihar, but for this he had threat on two fronts- principles of 
Ambedkar and Communist ideology. During those days, though there was less 
influence of the Communists in Bihar but there was influence of Marxist and Leninist 
ideologies who organized the khet mazdoor (field labourer, peasantry) on the line of 
their ideologies. Thus huge population of untouchables would drift towards them and 
this would be a challenge for his politics of creating a ‘space’ for the untouchables.41 
Poona Pact did establish an electoral college which facilitated for nomination of four 
Harijans in each constituency; and the Harijans were allowed to contest the elections 
thus, Harihans put forth a veto during the primary elections.42 For the assertion of 
Harijans Khet Majdoor Sangh was founded on 9th August, 1937 in Hindu Sabha 
Maidan, Patna. Between 1937 and 1939, “Dalit Warg Sangh”, “Harijan Sevak Sang” 
and “Khet Mazdor Sangh” were engaged in demanding temple entry for the outcaste 
people, for using public resources, abolition of untouchability etc. for the uplift of 
lower cast people. On 13th April, 1938, Sukhari Ram presented a proposal in Bihar 
Legislative Assembly, demanding temple entry, public hotel-restaurant, school, 
government jobs and dharmshala for the harijans and OBCs. Over all alongside these 
issues sporadic violence also occurred.43 
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The Kisan Sabhas were formed outside the Indian National Congress but these 
(Kisan Sabhas) could not champion the interests of the landless labourers, the 
marginal farmers and the very poor tenants. The Kisan Sabhas became instruments of 
fight against the Zamindars and they championed the interests of only the big and 
middle-range farmers. The component units of the Triveni Sangh, on the other hand, 
consisted largely of the poor farmers and labourers.44 
During the 1930s dacoities became major problem in Patna and Gaya 
districts.45 These goonda elements acted on support of well-known members of their 
respective communities, who became the champion of Hindus or Muslims.46 Thus 
class cleavage became more recurrent than ever and communal antagonism also 
added fuel to this fire. In 1932 communal riots occurred in village Khairabad in Bihar 
subdivision, when after harvesting of paddy crops by some defamed persons of Goala 
community from the lands owned by Muslim peasants on the instigation of a local 
zamindar.47 Economic competitions often resulted in communal conflicts. This way 
communal politics and communal conflicts distorted or misinterpreted social tension 
and class conflicts between the exploiters and exploited into communal conflicts. 
Thus under the pressure of communal propaganda the masses were unable to find the 
real causes.48 
Its ironical how the bourgeois of both communities (Hindu and Muslim), used 
the sacred name of religion to achieve their goals. The social and reactionary elements 
founded communal organizations to safeguard their vested interests in which they 
were supported by the zamindars, princes, and capitalists.49 
In the spring of 1932, political tension between the Hindus and Muslim 
communities throughout India. The Round Conferences had failed to pacify the 
communal issues, Congress had resumed its activities and all parties a waited with 
nervousness the communal award expected to Government. About the middle of May 
of that year petty quarrels were started among the Muslims and Hindu youths of 
Bombay resulted in communal conflagrations, anyhow it was resorted by police 
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though with considerable delay.50 The difference became more prominent, when the 
Congress adopted the attitude of aloofness towards the Communal Award51 by which 
even Hindu electorates were also fragmented. 
To justify the Shuddhi campaign of Hindu Mahsabha and Arya Samaj, the 
vernacular press like Durbhanga Gazette, Mithila Mihir, Dharambir Kayastha 
Patrika all started to articulate inflammatory news against the Muslims.52 All these 
vernacular press charged Muslims of butchering Hindu children, kidnapping and 
raping Hindu women, breaking idols and murdering Hindu preachers with support of 
the Muslim officials. These charges on Muslims were repeated ‘week after week’ by 
the Hindi press thus Hindus were pushed to keep themselves organized and ready to 
resist attacks.53 The Hindu Mahasabha was against the Congress assumption that the 
Hindus and Muslims could achieve swaraj only through a united struggle. The Hindu 
Mahasabha believed that they did not need Muslims to achieve swaraj, that they alone 
could achieve swaraj.54 
On the other hand the Urdu newspapers in Bihar where Muslims comprised 
just about 10.1 percent of the population, was not less strident.55 Urdu papers like the 
Imarat and Al Mobashir, raised their (Muslims) voice against the specific targeting of 
Muslim women and also against the campaigns of Shudhhi and Sangathan.56  
Hindu-Muslim schism dangerously widened after 1937-1938. The British 
Government shifted from “balanced to uncontrolled communalism”, encouraged total 
communal division by giving open support to the Muslim League especially in its 
anti-Congress role and tolerated its effort to acquire a mass character.57 There were no 
restrictions on the inflammatory speeches delivered by the leaders of the Hindu 
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Mahasabha which polarized the communal situation.58 The Congress also made no 
efforts to pacify the situation even the Congress leaders were succeeded in securing 
the license for the passage of the “rath jatra” through the disputed route which 
resulted in riots at Bhagalpur in 1938.59 Jinnah’s arrival in Bihar created communal 
tension in the province, where he made communal slogans and asked the Muslim 
masses to unite against their enemies. Since then League leaders were engaged in an 
intensive campaign. Their meetings were organized in the mosques where communal 
hatred was preached. In May 1939 a communal riot took place in Gaya as 
consequence of Jinnah’s arrival at Gaya one year before in 1938. The Gaya has a 
history of riots which can be dated back to the year 189360 then riots broke out 
in1937. Before, May riots there was already a controversy over singing of ‘Bande 
Mataram’ was on the scene.61 The hoisting of the national flag over the city school in 
January, 1939 and the appearance of the League leaders resulted in communal 
outbreaks in the city on that day.62 On 6 May 1939 a pot of beef, which was said to be 
thrown by Sabdul Mian while he was quarrel of with his wife, accidentally fell on a 
Hindu girl named Sumitra. This dragged the Hindus and the Muslims in fight. 
Although the situation was controlled by the police but tension remained and resulted 
into a riot on 7 May 1939 over a trivial issue when some Muslims assaulted the pujari 
of Dukharni temple and his brother when he was going to do morning prayers and a 
rumour spread that temple has been damaged by the Muslims. Gurkha Military police 
were called to control the situation. About 124 people were injured.63 
At the eighth session of the BPHMS in Mongyr in 1939, V.D. Savarkar said 
that the HMS would refuse to surrender their legitimate rights to the Bihar Ministry 
which seemed intent to ‘liquidate Hinduism’ by over representing Muslims in the 
services.64 
In the mid 1920s, the Arya Samaj campaigned to make Hindus give up 
participating in Muharram procession, which were subsequently reported to be held 
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on a much reduced scale. The Gaya Hindu Mahasabha tried to stop the Hindus from 
joining Muharram activities and encouraged to plan taking out Akhara during 
Dussehra festival.65 There was a group called the Ram Sena in Darbhanga aa also in 
Champaran. The Hindu Mahasabha reacted by arguing that Muslims formed only 10 
percent of the Bihar population so the Government should have called upon them to 
keep themselves within the bounds of law and order; instead of banning the session 
and humiliating the ‘Hindu honour’.66 
During the Legislative Assembly elections (1937) the Muslim League was not 
a popular organization. That was the reason, Muslim representatives could not be 
taken in the Congress Ministries and independent Muslims who had been elected to 
assemblies had to be invited to join them.67 By 1937 the Hindi-Urdu controversy 
turned into very grave situation. The Muslim League and the Urdu press charged that 
Urdu was being discriminated against. Haripura session of the Congress took on 
Hindu colour.68 The language controversy was bad enough with the Congress not 
abiding by its own stand on the Hindustani written in both Persian and Nagari 
scripts.69 Jameel Ahmad Khan, a Municipal Commissioner and member of the 
Congress, wrote that many Congress workers in Bhagalpur district had openly joined 
hands with the Hindu Mahasabha and delivered inflammatory speeches against 
Muslims. He said, ‘Our leaders have remained completely communal before, during 
and after the riots.’70 
A number of riots took place in Bihar viz; Aurangabad riot (July 25, 1937), 
Nagarnausa riot (September, 1937), Rajpura riot (November 9, 1937), Karanpura riot 
(October 20, 1937), Khairatia riot (November 30, 1937), Lalpura riots (November, 
1937), Chakbayas riot (December, 1937), Bhagalpur riots (1938).71 
Since acute tension prevailed there in the surroundings, even petty quarrels 
between the individuals of the two communities, after 1937, when the Congress 
formed its ministries in Bihar succeeding the MIP ministry (April-July 1937), the 
British shifted from balanced to uncontrolled communalism, encouraged total 
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communal division gave virtually open support to the Muslim League especially in its 
anti-Congress role and tolerated its efforts to acquire a mass character. Towards the 
end of October 1938, Jinnah visited Bihar and put his effort to unite all Muslim 
parties. It was one of the significant aspects of political scenario.72 The coming of 
Jinnah in October 1938 in Bihar created considerable communal tension in Gaya 
which turned into a communal that took place on 7th May 1939 in Gaya as a 
consequent to the Jinnah’s arrival.73 
There was tension already prevailing over the language politics. The Yunus 
Ministry in 1937 sanctioned the use of Urdu script in courts.74 In Bihar, the League 
instituted an enquiry committee under S.M. Shareef which submitted its report 
(Shareef Report)75 in March, 1939 stating that local Muslims suffered such atrocities 
in the hands of the Congress Ministry that they would “have to decide soon whether 
they should migrate from this province or face annihilation.”76 The Muslim League as 
the sole representative of the Muslims, that Congress should only speak for Hindus, 
that ‘Vande mataram’ as national anthem must be dropped, that Urdu must be adopted 
as the national language of India and that coalition Ministries must be formed in 
Congress ruled provinces.77 There was also allegation againstt the Congress that the 
Congress ministries were not treating the Muslims fairly. Thus an enquiry committee 
was appointed under the chairmanship of the Raja of Pirpur that came with a report 
(Pirpur Report)78 giving a formidable list of ‘atrocities committed by the Congress on 
the Muslims.79 This added fuel for the further communal polarization.80 
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The growing activities and intrusion of the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha and the 
Muslim League in politics created communal polarizations more stridently after 1937 
which created havoc between Hindus and Muslims and hereafter riots started 
occurring even more frequently. These were mostly provoked by either Mahabiri 
Jhanda procession or incidents of cow slaughter. The Lahore resolution (23 March 
1940) of the Muslim League further polarized the Hindu-Muslim tension.81 The 
Muslim League started its Pakistan Movement.82 As a result a serious broke out in 
Biharsharif on 6 May 1941.83 Riot started with the resentment over the observance of 
anti-Pakistan Day.84 Rajendra Prasad wrote in his Autobiography (1957) that although 
there was tension between the Hindu and Muslim and situation was not such that a 
riot could have occurred. Fortunately, Abdul Bari (1894-1947) reached Patna on the 
same day. With him Rajendra Prasad also visited the riot affected areas. The 
Government dispatched a strong police force to be deployed for restoring the peace 
and order. The District Magistrate and the Commissioner of Police were already on 
the spot. Shah Mohhamed Uzair Munimi and Mathura Prasad rushed to the riot 
affected spots on their own risk and appealed the people to defy the rioters.85 
We see that at many times, the communal organizations like the Hindu Sabha 
and its active supporters had been held responsible for communal tension. The reports 
and other evidences reveal that by 1945-46, quite a number of communal 
organizations stepped up their various kinds of activities which included not only 
propaganda and thereby their widened social base but also martial training to 
perpetrate violence. Some of these organizations were the Tablighi Movement, the 
Muslim League seems to be active in organizing Muslim National Guards, the Azad 
Hind Fauj Dal, the Khaksars, the Hindustan National Guard.86 
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83 Home Department (Political Special), File No. 26/37/41, p. 1. 
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58 
Tablighi Movement 
The movement was started in 1927 as an offshoot of the Deobandi movement by 
Muhammad Ilyas-al-Kandhlawi in India. It primarily aimed and aims at Tablighi 
spiritual reformation by working at the grass roots level, reaching out to Muslims 
across social and economic spectra to bring them in line with the group’s 
understanding of Islam.87 
Muslim League’s Muslim National Guard 
The League seems to be active in organizing Muslim National Guards. In Katihar 
about sixty students and fifty outsiders had already been enrolled and two drill classes 
were opened and a lathi (stick-wielding) centre was started. In Purnea a trainer was 
appointed. In Sahibganj volunteers were also organizing together. 
This was so because the League leaders were perturbed at the organization of 
Hindu students called RSS specializing in lathi and sword training. And it was 
obvious that the RSS was causing rancour between the Hindu and Mohammadan 
students.88 
This was militant wing of the Muslim League. S. Mazhar Imam, the then 
M.L.A. of Patna, was the provincial leader of this organization. Thirteen districts had 
reported the existence of this organization, though its activities were mainly confined 
to physical exercises and physical training. Members of the Muslim National Guard 
were used during festivals and election campaigns and they also acted like the Muslim 
League couriers intimating the people to attend the meetings convened by the League. 
After the recent communal disturbances (1946) there was acute increase in the 
membership of the organization. This organization had its sway over the Muslims 
which might be dangerous. It was also believed that Pakistan was carried on by its 
members.89 
Student Organizations 
As we know that RSS was an organization of the Hindu boys and about 150 boys of 
Banka and 150 boys of Bounsi were said to have joined the Sangh. They assembled 
daily in an open field and get trained in lathi, bhala (spear) and swords. The RSS also 
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started a branch in Sahibganj and about 50 students were recieving martial training. A 
Marwari Yuvak Sangh had been formed at Jamalpur (Monghyr).90 
The Azad Hind Fauj Dal 
This organization founded as the off-spring of the Indian National Army sponsored by 
the Forward Bloc founded by Subhash Chandra Bose. It existed in at least ten districts 
of Bihar. Though it was in its incipient stage, in most of the districts, its activities 
were confined to lathi and squade training. It had no uniform.91 
The Khaksars 
Moulvi Saiful Fazal Ali Ahmad Jan was the Provincial Hakim-e-Ala of the Khaksars 
in Bihar. The Activities of this organization were confined to military training on 
Fridays and an occasional march through the town. They had good discipline and their 
uniform was shorts. This organization was particularly defunct until the recent 
communal disturbances since when it had been trying to achieve prominence by 
helping a relief work.92 
The Khaksar party was not merely communal but also developing as amass 
movement which threatens the law and order.93 It was an anti-Congress as well as 
anti-Government.94 Although the Khaksar was a communal body, it became a potent 
danger to the Government. Like other communal bodies, the leader of the Khaksar 
also pursued the tactics of pressurizing the central and provincial government ‘to 
concede to the pocket demands of the Muslims of Bihar’.95 
Reports had been coming from various parts of the province that “…the way 
they march about in military formation in the country were detrimental to communal 
harmony and were actually leading to apprehension of communal trouble.”96 
The Hindustan National Guard 
It claimed to have been formed for the welfare of Hindus. About 15 members of the 
Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh were enrolled to the Hindustan National Guard and 
it was decided that the two organizations would run side by side with each other.97 
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In the elections to the Central Assembly in 1945, the Congress won 
overwhelmingly on the non-Muslim seats, while the Muslim seats went to the Muslim 
League.98 In the provincial elections in Bihar, the Congress aligned itself with three 
Muslim Parties viz. the Jamait-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, the Jamiat-ul-Momineen and the 
Muslim Independent Party, to give tough competition to Muslim League. In Bihar, the 
Ministry was formed with S. K. Sinha as the Premier (chief minister, then also called 
Prime Minister).99 
In the elections to the Central Assembly in 1945, the Congress won 
overwhelmingly on the non-Muslim seats, while the Muslim seats went to the Muslim 
League. In the provincial elections in Bihar, the Congress aligned itself with three 
Muslim Parties viz. the Jamait-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, the Jamiat-ul-Momineen and the 
Muslim Independent Party, to give tough competition to Muslim League. In Bihar, the 
Ministry was formed with S. K. Sinha as the Premier (chief minister, then also called 
Prime Minister).100 There was another reason that worried the Muslim community. 
Jawaharlal Nehru through his statement declared Majlis a self-dependent and separate 
institution and by his statement tried to deprive the provinces from the benefits 
provided by the Cabinet Mission Plan even Congress forgotten all the previous 
promises and speeches made to the masses. Then rejection of the June 16 (1946) Plan 
by the Congress and the government’s insistence on the formation of the Interim 
Government jointly by the Congress and the Muslim League, scared the M. A. 
Jinnah’s wishes to dominate Interim Government by Muslim League.101 Muslims 
were already looking at the Congress as a Hindu body thus they also assumed June 16 
(1946) declaration by the Viceroy as a first step towards a ‘Hindu Nation’. Thus they 
decided to oppose the June 16 (1946), Plan at any cost. Thus, the Muslim League 
decided to give call for the “Direct Action Day” on 16th August, 1946102 which 
unfurled the riots in Noakhali that we shall discuss later in this chapter. The Muslim 
League joined the Interim Government on October 15, 1946. The League’s 
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representatives were Liaquat Ali Khan, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Sardar Abdur Rab 
Nishtar, and I. I. Chundrigar.103 
In terms of class divide between Hindus and Muslims, in Bihar the situation 
was more complex and there were the rioting across Bihar in 1946. In Bihar there is 
evidence that in some villages the attackers seems to had came from outside, in many 
others low caste Goalas, Kurmis and Dusadhs attacked their equally deprived Muslim 
neighbors. 
Attacks on the peasants and constant deprivation of tenants’ right did not 
remain unchallenged for long time. In June 1946 therefore a serious agrarian 
movement erupted in several districts of Bihar. In many villages the landlords started 
preventing peasants from tilling their lands and claiming them as their Baksht land. 
The peasants reacted with anger and serious rioting broke out all over Bihar.104 
Besides agrarian violence there was also police discrimination. The 
Searchlight and the Indian Nation accused the police of discriminate arrest of Hindus. 
The Muslim League paper Dawn had a letter on the subject which it demanded the 
infliction of punitive police, collective fines, etc., on the Hindus in the area. In one 
case in Patna a Muslim boy was pushed out of a cinema by an employee who 
happened to be a Hindu and this resulted in a crowd of 200 Muslim marching towards 
the cinema. Mischievous persons spread the rumor that this incident had a communal 
background and the result was that 4 Muslim, who were providing music for Tilak 
ceremony in a Hindu family, were brutally assaulted by a mob of Hindus and one of 
them lost his life.105 If the order for ‘direct action is given it will deteriorate into a 
communal massacre, and from some district it is reported that the nationalist Muslims 
are particularly apprehensive of attack by Muslim Leaguers. The press has big 
responsibility in this matter. “The freedom of the press has degenerated into license 
and sensation mongering”. The worst being the murder of a Muslim goonda who was 
attacked (by a small group) while returning to Danapure from Patna on an ekka. He 
was seriously injured and soon afterwards died into hospital. Thus some Muslims 
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went Patna city in a truck and started communal rioting in which 4 Muslims were 
slightly injured.106 
Another cause of the rioting was the speedy growth of the Hindu Mahasabha, 
RSS and Muslim League that kept the communal polarization in trend. Both the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress were blamed to be establishing Hindu raj.107  In 
1946, M. S. Golwalkar said, if Muslims and Christian kept insisting to maintain their 
identity and culture he would adopt the method of Hitler108, to finish them exterminate 
the Muslims and the Christians.109 
 Jafar Imam110 (1903-1979), for example asked Biharis not to be taken by false 
ideas of Watan (broadly homeland), and to follow Jinnah’s lead instead. Not 
surprisingly, the Hindu Mahasabha had started deriding Islam. It was believed by the 
Muslim League that if Abdul Qaiyyum Ansari111 (1905-1973) was left uncontested, 
Tabligh (conversion)112 would soon become impossible in India and Shuddhi would 
get reactivated because he was a leader of the Congress.113 This was under the 
leadership of the veteran Akram Khan, whose visit made ‘the remotest village a city 
of Green flags. ‘After the provincial elections the BPML generate secretary, 
Badruddin Ahmed (1901-83), made a statement against the Hindu high-handedness 
and the Hindu official mentality’, which he said was evident when Muslims were 
intimidated at the polling booth by ‘Hindu mobs’, in a manner that was unparalleled 
in history.114 
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With Jinnah’s call, for Direct Action on 16 August 1946 started a chain 
reaction with the Great Calcutta Killings. Ferocious riots broke out115, conversion of 
Hindu’s to Islam, rape of women and destruction of property in Noakhali and Tippera, 
massacre of Muslims, as a revenge, started during the riots in Bihar and 
Gurmukteswar. As consequence, shocking incidents of riots took place all over the 
country. 
As the riots broke out in East Bengal116, the RSS strengthened its 
organization117 to offer some protection to the non-Muslim population of East Bengal 
and enjoyed considerable prestige. In Bihar the members of Swayam sewaks in 1946 
had increased to 4000 active member.118 The RSS press was virulent and widespread 
source of propaganda and communal articulation.119 Banias and traders contributed 
heavily to its coffers. Govind Sahai, the provincial RSS organizer for UP noted that in 
his province Banias contributed to the Sangh from 1944 much more than they had 
contributed to the Congressra. It was alleged that the zamindar, the mahant and the 
banias had fomented the agitation and in a number of cases encouraged the riots by 
extending financial aid to the communal organizations. At the same time Muslim 
League National Guards120 was also building up their organizations. Soon their 
membership increased to 3000. At the same time activities of the Khaksars121 also 
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Activities of this organization were confined to military training on Fridays and an occasional march 
through the town. They had good discipline and a uniform of shorts. This organization was particularly 
defunct until the 1946 communal disturbances since when it had been trying to achieve prominence by 
 
 
64 
contributed to the communal tensions in Bihar.122 Reports had been coming from 
various parts of the Bihar that the Khaksars marched in military formation in the 
country were detrimental to communal harmony but were actually leading to 
apprehension of communal trouble.”123 
The activities of zamindars and the communal propaganda by the communal 
groups do not, however, suffice to explain the virulent spread of communal rioting in 
the countryside.124 The sub-divisional officer of Monghyr thought that the RSS was 
definitely spreading communal hatred among the students of both the communities 
(Hindus and Muslims) and the Student organization125 of the RSS was a potential 
source of trouble.126 While M.S. Golwalker stated, in favor of RSS, that, “It has 
become a fashion to suppose that an organization exclusively of the Hindu must be a 
communal body…. The Sangh desires that all peoples should live a happy and 
peaceful life and accordingly it want to make the Hindus strong so that they will be 
able to live on honorable life as self-respecting society”.127  
The Home Members tried to hide the reports on communal situation from 
Viceroy’s Executive Council (EC) meeting held on 29th May, 1946. In the next EC 
meeting held on 12th June, 1946, however Wavell himself observed that the para on 
communal situation indicated that the position was not good anywhere but it was most 
tense in Punjab, the UP, and Bihar.128 He further observed that the economic 
disparities between the two communities and grievances of the other exploitation also 
led to serious communal conflagration in some cases.129 Consequently in March 1946, 
the Holi festival led to riot in Patna, Gaya, Monghyr and Palamau districts. More 
serious of all these riots was the communal riot which took place in Patna district on 
18th May (1946). 
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In the all-India political scenario the Cabinet Mission Plan was accepted by 
both the Congress and the Muslim League. In the elections to the Constituent 
Assembly that took place in July, 1946, the Congress captured 205 seats and the 
League 73. The 4 Sikh seats owed allegiance to the Congress, thus Congress had 209 
seats out of 296 Assembly seats.130 This overwhelming majority alarmed the Muslim 
League and then the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission 
Plan on 29th July, 1946.131 The 16th August was fixed as ‘Direct Action Day’ by the 
Muslim League. From 16th August, 1946, the Indian scene was rapidly transformed 
for worse. The Direct Action agitation came to be known as ‘Great Calcutta Killing’ 
in the history of communal riots in Calcutta from 16-20 August 1946. It will never be 
possible to give the final figures of casualties, dead and wounded during the 
disturbances but a figure of 4,000 killed and 10,000 injured is probably not far wide 
off the mark. The magnitude of killing of innocent Bihari Muslims was tremendous; 
women were raped, murdered and tortured by the angry mob and Muslim homes were 
destroyed, mosques were burnt and the Qurān was desecrated.132 
The happenings in Bengal as above had [inevitable] fall-out in neighboring 
Bihar for the fact that Calcutta was home to many people from Bihar. In 1946, during 
October 27 and November 6, massive anti-Muslim violence started in Bihar in 
“retaliation” against the anti-Hindu violence of Noakhali in East Bengal. Around 
7,000-8,000 persons were killed just in a few days of horrific violence. In comparison 
to Noakhali after the initial confusion posed by sudden outbreak of riots, the response 
of the provincial Government was determined, effective and consistent and horrible 
riots were ceased and this became possible, argues Mridula Mukherji, only because of 
Nehru’s secular approach.133 “He [Jawaharla Nehru] warned people that 
“Machineguns, bombs and all the forces of Government will be put in motion to stop 
bloodshed” “Lawlessness can never be tolerated … mob rule cannot be allowed”134 At 
Patna Nehru again  threaten the rioters to open fire, bombs, and machine-gunning 
against them to combat the communal madness among the masses.135 Nehru, as head 
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of the interim government, threatened to use aerial bombardment against rioting 
crowds said (at Gaya), “Stern measures will be taken to restore peace and order by the 
Government. If forces of retaliation do not cease, aerial bombing would be resorted 
too. 136 “Thousands of Biharis were brutally killed as a result of ethnic cleansing on 
the part of the Bengalis. In many parts Biharis were burnt alive or hacked to death by 
Bengali marauders”. Over 300 Biharis were killed by bombs at Chittagong in early 
March 1947 with subsequent slaughters at Jessore, Khulna, Rajpur and Saidpur.137 
The massacre of Biharis was described as: 
Thousands of families of unfortunate Muslims, many of them refugees 
from Bihar… were mercilessly wiped out. Women were raped or had 
their breast torn out with specially fashioned knives. Children did not 
escape the horror; the lucky ones were killed with their parents; but 
many thousands of others must go through what life remains for them 
with their eyes gouged out and limbs roughly amputated. More than 
20,000 bodies of the non-Bengalis have been found in the main towns 
as Chittagong, Khulna and Jessore. The real toll, I was told everywhere 
in East Bengal, may have been as high as 100,000 for thousands of non-
Bengalis have vanished without a trace.138 
The outbreak of violence was widespread in Bihar. Disturbances occurred in 
the towns on 11th August and then spread to the other districts. Demonstrators 
inflicted extensive damage to railway station, post offices, police station and rail 
tracts.139 
On 17th September a petition was filed before the ADM (Additional District 
Magistrate) that a minor Hindu was being kept in a Mohammedan house in Benibad 
village. Thus inspector J.B. Jha made enquires into the case on 20th September and 
Muslims agreed to produce girl before him in 7 days.140 On Friday 20th September, 
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1946 some Hindus headed by two Bengalis and Arya Samaj leader, Kuber Singh 
came to one Taslim Babu of the village Benibad. One of the Bengalis blamed that 
some Muslims of the village had kidnapped his cousin (Bahin) during the Calcutta 
riots.141 But other documents speak much different story. On enquiries from Syed 
Abubakar Abun Noor, the Pesh Imam of the Nakhoda mosque, Calcutta, it got 
revealed that Kalyani De, daughter of P.C.De of Jessore, aged about 20 years, 
appeared before the imam on 26th July, 1946 (26th Shaban) at the Nakhoda Mosque 
and requested him to convert her to Islam.142 “One Lochi Mishra, zamindar of the 
neighboring village of Benibad who knew our marriage in Calcutta, circulated false 
news to the effect that I had abducted Kalyani De whose Muslim name was given as 
Noor Jehan Begum, and that I had Rs.5 lakhs as looted property with me.143 While 
Kalyani De itself declared in her declaration that, “I Kalyani Dey… do hereby declare 
on solemn oath that I am neither induced or influenced nor persuaded or compelled to 
renounce my present faith, but the teachings of Islam having impressed upon my 
mind, [makes me convert to Islam]”.144 When Ali Hasan and Kalyani Dey after their 
marriage return Benibad, 700 Arya Samajists attacked the Muslim of Benibad.145 
When the SDO returned from Paru, a police station in western part of the 
Muzaffarpur district, on the 24th September, he realized that the situation was quite 
serious. He was aware that the 27th September was the date on which the 
Mohammedans had agreed to produce the girl in the village thus he decided to take 
armed police to Benibad on the 25th morning.146 But the communal outbreak occurred 
on 24th September 1946 in village Benibad, PS Katra. About 11 Muslims were killed 
and their houses were burnt and looted. Cause of trouble was alleged kidnapping of 
the Bengali girl by a Muslim.147 
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In the brutalities and atrocities at Benibad riots, the total number of casualties 
was 14 killed, 6 wounded, 13 dead bodies were found,148 one body was missing; 200 
houses149 belonging to 80 families of Mohammedans had been burnt.150 There were 
also widespread rumours that hundred of Hindus girls had been kidnapped in Calcutta 
during the Direct Action riot of August 1946.151 
On 24th October 1946 in Chapra (town of Saran district) complete hartal was 
observed as a protest against the East Bengal atrocities, but suddenly (on the same 
day) communal riots flared up starting from Karimchowk (Chapra) at 3:30 pm.152 As 
a result of this, four persons were killed.153 A hartal was observed in Patna on 25th 
October, which was observed as the “anti-Noakhli Day.” 
The communal riot became extremely serious in Saran. On 26th October, 
Hindus from the villages north of the town of Chapra attacked Muslim tolas in which 
20 persons were killed and injured. Some houses were set on fire. To control the 
situation the police also opened fire, as a result of which two people were killed and 
some were wounded. Curfew was imposed on Chapra from 5:30 pm. to 5:30 am., and 
section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) was promulgated banning 
carrying of arms and assembly of four or more persons.154 While another source 
mentions that the riot occurred in Chapra (Saran district) afternoon following the 
hartals. Figures of killed is same as above but number of injured were 40.155 
The riot spread to the Jehanabad subdivision of Gaya and into Munger on 27th 
October and the following day to Bhagalpur. In almost exactly a week of rioting 7 out 
of 16 districts and about 750 out of 18,869 villages were affected.156 
In the Sadar subdivision of Chapra, 15 persons were killed in a village, 
Khodaibagh and seven were killed at Rasulpur. There was also trouble in village 
Jalalpur, where, 30 houses including a Government grain shop were set on fire. As a 
result of the communal frenzy, ten dead bodies were found there.157 On 27th October, 
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1946, a large number of Muslim crowds assembled in mohallah Nabazar (Chapra) and 
used fire arms twice. Immediately after it the armed police arrived and brought the 
situation under control.158 
The total number of people killed in Chapra due to the communal riots till the 
27th October 1946, was 55, while the number of persons injured was 65, according to 
Sadar hospital records of Chapra.159 
On the 29th October 1946, Shrikrishna Sinha (1887-1961), the chief minister 
of Bihar and Syed Mahmood (1889-1971), the Minister of Development, visited the 
affected areas in Olhanpur, Nagra, Katendar and Paigamberpore. Then Rajendra 
Prasad assured with regard to the riot victims that the Government would give them 
all possible relief including cloth and food and granted Rs.2500/- from his 
discretionary fund to some women of minority community and also asked the DM of 
Saran to arrange for food, blankets, cloth, etc., for the refugees of Paigamberpore 
within 6 hours.160 
While Papiya Ghosh mentions that, ‘Only in few cases did Muslim victims 
receive help from their Hindu neighbors.161 But in a telegram of Sir H. Dow(Bihar) to 
field Marshal Viscount Wavell, dated, 9th November,1946, it is recorded that, “Roving 
Hindu mobs have sought to exterminate the Moslem population wherever they could 
find them. Almost all casualties have been Moslems and it is estimated that of these, 
75% have been women and children. Only in few cases have Moslem victims 
received help from their Hindu neighbors who have exhibited a callous indifference to 
suffering.”162 
Thus we see, there had been a ‘definite attempt’ by Hindu mobs to 
‘exterminate’ the Muslims. Men, women and children were killed indiscriminately. 
“Madness” seemed to have seized the people.163 Skulls and bones met their feet as 
they walked down the lanes of Paigamberpore, where 50 houses had been burnet. 
A Congress leader who toured the Chapra interior from 26th October 
encountered crowds sometimes numbering up to 50,000.164 On 1 November, enrouted 
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to Ranchi, Syed Mahmud (1889-1971) and Shrikrishna Sinha (1887-1961) saw from 
the air, a big village, besieged by a mob of about 10,000. The weeping and wailing 
women and children who were assembled on the thatched roof waved out frantically 
to draw their attention. While returning the next day the villages burning and mobs 
looting or besieging villages. All this was about 10-15 miles from the provincial 
capital Patna.165 
Many women jumped into wells to save themselves from rape. Scores of 
victims were dumped into wells. In one Chapra village alone Syed Mahmud saw five 
wells full of dead bodies and other 10-12 wells similarly chocked with the dead 
bodies.166 The maimed and wounded were mainly women and children, and so were 
the refugees.167 A Government communiqué, however, contradicted the allegation that 
women and children consisted 80% of the casualties.168 
The two leading provincial newspapers, the Searchlight and the Indian Nation, 
published particularly scurrilous write-ups after Noakhli. The Muslim League paper 
Dawn wrote pointedly that whenever the Ministry was approached for help it 
expressed its inability to give any or else connived with the rioters. It mentioned a 
Hindu procession that paraded through the streets of Gaya for two hours with 
important Congress leaders holding up Gandhi’s and Nehru’s portraits, shouting 
slogans such as ‘Noakhli ka badla le kar rahenge’ and ‘Hindustan Hinduon ka, nahin 
kisi ke baap ka.’169 The Statesman wrote that the League Ministry proved itself 
useless, it should be removed.170 
It was true that the utterances of some public men were the sources which 
occasionally fed the press with communal poison, but while the voice of public men 
only reached few thousands, the writings of the press reached millions.171 Editors of 
news agencies were particularly requested to instruct their Branch Editors as well as 
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correspondents that any messages bearing on the communal situation must be referred 
to Delhi for press advice before release.172 
Whenever communal tensions arose, the rumors used to start spreading that 
both communities were collecting weapons in preparation for a free fight should an 
occasion arises. There is a possibility of such rumors in turn being found out to be 
true in fact in certain cases. Therefore it was suggested that secret enquiries should be 
instituted by the police with a view to confiscating the weapons and taking suitable 
action against the culprits in order to prevent/deter the rioting.173 
 On 31 October 1946 a mob crying ‘Jai Mahabir’ had come near the 
Kanchanpur village. On that occasion, however both the Hindus and Muslims of the 
village went to stop them and averted a possible riot, but the news that some Hindus 
at Bhergaon had been killed, incited the Hindus of Kanchanpur. 
On 1 November 1946, a mob came from the west of the Kanchanpur village 
and set fire to the houses of the Muslims in Kundli which was tola (neighborhood) of 
Kanchanpur village. The Muslims of the tola came out and assembled on the roof tops 
in Kanchanpur village. Even so, the mob succeeded in attacking and killed many of 
them. Though there were attacks on the Muslims, the Bakrid festival that fell on the 
5th and 6th November, 1946, there were very few incidents arising out of customary 
cow sacrifice were reported, probably because Muslims were too frightened to 
celebrate in the usual manner.174 By 1946, rioting in South Monghyr had become very 
serious. In one specific village alone, as many as 300 persons were killed, women and 
children had been attacked and there had been several cases of rape also. There was 
communal riot also in Banka, south of Bhagalpur, and situation was tense in 
Jehanabad.175 Although Patna town is quite isolated but the cases of arson were 
observed in outlying villages South-West of Patna. Troops in cooperation with the 
police opened fire on the rowdy mob, seven were killed and three were injured.176 
Four deaths occurred as result of stabbing in Biharsharif. Patrolling by troops and 
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police therefore continued.177 A serious tragedy occurred on November 3, 1946 in 
village Telhara Kangarsarai in which 150 people were killed including one Assistant 
Inspector of police six constables were missing and  25 people were dead in Nina 
village of the same area.178 
Estimate of casualties vary from a hundred injured according to the official 
bulletin, to a thousand killed and many injured according to the Patna correspondent 
of the League’s organ, Dawn, brought out wild stories of the riot without virtually 
going to anyone of affected villages. One of the great difficulties of the situation is 
that the Muslim League does in fact depend on communal feeling to maintain the 
strength of their organization. They can not afford to let it subside. And on the other 
side Congress by their perpetual propaganda and their unceasing encroachments have 
convinced the Muslim League that they can not afford to let the tension die down, or 
to lower their defenses in any way.179 
Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-79)in his statement to the press said, “I am 
absolutely certain that behind this policy of the League is the hidden hand of the 
British, or else the League would, have no courage to start a programme like this on 
such scale.”180 
About the casualties and losses from these strife’s we did not find the accurate 
figure from the source. Police figures of deaths from rioting so far are just over 2,000 
but it is difficult at present to say how accurate these are. In some cases casualties 
may have been over estimated while in others many dead bodies must have been 
disposed of and will never be discovered. Even Pethic Lawrence, wrote to Wavell 
that, he was not sure about the numbers killed in Bihar. There was dissimiliarities in 
the reports of killing, viz. according to Jinnah 30,000 were killed and according to 
Khwaja Nazimuddin181, who was an honest and moderate man, the number of killed 
were 10,000 to 20,000. The official estimates were 4,000 to 5,000 and on the basis of 
all those report Pethick Lawrence put the numbers of killed between 5,000 and 
10,000.182 Also, according to Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-79) it was very difficult to 
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give accurate figures of casualties, but the number can not be over 2,000 killed, 
including those killed by military action.183 
Communal carnage had enveloped a fairly wide area in Bihar. While the 
situation in Chapra cooled down, a large part of Patna and fairly a big area covering 
Gaya, Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Santhal Parganas is in the grip of communal frenzy.184 
Riot was also occurred in north Bhagalpur on November 9, 1946, but the riot 
was quickly brought under control and the trouble was not spread.185 
There had been no further serious communal outrages since 19th November 
with the exception of an attack by a Muslim mob on a family of 17 Hindu goalas in a 
village in the south of the Monghyr in which 13 of the said families were killed. 
According to the enquiries of William Dow from the district officers, there were no 
further repercussions and the riots were not the result of private enmity but were 
purely communal outbreaks. Mohurram had passed off without any incident of 
communal violence that year.186 
In Bihar the riots were over. But the aftermath of riots was as terrible as the 
riots themselves.187 The partitioning Bihari Muslim community and its history of 
refugee lives started with the 1946 riot in October-November, and in its aftermath 
30,000-50,000 Muslims were killed according to the Muslim Leagues estimate.188 By 
December 60,000 of the refugees had moved to camps in the Muslim League ruled 
Bengal.189 Three to four lakhs of Muslims were affected in the five riot-ridden 
districts of Patna, Chapra, Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Gaya. Nearly one lakh of them---
men, women and children were refugees, homeless, uprooted from the soil. At least 
another one lakh were panic-stricken and at any moment they could have been made 
to join the army of refugees.190 
In the aftermath of the 1946 riots, the Hindu Mahasabha revealed its 
masculinist and enumerative politics with no holds barred testified by the fact that it 
saw a ‘mischievous’ and ‘unpatriotic’ propaganda in the socialist version that 
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zamindars and the Hindu Mahasabha were behind the riots.191 B.S. Moonje (1872-
1948) held the view that the Hindus never took initiative in attacking the Muslims. 
During his (Moonje) tour to Patna, Gaya and Monghyr, Moonje appreciated the 
Hindus for their role in the riots of that they stocked up weapons both to protect 
women and to fob off future attacks of Muslims and in cataloging how Muslims had 
provoked Hindus into act of violence.192 These riots created an atmosphere of 
confidence ensued among the goonda elements and they were free to do anything. 
Goondas were known to the authorities and police alike instigated the crimes or 
actually took part in them.193 
About 60,000 Muslims (including a large number of persons from unaffected 
villages) were reported to have moved to Bengal between the 3rd week of November 
and the end of December 1946.194 Their ration was also stopped. They went back to 
their homes in Police Station (P. S.) Attari, on the 17th December. They were then 
attacked on 18th. It is reported that 20 were killed many houses were burnt and their 
properties were looted.195 But the other document says that, the report that Muslims 
were killed, and houses burnt in Police Station (P. S.) Attari on 18th of December is 
quite without foundation.196 
Nonetheless, there were also some stories of communal amity. This is testified 
by a wire to the editor of Searchlight which was sent by the Muslims of some 
villages: 
“Hindus are protecting us with their lives. No apprehension, Jinnah’s 
leadership responsible for cause of trouble. We dissociate from him.”197 Certain 
Muslim refugees in Islampur were persuaded by the Congress workers to return to 
their homes.198 
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Data of Riot Affected Muslims 
District Total population 
of Muslims 
(according to the 
census of 1941) 
Total number of Muslims affected by the 
actual incidents 
Killed Injured Houses burnt/ 
damaged during the 
disturbances 
Patna 235201 3388 407 1680 
Saran 363692 114 101 203 
Gaya  293347 547 113 440 
Monghyr 264411 1021 436 1001 
Bhagalpur 
(including Saharsa) 
279525 166 
(+158+8) 
96 
(94+2) 
591(399+192) 
Santhal Parganas 262836 47 209 223 
Source: PS, file no; 314/1947, p.1 (A) 
The number of Muslims who were killed, or injured, has been given in the 
column 3 of above Table, but it is impossible to give the precise figures of those who 
suffered material damage during the disturbances. From the number of houses burnt 
or otherwise damaged, during the disturbances, the number of families, which 
suffered material damage directly, would appear to be about 4200. Taking the average 
number of members in a family to be 6, the total population directly affected would be 
about 25,000.199 In all, 18 villages were affected in Ghosi Police Station (P. S.) in 
Gaya district; out of 5 villages of Gaya Police Station a large number of Muslims had 
been killed.200 
According to a report of the S. P. of Gaya to the Chief Secretary, 96 Hindus 
were arrested till 13 January, 1947. According to the S. P’s report (reported on 21st 
January 1947, Gaya District), 121 Hindus were arrested. But evidently 3000 Hindus 
were arrested and 135 people were killed between 13 January, 1947 and 21 January, 
1947.201 
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Table: Communal disturbances since October, 1946 
Figures based on information supplied by the local police and magistrates 
(1) Monghyr Sadar Subdivision 
Name of 
PS 
Number of 
persons killed 
Number of 
persons 
wounded 
Number of 
houses looted 
Number of 
houses burnt 
Remarks 
Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim 
Tarapur 22 343 24 263 169 549 162 535  
Kharagpur - 133 - 23 - 284 3 251  
Barabigha 2 11 - 1 - 20 - 30  
Sheikhpura 4 19 5 2 2 32 - 3  
Lakhisarai - 4 - 8 - 96 - 49  
Kiul GRP - 1 21 - - - - -  
Burhee - - - 2 - - - 7  
Surajgarh - 86 - 35 - 49 - 11 (according to 
Shah Rashid 
Ahmed Molai, 
65 Muslim were 
killed and many 
casualties of 
loot and arson 
occurred in 
Alinagar, 
Mohammadpur, 
Anandpur, 
Basuhar and 
Belanija.) 
Monghyr 
Mufassil 
- 64 - 6 1 241 2 16  
Monghyr 
Town 
- 3 16 14 - - - 4  
Jamalpur 2 28 1 8 6 20 2 9  
Jamalpur 
GRP 
- 3 - 3 - - - -  
Total  30 667 66 365 178 1291 169 915  
(2) Jamui Subdivision 
Jhaja PS 14 1 - - - 1 - 5  
Sikandara - 12 - 9 - 55 3 14  
Jamui - 2 2 4 1 20 1 23  
Total 14 15 2 13 1 76 4 42  
                                                                    Sd. A.N. Momar 
                                                                    DM of Monghyr 
Source: Political Special file no., 317/1947, p.8 
                                                                  
On 2nd March 1947, Gandhiji reached Patna to persuade the Hindus, there he 
was accompanied by Dr. Rajendra Prasad, and he met some Bihar ministers. He said 
that he knew that, what the Hindus of Bihar did to their Muslim brethren was much 
worse than what had happened in Noakhali.202 There was pressure on the Bihar 
government to set up an enquiry committee into the Bihar riots of November 1946. It 
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could have helped in allaying the misgivings of the local Muslim minority.203 
According to the Judicial Secretary of that time, it was very difficult to find sufficient 
number of [unbiased] jurors to enquire into such a large number of communal cases 
and was difficult to have brought to session courts. Another difficulty was danger in 
communal cases of jury men, or assessors being swayed by communal feeling in their 
verdicts.204 As H. Dow wrote to Mountbatten: 
I did not discuss with Gandhi [about] his insistence on an 
official inquiry into the Bihar riots. Nothing about this has 
come to me officially, but the press has announced [that] it is to 
be a one man Commission and that Mr. Justice Ruben of the 
Patna High Court has been selected. I still do not think this 
brings anything good. While there are widespread communal 
disturbances still raging and possibly spreading in other parts 
of India, there is no likelihood that an official report on Bihar 
riot will have more than an academic interest by the time it is 
completed, and in the meantime any publicity given to its 
proceedings can do nothing but harm.205 
In village Berhampur (Police Station Sultanganj, Bhagalpur district) all 
twenty-eight Muslim houses were burnt and twenty-one Muslims were killed.206 
Reports had been reached to the office of the Central Muslim League Relief 
Committee of the openly anti-Muslim arrogant and callous attitude of many Hindu 
officials who were dealing with the cases arising out of the Great Massacre of 
November 1946.207 Many Hindu officers were using intimidation and abused Muslim 
witnesses. There was no redress, and investigation had become a mockery.208 H. 
Dow’s wrote to Mountbatten that, an open inquiry would involve recrudescence of 
communal trouble and to enquire into the riots was nothing but a waste of time and 
money, as well as a potential source of further communal strife. It would reveal the 
appalling excesses committed by the Hindus in Bihar.209  
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There was riot on 8th April 1947, at Ranchi in Bihar, Government’s summer 
capital, thus a punitive tax amounted 75,000 was imposed.210 As regards the cases of 
loot, arson, murder etc., which were attributed to the communal frenzy of the majority 
community, according to Professor Nirmal Bose and Gandhi, were not more than pure 
and simple criminal incidents in which both the Hindu and the Muslims had suffered. 
Until the confidence had not been restored, the sufferers frightened to return to their 
homes.211 
The techniques followed by the rioters in the worst affected areas of Bihar 
during the period of the Great Holocaust got revealed by the tens of thousands of 
refugees who had fled from these areas into Bengal and other places disprove that the 
risings were spontaneous or unplanned. Behind the widespread holocaust lies the 
story of months of careful and secret planning which was well within the knowledge. 
By late November there were 7000 refugees in Calcutta that swelled to 25,000 by 
early December. On the whole about 60,000 Muslims including a large number of 
people from unaffected areas moved to Bengal between third week of November and 
end of December, 1946. The exodus of Bihari Muslims to Bengal slowed down by 
January 1947.212  
The conduct of the police all through the carnage was quite wanting. All 
evidences collected by the League indicated that, with a few noble 
exceptions, the members of the Bihar Police, both armed and civil, were 
working in complete collaboration with the rioters. At many places the 
authorities remained silent spectators of the tragic drama, most of the 
time they sided the mob. In many places they seized lawfully-held arms 
on the assurance that they will protect them but the promises were not 
kept. The rioters had jeeps, trucks etc. sounds differently to alarming the 
rioters to attack. At almost all the places, the attackers were armed with 
guns, rifles and had unlimited supply of petrol to burn houses.213 
There was another proof of such modus operandi of carrying out the violence. 
There were 14 licensed gun-makers and merchants in Monghyr. Out of 14 only one S. 
M. Yasin of Chowk Bazar was Muslim, the remaining 13 were Hindu shops. On 28th 
October, 1946 S. M. Yasin, the gun-maker and arms-ammunitions merchants 
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apprehended communal troubles at Monghyr and approached Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad, 
the Superintendent of Police Monghyr to provide him two armed guards but it was 
refused and was directed to deposit the entire arms and ammunitions. Mr. Yasin did 
the same, and his shop was closed for indefinite period.214 
After Bihar, the wrath of riots turned to Punjab and NWFP. There was a clear 
link between the massacres committed in Bihar and NWFP. Riots occurred on large 
scale in various parts of NWFP, were the direct reflection of what happen to the 
Muslims in Bihar, these riots were directed against the non-Muslims in NWFP.215 
Likewise Hindus of Bihar, many Muslims of NWFP also saved their Sikh brothren. 
Civil Surgeon of Shiekhpura stated that Muslims provided shelter, even at the risk of 
their life.216 
The Riots of 1947 
Although there were no riots during few initial months in 1947, but sporadic 
and frequent attack on Muslims continued in many parts of Bihar. For example, on 30 
March 1947 shop (situated on the Main Road Ranchi) of Mohd. Ishaq (a member of 
the Jamiat- ul-Ulema), was looted by some Marwaris. When he screamed not to break 
his shop, he was attacked by one Amar (a Marwari boy) with a dagger and another 
one named Darya (also a Marwari boy) with a lathi. They also served a warning to 
repeat their assault against him.217 On 31st March, 1947, Imamuddin (a Fruit Merchant 
and also a member of Jamiat-ul-Ulema) was attacked by Darya and Amar they also 
shouted that, ‘dekho sala aa gaya, daur kar maro’, while he was engaged in opening 
his shop. But irony was that when Imamuddin rushed towards the Purulia Road and 
reported this matter in the Police Station. No action had been taken by the police.218 
Raghib Ahsan, a Muslim League MLA in his letter to Minatullah Rahmani (member 
of Working Committee of All India Jamiat-ul-Ulema), wrote on 4 March 1947, that in 
the night some Hindus came to Warisalganj Police Station area and burned the 
Muslim house.219 There was ten Muslim houses in a village of Rustampur Police 
Station in the Subdivision Nawadah (Gaya district) were burnt after being looted and 
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assaulted by the Hindus.220 The crops in the villages of Bajidpur and Shahpur were 
also looted by the Hindus.221 In the same month of March, 1947, in a village Kutubpur 
(Poonpoon, Police Station), there was an attack by Hindu mob on Muslim, their 
houses were set on fire.222 In another village Behrawan (Poonpoon, Police Station) 
Hindu houses were set on fire by Muslims and five houses of Hindus were burnt 
down. Later on this village also had been attacked by a Hindu mob and one house of a 
Muslim had been set on fire. The Muslims had defended themselves in the village and 
had opened fire on the mob.223 
According to the Superintendent of Police of Poonpoon, it was not true that 
the Muslims were responsible for starting riots everywhere and the Hindus were only 
retaliate in self defense. There was no evidence of a planned or organized attacks by 
the Muslims from anywhere. A large number of Hindus had been accused in the riot 
cases. Although some of them had been falsely accused but most of the accusation 
were true.224 
People were fed up with riots and felt insecure against recurrences of riots due 
to the very bone of contention, the Pakistan scheme. To avoid this spiral of violence, 
the Pakistan scheme of the League should either be dropped or be immediately 
granted. To drop the Pakistan scheme does not seem possible after the failure of ‘big 
Congress guns’ in eradicating the evil of communal feelings.225 Following the Bihar 
Government’s order to close refugee camps a strong police force raided the refugee 
camps at Dighaghat in the evening of 29th June, 1947, and arrested one doctor and 11 
League volunteers.226 On the whole, by May 1947, the BPHMS felt that it had lost ‘a 
very good chance of winning the heart of masses’.227 
Some sources testify that the feeling of ill will was almost invariably 
propagated by the Sangh students of the Dehri H.E. School against the Muslim 
students of the school. For instance, on 27th July, 1947 Maulvi of the school along 
with some seven to ten Muslim students was assaulted by the RSS students over a 
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very insignificant matter.228 There was misconception among the Hindu students of 
the school that the third Maulvi was communal minded teacher and he beated only 
Hindu students. Thus twenty to twenty-five Sangh students gathered and surrounded 
third Maulvi while he was going home Gopi Chaudhary a Malah (Hindu caste of 
fisherman) student of 11th class and instructor of RSS joined the scene and instigated 
the Hindu students to beat Maulvi Saheb black and blue so that he will shake off his 
communal nature forever.229 On the instigation of the RSS instructor, Basistha Singh 
(student of class 10), Ram Bilas Singh (student of class 10), and Hari Narayan 
(student of class 6) assaulted Maulvi Saheb and snatched away his spectacles and 
fountain pen. Some of the Muslim students, who managed to save Maulvi Saheb, 
were also driven away from that place through fists and blows.230 Thus with these 
events it becomes clear as to how RSS volunteers maintained their anti-Muslim 
attitude and spread false propagandas against Muslims, particularly during the closing 
months of the British rule. We get the idea of RSS hatred for the Muslims from their 
statement that, “We have driven out the ‘White Englishmen’, and we have now driven 
the Black Englishmen”231 similarly, in Bhabhua town there was a communal incident 
in July 1947 and it was found that this disturbance was led by the RSS. Here too, 
prominent role was played by the school boys of High English (H.E.) School and even 
some of the teachers had connived at the lawless activities of the students who were 
mostly members of the Sangh.232 “RSS wanted to drive out the Muslims and RSS 
dreamed a golden dream to establish a complete Hindu Raj in the country. According 
to their opinion, Muslims have right to settle only in Pakistan because Hindustan is 
now of Hindus.”233 
One Sitaram Khemka (a RSS associate) was involved in objectionable 
activities in Monghyr. Khemka was, therefore, arrested and his arrest was likely to 
dislocate Hindu Mahasabha’s plans not only in Monghyr, but perhaps in other parts of 
the province as well.234 The District Magistrate thought that Hindu communal activity 
in his district has ‘increased dangerously’, and he, therefore, proposes to arrest, under 
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the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, all persons who try to propagate the 
Hindu Sabha Direct Action Plan.235 
The happenings of the last few months culminating in the division of 
the country on a communal basis have undoubtedly created conditions 
favorable for the growth of a political and cultural Hindu revivalist 
movement. The widespread feeling among the Hindus that the Muslim 
League has accepted a truncated Pakistan only as a stepping stone for 
the achievement of full Pakistan, the fear that Pakistan will join a 
federation of Islamic States the object of dominating the whole of India, 
and reports that the Muslims in the Indian provinces are arming 
themselves with lethal weapons, are all factors conducing to the growth 
of militant communal feeling among the Hindus.236 
On 18th August 1947, the Sub Divisional Officer (S.D.O., Maldah Sadar, a 
district in West Bengal) tried to bring down ‘Pakistan Flag’ at Maldah, this created 
sensation in the district. On 22nd August some Muslims removed the ‘National Flag’ 
of India from the Station building of Baluka Road near Maldah- the Hindu again 
hoisted it.237 Apprehending trouble, the local authorities posted I.S.I. and four armed 
constables at Baluka Road Station. On the following day a mob of 1000 Muslims 
(better known as Sisbadia Musalmans who are agricultural labourers) all armed with 
bhalas, lathis etc. raided the railway station. The police force posted there at first tried 
to reason with them in course of which the Muslims snatched two guns from the 
constables. The remaining two constables slipped off to a little distance and fired 
several rounds killing 8 persons at the spot and injuring several. One Hindu passerby 
was also injured.238 This news of firing reached Kathiar in a different version, that the 
Punjabi Muslim constables had fired on the Hindus and the Hindus on Maldah-Purnea 
border came panicky. But the actual fact became known to them on the following day 
and the panic immediately subsided.239 
Muslim population was in majority almost in all villages on both sides of the 
provincial borders of Bihar and Bengal and therefore the Hindus in the area were a bit 
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nervous and they were apprehending some sort of trouble.240 About the Ranchi riot of 
March 1947, we find some fact from a confidential note of the S. D. M. of Ranchi that 
two prisoners were alleged to be mainly responsible for the riot in the Ranchi in 
which several persons were killed, houses were burnt and properties were looted.241 
The D.M. of Muzaffarpur reported that Sub-Inspector Razak Khan wanted to create 
some communal trouble while he was officer-in-charge of Lalganj police station 
during last Bkr-Id.242 
Dashahra and Bakra-Id happened to be celebrated on October 25th, 1947 and 
there was no report of disturbance from any part of the Tirhut Division. Only from 
Sitamarhi subdivision it appeared from reports that the situation was disquieting that 
in Singha Chauri cow sacrifice was performed in spite of protest of Hindus and this 
had the unfortunate reaction of the murder of one Muslim and the looting of Muslim 
houses.243 The Muslims complained that there was danger to their peace, life and 
property.244 
On 25th October, 1947 late in evening, communal tension had reappeared at 
village Mehsaul, PS Runisyedpur over sacrifice of cow.245 It appears that a cow was 
sacrificed there on 25th October, 1947 at mid-day. The Hindu of the place and the 
locality were greatly annoyed by cow sacrifice and a mob raided the house of one 
Ekbal Hussain, a cultivator, aged about 70 years and he was killed.246 
Rev. Father Farrel (who belonged to an American mission, and held high 
educational qualifications, though his reputation otherwise was not good as he was a 
Beat President of Beat no. 3) confirmed the story of cow sacrifice, which led to the 
aggravation of the trouble. That way the communal riot at Sheonagar might have had 
undesirable repercussions.247 Muslims of Bihar gave assurance to the Hindus that cow 
sacrifice will not take place. But on Bakra-Id (October, 25th, 1947) at Pupri PS of 
Sitamarhi Subdivision a cow sacrifice had taken place which enraged the Hindus. 
Hindus attacked that village (Singha Chauri) burnt the houses and butchered the 
Muslim leaders and Muslim locales of that village.248 During the second week of 
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December, 1947, a series of incidents, though not of a very grave nature, occurred in 
Arrah town due entirely to the lawless activities of the members of the RSS.249 
Conclusion 
There were series of riots in Bihar from late 19th century. In 1920s we find 
four major issues (protest against cow-slaughter, Hindi-Urdu controversy, Shuddhi-
Sangathan and Tabligh-Tanzim) around which communalism revolved. But 1946-47 
riot present horrific scene before us. In 1946 the Noakhali’s Great Killing actually 
happen in Calcutta (Bengal) but the effect fell on Bihar because people From Calcutta 
came to Bihar with their tale of sufferings which resulted in frequent riot in Bihar, and 
that were worst than that of what happen in Bengal. 
In fact we can call that the scene of Bihar riots were heart-rending. About its 
horribility Gandhi himself speaks that, ‘Hindus have done more cruelty on Muslims 
of Bihar than what happened at Noakhali.’ 
Then we see 1947 riots. Riots in Hazara (sic) in January 1947, were followed 
by a Congress defeat in a crucial bye-election in Mardan.250 And other riots were 
knitted around the refugee problem, cow-sacrifice and partition problem and on false 
propaganda by RSS. Like in July some Hindu student and RSS activist beaten and 
driven away, then we see in Sheohar disturbances occurred on the issue of cow 
sacrifice. We find riots in June, July. Disturbances occurred in the towns on 11th 
August and then spread to the districts. Demonstrators inflicted extensive damage to 
railway station, post offices, police station and rail tracts. Then in September 
communal outbreak occurred in village Benibad, PS Katra. Eleven Muslims were 
reported killed and their houses burnt and looted. Cause of trouble was alleged 
kidnapping of a Bengali (Hindu) girl by a Muslim, resident of Benibad, working in 
Calcutta. Communal riot at Benibad resulted as a terrific episode of Hindus brutalities 
and atrocities at Benibad. The total number of casualties was 14 killed, 6 wounded, 13 
bodies had been found, and one body was missing251  between October and 
December, 1947. Government put its efforts to curb the chaotic situation. Mahatma 
Gandhi threatened to faste unto death if riots would not be stopped. Nehru threatened 
to boarded to stop the riots anyhow riots were seized but loss of life and property was 
unprecedented. Naranjan Singh Gill’s Report on Bihar riots (1946) observes that there 
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was fight for power between the two parties amongst the Congress. Thus 
administration failed to prevent the riots.252 Viewing the strained situation of the 
period, (Bihar) government must have had to be aware of the ongoing process and 
take adequate steps to prevent the riots. 
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Chapter- 3 
Communal Riots in Post-Independence Bihar Till 1967 
 
With the independence, many problematic elements emerged that disturbed the 
community relations in independent India. Pakistan was created as a Muslim majority 
state. Yet many Muslims chose to remain in India though they decided this partly 
because of their emotional attachment with their country. They were reduced to 
minority both numerically as well as politically. Muslims believed that Hindus 
consciously or unconsciously held that the Muslims had no moral right to live in 
India.1 As a result of the creation of Pakistan and the accompanying massacre, 
“demands were made by many leaders within the Congress to declare India the 
defender of the interests of India’s Hindu majority.”2 Muslims were considered 
disaffected and less than citizens of India.3 Communalism deepened its roots in 
contemporary political and economic structure and the atmosphere created by the 
administration, intelligentsia and different agencies. The communal political leaders 
represent communal ideologies in their politics. Many government officials and 
leaders openly or secretly compromised or supported communal forces even 
encouraged the intrusion of religion into politics.4 
The socio-economic and political institutions of the state too have shown 
considerable degeneration. The academic institutions have more or less collapsed and 
the administrative machinery, which was regarded as one of the best in the country 
during the 1950s, was in complete disarray. Casteism made inroads not only into 
politics and the bureaucracy but also permeated almost every institution.5 Incidentally, 
it was also the period during which political awakening in Bihar developed as 
different socio-economic interests, coinciding mainly with caste groupings, were 
inducted gradually into politics, and various political tendencies appeared matured 
and shaped the future course of politics in Bihar 
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Political Processes in Bihar after-Independence 
The period between 1951 and 1967 was very important in the political history 
of Bihar. Because the Congress ruled Indian politics after independence remained by 
and large politically, and to an extent socially too, unchallenged. But by 1967 the 
political arena was enlarged and many parties emerged to challenge the dominance of 
the Congress.6 
In 1957, the election campaign got into full swing almost everywhere and 
most of the parties adopted communal leanings or proclivities in their manifestos. U. 
N. Dhebar, the then the President of All India Congress Committee (AICC), asked for 
special support for the party in view of the strained relations with Pakistan over the 
Kashmir issue and also were hopeful of the support of the Muslim community. A 
Congress election meeting in the Nala (sic) constituency in the Santhal Pargana 
district of what is now Jharkhand was broken up by Satrughan Besra (MLA) and his 
supporters of the Jhakhand Party.7 
There was also clash between Congress and Janata Party at some places. In the 
Muzaffarpur town Assembly Constituency in north Bihar there was contest between 
Congress candidate and the Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) candidate supported by some 
of the dissident Congressmen, besides the Jan Sangh8 and other leftist parties.9 
There was rift in Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) over the selection of candidate 
at some places. Mahamaya Prasad Singh (1909-74), and other prominent members of 
P.S.P., C.P.I. and dissident Congress group addressed a public meeting.10 But this 
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alliance had failed. However, the Communist Party of India (C.P.I.) decided to assist 
the Forward Bloc11 and the dissident Congress members came up with a special 
manifesto for the party. For instance, they came up against the failure of the 
Government in taking action against a police officer who exploited the caste-
prejudices and was also guilty in the August 1955 disturbances12 at Patna where a 
police-student clash took place on 15 the August.13 
In 1957, due to the manoeuvres of Krishna Ballabh Sahay (1898-1974) there 
was a tough fight for the leadership of the Bihar Congress Legislature Party between 
Shri Krishna Sinha (1887-1961) and A.N. Sinha (1887-1957). Bitter struggle for 
leadership between them lasted till their deaths.14 
The Janata Party announced its promises for rent-free land to peasants and for 
supporting the private enterprises in its election manifesto. Mehdi Hussain, ex-
Muslim Leaguer, had been selected as party President of the Biharsharif party unit in 
order to win all ex-zamindars. At Hazaribagh district, Kamakshya Narain Singh 
appealed the female voters to come out of pardah and to take part in elections. The 
Janata Party was active in the Palamau, Gaya, Saran, districts and Santhal Pargana 
districts. Another development was that, party tickets were allotted for all general 
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Assembly seats in the Ranchi district to non-Adivasis. Thus selection of non-Adivasi 
candidates15 in Santhal Pargana, which was an Adivasi ppopulated region, caused 
dissatisfaction, and a splinter group known as the “Santhal Mahasabha” had been set 
up there.16 
 While the Socialist Party came up with vigorous election propaganda, the 
party workers took out an unlicensed procession to present a memorandum to the 
S.D.O., Buxar, on behalf of the Harijan for alleged oppression on them by local 
zamindars.17 RSS and Jan Sangh came with the promises for establishment of 
Dharma Rajya as election manifesto, which was seen as a politics of majoritarian 
dominance. Apart from these kinds of socially divisive manifestos there was also 
discontent among the industrial working class which led to sporadic riots in the 
confined areas.18 These riots were the results of personal rivalries between the 
workers and industrialists that were exploited as political stunt. The industrial workers 
were showed their unity by participating in those riots and this class consciousness 
were manipulated by the communal-political leaders by favouring a class, caste or 
community19 
Though the country began to see some political change as early as in mid-
1960s, reflected in the form of various non-Congress governments coming to the 
power in different provinces and states in 1967, Bihar being one of them, it was in 
1977 that the monopoly of the Congress Party was broken at the centre for the first 
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of Bombay, an employee of the Tatas. Similarly, for the Jamshedpur Parliamentary seat, the name of 
the candidate was not announced till the last moment when the ticket was given to Eric Decosta, the 
editor of the Eastern Economist, and said to be an employee of Birlas. The rumor was also in the air 
that, Jaipal Singh negotiated with some powerful industrialists for financial help till the last moment in 
order to extract more benefit for himself. The Jharkhand Party had filed 99 nomination papers for the 
Assembly, and 14 for the Lok Sabha seats. Thus there was considerable dissatisfaction within the party. 
C. f., Ministry of Home Affairs, Political-II, File No. 4/10/57-Poll-II, p. 11. 
16 Ministry of Home Affairs, Political-II, File No. 4/10/57-Poll-II, pp. 10-11. 
17 Ministry of Home Affairs, Political-II, File No. 4/10/57-Poll-II, p. 9. 
18 There was a sudden sit down strike by 200 workers of the Cold roll Mills of the Tinplate Co., 
Jamshedpur. There were riots at the Iron and Manganese Mines in Singhbhum district, where 250 
workers attacked the mine Engineer at the instigation of Barajamda Noamundi and Mine Workers’ 
Union. Inamul Hai Khan established his Union in Lakurka Colliery, working among the labourers and 
supported hunger-strike by the chowkidar of the Colliery and with 200 workers raided the Colliery 
office and late he engineered a partial strike in the Colliery.; Ministry of Home Affairs, Political-II, File 
No. 4/10/57-Poll-II, p. 13. 
19 Surya Prakash Upadhyay and Rowena Robinson, “Revisiting Communalism and Fundamentalism in 
India” in Economic and Political weekly (henceforth Used as EPW), September 8, 2012, Vol. XLVII, 
No. 36, p. 44 
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time and the Janata Party came to power. Non-Congress governments were installed 
in a large number of states as well, with whipping majorities.20 A quick review of 
political history of Bihar in the post-Independence period can be studied under three 
distinctive phases. The first phase (1947-1967) is marked by complete dominance of 
the Congress Party with Upper Castes at the top of the power structure. The second 
phase (1967-1990) could be designated as a transition period with gradual decline in 
dominance of the Congress Party as well as of the Upper castes and slowly but 
steadily emerging influence of the middle castes in the political arena. The third phase 
(1990 and after) is marked by complete reversal of the first phase, that is, 
marginalization of the Congress Party and the upper castes in the politics of state.21 
But here we shall be mainly confined to the first phase because this chapter covers 
period from 1948 1967. 
Since the Indian National Congress was the leading party in the freedom 
struggle for liberating the country from the colonial power, the Congress party 
naturally became the political heir of the British in the state, as elsewhere in India. 
Other parties, such as the left parties, that had some pockets of support in the districts 
such as Begusarai, Muzaffarpur, Madhubani, Gaya and Sitamarhi, were unable to 
consolidate their mass base. Thus, the Congress Party was, in effect, without political 
rivals. In fact the Congress occupied entire political space of the country in general 
and of Bihar in particular, at least until 1962.22 The Congress party was dominated by 
                                               
20 Sanjay Kumar, “New Phase in Backward Caste Politics in Bihar: Janata Dal on the Decline”, EPW, 
Vol. XXXIV, No. 34/35, 21 August- 3 Sepetember, 1999, p. 2472. 
21 Sanjay Kumar, Mohammad Sanjeer Alam and Dhananjai Joshi, “Caste Dynamics and  Political 
Process in Bihar”, Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, Vol. XX, No. 1&2, January-June, 
2008, p. 5. 
22 Untill the mid-1960s, there was abject poverty, unemployment and destitution on the part of rural 
masses in the Bihar countryside on one hand and affluent, power and endless opportunities for the 
landed aristocracy, usually from the upper crust of the Caste society. The large section of the dalits, 
OBCs and tribals credited their freedom dignity and employment to the landlord because of their 
poverty and massive attacks on the downtrodden by the mafia hired by the zmindars (landlords). Bihar 
Assembly passed the Bihar Land Reform Act (1950) and the Fixation of Land Act (1962), but these 
acts were severly watered-down with deliberate loopholes, clearly intending to benefit the landlords.; 
see, Francine R. Frankel, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State: Bihar” in Atul Kohli, Democracy and 
Development in India: From Socialism to Pro-Buisness, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009, p. 
257.;  Since more than 44% members of the Congress in  Bihar Legislative Assembly were 
breahmanas, rajputs, bhumihars and kayasthas thus the Bihar governing elite deliberately conspired to 
thwart the peasantry from acquiring their minimum share of land and its produce. Thus the successive 
Bihari government had failed to implement land reforms and guaranties of minimumwages for 
agricultural labours, as a result, disparities in wealth between landless dalit labourers and their landed 
upper caste and middle-caste counterparts had increased., see, Sumita Narula, Broken People: Caste 
Violence Against India’s “Untouchables, Human Rights Watch, 1999, New York, pp. 34-45; But with 
the abolition of zamindari situation was changed, the organized and mobilized masses started denying 
to recognize them as landlords and their masters. The Bihar countryside had undergone tremendous 
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the upper castes viz., Brahmans, Rajputs, Bhumihars and Kayasthas. More than 44% 
of the Congress members belonged to these (upper)23 caste groups and drew support 
from them and the Congress also enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the two important 
vote banks, that of the Scheduled Castes (ex-untouchables/Harijans) who were loyal 
to the Congress as Gandhi had fought for their dignity and it had incorporated many 
provisions in the Constitution of the Republic,24 such as the practice of untouchability 
was made a punishable offence, and the Muslims who were left leadless after the 
India’s Partition because most of the Muslim leaders migrated to Pakistan thus 
Muslims had no choice but to support the Congress.25 In order to ensure their fair 
representation in the Central and State Legislatures, reservation was granted to them. 
Provisions of reservation in other public sphere such as educational institutions and 
public employment were also embodied in the Constitution. Various laws relating to 
discrimination against them also followed. All these measures were seen and 
propagated as a gift of the Congress to the dalits, they therefore rallied behind the 
Congress.26 
Role of ideology in the post-independence India also undermined communal 
polarization. For political parties in the 1950s were broadly formed on ideological 
basis, with the Congress on the left of the centre and the Socialists as the main 
                                                                                                                                       
changes, throughout 1950s, 60s, and 70s. But these changes were going on the exploitative socio-
political and economic system that had created mafiosi to thwart the process of change in society which 
might usher in era of socio-economic justice for all., see, Arvind Sinha, “Social Mobilisation in Bihar: 
Bureaucratic Feudalism and Distributive Justice” in EPW, Vol. XXXI, No. 51, 21 December, 1996, pp. 
3287-3288. 
23 The Congress party was dominated at the centre by progressive leaders who did not bothered caste as 
a relevant category for state-sponsored social change and relied on conservative notables at local level. 
Caste was ignored because it was bound to submerge by the class because they were poor.; see 
Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of Low Castes in North Indian Politics, 
Permanent Black, Delhi, 2003, pp. 254-255.  
24 Frankel, “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order”, pp. 
82-83; see also, Kumar, Alam and Joshi, “Caste Dynamics and  Political Process in Bihar”, p. 5 
25 Hindus, who form more than 80 per cent of Bihar's population, can be classified into four categories: 
upper (ftwice-born) castes, middle castes, lower castes, and Harijans or Schedul-ed Castes. The other 
two communities are Muslims, and Scheduled Tribes or Adivasis, forming 13.48 and 8.8 per cent 
respectively of the state population. Adivasis were mainly concentrated in Chhotanagpur. Though 
Muslims are found all over the state, they are mainly concentrated in Patna, Gaya and Muzaffarpur 
districts. The thirty sub-divisions of the lower castes together form the single largest group, nearly 32 
per cent of the population. The Scheduled Castes, even poorer, from 14.1 per cent of the total 
population and are scattered all over the state. The upper castes (Brahmin, Bhumihar, Rajput and 
Kayastha), though constituting only 13.6 per cent of the population, occupy a dominant position not in 
the state. The middle castes (Yadav, Kurmi and Koiri), forming 18.7 per cent of the total population of 
the state, have been lately coming up in politics.; see, L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers: 
Muzaffarpur, Superintendent Government Printing, Patna, 1919, pp. 26-41, see also, O’Malley, Bengal 
District Gazetteers: Gaya, Superintendent Government Printing, Patna, 1919, pp. 93-109. 
26 Frankel, “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order”, p. 83. 
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opposition. Other ideologies of the political spectrum included Marxism of the 
Communist Party, liberal capitalism of the Swatantra Party, and assertive nationalism 
of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh.27 At organizational level, the leadership of the Muslim 
community, after the partition, was thrust upon Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (JuH, 
founded in 1919), an ally of the Congress Party.28 In independent India, Muslims 
carried an image of being disloyal to the country and their loyalty towards country 
was suspect by many Hindus. Moreover, there were no major and viable political 
organisations or party of the Muslims to raise their issues and that could have been an 
alternative of the Congress. Thus, Muslims had no choice but to go with the Congress 
and vote for it. Even as the Congress was a party dominated by the forward castes and 
landed aristocrats as well, it took a reformist path despite the fact that some of its 
policies would go against the interests of the upper castes.29 Abdul Qaiyum Ansari 
(1905-74) who served as President of the All India Backward Muslims Federation 
from 1952, undertook a number of constructive activities for the advancement of the 
backward Muslims in general and Momin community in Particular.30 Between 1953 
and 1954, top 10 per cent of rural households owned 52.36 per cent of land and 
bottom 40 per cent households owned mere 1.25 per cent of land. And most of the top 
10 per cent households that owned about half the land in the state belonged to the 
upper castes,31 except for some Muslims. Abdul Qaiyum Ansari chaired the Bihar 
State Handloom Weavers Conference in 1955 for the betterment of the julahas and he 
was also a member of the All India Handloom Board from 1953-59.32 The Jamiat was 
all along an appendix of the ruling Congress Party, through which the latter sought to 
consolidate its vote bank. The Jamiat thereby acquired an image of a sarkari (pro 
establishment) party and was as such incapable of representing anti-establishment 
sentiments which were bound to exist, in some degree, among the Muslim as they did 
in any other community. Conscious of its limitations, the Jamiat sought to broad-base 
its activities and took the initiative in convening an all-India Muslim convention in 
June 1961. It excluded what were called communal parties like the Muslim League 
                                               
27 Balraj Puri, “Indian Muslims since Partition”, in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVIII, No. 
40, October 2, 1993, p. 2142. 
28 Puri, “Indian Muslims since Partition”, p. 2142. 
29 Kumar, Alam, and Joshi, “Caste Dynamics and Political Process in Bihar”, pp. 5-6. 
30 Muslim India, September, 1987, Vol. V, No. 57, p. 389. 
31 P. H. Prasad, “Agrarian Violence in Bihar” in EPW, Vol. XXII, No. 22, May 30, 1987, pp. 849-850; 
also see, Frankel, “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order”, 
1989, p. 83. 
32 Muslim India, September, 1987, Vol. V, No. 57, p. 389. 
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and the Jamaat-e-Islami-e-Hind (JIH, founded by Maulana Maududi in 1941). But a 
group of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, led by Mufti Atiqur Rahman, publicly favoured 
cooperation with the Jamaat-e-Islam-e-Hind. The convention was further split on a 
resolution of the Communist leader Z. A. Ahmed33 (October 29, 1908-1999) aiming 
to ban communal parties. All in all, the ground left vacant by the Muslim League, as a 
consequence of the partition, and due to the absence of the leaders such as Maulana 
Azad, Rafi Kidwai and Abdullah, could not be fully filled in by the Jamiat or any 
coalition of Muslim parties or any secular party. Muslims, thus, lacked not only 
adequate articulation but also a communication link with the Hindu majority.34 
As we know that, communalism refers to the political assertiveness of closed 
groups sharing a common culture or identity35, thus there was another development 
that created tension among the communities that was growing power of the middle 
caste and minorities in the North India. The process could be traced back36 to the days 
of the Second World War when food prices suddenly shot up and considerably 
reduced the burden of land revenue. The income of the middle castes, who were 
mostly agriculturists, rose. Slowly and steadily they retrieved their long-mortgaged 
                                               
33 Z. A. Ahmad was an Indian politician from Uttar Pradesh. He was Member of the Rajya Sabha for 
four terms: 1958 to 1962, 1966 to 1972, 1972 to 1978, and 1990 to 1994. From 1976 to 1978, he was 
Chairman of the Committee on Government Assurances of the Rajya Sabha. He was Secretary of the 
Uttar Pradesh Committee of the Communist Party from 1951-56. 
34 Puri, “Indian Muslims since Partition”, p. 2142. 
35 N. C. Saxena, “Historiography of Communalism in India” in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Communalism 
and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, Manohar, New Delhi, 1981, p. 331. 
36 The Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha (BPKS) was the only movement that was involved in class struggle 
with potential of challenging the class consolidation, and in 1936 All India Kisan Sabha came to 
existence. However, Bihar Congress with the help of national Congress was able to hend back the 
peasant movement rather than to destroy zamindars, with them Congress cooperated, thus tension 
between Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC) and BPKS built up slowly. In 1932 Kameshwar 
Singh organized UNITED Party parallel to the Congress and had close links with Hindu Mahasabha. 
By 1934, Marxist, led by Jaiprakash Narayan and Narendra Deva, decided to admit communists to 
membership in an attempt to unify all left groups, thus cummunists facilitate themselves to put their 
strategy in action. The Bihar Tenancy Act of 1936, reduced rents by 25% byut made commutation 
through cash further pitched the high rate of 9/20 of the produce. This Act however, did not providing 
the enforcement machenism for guaranteein rent receipts to the peasants as proof of occupancy of land. 
After that the Restoration of Bakasht Lands Act, 1938, only required the peasants to pay an amount to 
zamindar for restoration, as determined by the District Collector, thus this Act was also defected, 
favouring zamindars. Between, 1936-1939, Kisan Sabha leaders launched “bakasht struggles” in the 
districts- Champaran, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga and Monghyr. Many of the Kisan Sabha members were 
drawn from Shudra caste groups having limited education.  The “bakasht agitation was strong in Padri 
Circle area of Darbhanga Raj. Koeris and Goalas struggled against the Maithil Brahman dominance to 
regain occupancy rights over bakasht lands. As Shahjanand had attemptet to create a united Left 
alternative to Gandhian leadership, thus he agreed to suspend the agrarian agitation in 1940s. As result, 
the poor and low caste peasantry launched a ‘subaltern rebellion’ that took advantage of opportunities 
for grain looting. Thus, the agrarian agitation was carried by the poor peasants and this agitation were 
intertwined with the demands for higher social status, since they had suffered social and economic 
oppression because of their lower caste ranks., see, Frankel, “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: 
Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order”, pp. 74-81. 
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lands from the Thakurs and the Bhumihars who formed the bulk of absentee landlords 
and who were increasingly busy in sharing the political and administrative plums left 
by the British. During the general elections of 1952, 1957 and 1962 the Congress was 
able to win a large majority of legislative seats with 41 to 45% of votes.37 The ruling 
elite did their best to keep the middle castes out of political and administrative 
offices38, but they failed in maintaining it forever.39 Universal adult franchise and 
explosion in education at village as well as at state and national levels, meant that 
numbers had become a weapon of much influence in the political processes. Thus it 
facilitated the middle castes’ rise to power.40 The representation of the middle castes 
in Parliament and State legislature rose from election to election which is clearly 
shown in table below: 
Percentage of Middle-castes’ growth in Lok Sabha 
Year Growth rate in % 
1952-57 22.4% 
1957-62 29.1% 
1962-67 27.4% 
1967-71 30.6% 
1971-77 33.2% 
1977-79 36% 
Source: Janardan Thakur, Indira Gandhi and Her Power Game, 1979, p. 161. 
The consolidation of the middle caste and their awareness of numerical-
political strength had been going on for many decades. With the establishment of 
secular state, adequate representation were given to the religious minorities—
Muslims-- during the general elections of 195241 and 1957. Although there was no 
                                               
37 Frankel, “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order”, p. 82. 
38 Social struggles in the Indian countryside in general, and in Bihar in particular, even when that was 
class struggles in their essence, had significant caste implications. In fact the oppression of the rural 
vested interests over the rural poor in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and so on, was inevitably intertwined with 
caste oppressions. Unless the militant political forces specifically adapted their class approach with an 
awareness of these caste dimension, they would find themselves severely handicapped in mobilising a 
large part of the downtrodden mass, that is, those who happen to be oppressed class, on the one hand, 
and would also fail to combat the manifestations of the most despicable forms of social oppression on 
the other. 
39 Janardan Thakur, Indira Gandhi and Her Power Game, Vikas Publishing House, Ghaziabad, 1979, 
pp. 160-161. 
40 Harry W. Blair, “Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India: Caste as a Differential Mobilizer in 
Bihar” in, Comparative Politics, Vol. V, No. 1, October, 1972, p. 112. 
41 Apart from representation in general elections there was another important thing had happened that 
in 1952 a non-governmental legislation for the reservation in government jobs for the OBCs, SCs and 
STs were presented in Bihar Legislative Assembly by Baidyanath Singh but the legislation was 
rejected by 180 votes against 52 votes because prominent leaders of backward caste like, Bindeshwari 
Prasad Mandal, Abdul Qaiyyum Ansari, Shivnandan Prasad Mandal, Mungeri Lal, Ramlakhan Singh 
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communal reservation, members of the minority communities were selected in 
considerable numbers in the administrative, diplomatic and other services. Thus, 
minorities were able to play adequate role in walks of public life.42 In 1957, after the 
death of Anugrah Narayan Sinha (1887-1957), his son Satyendra Narayan Sinha 
(1917-2006) emerged as the leader of Rajput faction43 and the death of Shri Krishna 
Sinha in 1961 was followed by the emergence of his lieutenant and fellow caste-man, 
Mahesh Prasad Sinha (1900-1971) of Muzaffarpur.44 The gradual decline in the 
voting percentage of the Congress from 1952 to 1967 had much to do with the gradual 
coming up of the middle castes, which had first found a platform in the Ram Manohar 
Lohia led Samyukta Socialist Party that had emerged as the largest single party in the 
Bihar Assembly elections of 1967. Indeed, the emergence of a Jat leader, Chaudhry 
Charan Singh in Uttar Pradesh, from a tehsil level politician in early fifties to the 
Chief Ministership in1967 and Prime Ministership in 1979, was the result of the 
growing power of the middle castes in North India.45 
After independence, attempts were made to strengthen the political and 
administrative systems in Bihar and the Socialist Party carried forward the work of 
the Triveni Sangha, a caste-based association of three major intermediate castes-
Yadava, Koeri, and Kurmi.46 The political affairs of Bihar were controlled by Shri 
                                                                                                                                       
yadav, Devsaran Singh, Jaglal Chudhary, Lahatan Chaudhary, Kamleshwari Prasad Yadav, Dumarlal 
Baitha, Bhola Paswan Shastri, Jagannath Prasad Swatantra, etc. seized back their support to this 
legislation and more than 25 Adivasis supported this legislation thus there was discontent among them., 
see, Chaudhary and Shrikant, Bihar Mein Samajik Parivartan Ke Kuch Aayam (1912-1990), pp. 143, 
213.; This isolation had created antagonism and tension and had made the problem of consolidation 
more difficult. There was an alienation from other lower and backward communities. The newly 
emerged lower class leaders had no involvement with the problem of Harijans, untouchables and tribals 
after having made considerable progress, politically and educationally, they were now concerned with a 
breakthrough at the level of higher education, and with political alignments with othe political parties 
that would advantageous for them. Like Ram Manohar Lohia desrrted Provincial Socialist Party (PSP) 
on 1 January, 1956 and organized Samajwadi Party, although the immediate reason was the demand of 
resignation of Pattam Thanu Pillai of PSP, by Lohia was not accepted., see, George Kristoffel Liete, 
“Caste in Class Politics”, EPW, Vol. XIV, No. 7 & 8, February (Annual Number), 1979, p. 325. 
42 Moonis Raza, “Communalism: The Dragon’s Teeth”, in Pramod Kumar, Towards Understanding 
Communalism, Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, Chandigarh, 1992, pp. 127-
128. 
43 The political elite of Bihar were always factionalized, even within the Congress party, even though 
they all belong to forward castes. Growing power conflicts alongwith caste and party lines added to the 
political fragmentation.; see, Francine R. Frankel, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State: Bihar” in Atul 
Kohli, Democracy and Development in India: From Socialism to Pro-Buisness, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 2009, p. 254. 
44 Frankel, “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order”, p. 82, 
see also Prasann Kumar Chaudhary and Shrikant, Bihar Mein Samajik Parivartan Ke Kuch Aayam 
(1912-1990), p. 206. 
45 Thakur, Indira Gandhi…, p. 160. 
46 Indu Bharti, “Dalits Gain New Izzat” in EPW, Vol. XXV, No. 18/19, May 5-12, 1990, p. 980. 
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Krishna Sinha47 (1887-1961), a Bhumihar, and Anugrah Narayan Sinha (1887-1957), 
a Rajput. Krishna Ballabh Sahay (1898-1974), a Kayastha, was the lieutenant of Shri 
Krishna Sinha from 1946 to 1952. After the elections of 1952, Mahesh Prasad Sinha 
(1900-1971) began to work as Shri Krishna Sinha's trusted man. Hereafter began the 
dream of unabated political contention within the ruling Congress between Krishna 
Ballabh Sahay and Mahesh Prasad Sinha for leadership succession. This rivalry 
assumed the dimensions of a regular caste struggle that led not only to extremely 
hostile political groupings but also had its undesirable impact on the administrative 
system. Hitherto, the leaders had their loyal supporters in the political camp. But from 
1952 onwards administrators also began to be organized in rival camps owing 
allegiance to different ministers and political bosses. This led to an unholy 
combination between the divergent political Bihar up to the present.48  
 The Socialist Party and even the CPI mobilised the rising middle peasantry 
(kulaks) which, in caste terms, meant the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeries. The leadership 
of the Socialist Party and the CPI, together with the economic49 prosperity that these 
castes had acquired through the government's development programmes and their own 
hard labour and burning desire to bring themselves on par with the upper castes, 
ended the feudal oppression of the backward castes to a great extent. In electoral 
politics this was reflected in the 1967  Provincial Legislative Assembly Vidhan Sabha 
elections when the Socialist Party won 147 seats and with the CPI went on to form the 
first non-Congress government in the state.50 
Communalism in politics in India goes almost together. In the 1967 elections, 
divisive forces took the form of the Jan Sangh campaign against cow-slaughter51 and 
                                               
47 From 1937 to 1939 Shri Krishna Sinha was Chief Minister of Bihar and again from 1947 to January 
1961 he was the chief minister of Bihar. During his Chief Ministership, many new leaders emerged 
from this community. Important among them were Mahesh Prasad Sinha, Krishnakant Sinha, L P 
Shahi, Ram Briksha Brahmachari, Basawan Sinha, Shyam Nandan Mishra, Ramashray Prasad Singh, 
Kailashpathi Mishra and others. This caste has also provided some women leaders like Krishna Shahi, 
Tarkeshwari Sinha and Usha Sinha., see, Ravindar Kumar Verma, “Caste and Bihar Politics”, EPW, 
Vol. XXVI, No. 18, 4 May, 1991, p.1142. 
48 Varma and Verma, “The Political System in Bihar”, p. 506. 
49 After independence, economic and political differentiation within the bourgeoisie started rapidly 
during the 1950s., see, Arjun Makhijani, “Structural Retrogression in the Indian Economy”, EPW, Vol. 
XIII, No. 45, 11 November, 1978, p. 1865. 
50 Bharti, “Dalits Gain New Izzat”, p. 980. 
51 In legal terms, the call for abolition for cow slaughter had been reduced to the demand that the 
Central Government should give effect to Article 48 of the Constitution of India, which stated that state 
should, amongst other things, take steps for ‘prohibiting the slaughter’of cows and calvs and other 
milch and draught cattle’. Although this Article belonged to the Directive Principles, and was therefore 
intended only to provide guidance to the state in making of laws, there had been several attempts to 
persuade the Central Government to prohibit cow-slaughter through an Act of Parliament. However , 
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the Hindi-Urdu controversy. However communal violence just before elections 
always polarized votes, for example, after the anti-cow slaughter movement in 1967, 
the Jan Sanh got 36 Lok Sabha seats and more than 9% of total votes polled.52 
In the 1967 elections, due to the uninterrupted propaganda of non-
Congressism carried on by Ram Manohar Lohia (1910-1967) and other persons in the 
opposition, the Congress was dislodged from power in Bihar. There was little 
manoeuvring space for Congress during 1965-1966. By the time Congress was weak 
because of internal dissension over the leadership question ant the centre-state conflict 
within it; Congress was under attack politically from the Left and the Right.53 Thus 
the weakness of the Congress rule was so exaggerated and prominent54, that the 
overall positive progress was concealed and the dangers posed by anti-national 
communal forces, were ignored. After 1967 general elections country got a weak 
centre and non-Congress coalitions in nine states.55 There were several experiments of 
non-Congress governments under the Chif Ministership of Bindeshwari Prasad 
Manda (a Yadava), Bhola Paswan Shastri (a Harijan, Dusadha) and Karpoori Thakur 
(a barber of lower backward class). The 1967 experiments, however, brought in its 
wake the worst kind of communal violences, viz. Meerut (1961)56, Ranchi, 
Jamshedpur etc. that shook the very roots of our nationhood57, and was nurtured only 
by negative sentiments of protest against the Congress monopoly of power but there 
were not present fundamental forces for nurturing organic cohesiveness among the 
constituents.58 CPI (Communist Party of India), closer to Congress (I) suited to the 
communist; they would like the Janata Party to lessen the BJP’s in Bihar and Uttar 
                                                                                                                                       
Nehru had set himself firmly against such a course and in 1955 a committee of experts had decided that 
such a ban would not be in the best interests of the country., see, B. D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and 
Indian Politics: The Origin and Development of the Bhartiya Jan Sangh, Cambridge University Press, 
Sydney, 1990, p. 147. 
52 India Today, 31 October, 1989, p. 37. 
53 Makhijani, “Structural Retrogression in the Indian Economy”, p. 1867. 
54 Bihar also was hard hit by famine and flood by 1966-1967 that create food crisis, thus Bihar Relief 
Committee was appointed. Instead, initially the Government of India distrusted and discounted reports 
coming from Bihar and treated them as being politically motivated; it required Bihar politicians and 
relief workers to create a crisis atmosphere in order to procure help from outside. Ultimately, when the 
Government of India realized the gravity of the situation in Bihar, it, too, had to turn the situation into a 
grave national crisis in order to secure a massive release of P.L. 480 (wheat loan) from the United 
States to India.; C.f., Paul R. Brass, “The Political Uses of Crisis: The Bihar Famine of 1966-1967”, 
The Journal of Asian Studies,Vol. XXXXV, No. 2, February, 1986, pp. 246-249. 
55 D. R. Goyal, “Communal Challenge Today” in Aruna Ashraf Ali (ed.), India’s Unity and Security: 
Challenges, Patriot, New Delhi, 1984, pp. 158-159. 
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City, 1961 to 1982” in EPW, Vol. XXXIX, No. 44, 30 October 2004, pp. 4839-4848. 
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Pradesh.59 During early years of independence politicians, though instigated riots but 
they always tried to conceal their involvement in the riots but with the criminalization 
of politics they started expressing their biased and communalized outlooks.60 
Hindu-Muslim riots were often a result of political instigation. Leaders or 
political parties, which were not in power, incorporated the communal agendas, e.g. 
language issue, religious issues etc., and in their election manifestos to achieve 
political power that ultimately resulted in riots. As Hitendra Patel (2011) wrote that, 
“the careful perusal of the writings and speeches of the Congress [Hindu] leaders 
suggest that they were trying to conceptualize the rise of Hindu organizations and 
their communal mobilization under the programmes ‘shuddhi’ and ‘sangathan’,…”.61 
Vinita Damodaran also wrote that the zamindars, the Mahants and the banias were 
involved in encouraging the riots in the villages and bound peasants were due to their 
helplessness automatically dragged into the riots and the peasant class was only 
involved in loot during the riots.62 In some other cases of the riots local grievances 
provide reasons for rioting. Hindu low-caste peasants used these grievances to hit 
back economically to their Muslim competitors and looted their burnt their houses 
after been looted.63 Even after independence the same pattern what was continued in 
the Indian politics even after independent India. The majority community assumed the 
affluent Muslims, who have had gained political and economic influence and can 
compete with the majority community, as their great competitors.64 Thus in almost all 
riots list of the houses of Muslims were already prepared by the rioters.65 Only 
Muslim houses were targeted by political and Sanghi goondas and if there was any 
Hindu’s house adjacent to Muslims’ house, those houses were only looted but not put 
on fire because it might ignite  nearby Hindus’ houses. In the patronage of police and 
armed forces Muslims were butchered openly administration also gave support to 
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these communal forces like in Bhagalpur, Ahmedabad, Surat, Bombay, etc. During 
the riots women were gang raped and killed.66  
Gandhian leader and the leader of Sarvoday movement, Jayaprakash Narayan 
(1902-1979), who earlier was a vocal opponent of RSS, had the following to say 
about it in 1977 "RSS is a revolutionary organisation. No other organisation in the 
country comes anywhere near it. It alone has the capacity to transform society, end 
casteism and wipe the tears from the eyes of the poor." He further added "I have great 
expectations from this revolutionary organisation which has taken up the challenge of 
creating a new India.”67   
Majoritarian Communal Politics of the Press 
Significant section of the press had adopted a thoroughly partisan attitude in 
respect of the major incidents that had taken place. The Hindu communal press had 
sought to put all the blame on the Muslim community and had highlighted stray acts 
of physical violence on the part of Muslim. The Muslim press had furnished to its 
readers blood curdling details of communal incidents and had drawn an inference that 
the majority community can not be trusted. In an atmosphere of mutual distrust 
between the Communities the writing in communal press and the activities of 
communal organizations analyzed above pose a serious threat to the fabric of rational 
and harmonious relation between Hindus and Muslims.68 
The role played by the press is not negligible, the tone and temper of writings 
in the communal press had also devastating and aggravating impact on the society.69 
As in case of Assamese, Bengali, Guwahati language press, the state government was 
very anxious to persuade the press to give only verified versions of incidents and held 
daily meetings with the press representatives and furnished factual information 
district-wise.70 
There were several language newspapers of Assam and Bengal which did not 
publish correct information and continued to set out inflammatory reports. On 
occasions, the State Government requested papers to put off publication of news items 
that came their way in order to giving these some opportunity for verification. They 
were also requested not to mention the number of casualties community-wise and to 
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moderate the tone of headlines. The reaction of press was not helpful and ultimately 
the circulation of some papers had to be stopped.71 
The approaches of the Hindi-Urdu press on Hindu-Muslim issues were 
unpredictable in the Hindi belt. Basically the language press politics is continuation of 
1940s developments which reached its maturity and growth in post-partition years and 
carried many communal chips-both real and imaginary-on its shoulders as a result. 
After independence, Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh were able to influence small 
traders and urbanite middle class, particularly in North India, with their faith in Hindi, 
Hindu, Hindustan and which bought and read Hindi newspapers. Therefore, in order 
to cater to the needs of their clientele the Hindi press had shown a bias against the 
Muslims.72 The vernacular press (Hindi-Urdu) in the Hindi belt had often encouraged 
and deepened the Hindu-Muslim divide in the states of U.P., M.P., Bihar, Rajasthan 
etc., knowingly or otherwise. Apart from Navbharat, Hindustan and Jansatta, 
circulation of Amar Ujala under Ashok Agrawal, Dainik Jagran under Narendra 
Mohan and Rajasthan Patrika under Kulis and some vernacular weeklies, all were 
growing rapidly. Because these papers and weeklies, while, reporting riots or any 
other conflagrations in such a complex that awaken the peoples’ conscious negatively. 
These papers always intend to find sensitive issues to enhance the circulation and any 
communal biases in reporting and presentation of news items be speedily brought to 
book.73 Writings on sensitive issues played major role in moulding the masses’ 
opinion. The Hindi dailies Vir Arjun of 16th May, 1963 and Pratap of 17th May 1963, 
published articles of communal nature, that provoked disturbance of public order and 
tranquilty.74 Urdu periodicals like, Al Jamiat, Payam-e-Mashriq, Astana, Nayi 
Duniya, Nida-e-Millat etc. generally reflected the Muslim bias and carried Muslims’ 
issues such as, communal riots, discrimination against Muslims, under-representation 
of Muslims in government services.75 Like, Nida-e-Millat (Urdu weekly, Lucknow) 
printed an article on April 24, 1964, that was quite provocative. It wrote: 
Firqawaranah nafrat ka sailâb umadata chala â raha hai. Jo log 
duniya ke sâmane secularism ki qasam khate hain woh bhi dilon 
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ke andar tàssub aur firqah parasti ke ambâr lagaye baithe hain. 
Kam az kam ¾ Congressiyon aur Jan Sanghiyon mein ab farq sirf 
lable ka reh gaya hai warnah andar se jahan tak firqawaranah 
tangnazari ka sawâl hai donon yaksan hain.76 
In 1965 in Bihar there was wide publication of an English calendar that 
instigated communal feelings- in which Hindu pujaris were attacked by the 
mullas and a Muslim snatched the dhol used for kirtan,77 this also communally 
charged the Hindu sentiments in Bihar.78 Even in Panchjanya (Hindi organ of 
the Jan Sangh) a scketch was printed in which, Mahatma Gandhi was depicted 
on one side and Gautam Buddha on the either side and in between there were 
cows; and a cow, as depicted in the sketch, was slaughtered by a Muslim 
butcher. Through this sketch message, communalism was easily conveyed. 
However, administration, did not issue any prohibitory notice against this kind 
of inflammatory publication.79 
Also in Jabalpur disturbances we find that press played very crucial role. 
In the Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) riots (1961)80, a newspaper, “Yugdharm”, was 
generally believed to have been the chief means of spreading panic and hatred. 
Yugdharm, published the news of suicide of Hindu girl, who happened to have 
been criminally assaulted by two Muslim boys. It sparked off a riot on 10 
February, 1961.81 But the government only removed its name from the list of 
newspapers; there was no imposition of any kind of penalty/fine upon the 
newspaper.82 
Apart from this, the administration adopted partial attitude against the Muslim. 
Instead of relief distribution and rehabilitation, the Muslims, after independence, in 
fact after the riots, were blamed as initiator of the riots and were also blamed that they 
were harbouring separatist attitudes. When question was raised against the communal 
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82 Home Department (Political), file no. 19/26/1964 Poll-I (A), p. 40. 
 
 
102
character and attitude of the Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and RSS, it was argued the 
there is no legal explanation on communalization, thus they could not ban these 
organizations but if Muslims were organized to raise their issues they were accused as 
communalists.83 Even when a calendar, in which Hindu pujaris were attacked by the 
Muslim mullas, was widely published and openly sold on large scale in Jamshedpur 
but administration was not bothered to curb all the copies. Only when it was ordered 
to seize the said calander, when Jamiat-ul-Ulema’s leaders appealed the Chief 
Minister and it reached door to door. Even though, one Bhimsen Sachar, in his note to 
Jawaharlal Nehru, suggested that any agitation that made in the name of religion to 
gain political benefits and power should be made an offence.84 But Nehru did not pay 
any attention to the Bhimsen’s suggestions. Thus no action was taken against the artist 
and the publisher by the administration.85 
It may be argued that the fertile soil for communal and separatist politics was 
prepared by those historians and statesmen who shared with the imperialists the 
exploitation of the narrow communal sentiments of backward masses in their own 
interest. Some of them formulated that development of modern polity only possible 
through religion.86 
During the period between 1950 and 1960, the communal disturbances were 
fewer and they were not of very serious in nature. In fact, the decade between 1950 
and 1960 can be described as a decade of communal peace.87 There was no large scale 
communal riot in India during the first decade after independence. This happened 
possibly because of the migration of Muslim political leaders and ban on Hindu 
communalists who fomented communal violence. But again it started with beginning 
of the 1960s. Yet communalization prevailed in the society over different issues viz. 
relation with Pakistan, economic problems, power politics etc. This communalization 
process was ranging from assuming ‘Muslims as alien’, ‘responsible for the partition 
of the country’, have had spread Islam on the strength of sword’, ‘Muslims were loyal 
to Pakistan and disloyal to India’ and ‘all Muslims are terrorists’ etc., even 
provocative slogans like, ‘Muslims ke do hi asthan, Kabristan ya Pakistan’ (Muslims 
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can have two places to live: Pakistan or grave), ‘Pahle Kasai88 fir Isai’ (first Muslims 
and then Christians) etc., were also used to communally charged the masse and 
atmosphere.89 
As Bipan Chandra describes communalism as the product of a particular 
situation of a particular society, economy and polity which creates problems90, the 
incidents of student unrest and crimes increases the figures for riot records thus there 
was an abnormal rise in riots in 1967.91 
However, the 1946-1947 riots were different from the riots that took place 
after independence. There were massacres; organized uncontrolled violence and terror 
were used. Although there were serious communal disorders in many parts of 
northern India in the interval before the transfer of power, including a number of 
violent incidents in Calcutta, in which the rioters sometimes used sten guns, by far the 
worst and the most menacing for the future were in the Punjab. 
The 1947 riots and terrible massacres, all were beyond telling, accompanied 
into existence the new states of India and Pakistan. There was an organized bloodbath 
on both sides of the permanent divide. The partition was followed by an exodus of 
people across the border- Hindus and Sikhs immigrated to India and Muslims 
migrated to Pakistan. Whether it was Sindh, Punjab, East Bengal or Calcutta, Bihar 
and U.P., the idea was to derive “them”92 out of the country form both side. Many 
Muslims especially from central Bihar migrated to East and West Pakistan.93 Most 
people who fled to Pakistan or India did not do so out of love for the other country, 
but out of their terror. Decades later they still find themselves aliens in their countries 
of domicile.94 Those who stayed in their homeland, faced with a traumatic experience, 
bewildered and demoralized, thus, they looked upon another country as their savior.95 
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The Muslims were held responsible for the creation of Pakistan, thus Muslims were 
not only suffered economically, socially, and culturally but also suffered from sense 
of guilt. This was the picture of Hindus in Pakistan as well as of the Muslims in 
India,96 which we have already discussed in the previous chapter. 
Communalism is generated by competitive politics, which is not located only 
in the formal political sphere. Muslims had been reduced on all fronts and have had a 
low political, economic and social status in independent India. However, images of 
Muslims created during the colonial times, the experiences of Partition and 
contradictions in the political system supplied inputs in the creation of new reasons 
for communalism in independent India. In the colonial period, Muslims were socially 
and economically marginalized and did not gain much from the modernization 
process.97 After independence most of the riots have been grim disaster and massacres 
committed by the majority upon a defenseless minority. Rioters frequently target 
Muslim businesses, further impoverishing the community.98 Parties like the Shiv Sena 
in Maharashtra, which equates Hinduism with Indian nationalism. Among other 
things, Muslims lost political influence after 1947 because the Muslim-middle99 class 
migrated to Pakistan, leaving those left behind leaderless and economically 
depressed.100 After independence Muslims (except in Kashmir) were dispersed thinly 
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throughout the country, making it difficult for them to organize politically. Even the 
Constituent Assembly on May 11, 1949, recognized only reservation for the 
minorities except for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes as that was another reason for 
the political weakness of the Indian Muslims.101 Their hardship was caused by general 
decline of feudalism, the decay of traditional crafts, and steady erosion in their landed 
status. Besides this the very basis of their landed status was continuously eroded by 
the rise of powerful commercial classes (mostly Hindus) who besides achieving status 
were buying up their (Muslims) land.102 
In independent India, many of the privileges that Muslims had benefited from 
during the colonial period, including separate electorates, reservation in services and 
weightage for both employment and election, were dismantled. Thus the privileges 
and special positions enjoyed by the Muslims under the British were vanished.103 
There were deliberate efforts by the administration to displace Muslims from 
opportunities that were available in independent India.104 Separate electorates for 
Muslims were also rejected.105 M.S. Sathyu’s film Garm Hava (Scorching Wind, 
released in 1973) shows how the economic and social conditions of a Muslim family 
deteriorated in independent India following partition.106 This can be found in the 
debates of “Constituent Assembly of India on Minority Rights” which reveal that 
even after the partition of the country mostly Muslim members of the Assembly were 
of the opinion that there should be provision of separate electorates for Muslims. 
Reacting to the move of B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur, a member of the Assembly, who 
had demanded separate electorate for Muslims, M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, 
another member of Assembly, opposed the proposal of separate electorates.107 
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On 28th August, 1947 another amendment was moved by K.T.M. Ahmed 
Ibrahim Sahib Bahadur regarding the future of Muslims in the elections to the Central 
and Provincial legislatures. He did not directly advocate for the separate electorate but 
what he said was in no way different from a demand for a separate electorate for 
Muslims. He was also supported by Nazruddin Ahmed. Cultural elements of Muslims 
also do not get much recognition; for instance, Urdu is spoken in many states but it is 
not an official language in any state.108 Nevertheless, Muslims are still considered the 
most powerful opponents of Hindus and a “fifth column” in the Indian nation. This 
image of powerful opponent is drawn from various developments in the political and 
economic spheres in post-independence India.109 
In independent India the slow rate of growth and of economic development, 
along with the political mobilization of communities, has been seen as reasons for 
communalism. Muslim communalism has been on the decline since the partition.110 In 
the contemporary phase, communal politics has increased in leaps and bounds the 
poses challenges to constitutional provisions; for example, the demand for the 
abolition of Muslim Personal Law or Article 370 on Jammu and Kashmir. There are 
interconnected issues around which communalism has developed. The rise in the 
economic111 power of the Muslim community due to the migration to Arabian Gulf 
countries, mobilization by political parties, and a new political leadership among 
Muslims were few other reasons around which communalism has grown in 
contemporary India.112 Asghar Ali Engineer113 holds that prosperity of Muslims 
threatening the Hindus’ vested interests, as we could see in case of Jabalpur114 (1961) 
and Bhiwandi (1969)115 riots. These two towns have had small-scale artisan based 
industries in which Muslims were involved. Thus the increasing prosperity among the 
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Muslims leads to increased political aspirations among them posed challenge to the 
pre-existing traditional leadership of the town.116 
As leaderless Muslim masses left behind in India were too demoralized and 
dazed by the catastrophe to react in any meaningful way, much less in an aggressive 
manner, we find a comparative lull in communal violence during the fifties. But with 
the Jabalpur riots117 in 1961 a new phase in communal violence started in post-
partition India.118 The Muslims felt alienated and insecure after a chain of riots broke 
out in the 1960s. The Majlis-e-Mushawarat, a consultative body of various Muslim 
groups and political parties, began a debate about the plight of Muslims in 
independent India but could not success in bringing peace.119 Regional parties such as 
Majilis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (MIM), founded in 1927, were propagating the idea 
of an Islamic polity in the wake of frightening prospect of a Hindu upheaval and 
majority rule. During the integration of Hyderabad into the Indian Union, the 
Razakars120 played an aggressive role, committing arson and loot against Hindus121, 
which fed the aggressive politics of the Sangh Parivar.122 The Muslims gave their vote 
and support to the Congress in the 1960s, in comparison to any other party but in 
general election of 1967 the Congress monopoly of Muslim vote was scattered and by 
1967 emerged a new set of Muslim leaders, such as Ghulam Sarwar (1926-2004), 
Betab Siddiqui, A. Moghani, Shah Mushtaq Ahmed, Moin Ansari, and Taqui 
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Hindu refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan. In Jamshedpur and Bhilai steel factories some 
Muslim workers were thrown into steel furnaces and were burnt alive. These riots continued up to 1965 
when war with Pakistan broke out., see, Engineer, “Communal Conflict after 1950: A Perspective”, pp. 
1782-1783.Modern Asian Studies 
118 Narayan, Communal Riots in India…,  p. 39 and also see M. Aslam, “On Muslim Identity and 
Politics: Some Perspectives”, Occasional Papers, No. 26, G.B. Pant Social Science Institute, 1984, 
Allahabad, p. 18. 
119 Engineer, “Communal Conflict after 1950: A Perspective”, p. 1782. 
120 Though the 'Razakars' were curbed by the police action in 1948, the bitter memories remained alive 
in the minds of Hindus. See. Rajni Bakshi, “Changing Dimensions of Communalism”, EPW, Vol. XIX, 
No. 51/52, 22-29 December, 1984, p. 2152. 
121 Bakshi, “Changing Dimensions of Communalism”, p. 2152. 
122  Sangh Parivar is a term commonly used to denote all groups such as the BJP, the RSS, the VHP and 
the Bajrang Dal, which together espouses the ideology of Hindu nationalism. 
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Raheem, around Urdu cause.123 Except Taqui Raheem leader of the left wing 
(coalition of CPI, CPM, and SSP) none of these leaders were connected with any 
political party. But these Muslim leaders were new and inexperienced, and not 
prominent thus their emergence shows the Muslim Politics reflected the general trend 
of state politics in which anti-Congress wave was at pre-eminence thus their 
emergence reflects in Muslim voting behaviour.124 It is also clear that, Muslim 
representation in Lok Sabha rises with the rise in the fortunes of the Congress in 1952, 
1957, 1971 and 1980125, which is given in the table below: 
Muslim MPs from Bihar since First General Election 
Party 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 
Congress 3 2 2 2 3 - 5 
Janata Congress - 1 - - - - - 
Janata Party - - - - - 2 - 
Total 3 3 2 2 3 2 5 
Source: Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, p. 47 
The Muslim community virtually leaderless till the 1960s saw the emergence 
of some prominent leaders in the early 1980s, such as Syed Shahabuddin (b. 1935) the 
former diplomat turned Parliamentarian, and the editor of Muslim India, English 
monthly of research, reference, and documentation.126 
Language Problem  
Hindi-Urdu controversy is a problem persisting since 19th century.127 It is very 
old and unique problem that was created during the colonial regime. Hindi-Urdu 
controversy became a tool to polarize the relation between Hindu-Muslim 
communities in second half of the 19th century. In 1837 the Government replaced the 
Persian as court language with Urdu (also known as Hindustani) thus job 
opportunities were waiting for those people who had knowledge of Urdu as well as of 
Persian and Arabic too. Kayasthas, Khatris and Kashmiri Brahamans were the major 
                                               
123 Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, pp. 45-46. 
124 Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, p. 46. 
125 Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, p. 47. 
126 Syed Shahabudin (b. 1935), a former Indian Foreign Service Officer, became a prominent 
spokesman for Muslim cause in the 1980s. See, Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since 
Independence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994 [1990], pp. 236-237; also see, Upadhyay 
and Robinson, “Revisiting Communalism and…”, p. 42. 
127 Sampurnanand continued to be publicly associated with this pro-Hindi bias in the language question 
well into the 1940s, which suggested that neither he, nor his close Congress colleagues interpreted the 
effect of his stance as communally antagonistic. At a meeting of the Provincial Jamiat-ul-Ulema 
Working Committee in the second week of March 1945, Sampurnan and Purushottam Das Tandon 
were vehemently criticized for their attitude towards Urdu. The complaints were repeated a month later 
in a meeting at Muzaffarnagar, by Hifzul Rahman of Bijnor and Hafiz Mohammed Ibrahim., See., 
William Gould, “Congress Radicals and Hindu Militancy: Sampurnanand and Purushottam Das 
Tandon in the Politics of the United Provinces, 1930-1947”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. XXXVI, No. 
3, July, 2002, pp. 639-640. 
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Hindu communities well professed in Urdu. However, in later half of the 19th century 
there was a rise of Hindi-Nagri movements against Urdu.128 Christopher R. King 
(1994)129 points out that the inconsistent and contradictory language policies and 
educational system introduced by the British intensified the differentiation between 
the Hindus and the Muslims130 which later can be seen in opposition of Congress by 
Sir Sayid and this rivalry was continued in form of rivalry between Hindu Mahasabha 
and Muslim Laegue. This issue has two sides: one is political and other one is literary. 
Hindi speaking people wanted Hindi as sole language of India and Urdu speaking 
people also wanted the same.131 This issue we have already discussed in the 
introductory chapter. 
We can see that the language issue had more importance, although it was 
mainly concerned with the cultural side, it had dangerous complications in the 
political life of the country. It was a fact that the language issue had given birth to bad 
communal differences in the recent past. In contras to Bihar, in U.P. there was 
prolonged and divisive struggle between the Hindus and the Muslims over the issue of 
Hindi-Urdu.132 
It was only language issue which had brought differences among the people of 
India during the independence movement and even after the independence it was 
same language issue which was responsible for the various linguistic regions. Not 
only that it was only due to the same language issue that the country had yet not an 
all-India language which might be the voice of the entire people of the country and 
through which education and culture might progress. The main reason for the failure 
to tide over the linguistic problem during the 19 long year of self-rule was the lack of 
sincerity. The conference felt that it was its bounden duty to remain that Mahatma 
Gandhi had suggested a very realistic decision in view of the national interests. In 
1938, it was decided in this very city through Abdul Haque-Rajendra Pact that the 
post-independence lingua franca of the country would be Hindustani written either in 
                                               
128 Sajjad, Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours, p. 93. 
129 Christopher R. King, One Language, Two Scripts: The Hindi Movement in Ninteenth Century North 
India, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1994. 
130 King, One Language, Two Scripts, pp. 16-19. See, Sajjad, Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing 
Countours, p. 93. 
131  Urdu, Hindi, Hindustani (Urdu), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1993, p. 133. 
132 Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, p. 161. 
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Devnagari or Persian but the Constitution133 made in 1950134 declared Hindi in 
Devnagari script alone as the singular official language.135 
This was the initial denial of its right to Urdu. It was a broadmindedness of 
Urdu-speaking people that they accepted Hindi as official language. They were still in 
the hope that Urdu would be given its rightful place but it was a pity that organized 
efforts were started to finish Urdu from Government and private institutions alike.136 
Under these circumstances as many as 10 lacks signatures favoring Urdu on a 
memorandum were obtained and it was presented to the President of India on behalf 
of Bihar State Anjuman Taraqui Urdu137 Hindi for the first time on 24th January 1966. 
It was demanded in that memorandum that Urdu should be recognized as a regional 
language in Bihar and necessary orders might issue authorizing its use under Article 
347 of the constitution. The repeated question on this point had so far been a cry in 
wilderness. The 1957 conference once again reminded the Government of demand of 
the Anjuman regarding making of Urdu as the regional language in the areas 
mentioned in the original demand. But with the completion of 1958 elections, 
recognizing Urdu as second official language was again neglected.138 The conference 
held at Muzaffarpur in November, 1960 reiterated the demand of making Urdu as the 
regional language and giving it the state of a second official language in Bihar under 
                                               
133 Article 29 of the Constitution, provided right to the citizens to preserve their distinct language, script 
or culture. Article 30 provided right to all the minorities to establish and administer educational 
institution of their choice and no discrimination against any educational institutions on the ground that 
is under the management of a minority is permissible to the state. Under Article 350, every person was 
instructed to submit a representation for the redress of any grievances in any of the languages of used in 
Union or in the State. Under Article 350A, every state and every local authority within the state was 
required to provide adequate facilities and instructions in mother tongue at primary stage of education 
to children belonging to linguistic minority groups and the president is authorized to issue such 
directions to any state, as he considers necessary or proper, for securing the provisions. 
As the Government of Bihar have not said that facilities to Urdu-speaking people were not being 
provided in accordance with the policy statement and having regard to the constitutional provisions 
referred to above, Ministry of Law may advise whether there was a case for presidential directions 
under Article 347 of the constitution to the state Government of Bihar on specified matters., see, Home 
Department (OL), File No. F8/167, pp. 23-25. 
134 Home Department (OL), File No. F8/167, p. 7. 
135 Nida-e-Millat, 26 March, 1965, p. 10 
136 Home Department (OL), File No. F8/167, p. 7. 
137  Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu Bihar came into existence in 1923-24 and it was the result of the efforts 
of Zubair Ahmad and Qazi Abdul Wadood. By 1938 it was affiliated with the All India Taraqqi-e-
Urdu. But due to the Partition, riots horrors and migration, Muslims were disorganized and dipressed.  
There was need to revitalize the Muslim society and culture, thus, in 1951 Urdu Conference was 
organized. Bihar Rashtriya Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu was created under the inspiration and initiative of 
Syed Md. Ayub (1910-1964), who was more of a social worker, primarily interested in the cause of 
Muslim education and the advancement of Urdu and maintained his contacts with many political 
leadersto fulfill the above reasons., see, Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, pp. 45-81. 
138 Qazi Mohammad Adeel Abbasi, “Assembly mein Urdu” in Nida-e-Millat, 26 March, 1965, p. 8 and 
10. 
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Article 347 of the constitution by suitably amending the Bihar State Official 
Language Act. A delegation on behalf of Bihar state Anjuman Taraqui Urdu met the 
Chief Minister of Bihar in January, 1962 and presented a memorandum in which a 
demand for making Urdu a regional, state and a second language was reiterated. Yet 
another memorandum was presented to the Bihar chief Minister in March, 1965 
requesting him to place the demand before the Chief Minister Conference, Delhi. The 
demand was once again repeated at the convention of the Anjuman held at Patna on 
April 19, 1965. In April this year it was decided at the combined session of the 
Anjuman’s Working and Executive to form an Action Committee for getting the 
rightful demand accepting by taking all democratic measures. The Action Committee 
decided to have talks with central and state Governments once for all after which if 
the demand was yet not concerned preparations would then be made for 
demonstrations, hunger strikes and other mode of Satyagraha. Finally the question of 
Urdu would be made the issue of coming elections. As the first delegation met the 
Bihar Chief Minister in June that year and presented to him a memorandum in 
reiteration of the old demand. As no reply was received from Bihar Chief Minister for 
a long time, an interview with the Indian Prime Minister was sought but it was not 
granted. No reply has yet been received from the Bihar Chief Minister. The process of 
reiterating the demand was continued at the conferences held at Gopalganj, Siwan and 
Giridih.139 
Thus conference of Bihar State Anjuman Taraqui Urdu in November 1960 
strongly and finally made a demand to the State Government to amend the Bihar State 
Official Language Act under Article 345140 of the Indian Constitution without any 
                                               
139 Nida-e-Millat, 2 March, 1967, pp. 17-19. 
140 The constitutional provisions for the recognition of regional language by the states for official 
purposes has been set out in Article 345 were- Article 345: Subject to the provisions of Article 346 and 
347, the legislature of a state may by law adopt any one or more of the languages, use in the state or 
Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purpose of that state. 
Provided that, un till the literature of the state otherwise provided by law, the English language shall 
continue to be used for those official purposes within the state for which it was being used immediately 
before the commencement of this constitution.; Article 347, contains a special provision relating to a 
language spoken by a substantial proportion of the population of a state and provides as- Article 347: 
On a demand being made in the behalf of the President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial 
proportion of the population of the state desire the use of any language spoken by them to be 
recognized by the state direct, that such language shall also be officially recognized throughout that 
state or any part thereof for such purpose as he may specify. The other provision of special relevance 
are- Article 350: every person shall be entitled to submit a representation for the redress of any 
grievance to any officer or authority of the Union or a state in any of the languages used in the Union 
or in the State, as the case may be.;  Article 350A: It shall be endeavor of every state and of every local 
authority within the state provide adequate facilities fir the instruction in the mother tongue at the 
primary stage of the education children belonging to linguistic minority groups; and the President may 
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further delay and to declare Urdu as regional, official and a second language by 
making a suitable legislation to that effect which was reiterated in January 1962. Later 
in March 1965, when their demand were not replied, the Anjuman Taraqui Urdu 
conference decided to present a memorandum to the chief minister of Bihar and 
requested him to place their demand before the chief ministers conference in Delhi. If 
the preliminary steps for getting the demand conceded would not succeed, the 
Anjuman would make it the issue of coming elections. The conference wished to 
make it known beyond any shadow of doubt that nothing short of demand for making 
Urdu a regional, official and a second language backed up by proper legislation would 
be acceptable to it.141 
It is in this context that the status of Urdu has to be seen. It has nothing to do 
with any particular religion. It was as much a language of Hindus and persons 
professing other religions as of Muslims. Urdu was born and nourished in India. It 
came to a flowering and achieved in its social, physical environments the distinction 
of being one of the highly developed expressions of the composite culture of India.142 
Broadly, there were two purposes for which the problem of recognition of 
Urdu as second language (or any other) was raised, namely: 
1. Educational and 
2. Official 
According to the census of 1961, Bihar had 8.9% population who were 
speaking Urdu. The highest was in the district of Purnea (31.4%) in eastern Bihar. 
The next highest in any district was below 12%. The percentage of Urdu speaking 
population in U.P. was 10.7% taking the state as a whole. Three districts in U.P. had a 
population of over 30% in 1961 census; the total of districts with more than 15% 
Urdu-speaking people is 9%. In Delhi the last census recorded a population of 5.6% 
of Urdu-speaking people. States Reorganization Commission (SRC) are 
recommended that, “Where there is a substantial minority consisting 30% or more of 
the population, the state should be recognized as bilinguale for administrative 
purposes”.143 
                                                                                                                                       
issue such directions to any state as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such 
facilities., see, Home Department (OL), File No. F8/167, pp. 44-48. 
141  Home Department (OL), File No. 18/1/1967- OL, National Archive of India, pp. 10-11. 
142  F.A. Ahmad’s letter to Indira Gandhi (the then Prime Minister of India), 18 September, 1966, in 
Home Department (OL), File No. 18/1/1967- OL, National Archive of India, p. 23. 
143 Home Department (OL), File No. F8/167, pp. 44-45. 
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However if we were to apply the criterion suggested by the SRC, and ignore 
the more stringent (and if I may say so somewhat illiberal) standard adopted by the 
Chief Minister, only Purnea district in Bihar and three district in U.P. would qualify 
for Urdu being recognized as the official language at the district level.144 
Muslim Voters’ Conference was held under the auspices of All India Muslim 
Jamaat on Sunday the 5th February, 1967 at Gokhle Hall, Madras. This conference 
viewed with concern the tendency on the part of some ‘unscrupulous politicians and 
political parties’ to rouse the communal and linguistic sentiments for political 
purposes and suggested an immediate statutory electoral code of conduct. This 
conference felt that the official recognition of encouragement to the Urdu language 
was very essential to instill a sense of linguistic security in the minds of the Muslims. 
Hence it appealed to the Government to take immediate steps to proclaim regional 
language status for Urdu in Urdu speaking areas.145 
However, despite the Constitutional provisions, the SRC recommendations, 
and the educational policies, the Hindi-Urdu controversy remained as problematic as 
it was during the colonial era. This remained an unresolved issue ever to the 
administrative functionaries. Many communal riots broke out over this issue. 
The gravest communal riot occurred in Bihar over the question of Urdu 
language in 1967. It was perhaps for the first time in post-independence period that 
differences over language had been the starting point of trouble on a large scale. As 
we have already discussed that the repeated demands were made to grant Urdu the 
status of second official language, thus, to resolve this problem, since during the 1967 
election propaganda was made on communal lines146, the Congress made a clever 
move by issuing a confidential instruction to Nasiruddin Hyder Khan (a MLA from 
the ruling Congress) asking him to move a private member bill to this effect in the 
Assembly on 14 July 1967. In reaction to this private member bill, violent anti-Urdu 
procession came out on the streets.147 Thus the Ranchi incidents started when stones 
were allegedly thrown at this procession near a cinema hall and communal riot broke 
out which continued over nearly a week and took a heavy toll of life. Considerable 
                                               
144  “Secret/Immediate (Recognition of Urdu)” in Home Department (OL), File No. 18/1/1967- OL, 
National Archive of India, pp. 44-46 
145  “Muslim Voters’ Conference” in Home Department (OL), File No. 18/1/1967- OL, National 
Archive of India, p. 63A. 
146 Home Department (Political) file no. 19/41/67- Pol I(A),  P. 5. 
147 Mohammad Sajjad, Contesting Colonialism and Separatism: Muslims of Muzaffarpur Since 1857, 
Primus, Delhi, 2014, p. 165. 
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damage to private property was also caused although a detailed assessment was not 
made.148 Naval Kishore Sinha (former minister and the then General Secretary, Bihar 
Congress and Member, Central Relief Committee) the then MLA of Paroo, 
Muzaffarpur, made a statement on 16 October 1967, that the October 13, 1967 riots 
were fabricated by the Jan Sangh. Jogindar Prasad Thakur also in his statement before 
Enquiry Commission said that the shakhas of the RSS-Jan Sangh had been spreading 
in the region since 1957 and were engaged in aggravating the communal situation. 
Enquiry also found that the local leaders of the Jan Sangh and the RSS and a section 
of the Congress were aimed and pre-planned the disturbances.149 
Urdu has nothing to do with any particular religion. It is as much language of 
Hindus and persons professing other religions as of Muslims. Urdu was born and 
nourished in India. It came to flowering and archived in its social, physical 
environments the distinctions of being one of the highly developed expressions of the 
composite culture of India. It is, therefore, natural that all Urdu speaking people, 
irrespective of their religion and place of birth, should strive for the preservation and 
progress of this language. But the chauvinist Hindus relates Urdu language with 
Muslims and with Pakistan. The Hindu communalists soundly treat Urdu as language 
of Pakistan and said that Urdu would create another Pakistan even in Bihar it was 
announced by some communal minded people that if Urdu would be recognized as 
second official language with Persian as its script, they would start anti-Urdu 
movement in Bihar.150 
The Bihar government officially recognized Maithili as state language but the 
government failed in providing enough teachers and textbooks in the Maithili 
language. It was only after 1961 that the children actually started receiving instruction 
through the medium of Maithili.151 With the 1967 election campaigns, demands were 
again made to recognize status of Urdu.152 In Bihar, the non-Congress parties faced a 
lot of opposition on the issue of Urdu language because the Jan Sangh vehemently 
opposed the demand of recognition of Urdu as second official language of the state by 
a private member bill to this effect in the Assembly on 14 July 1967 which was 
moved by Nasiruddin Hyder Khan. But due to the opposition against this bill it did 
                                               
148  Home Department (Political) file no. 19/41/67- Pol I(A),  P. 5, also see, p. 9 of Secret section. 
149 Sajjad, Contesting Colonialism and Separatism: Muslims of Muzaffarpur Since 1857, pp. 164-165. 
150 Parcham-e-Hind, 6 August, 1967, p. 20.  
151 Brass, Politics of India Since Independence, p. 160. 
152 Parcham-e-Hind, 27 August, 1967, p. 4. 
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not come to the effect. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha of Jan Kranti Dal, the then Chief 
Minister of Bihar, said he aimed at the recognition of the status of Urdu as second 
official language153 of Bihar154 thus, Muslims were fooled by the speeches of the 
leaders of the anti-Congress parties. The Muslims thought that these anti-Congress 
parties would recognize the status of Urdu as second official language. Thus the 
Muslims155 voted for the anti-Congress parties.156 
Although there were a large number of Urdu speakers in North India 
particularly in U.P. and Bihar, the demand for recognition of Urdu as second official 
language going through various organizations and movements launched in the 1960s 
and 1970s in U.P. and Bihar. But it was only in 1980s Urdu was granted the status of 
second official language (by ordinances, rather than formal legislation) for official 
purposes in 15 districts of Bihar and in Western districts of U.P., but the U.P. 
ordinances later lapsed.157 
Riots in Bihar after Independece 
The revival of communal violence in the country began in 1961 with the 
Jabalpur riots of Madhya Paradesh, followed by the disturbances in western Uttar 
Pradesh cities. The national leadership responded by setting up the National 
Integration Council. The evidences show a rising curve of communal violence from 
mid 1960s peaking in 1969-70.158 In 1962 the Chinese aggression and in 1965 attacks 
by Pakistan in Kutch and then in Kashmir brought out the essential oneness of the 
nation, and evoked a united response from the people all over the country.159 But this 
proved to be freak because the second wave of communal disturbances began with the 
                                               
153 Binodanand Jha (1900-1971), former Chief Minister of Bihar (Congress Party), also made promise 
to recognize the status of Urdu earlier than the promise of Mahamaya Prasad Sinha., see, Nida-e-Millat, 
13 March, 1967, p. 3. 
154 Nida-e-Millat, 13 March, 1967, p. 3. 
155 Muslims were already fed-up with the policies and false promises made by the ruling Congress. 
Even the Congress assured of protection of the lives and properties of the Muslims but form the very 
time of the partition Muslims were victimized by the Hindus during the riots and the Government 
failed in providing them protection. The Muslims, with the change in their social and economic profile 
became able to take up their issues. Thus there was gradual decline in the voting percentage of the 
Congress from 1952 onwards and for the first time, after independence, Congress was defeated by 
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP). See, Nida-e-Millat, 30 December, 1966, p. 11; see also, Thakur, Indira 
Gandhi and Her Power Game, p. 160. 
156 Parcham-e-Hind, 27 August, 1967, p. 4. 
157 Brass, Politics of India Since Independence, pp. 156-157. 
158  Engineer, Communal Riots after Independence: A Comprehensive Account, p.9. 
159  Because of the two conflicts with Pakistan there was serious apprehension of communal trouble in 
1965, but large part of the country remained on the whole peaceful., see Home (Political) File No. 
19/41/67- Poll. I(A) p. 1. 
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disturbances in the Calcutta industrial belt, and then spread to Jamshedpur in Bihar 
and to Rourkela in Orissa in 1964.160 
In Bihar, as many as seven communal incidents took place in 1954, nine in 
1955, eight in 1956, six in 1957, eight in 1958, twelve in 1959, eight in 1960, twenty 
two in 1961, five in 1962 and ten in 1963.161 The Bengal District Gazetteers, 
Muzaffarpur (1907) made it clear that it has long history of communal riots since 
March 1895, when for the first time a communal riot broke out over the issue of cow-
slaughter in the village of Mathurapur in the Sheohar police station area; where some 
Muslims were intended to sacrifice a calf at the mosque on occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr but 
they were attacked by hundreds of Hindus.162 While Bihar District Gazetteers, Ranchi 
(1970) give us a quite distinguished record of riots which took place in Ranchi alone. 
It is mentioned in the table given below: 
Riots in Bihar (1957-1967) 
Year Instituted Charge Sheeted Convicted 
1957 49 40 13 
1958 41 33 14 
1959 60 47 12 
1960 76 48 5 
1961 87 63 15 
1962 77 68 16 
1963 100 83 NA 
1964 97 NA NA 
1965 74 NA NA 
1966 97 NA NA 
1967 234 125 NA 
Source: N. Kumar, District Gazetteers (Ranchi), Patna, 1970, p. 419 
During the colonial period, the participants in the communal violence were 
mainly the Jute mill workers in Bengal most of them were immigrants from Bihar. 
These labourers exhibited traits of community consciousness which partly accounted 
for the frequent fratricidal, communal (in the Indian sense of a religious divide, in this 
case Hindu vs. Muslims) clashes in which factory labourers participated. These 
labourers came from peasant backgrounds and employed as factory workers. The 
phenomenon of migration and the presence of migrants in riot-prone cities have also 
been contributed to communalism and communal conflicts in modern times.163 For 
instance a riot broke out in 1891 over the demolition of a building in Calcutta, which 
said to be a mosque, in Shyambazar in north Calcutta and due to the presence of the 
                                               
160  Ghosh (ed.), Community and Nation: Essays on Identity and Politics in Eastern India, p. 129.; see 
also, Narayan, Communal Riots in India, p 39. 
161  Home (Political), File No. 19/26/64- Poll. I (A), p. 48. 
162 L. S. S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers, Muzaffarpur, Bengal Secretariat Press, Calcutta, 
1907, p. 33. 
163 Parimal Ghosh, “Communalism and Colonial Labour: Experience of Calcutta Jute Mill Workers, 
1880-1930” EPW, Vol. XXV, No. 30, July 28, 1990, p. 61. 
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immigrants from Bihar in Calcutta the news of the demolition was reached to Bihar 
thus a mob of 5000, comprising, mostly julahas, members of a Muslim waving caste 
from Bihar and U. P. went to Calcutta and riot broke out between the Hindus and the 
Muslims. The riot was strong at Chitpur specially at Machuabazar which was largely 
inhabited by the Muslims.164 Even 1897 riot against the authorities also erupted over a 
communal demand by Hindu and Muslim workers of Calcutta Jute mill.165 In North 
India instances of Hindu-Muslim communalism in colonial period dates back to the 
early 19th century. The Julahas (weavers) of Banaras were involved in communal 
clashes that took place in 19th century in several North Indian towns.166 Severe 
dislocation in the social and economic sphere during the colonial period contributed to 
widespread communal tensions. The subaltern school of scholars began exploring the 
field of community consciousness and impact of communal politics on peasants and 
on workers. For instance, Parimal Ghosh argues that colonialism was the biggest 
determinant and the workers in the jute mills displayed two selves- the self of the 
peasant and the self of the workers as many migrated from rural Bihar and close 
association with the middlemen who recruited them- the “jobbers”.167 Communal 
violence in India seems to hold in its grip the middle-class Hindu psyche as the 
Hindus view themselves as the victims of the state, a state which by its policies 
“pseudo-secularism” and “appeasement of minorities” has frustrated their genuine 
aspirations and diminished their position.168 
It was also witnessed that the communal riots mainly erupted only in those 
states or places that were rich in social resources. And economy was accumulated into 
the hands of capitalists and elites. Also one community was rich as against the either 
community. All these aroused tension between the two communities.169 
Along with this, there were many other elements responsible for the 
communal riots. For instance, the colonialist and the RSS/Hindu Mahasabha 
                                               
164 “Editorial” Amrit Bazar Patrika, 21 July 1893, Cf. Chakrabarty, “Communal Riots and Labour: 
Bengal's Jute Mill-Hands in the 1890s”, p. 142. 
165 Chakrabarty, “Communal Riots and Labour: Bengal's Jute Mill-Hands in the 1890s”, pp. 141-142. 
166 Upadhyay and Robinson, “Revisiting Communalism and…”, p. 44; also see, Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
“Communal Riots and Labour: Bengal's Jute Mill-Hands in the 1890s”, Past & Present, No. 91, May, 
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169 Congress ki Jimmadari Mutalliq Fasadat, 1942-1943, Home Department (Government of India), 
Art Team, New Delhi, February 13, 1943, p. 40. 
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construction of history produced Muslims as alien on Indian soil. This vision of the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS was boosted by the Muslim League’s demand for a 
separate state for Muslims and thereby the partition. The demand for partition and 
separate statehood made Muslims an enemy of united India.170 
In these circumstances communalism was installed as a rock by the different 
communal bodies over the different issues like language problem, discretion of holy 
places, economic, social, cultural problems and so on. As we can see in the table no. 2 
that riots takes place over different issues during 1961-1970. 
 
State Cow 
Slaughter 
Discretion 
of Religious 
Places 
Festivity/ 
Celebrations 
Graveyards total Chain 
incidents 
 
Andhra 
pradesh 
  - 1 21 1 23 680 
Assam 7 1 11 - 19 106 
Bihar 56 4 64 8 132 1199 
Gujrat 6 2 6 - 14 724 
Haryana - - - - - 2 
Karnatka 1 1 8 2 12 100 
Kerala - 1 4 1 6 9 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
6 - 11 - 17 429 
Maharashtra 8 18 35 2 63 1022 
Orissa 5 - 9 - 14 699 
Punjab - - - - - 1 
Rajasthan - - 4 - 4 51 
Tamil Nadu - 1 5 1 7 17 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
17 4 27 3 51 425 
West Bengal 15 1 17 - 53 1040 
Delhi - - 2 - 2 - 
Arunanchal 
Pradesh 
- - 1 - 1 - 
Tripura - - - - - 11 
 
We also noticed that the rural areas were communally sensitive more than that 
of urban areas which is given in the table below: 
Rural/Urban disturbances over different issues 
                                               
170  Upadhyay and Robinson, “Revisiting Communalism and…”, p. 42. 
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Issues Rural Urban 
Cow slaughter 88 33 
Festivity/Celebrations 104 121 
Desecration of religious places 16 18 
Graveyards 11 7 
Total 219 179 
Source: Steven I. Wilkinson, Religious Politics and Communal Violence, Oxfors University Press, New Delhi, 2005, p. 163 
The communal trends suddenly and sharply reversed in 1961 when the number 
of incidents increased to 92. The increase was however largely in the three Hindi-
speaking states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and in West Bengal.171 
There was a substantial fall during the next two years indicating stabilization of the 
situation. 1964 was an abnormal year when largely as a repercussion of serious 
communal riots in East Pakistan there was a large scale communal violence in Bihar, 
Orissa and West Bengal.172 
A conference of Ministers of Union Government and the Governments of the 
provinces of West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya Paradesh and Maharashtra agreed on 8th 
February (1964) to enlarge the area of the Dandkarnya Project (A district in South-
West Orissa which was being developed to accommodate refugees) by addition of 
contiguous areas in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. An 
unforeseen result of this policy was the spread of communal rioting to larger parts of 
Southern Bihar, Western Orissa and Eastern Madhya Pradesh as train loaded of 
destitute refugees passed through these states.173 Of the 1070 incidents reported in 
1964, 1006 occurred in these three states.174 Because of the two conflicts with 
Pakistan there were serious apprehension of communal trouble in 1965, but large part 
of the country remained on the whole peaceful.175 
In 1966, the number of incidents fell down to 132, but even this was much 
higher figure than that of any of the normal year starting from 1954. The very high 
figure of the incidents in 1964 and 1965 were not indicative of any special trend; 
those incidents occurred under special circumstances and were confined to certain 
parts of the country. The relatively high figure for 1966, however, was a matter of 
                                               
171 Subhash Shukla, “Communalism and Indian Politics Since Independence”, Shukla (ed.), 
Communalism in India…, p. 228.; also see, Ram Puniyani, “Politics of Hindutva and Violence”, 
Shukla, Communalism in India…, p. 198. 
172 A Review of Communal Situation in 1967, see, Home (Political) File No. 19/41/67- Poll. I (A) pp. 1-
2. 
173 Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence; A Comprehensive Account, p. 34. 
174 Home Department (Political) File no. 19/41/67- Poll-I (A), p. 1. 
175 Home Department (Political) File no. 19/41/67- Poll-I (A) 
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some concern since it was otherwise a normal year.176 In Chakradharpur near 
Jamshedpur (Bihar; now in Jharkhand) on 16 March, 1964, a mob of about 200 
persons attacked and looted 6 Muslim shops. Armed police force was rushed to the 
spot. A criminal case was registered and investigation also started. Few more 
incidents of looting and arson in and around Chakradharpur, on 18 March, 1964, took 
place which necessitated promulgation of prohibitory orders under section 144Cr. 
P.C. in the area.177 
In March 19-20, 1964 in Jamshedpur (Bihar, now in Jharkhand) infuriated 
mobs also committed acts of loot and arson and indulged in violence which resulted in 
death of 31 persons of the minority community. To control the situation police opened 
fire on five occasions.178 
Most of the communal disturbances were deliberate and occurred generally 
due to the following causes; viz. music before mosques, desecration of places of 
worship, molestation of women, cow slaughter, throwing of colored water during Holi 
festival, quarrel during religious processions, assault on individuals, accidents, feuds 
or enmity, pro-Pakistan activities,179 land disputes, altercation, etc.180 
Apart from these issues, the incessant propaganda by Pakistan and a change in 
composition of local population due to the advent of displaced persons from Pakistan, 
particularly in the Eastern regions, and communal propaganda indulged in by certain 
political parties and volunteer organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha, Bhartiya Jan 
Sangh, Jamait-e-Islami, the Muslim League, the RSS, etc., also contributed to keep 
alive the flame of communal hatred.181 
Most of the communal incidents of March 1964 in Bihar, Orissa and Madhya 
Pradesh were linked with the passage of trains carrying refugees from East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) to camp at Mana near Raipur.182 
The inquiry commission report on Ranchi-Hatia riots of 1967 suggests that the 
State Government should have taken stern and determined action to put down any 
                                               
176 Home Department (Political) File no. 19/41/67- Poll-I (A), p.2. 
177  Home Department Political I (A), file no. 19/26/64-Poll-I, p. 28. 
178  Home Department Political I (A), file no. 19/26/64-Poll-I, p. 28. 
179 The majority community is made to think that Indian Muslims are ‘traitors’ and ‘pro-Pakistanis’; 
hence the urgent need to teach them a lesson. It is well-known that there exists a group in India for 
whom the very existence of Muslims and Muslim culture in this country is a permanent eyesore. These 
people have publicly suggested the forcible emigration of Muslims in exchange for Pakistani Hindus, 
or at least the forcible evacuation of Muslims from all the border areas., see Radiance, 1 Oct. 1967 
180  Home Department Political I-(A), file no. 19/26/64-Poll-I, p. 34. 
181  Home Department political I (A), file no. 19/26/64-Poll-I, p. 34. 
182  Home Department Political I (A), file no. 19/26/64-Poll-I, p. 34. 
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disturbances and should have taken preventive measures at the first sign of trouble. 
But that was not the case. Administrative apathy, lethargy, and even complicity were 
often to be found. The State Government were further asked to utilize the Home 
Guard (stand by para police) and to keep in touch with the local military commander 
and to draw up plans for requisitioning troops in exigencies necessitating it. They 
have also been told to seek cooperation of the press for maintaining good relations 
between the communities and the exercise of restraint of their part in reporting and 
presenting news and editorial comments in regard to communal incident. Special 
instructions have been issued to the State Governments to the effect that, in regard to 
communal violence, police should open fire at the earliest stage when firing would be 
justified; police firing should be as effective and powerful as possible; all officers 
taking effective action against communal trouble should be assured of government 
support; and full use should be made of the preventive Detention Act and Defense of 
India Rules assert communal trouble-makers and instigators.183 
In Bihar, during 1951-1958, there was recurrence of riots but those were not 
serious in nature. It was only in 1959 that a major riot occurred at Sitamarhi in 
Muzaffarpur district. 
Sitamarhi Riot, April 1959 
Sitamarhi, then a subdivision of the district of Muzaffarpur in north Bihar has 
had a long history of Communal riots and a number of riots had taken place in this 
small town. It is quite striking co-incidence that, the first communal riot in 
independent Bihar had broken out in 1959 in Belsand, a village in Sitamarhi 
subdivision, over the issue of Mahavir flag in the same area of Muzaffarpur district, 
where the first communal riot before independence in 1895 had occurred.184 The 
Belsand riot of 1959 was a major riot. More than 50 people were killed, most of 
whom were Muslims.185 With the ‘Ram Navami Mela’ an annual cattle fair was also 
held at the town of Sitamarhi thus again on April 17, 1959 communal riot broke out 
over the issue of cow slaughter. There were a number of Muslim hotels. At about 9:30 
am, a Hindu boy noticed, a she calf being slaughtered in one of the Muslim hotels. 
The boy raised a hue and cry. The Hindus discovered beef as well as partly 
                                               
183 Virendra Kumar (ed.), Committees and Commissions in India; 1947-1973, Vol. VIII, 1967, Concept 
Publishing Company, New Delhi, p. 257. 
184 Mohammad Sajjad, “Zila Muzaffarpur Mein Firqhawarana Tashaddud: Ek Tarikhi Jaizah” in 
Tahzibul Akhlaq (Urdu monthly), Vol. XXVI, No. 5, May, 2007, p. 52; see also, Sajjad, Contesting 
Colonialism and Separatism: Muslims of Muzaffarpur Since 1857, pp. 163-164. 
185 Home Department (R&P Divison), file no. 5/12/1976-RP, p. 13. 
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slaughtered she calf.186 Thereafter, a section of the Hindu mob set the hotel to fire and 
attacked the hotel-keeper and other Muslims with lathis and sticks. Since all the 
Muslim hotels were built of thatch and canvas, it took no time to turn them into ashes. 
Police arrived and tried to pacify the mob but in vain. The disturbances spread almost 
all over the fair. As a result of the riots, seven Muslims were killed on the spot and 
seven other succumbed to their injuries in the hospital. As many as 657 Muslims were 
reported to have injured. A number of Hindus were also injured but they did not come 
forward for fear of being arrested. Curfew was imposed in urban areas of Sitamarhi 
and prohibitory orders were promulgated.187 In 1959 another riot took place at a 
village, Akhta188 over the issue of cow-slaughter in which 11 people were killed and 
200 houses were set on fire.189 Although riots were controlled but the communal 
trends and sporadic riots, in an outside of the country, were going on, that prepared 
the grounds for the riots in the future. 
From 1960 to 1963, no large scale communal disturbances were reported. In 
1961 and 1963, minor communal incidents occurred in almost all months of these 
years. It was only in 1964 a very serious riot took place at in Calcutta and the 
immediate cause was the disappearance of the holy relic of the Prophet from 
Hazratbal Mosque (in Kashmir), in last week of December, 1963. Over this issue riots 
broke out in the in Khulna and Jessor district of East Pakistan and soon after the 
disturbances in Khulna and Jessor, in West Bengal, the vernacular language press 
came with the news of atrocities on Hindus by the Muslims in East Pakistan, which 
was likely to cause excitement and inflamed the communal passions190, thus Hindus 
in Calcutta on 8 January, 1964 some Muslims’ stalls were raised down at Sealdah.191 
                                               
186 Riot started due to false rumour that the Muslims slaughtered a cow, though the cow was traced out 
alive near Jankyosthan.; see, Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence: A Comprehensive 
Account, p. 125. 
187  Home Department (R&P Divison), file no. 5/12/1976-RP, pp. 13-14. 
188 Asgahr Ali Engineer mentioned this village as, Balminiya Akta.; see, Engineer, Communal Riots 
After Independence: A Comprehensive Account, p. 125. Also see Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided 
Nation, 1997 
189 Home Department (R&P Divison), file no. 5/12/1976-RP, p. 14. 
190 Home Department (Political), file no. 19/26/1964 Poll-I (A), p. 41 
191 Home Department (Political), file no. 19/26/1964 Poll-I(A), p. 41.; On 9 January, 1964, a meeting 
was held to organize a protest against the atrocities by the Muslims on the Hindus in East Pakistan and 
they made their demand, for the protection of Hindus in East Pakistan and punished those who were 
responsible, to Deputy High Commissioner of East Pakistan., see, Suranjan Das, “The 1992 Calcutta 
Riots in Historical Continuum: A Relapse into ‘Communal Fury’?”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 
XXXIV, No. 2, May, 2000, p. 287. 
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Throughout 11 and 12 January, 1964, disturbances192 prevailed in the Amherst Street, 
Sealdah, Taltola, Entally, Beniapukur, Beliaghata and Garia in Calcutta. Arson, 
looting and secret stabbing were going on throughout the riot. Most of the deaths 
around 82, were caused by rioting, and 44 had succumbed to police/ army bullets,193 
some Hindu bustees (slums) in East Calcutta were also looted but the Muslims were 
the worst sufferers during the Calcutta riots in 1964. Muslims were suspected by the 
police,that the firearms that Muslims had provided by the Pakistani instigators.194  
Following the Calcutta riots in January, 1964, a series of incidents of violence 
broke out in Rourkela (Orissa), in the Tribal Belt of Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh.195 
The provincial Governments failed to protect Muslims, which becomes clear from the 
statement of Vikram Savarkar, a famous Hindu Mahasabha leader of those days, who 
insisted upon the exchange of the population and said, “we [Hindus] appealed to the 
Muslims to leave India otherwise we would expell them out and if they want to live in 
India they had to go to mandir instead of masjid for prayers and Kashi for pilgrimage 
instead of Arab. And Congress favoured Muslims only for the votes but Congress was 
incapable to protect the Muslims unless Muslims were not butchered at Calcutta, 
Jamshedpur and Rourkela”.196  
                                               
192 The impact of riot in 1964 fell on the neighbouring districts of Hooghly, 24 Parganas, Nadia and 
Howrah. Although the Muslims were condemned as responsible for the Calcutta riots but the fact was 
that the Calcutta riot was largely a response to communal incidents in East Pakistan. This was also 
happened because of the printing misleading reports on disorder in Calcutta in Pakistan. Nevertheless, 
the 1964 riot as horrible as in 1946, but the impact of the 1964 violence on Bengali society was also not 
far-reaching, in sharp contrast to that of the Great Calcutta Killing which survives in the form of 
collective memories. A clue to 1946 and 1964 riots can, however, be found in 1992 riots, viewed 
against the background of an increasing dispute for land following the growth of the tannery and 
leather industry in that locality. Not unnaturally, Dhobiatala bustee (Dhobiatala bustee also known as 
Dhobiatala Muslim camp- housing 1,006 families had their origin linked to the 1964 riot. Established 
to rehabilitate 48 riot-torn Muslim families, the number of its inhabitants rose by 1992 to 5,000, of 
which 4,543 are Muslims, 450 Hindus and 7 Christians. They make their ends meet as carters, 
rickshaw-pullers, ganja (marijuana) dealers and day-labourers), encompassing at least 15 bighas of 
land whose occupants do not possess tenancy or possession certificates-constitutes a prime site for 
estate developers. In the pre-riot days, thus, a group of promoters offered each dweller in Dhobiatala 
twenty thousand as incentive to desert their huts. Thus we can see a clear indication that the clearing of 
the bustee, more than anything, had been the primary objective to those who had organised riots, thus it 
is clear that it was not the influx of refugees from Pakistan but also the rivalry for land that erupted the 
grim riot of 1964. By that time Bihari Muslims (both who were employed in Calcutta and the refugees 
from Bangladesh),  were discriminated as ‘intruders’ and were denied opportunities of secure 
employment, by the educated Bengali Hindus, thus they find solace from mullas and seek strength fro 
strong kinship bonds and engaged themselves in rowdyism as the only means for their livelihood, 
started following local musclemen like Jhunnu and Mughal.; C.f., Das, “The 1992 Calcutta Riots in 
Historical Continuum…”, pp. 290-299. 
193 Das, “The 1992 Calcutta Riots in Historical Continuum…”, p. 288. 
194 Das, “The 1992 Calcutta Riots in Historical Continuum…”, pp. 290-291. 
195 Home Department (Political), file no. 19/26/1964 Poll-I (A), p. 24. 
196 Nida-e-Millat, 16 October, 1964, p. 8. 
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Riots in the Tribal Belt (1964) 
Communal riots broke out in March, 1964 in Jamshedpur (Bihar; now in 
Jharkhand) and in Rourkela (in Orissa, not far away from Jamshedpur; 197 both were 
industrial areas) almost three months after the Calcutta riots of January 1964.198 The 
communal disturbances were mainly confined to the tribal belt comprising the 
districts of Ranchi and Singhbhum. The areas badly affected were the bordering tracts 
of Bihar and Orissa and the steel city of Jamshedpur. The immediate instigation to 
this serious outbreak was the story narrated by the Hindu refugees from East Pakistan 
in transit to their camps.199 The special trains carrying refugees were meeting at all 
important railway stations including Tatanagar, i.e., Jamshedpur and Chakradharpur 
by individuals and relief organizations. The latter gave wide currency to the stories 
collected from the refugees. The resentment against the Muslims had been worked up 
earlier by the news reports of the minorities including tribals in East Pakistan during 
January and February, 1964.  
Another factor that seemed to have further accentuated the resentment against 
the Muslims was the feeling that the Dikus (outsiders were referred to as Dikus by the 
tribals which also included Muslims), were the traditional exploiters in the tribal 
areas. It was a fact that there were a large number of Muslim forest contractors, 
licensed and unlicensed distillers, timber merchants and landlords in this tribal belt. 
The Muslim forest contractors were also reported to have regarded Adivasi women as 
‘comfort girls’. All these deep rooted traditional grievances found a very justifiable 
                                               
197 There was also disturbance in Jharsuguda (Orissa). On 18th March some goonda elements of 
Jharsuguda set fire to some houses and looted some shops, thus, infuriated mob attacked a Muslim and 
also looted two shops. In Rourkela disturbances started on 19th March, 1964, with an attack on a 
Muslim at the Railway Station. Thereafter, a number of cases of loot and arson started that continued 
till 20th March, 1964. Violent mobs attacked the members of minority community. However mobs were 
dispersed by the police firing, 49 pepole during the riot., see,  Home Department, Poll-I (A), file no. 
19/26/ 1964-Poll-I (A), p. 28. 
198 Nida-e-Millat, 24 April, 1964, p. 4. 
199 On 18 October 1952, United Central Refugee Council (UCRC) meeting at Wellington Square 
criticised Shyama Prasad Mukherjee for demanding sanctions against Pakistan. On 7 April 1953, 
UCRC held a big demonstration and presented a charter of demands to the West Bengal Legislative 
Assembly that also contained the demands for the Rehabilitation of displaced Muslims and grant of 
interim relief to the Muslims, but there was no mention of refugees themselves for safely returning to 
East Pakistan in accordance with Nehru-Liaquat Pact. But the betrayal of the upper caste refugees 
about their own people in East Pakistan ensured the future illegal migration and continuous inflow of 
refugees, who were mostly considered as Scheduled Castes by Indian Constitution. This caste 
difference conserved the fate of the Hindu refugees for later years, an expression of upper caste Hindu 
leadership in Left, right and centre and their indifference., see, Prafulla Chakrabarti, The Marginal 
Men: The Refugees and the Left Political Syndrome in West Bengal, Lumierre, Kalyani, 1990, pp. 143-
152. 
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opportunity to provoke the tribals to wipe this class of vested interests. That was the 
reason that even when Muslim families were evacuated the tribal mob went all out to 
destroy their houses and properties.200 
The first outbreak of violence was reported from a hut near Chakradharpur 
(Bihar; now in Jharkhand) coincided with the new outbreak in West Bengal on March 
16, 1964 where Muslims’ shops were attacked and looted. From the towns, rioting 
spread to the forest areas on the border of Bihar and Orissa, where Christian Adivasis 
raided Muslim villages as a reaction to the expulsion of tribal Christians from East 
Pakistan.201 Trouble spread in Chakradharpur town on March 18, 1964. The rumor 
afloat was that the Muslim butchers had come to assault Adivasis. On 19th March, a 
violent mob set fire to a bus and two shops at Raigarh. 148 houses were burnt down in 
Jamshedpur.202 It was more than a coincident that a similar rumor on morning of 
March 21, 1964, the Muslims were coming out in trucks to attack the Hindus, led to a 
serious flare up in Jamshedpur town. On the morning of 21st March 1964, workers of 
the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO) came out with forged 
weapons and attacked every Muslim house in the Telco Colony; there were also 
disturbances in TELCO and TISCO of communal nature during 1940s.203 The 
                                               
200  Home Department, File No. 5/12/1976-RP, p. 15. 
201  Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence; A Comprehensive Account, p. 34. 
202  Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence; A Comprehensive Account, p. 35. 
203 By 1918 Tata Iron and Steel Co. owned almost everything from the rivers in the north to the 
Jugsalai an area in the south. A number of towns laid out, the jungles were almost cleared in the 
Susingeria area that was so far reserved as a forest, thus Harold Mann in his report advised that, the 
Company must reserve an area for the establishment of village colonies for the aboriginal coolies and 
available space must be divided at Dakidih ridge into town and village areas,; see, TATA Steel Archive 
Harold Mann: Report on Investigations with regard to Social Welfare Work at Jamshedpur. Summary 
of recommendations 27th March 1919.; Although Sahajanand gave the list of villages that pay rent 
TISCO and quotes at length a complaint letter that locals handed over to him in 1939, evictions took 
place on grounds of ‘illegal occupation’ and rent arrears while there had been no improvement of 
infrastructure. The gravest harm had done to people who were involved in productive activities, viz. 
fallow lands that we formerly used for grazing our cattle are now let out to contractors by the Company 
for making bricks, had to desert their villages and seek shelter elsewhere. Conflicts over land were not 
issues of the fringes of Jamshedpur. Disputes also concerned the immediate vicinity of the works. In 
the mid-June 1939 some fakirs refused to leave an area that belonged to the company to that they 
claimed that the place near Banyan tree was a dargah. Within weeks believers erected 35 huts in the 
vicinity of the tree and attempted to construct a shrine thus town Administration decided to file a court 
case against them. The Magistrate of Chaibassa convicted Syed Akbar Shah for a heavy fine of Rs 10 
or 14 days of rigorous imprisonment. Akbar Shah chose the latter. The company ordered the huts to be 
demolished except for the two that belonged to the leaders. The fakirs, however, made a counter-
complaint against town administrators and the Land Officer of the district. Syed Akbar Shah stated that 
he had been offering Namaz for decades, that is not a crime. They petitioned at Purulia before the Sub-
Divisonal Officer. On behalf of the company J.J Ghandy argued that there is no oral evidence to show 
that there was any religious site under that banyan tree before June 1938. Thua the cases were still 
pending at the end of May 1939. C.f., Tata Steel Archive Box no.312 File no.173.; By 1939 the 
atmosphere were communally charged to prevent radical action against religious sentiments. Thus 
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disturbances spread to the rural areas and the borders of Bihar and Orissa were 
seriously affected with mobs of Adivasis chasing Muslims across the border from 
both sides. A serious situation therefore, developed in Simdega and Khunti Sub-
divisions of Ranchi and the bordering areas of Singhbhum.204 
The situation remained serious and called for intensive development of armed 
patrol and policefiring till 26 March, 1964. From March 27, 1964 there was an 
appreciable fall in the number of incidents but tension continued. Some areas of 
Singhbhum remained affected till March 28, 1964. On 29th March a police station was 
attacked in which the Muslims had taken refuge.205 
In these riots, 409 Muslims, 16 Hindus and 3 unidentified were killed and 262 
Muslims, 27 Hindus and 9 unidentified were injured in the riots in which Hindus and 
Muslims were involved. Firing was reported to 40 occasions and 312 rounds were 
fired. 20 Hindus, 6 Muslims, 3 Adivasis and 4 unidentified were killed and 45 Hindus, 
1 Muslim, 9 Adiwasis and 3 others were injured in the firing. 185 Muslims, 1487 
Hindus and 401 others were arrested.206 While Asghar Ali Engineer gave details that 4 
persons were dead, 458 were injured and the properties worth Rs. 4,00,000 had been 
damaged at Rourkela.207 
Jai Prakash Narain, a Sarvodaya leader, wrote about the devastating results of 
these riots in his later to Speaker of Parliament and Chairman of Rajya Sabha, that the 
atrocities on the Muslims were limitless and the situation was so obnoxious. Out of 17 
refugee and relief camps, he visited only two camps because he had no tolerance to 
see the worst and deplorable condition of the Muslims.208 
For March 1964 riots, wild and exaggerated rumors were perhaps the deadly 
weapons at the disposal of the goonda elements and proved the causes of a great deed 
of mischief. It was essential to track these rumors down to their sources and nip them 
by stern action. Officers of the Intelligence Bureau and the state CIDs should be able 
to collect useful intelligence about the state of public mind and about any plans for 
                                                                                                                                       
authorities were not willing to touch anything that belonged to Syed Akbar Shah. The High Court at 
Purulia assigned a Muslim judge for the case where the people whom Akbar Shah accused were non-
Muslims.; for more details see, Ramchandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s 
Largest Democracy, Picador, London, 2008. 
204  Home Department, file no., 5/12/1976-RP, p 16 
205  Engineer, Communal Riots after Independence: A Comprehensive Account, p. 34. 
206  Home Department, file no., 5/12/1976-RP, p 16 
207  Engineer, Communal Riots after Independence: A Comprehensive Account, p. 34. 
208 Jai Prakash Narain’s later to the Speaker of the Parliament’s Lok Sabha and to the Chairman of the 
Rajya Sabha, see, Nida-e-Millat, 24 April, 1964, p. 5. 
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creating trouble in the cities. Whenever trouble was apprehended or broke out, there 
was need for close contact and co-ordination between the neighboring states and 
between the district officers. It was difficult to forecast with any accuracy the trends 
during the next three months. In Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir the situation would 
need to be watched with very special care, as the causes that gave rise to the incidents 
are still alive. Moreover the tension generated by the incidents has not yet completely 
subsided. In other states the incidents were more or less sporadic and spontaneous in 
nature. However in many urban centers, particularly in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh continuance of vigilance would be required.209 
Gulzarilal Nanda, the then Union Home Minister, revealed that the right wing 
Hindu organizations like, the Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) was believed to 
have been largely responsible for the disturbances. Its leader M. S. Golwalkar, was 
arrested in Bihar on 23rd March and was expelled from the state.210 
Large and vital industrial undertakings both in public and private sectors were 
affected by the communal disturbances in Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh in 
March, 1964. This brought to light some special factors pertaining to industrial 
undertakings which must be taken in account of impairment to production and large 
scale involvement of industrial workers in communal activities were to be avoided.211 
In the year of 1965 and 1966, minor incidents of communal violence occurred 
in almost all months in Bihar. But there was not any serious outbreak. Again in 1967 
serious out breaks takes place. The most serious communal violence occurred in Bihar 
over the question of Urdu language.212 This was perhaps the first time in post 
independence period that differences over language have been the starting point of 
communal trouble on a large scale. The Ranchi incidents started, with, when an anti-
Urdu procession was allegedly stoned near a cinema house. Riot goes over nearly a 
                                               
209 Home Department (Political) file no. 19/41/67- Poll-I (A), P. 23. 
210  Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence: A Comprehensive Account, p. 34. 
211  Home Department, Poll-I (A), file no. 19/26/ 1964-Poll-I (A), p.39. 
212  Despite language issue, communal polarization was also going through the anti-cow-slaughter 
agitation. The All India Goraksha Smmelan at Vrindavan, in the Mathura (U.P.) was held in 1964, 
where it was decided to ask government to pass legislation to ban cow-slaughter completely by 
Gopashtami in 1965, and to send deputation to meet the President, Prime Ministe and other ministers to 
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week and took a heavy toll of life. Considerably damage to private property was also 
caused although a detailed assessment has not so far been made.213 
Impact of the grim tragedy of Jamshedpur was so grave that the workers 
wanted to return to their homes (if were saved during riots), they did not want to live 
in the isolated servant quarters214 because in Jamshedpur and Rourkela most of the 
Muslims were butchered by their Hindu co-workers.215 But the fact is that although 
not on large scale but Hindus were also murdered by the Muslims, their houses were 
burnt too by the Muslims.216 The chain outbreaks of the riots in Jabalpur (1961), 
Calcutta (1964), Jamshedpur (1964), Rourkela (1964) etc., were not the result of 
commotion but were the riots-- pre-planned and organized-- and were directed against 
the emerging centers of the Muslims.217 Most of the riots were organized about 9 to 
10 months before the elections. And most of the time, in the riots, losses of human 
lives and of properties invariably fell on the Muslims.218  
Making observations on these violence, a newspaper write up commented, “It 
has been proved that the flames of communal riots have had aggravated by the 
Pakistani agents and RSS”.219 
West Bengal Detective Police claimed to have got evidences that Pakistani spy 
were running their organizations vehemently in Calcutta. These spies got support and 
cooperation from the communalists of the city was.220 Even Jai Prakash Narayan said 
that all Pakistani agents were not Muslims but the Hindus were also involved in this 
e.g. at Calcutta 5 spy agents of Pakistan were arrested, but all were not Muslims, 4 out 
of 5 arrested persons were Hindus and only one was a Muslim. In several cases 
Hindus were arrested for working as Pakistani agent.221  
A Ragahwan in his article in Blitz (Urdu)222 told that there was a very 
enigmatic side of contemporary communal riots that broke out only in those areas 
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through which trains, carrying refugees, passed and this issue was raised in Lok Sabha 
by Gulzari Lal Nanda (Wazir-i-Dakhila, the Union Home Minister) vehemently. 
But the point is: it was not explained that the chain of refugee camps were 
spread from one end to other. These camps were established to give support and 
assistance to the refugees but it is also true in instigating the communal riots these 
camps were actively responsible and it has been revealed to the government that these 
camps were influenced by the RSS. 
Though the then Government was very sure of this that many RSS members 
were also the leaders of the Jan Sangh but the investigations were not made properly 
to prove that whether  the Jan Sangh was involved in those riots or not. Quite often, 
riots were outcome of long ongoing processes. After the assassination of Gandhi 
(January 1948), the leaders such as Golwalkae and Nathuram Godse, these two Gurus 
(of Hindu communalism) of RSS were kept intern (nazarband) in Bihar and they were 
later exiled.223 
When the whole country was charged with the communal tension and flame, 
“the Hitler of RSS” (Golwalkar) arrived at Hazaribagh and in the festive anniversaries 
of tribals gave a very inflammable speech.224 Golwalkar was also willing to give 
speech in an anniversary of Ranchi which has already been charged with the 
communal tension.225 
Government also got report that the RSS leaders assembled at Nagpur, the 
RSS headquarters, and decided to take revenge against the India’s Muslims if riots 
broke out in East Pakistan.226 
It was the time when Nehru was ill and at that time they wanted to create such 
situation to meet their political ends. 
But fortunately in East-Pakistan there was not even a single outbreak. But as 
the communal minded RSS people had already decided and had firm determination to 
take revenge, they established a chain of refugee camps where they gave assistance to 
refugees and also to spread rumours of their sufferings and gave wide publication to 
their tale. On 18 March they spread a rumor that Muslims had uprooted the railway 
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lines so that the trains carrying refugees. This rumor lit the fire to the whole leading to 
outbreak of riots in Jarsogoda. 
As argued earlier, quite often, riots were not a sudden occurrence, or rebuking 
someone, assaulting someone or speaking against someone did not always turn into 
riots. In fact it was an on going process---politically manufactured through. False 
rumours, heated speeches, communal organizations, etc., For instance in 1964 there 
was a rumour that one Muslim was wandering around the railway stations intending 
to pour poison into the food for refugees. This rumour had horrific results.227 In 
Rajganj there was also a rumor of same nature that a butcher betrayed the Hindus. He 
sold them (Hindus) beef.228 Even in the Delhi elections the RSS volunteers spread this 
rumor that Nehru eats beef in every evening at the Ashoka Hotel.229 This is too 
ridiculous that many politicians defended or provided shelter to the communalists and 
fascists, where these sections of politicians, enjoyed the full liberty to do whatever 
they wanted230 which had been clearly shown in the sketch given below: 
 
Source: Blitz, 26 December, 1964, p. 2. 
It is testified by a report of the weekly Blitz pertaining to the peaceful tribal 
areas of Orissa and Bihar that behind the communal riots poisonous propagandas were 
there and these were spread by the agents and hysteric Hindu propagandists. And 
these communal minded Hindus were headed by the RSS and Jan Sangh.231 
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In all these riots, small traders were also found to have been involved. In 
March, 1964 when tribal people (of Orissa) escaped from Orissa and entered Bihar, 
they were chased by the rioters (of Orissa) who also entered in Bihar and were joined 
by the tribal people of Bihar and jointly they indulged in rioting. And a boy from 
(Belgium) was stoned to death.232 
Gulzari Lal Nanda (the then Union Home Minister) told in an interview that 
tribal people were instigated by the selfish people for carrying out the riots.233 
Although were seized but the communal polarization were carried by the communal 
organizations. Thus riots broke out in Sheohar in 1966 over the issue of cow 
slaughter. Sheohar riot was also an organized riot. Before the riot there were, agitation 
against cow-slaughter. Jagat Gurur of Jagannathpur, leaders and members of Jan 
Sangh and RSS were involved in arousing the people against the Muslims and spread 
the rumour that, although Muslims were beef eaters yet Congress continued to 
appeased them because Muslims were their vote banks, thus there was no ban on cow-
slaughter by the government. In wake of increased agitation against cow-slaughter 
Sheohar riots broke out. There were no record of numbers of deaths and wounds, but 
a number of the houses of the Muslims were burnt during this riot.234 
Ranchi-Hatia Riots August 22-29, 1967 
The August, 1967 riots had occurred in Ranchi-Hatia industrial area over violent 
protests by Hindus against the Government’s move for making Urdu the second 
official language of Bihar235 and the immediate spark was provided by the brick 
batting on the procession.236 
The 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict had also deepened suspicion about the Muslim 
community. A number of events took place right since April, 1964. Details of 
atrocities from the then East Pakistan area were reported by refugees and the 
suspicion against the Muslims worsened. The degeneration started in March 1967 
after the results of the general elections and the formation of a new Government. 
There were conflicts between students and taxi drivers and also between students and 
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the police. The State Government was indifferent to the downslide in the law and 
order situation despite messages from the District Magistrate.237 
There was a culture of goondaism in the city of Ranchi with a Hindu gang and 
a Muslim gang operating in mutually sequestered territories.238 The final blow came 
when rumours started spreading on August 22 that on the one hand Muslims had been 
murdered by Hindus in one part of the city while in another part of the city rumours 
spread that the Hindus had been murdered by the Muslims. Attacks were reported by 
communities on each other. Preventive action was not been taken by the police. They 
allowed the starting of communal riots. Goondas went underground and the situation 
went out of control.239 
The immediate spark for the Ranchi riots was stoning by Muslim of a 
procession of school boys taken out against providing official policy, according to 
which, the status of second language to Urdu would be recognised.240 Soon, 
thereafter, Shadilal, a Hindu proprietor of Kashmir Vstralaya was done to death on the 
main road. This sparked off chain of incidents in which 156 persons of whom 98 were 
Muslims lost their lives. While the incidents in Ranchi town might have taken place 
as a reaction to what had happened to the procession and Shri Shadilal the Hindu 
communal elements took complete charge of the situation after the initial impetus had 
spend itself. On 23rd and 24th August there was a systematic killing of Muslims. From 
the way the killing took place in Hatia, it would appear that there was an element of 
pre-planning involved. It would be difficult to come to any firm conclusion on this 
point as all the facts are not yet available and a judicial inquiry into the incidents has 
been ordered. According to information so far available 78 Muslims’ houses were set 
on fire and 14 looted. The loss to property has been on large scale but no official 
estimate is available.241 
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The communal situation had definitely deteriorated in 1967 in comparison to 
previous year. The 1967 incidents had some special features. Like in 1967 fairly large 
number of communal incidents took place in Jammu and Kashmir which had been 
almost completely free from communal tension in previous years.242 
The student communities were drawn into communal incident on an organized 
basis. The trouble in Ranchi in fact started after a student procession had been stoned. 
The Hindu students of Medical College at Ranchi and some other technical 
institutions also took part in assault on Muslim students. In Jammu and Kashmir also 
the student played a leading role in the series of communal incidents in August and 
September, 1967.243 
Perhaps for the first time since independence the police and army have been 
accused by the minority community of having sided with the aggressive majority 
community. This has particular relevance to the incidents that occurred in Ranchi. The 
CPI as well as a number of Muslim organizations criticized the role of army and 
police.244 
The incidents at Ranchi highlighted the fact that the new industrial centers 
were markedly prone to communal violence. Following only two years after the wave 
of the communal violence which engulfed Ranchi, Jamshedpur and Rourkela, the 
1967 riots brought out the failure of the trade union movements in these centres to 
integrate the working force into a composite community marked by the values of an 
industrial civilization.245 Although the Ranchi riots occurred over the issue of making 
Urdu official language in Bihar, but it was the Muslims in worker’s colonies of Heavy 
Engineering complex, where as many as 150 out of them were killed.246 And most of 
them were skilled Muslim workers engaged in textile, silver work, bidri-ware, 
bangles, ivory-work and other industries and were patronized by feudal nobility.247 
As it was demanded to make Urdu the Second Official Language, a circular 
was issued by the then Deputy Chief Minister stating that- ‘in all the Government 
offices, letters, applications, petitions in Urdu should be accepted and their replies be 
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given in Urdu; all important Government publications should possibly be translated 
into Urdu and; all the Government sign boards should also be written in Urdu besides 
Hindi.’ Then on 14th July 1967 a non-official Bill was moved in the Bihar Legislative 
Assembly by a Congress member, Nasiruddin Hyder Khan for making Urdu second 
official language of the state.248 
Thus, a huge procession was organized by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan on 28th 
July, 1967. On 29th July, 1967 in a conference of Hindi Sahitya Sammelan they 
pointed out that Urdu did not have its own script and even they went on to add that, 
“Urdu is the symbol of our slavery”.249 Even Jan Sangh created panic among the 
Hindu people that, recognition of the status of Urdu meant end of the existence of the 
Hindi and it would be an insult of Hindi.250 
But the Jan Sangh, a constituent of the then United Front Government in 
Bihar, did not subscribe to the making of Urdu second official language of the state 
and it was given liberty to oppose it at any time. So the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, the 
Jan Sangh and certain Congress members organized regular agitations throughout the 
state from August 12 to 26, 1967. A handbill was distributed at Ranchi on 12 August 
1967, which not only opposes the move of the Government but also added that it 
would disrupt the unity of the country. One V.R. describing himself to be president of 
Chhota Nagpur division, Students’ Congress, started a demonstration at Ranchi on 
August 16, and was opposed by A. Ali, a communist leader, who shouted pro-Urdu 
slogans. On 17 August V.R. distributed a Hindi pamphlet headed “Challenge to 
Manhood of New Generation” and used very strong language against supporters of 
Urdu. In August 1967, V.R. informed the P.S. kotwali, Ranchi that he would take out 
a procession on 22nd August 1967 against the proposed recognition of Urdu as second 
official language of the state, moved out in the city in a rickshaw, using provocative 
language against Muslims. He was arrested on 21 August 1967. However, his 
associates could not be arrested.251 
Serious communal trouble, which lasted for over a week, broke out at Ranchi 
on August 22, 1967 in connection with the anti-Urdu agitation in the states. The 
trouble started with the taking out of an anti-Urdu procession which we have been 
already discussed in this chapter. It started from the Vijay Chowk (Ranchi) at about 2 
                                               
248 Kumar (ed.), Committees and Commissions in India, p.255. 
249 Parcham-e-Hind, 27 August, 1967, p. 4. 
250 Nida-e-Millat,13 March, 1967, p. 3. 
251 Ghosh, Communal Riots in India, pp 138-139. 
 
 
135
pm and consisted of about 2000 students. On reaching at the St. Xavier’s College, the 
processionists unsuccessfully asked its students to join them. The processionists 
indulged in the act of hooliganism. The procession proceeded to Grosener High 
School and indulged in brick batting. On the main road near Ratan Talkies, there was 
a sudden exchange of brick-bats between the anti-Urdu processionists and Muslims 
numbering around 100. There were further exchanges of brick-bats near the Jamat-e-
Islami office and the Urdu library. Near the daily market, some Muslims threw soda 
water bottles on the processionists in which two students of the Marwari School were 
seriously injured. During this period, a Hindu was fatally stabbed by a Muslim. The 
situation then took a serious turn and went out of control.252 
Incidents of arson, loot and assault took place in the mohalla of Hindpiri, 
Upper Basar, Bariyetu, Lalpur, Morabadi, Kenta tollah, Nakum etc. Army was then 
called in the night of 22 August 1967 and curfew was imposed. On August 23, 1967 
communal violence spread to Ranchi Medical College. The Hindu students assaulted 
their Muslim colleagues. One of the injured Muslim students succumbed to his 
injuries. Around 13 medical students were arrested which led to a lightening strike of 
house surgeons and nursing staff which was called off only on the morning of August 
28, 1967. While the mob fury was by and large contained in the Ranchi town by the 
evening of August 23, 1967, trouble flared up suddenly in the industrial township of 
HEC (Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited), Hatia. Large scale killing of Muslims 
started in the township in the afternoon of August 24, 1967. The victims were mostly 
lower class Muslim employees living on the fringes (outskirts) of the township. The 
HEC management closed the factory to prevent the situation from deteriorating 
further. The situation was brought under control by 27th August 1967 though sporadic 
cases of stabbing, arson, etc., continued for some more days.253 
The periphery of Ranchi was also affected. The affected areas were Beriatu, 
Arara, Tantilsilwai and Namkum. In all, 12 Hindus, 98 Muslims and 46 unidentified 
were killed and 36 Hindus; further 79 Muslims and 16 unidentified were injured.254 
Members of Jan Sangh and RSS were very active in spreading the communal 
hatred and organizing massacres the throughout Ranchi and Hatia area. They were 
involved in fanning provocative and wild rumours, propagating hatred and terror and 
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organizing offensive riotous mobs along with certain Congressmen in certain 
places.255 
Raghubar Dayal Committee Report suggested all measures of preventive 
action should be taken on the mere possibility of a communal disturbance in the 
present atmosphere. It is better to be forewarned and forewarned than to be optimistic 
and be proved wrong. 
Contradicting the rumors likely to inflame communal tension, which 
were bound to get afloat at the happening of the slightest incident of 
prime importance. Rumors travel very fast and can be contradicted 
only an officer getting information about their currency. It is to be 
considered how to contradict them before they get circulated widely 
and what action can be taken against adding such rumors. The use of 
radio may also helpful in contradicting rumors and giving out correct 
facts of the situation. Ranch had a radio station and it should be 
possible to arrange frequent broadcasts on some controlled wave 
length for this purpose.256 
 The increasingly blatant misuse of the government controlled media (TV and 
AIR) to extol the Prime Minister’s activities and statements, while virtually blacking 
out the opposition, criticism and coverage of people’s sufferings and struggles 
represented another threat to democratic value. Harmful programmes were put out 
which only encourage religious fundamentalism and communal sentiments.257 The 
Raghubar Dayal Committee Inquiry Report also suggested the use of publicity 
vehicles for contradicting rumors in a large city like Ranchi has not been found very 
effective on account of the time-lag factor.258 
The pattern of the police and military patrolling in vehicles has not been found 
to be very effective when the vehicle pass to a certain place, the people committing 
mischief or intending to commit mischief get off the road and conceal themselves. 
They came out just after the violence have passed, in full knowledge that no further 
patrol party would be coming along to stop them from their activities for a substantial 
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period of time. Further the vehicle cannot go through a number of lanes and bye-lanes 
connecting the main streets and roads of Ranchi. The patrolling party should be so 
arranged that it would pass a certain spot within short intervals of time. The patrolling 
party can make surprise return visit to the spot. There can be one satisfactory way of 
checking incidents once disturbances have broken out.259 
Raghubar Dayal Committee Inquiry Report, came with the point of the 
suggestions for recruitment of greater proportion to the police force in the various 
states resumes that either Muslims were deliberately not recruited to the various 
forces or that there should be some posts in various services to be served for Muslims. 
The suggestions can not be favored. Recruitment to the services should be on the 
basis of merit and is to be presumed that the recruiting authority recruits fairly. If 
there be any instance of the recruiting agency failing in its duty with respect to any 
particular individual, a grievance can be made of it and can be inquired into. So far as 
recruitment through Public Service Commissions is concerned, selection must be 
deemed to be on merit. So far as selection by other agencies is concerned, no direction 
can be issued for their leaning in favor of Muslims to see that an adequate number of 
Muslims are recruited whenever recruitment made to any particular service.260 
The Chief Secretary said that the recruitment of the Muslims to the Bihar 
police services seems to be fairly conducted. He also expressed the view that he did 
not consider it a proper approach to the question of recruitment of services, especially 
the police service, whether recruitment is adequate or otherwise in respect of any 
particular community.261 There were different modes of selection for different 
services. Thereafter, he gave sample figures for recruitment to the ranks of Dy. S.Ps 
and S.Is in different years. He said: 
In 1964, four Dy. S. Ps were appointed and all the four happened to be 
Hindus. Twenty-five sub-inspectors were appointed in that year and 
out of them, twenty-three were Hindus and two were Muslims that is 8 
percent. In 1965, no Dy. S. P. was appointed but twenty-five sub–
inspectors were appointed, out of whom twenty-two were Hindus and 
three were Muslims that is 11.5 percent. In 1966, five Dy. S. Ps were 
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appointed out of whom two were Muslims and three were Hindus that 
is giving 40 percent representation to Muslims. In that year thirty-one 
sub-inspectors were appointed out of whom four were Muslims i.e. 
12.9%. In 1967, three Dy.S.Ps were recruited and none of them was a 
Muslim; twenty-eight sub-inspectors were appointed and two were 
Muslims among them i.e. 7.04%.262 
There was no communal reservation, out of seven D. I. Gs three were 
Muslims. The Inspector General (IG) of police had expressed the opinion that the 
Muslims were reasonably represented in the police of the state.263 
Enquiry committee report on Ranch-Hatia riot of 1967 also suggested that a 
Board for the Indian Muslim Minority with effective powers to look after the welfare 
of the Muslims and able to secure and redressal of their grievances should be 
established at the center and in each of the state of the Union of India that men of the 
highest integrity and well established non-communal outlook alone should be selected 
to serve on these boards. These suggestions again perpetuate the separatist attitude of 
the Muslims and would be of no help in bringing about harmonious relations between 
the two communities.264 
The problem of communal riots can be solved by government 
alone. The larger part of responsibility was rests upon the political 
parties, the press, social workers, teachers and students and 
enlightened members of the general public. Jointly and severely, in 
every possible way, they must launch a nation-wide program of 
education and action to promote harmony, not only among Hindus and 
Muslims but among all communities of the country. The reports 
referred to above have many suggestions that might found useful. The 
All India Radio can play a notable part in this.265 
Government made assurances to rehabilitate the victims which we shall 
discuss later in this chapter. Government considers the riots a matter of shame and 
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assured to, irrespective of cost, protect the life, property and honour of all section of 
community.266 
Sursand Riot, October, 1967 
On October 13, 1967, a Durga procession was brick batted267 in Sursand in Sitamarhi 
sub-Division of Muzaffarpur district when it was passing through a Muslim locality. 
About 20 persons were injured. Precautionary measures were taken.268 
The communal tension generated by the clash between the Hindus and 
Muslims at Sursand, turned out to be explosive on October 15, 1967 when some 
Muslims set fire to a few Hindu houses. When the police intervened the Muslims 
attacked and injured a policeman grievously. Some Muslims took position in a near 
by mosque and fired gun shots. The police returned the fire, killed two Muslims in the 
mosque. The Hindus retaliated by setting fire Muslim houses on fire. Some cases of 
stabbing were also reported.269 The situation was brought under control by the 
evening. In the riots, 14 Muslims and 4 Hindus were killed. 32 Hindus and 65 
Muslims were injured. The total number of arson cases reported till 18th October 1967 
was 139 Muslim houses and 13 Hindu houses.270 
Rampur Khas Riots, November 1967 
Rampur Khas, Police Station (P.S.), Belsand of Sitamarhi Sub-Division in 
Muzaffarpur district was the scene of serious communal disturbances on 13 
November, 1967. Five Mahabiri Jhanda processions were to assemble at Iratu Bazar. 
Four of them arrived peacefully but when the procession from Madhopur Chats 
reached the Rampur Ghat at 3pm. A rumor spread that a Hindu had received gun 
injuries from a Muslim. This caused commotion and the mob started indulging in 
arson and murder. Three Muslims were killed. Charred remains, suspected tale of two 
Muslim children were also found the in the debris. Three only Muslim women were 
injured. 35 Muslim houses and two Hindu houses were burnet down. 47 Muslim and 2 
Hindu families were affected. Orders under section 144 Cr. P.C. were promulgated in 
the affected areas.271 Since in Ranchi-Hatia riots of August 1967 disturbances the 
information reached to the District Magistrate (DM) and the Sub-Divisional Officer 
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(SDO) after the riots had been started.272 Thus inquiry commission advised that 
walkie-talkie should be provided to police parties escorting processions so that 
immediate information from the place where trouble was taken place can be 
communicated to control room.273 
As in the case of the Ranchi-Hatia August 1967 riots we saw that non-officials 
elements took out an anti-Urdu agitation. This committee suggested that the 
propaganda should be carried through press and platform and through other means of 
communications. It should be on constant regular basis for inculcating a feeling in the 
Hindus to consider the Muslims who have been residing in the country as good citizen 
and nationalist as they are, and in the Muslim the feeling that they are the citizen of 
this country of this country and should show no sympathy or preference to Pakistan in 
matter of differences between Pakistan and India. It also suggests that the press or the 
speeches from the platform should avoid any expression which may tend to create ill 
will between the various communities of the country. And also suggests that the 
Ministers constituting the Government should not speak with difference voices as 
happened to be case in connection with the agitation about making Urdu the second 
official language of the state.274 
Above all one can ideate that these riots were organized and pre-planned. 
Even Glzarilal Nanda the then Union Home Minister said about Ranchi riot of 1976, 
that, such large scale riot could not have happened without prior organization. That is 
quite possible, but Glzarilal Nanda believed that more deep-seated cause was the 
systematic under cover organization. Propaganda and indoctrination that have been 
going on for years past aimed to inculcate to inculcate in the youths particularly, 
sentiments of narrow nationalism religious bigotry and arrogance, mutual suspicion 
and hatred. Jayaprakash Narayan argued whatever had happening during those days in 
the country, made it clear that venomous and virulent activities were going on 
ostensibly under the guise of cultural or religious activities. Jayaprakash Narayan was 
sure that, “if the authorities had known what was cooking in Ranchi, they could have 
prevented the outbreak or put out the fire at first flicker. But that was not the 
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weakness of the Ranchi administration alone – that was a national weakness, which 
can be neglected further at grave peril to the nation.”275 
The following steps were taken to rehabilitate the victims of communal riots at 
Ranchi (August 1967), Sursand (October 1967), and Rampur Khas (November 1967) 
in the districts of Muzaffarpur district: 
1.  Rs. 323921.81 was spent on relief and rehabilitation of riot-victims at 
Sursand. 
2. Rs. 1512097 was spent on relief and rehabilitation at Rampur Khas. 
3. At Ranchi relief in the shape of rehabilitation, house repair and educational 
grants were provided. 128 shopkeepers and 52 artisans were provided sums of 
Rs. 32375/- and 11100/- respectively. Rehabilitation grants amounting to Rs. 
210240/- were given in 543 cases and miscellaneous relief grants amount to 
5540/- in 19 cases. House repair grants were given in 74 cases amounting to 
Rs. 43975/-, education grants in 167 cases amounting to 43700/- and 17 
widows were sanctioned maintenance allowance between 30/- and 40/- per 
month for two years.276 
Cases were initiated against persons alleged to have been responsible for the 
riots in Sursand and Rampur Khas. In Ranchi 494 criminal cases were instituted, 7 
persons were detained under the PD Act. Action against those responsible for failyure 
to check the recurrence of communal riots is being taken.277 
Bhagalpur Riots, December 1967 
Bhagalpur had a long history of communal riots in 1924, 1936, 1938, and 
Bhagalpur also was the scene of bloodiest communal riots in 1946278 and saw some 
exodus of Muslim population from this district.279 In Bhagalpur 88% of the 
population of Bhagalpur lived in its rural areas. Communal riots arose at Bhagalpur 
on 13 December, 1967 following assault on two Muslim students of the Marwari 
College. In the second shift of the College, two Muslim students were stabbed. These 
incidents were the outcome of tension that was caused on 8 December, 1967 when 
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some Hindu students were injured while trying a near non-Hindu signboards from the 
shops of Muslims in the mohalla Tatarpur of Bhagalpur town. The trouble spread to 
rural areas of Bhagalpur, Sultanganj and P.S. Jagdishpur. Incidents of arson, loot, 
assault continued to occur till December 26, 1967. Prohibitory orders under section 
144 Cr. P.C. were promulgated and curfew was imposed. In all, Hindus and 11 
Muslims were killed and 15 Muslims were injured. 
During 1968-69, incidents of communal nature took place in all months. But 
none of them was serious. It was again in 1970 a serious communal outbreak occurred 
in Chaibasa of Singhbhum district. 
The figures of communal incidents for the nine months in 1967 exceeded the 
total figures of riots in 1966. Thus 1967 figures were subjected to revision for a 
complete picture of the Ranchi incidents had yet to emerge. Though the number of 
incidents reported from Bihar was 54 but the information about the gravity of Ranchi 
riots the figure of incidents were bound to increase significantly. There had been a 
remarkable rise in the numbers of incident in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, J&K, Kerala and 
Uttar Pradesh as compared to 1966.280 
We may bring this study to a close by an analysis of the role of various 
communal organizations. In the rural areas no communal organizations as such as 
come to notice for inciting of taking advantage of communal violence. In the urban 
centers, however, the role of RSS needs to be noticed. Like in Kerala, incident in 
Palghat district in which two Muslims were killed, the involvement of RSS volunteers 
has been reported. In Kasargod area, the Jan Sangh has been mobilizing the Hindus in 
favor of a merger with Mysore.281 
Muslim population had resolutely opposed to the merger the possibility of 
communal trouble being engineered by the Jan Sangh and the Muslim League can not 
be ruled out.282 
In Bihar there was definite evidence of Jan Sangh having a hand in the 
incidents. It has been reported that some Marwaris of the Upper Bazar area had 
initiated their low class laborers to indulge in hooliganism in these incidents and had 
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assured them of financial backing. The CPI, the CPM and the SSP have all assured 
Jan Sangh of being responsible for the incidents.283 
There is no evidence of any Muslim Communal Organization having played 
any part in the incidents that have been reported except in Hydrabad where Majlis-e-
Ittehad-ul Muslimin was apparently connected with certain incidents. It is interesting 
that in Haydrabad the tension between the workers of the Jan Sangh and those of the 
Majlis were responsible for at least two incidents. An unfortunate aspect of the recent 
incidents in Ranchi is that the Muslim organizations like Jamat-e-Islami and Majlis-e-
Mushwarat are thinking in terms of raising a Muslim Volunteer Force for protection 
of the minority community against aggression by the majority community. This is 
mainly linked up with their assessment that the armed forces and the police were not 
in a position to help the Muslim community when it was attacked be cause whenever 
trouble occurred, some of the communal-minded officers do no act properly.284 If 
these plans materialize, there would be possibility of a head-long clash between such 
as volunteer force and the RSS.285 
Conclusion 
After independence there was drastic change in political, economic and social 
life of Bihar (as also in India as a whole). The year 1967 is also a landmark in the 
political history of Bihar, because in 1967 political arena was enlarged and many 
parties emerged to challenge the dominance of the Congress, thus for the first time a 
large number of members of non-Congress were installed in the Bihar legislature. 
This was done because the lower castes like koeries, Kurmis, Yadava etc. among the 
Hindu community and ajlaf, ashraf and arzal among the Muslims, started asserting 
their share in power and politics on one hand on the other hand inflow of the riches, 
due to their migration to Arabian Gulf countries, in a section of Muslim community 
and conflict for power share and for their grievances created rift between the 
communities which resulted many riots viz. Sitamarhi riot (1959), riots in the tribal 
belt (1964), Sursand (1967) etc., and the major one was Ranchi-Hatia riots of 1967 
that was ignited as the first riot over purely political issue after independence. Most of 
the riots were occurred in the areas where Muslims were economically stable or 
emerging, and were in majorities. Most of the killed were skilled Muslims. As we can 
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see that the Ranchi-Hatia riots (1967) broke out over the procession against the 
recognition by the government of Urdu as second official language, by Hindu the 
Hindu students but sufferer were the Muslims of the industrial colony. Moreover, 
during Sursand riots (1967), almost entire Muslims of the Villages were rendered. 
It is also evident that in the Bihar incidents the Jan Sangh was one of the main 
players in instigating and carrying out the riots. They instigated the working and 
laborers class to indulge in hooliganism for this they had assured them of financial 
backing. The CPI, the CPM and the SSP have all assured Jan Sangh of being 
responsible for the incidents. 
There is no clear evidence of any Muslim Communal Organization having 
played any part in the incidents. However, in the Ranchi riots of 1967 the Muslim 
organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami and Majlis-e-Mushawarat were thinking in terms 
of raising a Muslim Volunteer Force for protection of the minority community against 
aggression by the majority community. This was mainly linked up with their 
assessment that the armed forces and the police were not in a position to help the 
Muslim community when it was attacked. Thus there were chances of prolonged 
violence, given the mistrust of the minorities in the state security agencies. 
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Chapter - 4 
Major Riots in Bihar, 1968-1992 
 
In Bihar, during 1951-1958 there were a number of communal riots but those were 
not serious in nature. As we have discussed in the previous chapters, the post-
independence Bihar witnessed a spate of outbreak of communal riots. Major riots 
after independence, up-till 1967 were: Jamshedpur riots (April 1959), riots in the 
1964, Ranchi-Hatia riots (August, 1967), Sursand, in Sitamarhi subdivision of 
Muzaffarpur in north Bihar, riots (October, 1967), Rampur Khas ((in Belsand of 
Sitamarhi Sub-Division in Muzaffarpur district)) riots (November, 1967) and 
Bhagalpur riots (December, 1967). 
Bihar During the 1960s 
The Indo-Pak war in Kutch (1965), followed by the Bangladesh war in 1971, 
which affected the Hindu-Muslim relations in India specially in Bihar, because during 
the Liberation war of Bangladesh, India collaborated with the East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) where majority of the Bihari Muslims suffered. During the Bangladesh 
war a number of Bihari Muslims suffered because at the time of partition of India 
some of them migrated to East Pakistan. Many of them were looked upon as lording 
over the Bengali Muslims and were suspected to have sympathized with the West 
Pakistan during the liberation war of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) Hence they were 
subjected to loot, genocide and general terror perpetrated by the East Pakistan regime. 
But it was not the whole truth, after partition of India there were communal riots all 
over the country and about 30,000 Muslim was killed in so called “Bihar Killing” in 
October and November. Thus people from Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Orissa, 
Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Sikkim, migrated to newly established, Pakistan. 
Majority of the people migrated from the Bihar so they were well known as Bihari in 
East Pakistan. Bihari’s language, culture, custom, tradition was quite different except 
the religion to East Pakistan. But the Urdu speaking Biharis shared the same language 
with West Pakistanis who captured the economic and political power in East Pakistan. 
The similarity of language and religion created opportunity for Biharis in the position 
of East Pakistani economy as West Pakistani rulers patronized them for their own 
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interest.1 Since Indian Government (then the CPI-M led front was in power in the 
Indian province of West Bengal) collaborated with East Pakistan and eventually 
Bangaladesh was liberated, thus, Bihari Muslims (not all the Bihari Muslims) suffered 
and in Bihar Muslims, who had their relatives in Bangladesh were drifted their 
support towards the Jan Sangh, demanded that the Indian Government should 
gurantee the the safety and honour of the Bihari Muslims in Bangladesh.2 Refugees 
from Bangladesh added fuel to fire. The country again suffered riots in Ranchi, 
Jamshedpur, Aligarh, Bhiwandi and other towns. With Pakistan born in 1947 and 
Bangladesh in 1971, there emerged a distinct possibility of a third break-up of the 
subcontinent3 and this gave immigration of refugees on large scale form Bangladesh. 
In Bihar, approximately 1 crore (10 million) refugees were accommodated. Because 
of these immigrations, there were threats of communal riots even the minor issues 
turned into communal clashes such as in Chatra (Hazaribagh) a coomunal clash 
erupted on 23rd February, 1971, when a Hindu had gone for toilet in a field near the 
mosque.4 The burden of those refugees had created an imbalance in the Bihar 
economy.5 By 1971, many other “odd” developments took place such as, the 
Naxalites sped up their activities, and due to heavy rainfall rabi crops were destroyed. 
This shot up the prices of daily commodities and unemployment, thus tension spread 
into the society.6 The Hindu mood with an emphasis on the Hindu Rashtra began to 
take shape in the minds of Indians against the backdrop. The frustrated Hindus 
thought they were being marginalized in the process of nation building and that was 
time they too raised their banner of identity.7 
With the consolidation of the middle castes and their awareness of their 
numerical political strength which has been going on for decades, the political 
scenario of country in general and of Bihar in particular began to change in the mid 
1960s. The gradual decline in the voting percentage of the Congress from 1952 to 
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19678 had much to do with the gradual coming up of the middle castes, which had 
first found a platform in the Ram Manohar Lohia led Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) 
that had emerged as the single largest party in the Bihar Assembly elections of 1967. 
The period from 1967 to the imposition of Emergency in June 1975 was a period of 
political tumult and instability. By 1960 the forward castes started losing their hold 
over the lands that strengthened the capacity of new land-owning class mainly 
consisting of the upper Other Backward Castes (OBCs)9, i.e., Yadavas, Koeris and 
Kurmis. By 1968, the consolidation of these upper segments of the backward castes 
enabled them to stand against the upper caste hegemony, who denied them the 
emerging socio-economic opportunities.10 The land owning class of Yadavas had 
small political parties that merged, after the 1967 Assembly elections, with the 
Communists, the Jan Sangh and the Samyukt Socialist Party (SSP) to form a grand 
coalition called the Samyukt Vidhayak Dal11 (SVD) was formed and a former 
Congressman, Mahamaya Prasad Singh (1909-74) was sworn in as the first non-
Congress Chief Minister of Bihar in March 196712 with Karpoori Thakur13 (1924-88) 
as his Deputy. Unlike UP, however, SVD government did not last long and, using the 
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factionalism within the SVD, Satish Prasad Sinha became the “interim” CM in 
January 1968 for 3 days, paved the way for Congress-backed instant coalition called 
Shoshit Dal.14 He was overthrown by the former Congressman and the sitting SVD 
minister Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal who was elected as chief minister by the Shoshit 
Dal (SD). Within a few weeks the former Congress Chief Minister Binodanand Jha 
(1900-1971) along with a group of Dalit MLAs split the Congress to form the 
Loktantrik Congress Dal. He made Bhola Paswan Shastri, the first Dalit CM of Bihar 
in March 1968. Shastri also had an unstable government and within less than 100 days 
of his becoming the Chief Minister, Governor’s Rule was promulgated.15 
The 1969 Assembly elections were also resulted in an unstable Assembly. The 
first OBC CM of the Congress, Harihar Prasad Singh, the first ever Chief Minister 
belonging to OBC, was sworn in but his government lasted for only 4 months. Bhola 
Paswan Shashtri again formed the government but his was also a freakshow of two 
weeks, thus Bihar was under President’s Rule once again.16 Indeed, the emergence of 
Chaudhary Charan Singh (1902-87)17, from 1967 to 1979, was the result of the 
growing power of the middle castes in North India.18  
Bihar During the 1970s 
By 1972 Bihar gained notoriety for administrative incompetence, political 
corruption, nepotism and various other ills.  There were some ministers whose 
corruption was defended on the ground that they collected funds for party politics. It 
is alleged that there have been Ministers and Chief Ministers in Bihar whose regimes 
have been marred by illegitimate extortion of money for illegal gratifications and 
selfish accumulation.19 There have been rumours that some Chief Ministers had to 
supply funds to the Congress Party High Command to electoral purposes. Even if 
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such charges are not legally validated, they vitiate the political atmosphere and 
generate streams of resentment.20 
The ‘Total Revolution’ led by Jai Prakash (JP) Narayan, hence also called the 
J.P. Movement, launched in Bihar in 1974, was essentially a popular protest against 
corruption which had acquired disturbing dimensions. The J. P. movement was 
followed by a period of emergency and the announcement of elections.21 But with the 
second tenure of Mrs. Gandhi, corruption22 had assumed truly gargantuan proportions. 
The countryside was marked with caste atrocities and massacre, many of them faced 
atrocities by the police. In Bihar, the places such as Pipra, Masaurhi, Arwal, 
Dhanarua, Parasbigha, Kacharia, Birra, Dalilchak were the scene of horrible 
violence.23 The system of Government by the people and for the people transformed 
into the Government by the corrupt and for the corrupt.24 The ruling Congress-I, had 
contributed to the resurgence of communalism by its indulgence and appeasement of 
religious fundamentalists of both majority and minority communities.25 
Criminals who were wanted by the police and the courts of law and who could 
not enter the country for fear of being arrested and tried had now become politically 
powerful. They were boasting about the accessibility to and influence the corridors of 
power and in centre cases even participated in discussions with ministers on the 
economic future of the country. International smugglers have become eagerly sought 
for guests while their nefarious activities were continued to ruin national economy 
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that was almost under official and political patronage.26 The corruption at the centre 
and political violence has spread like a malignant cancer to the states. The 1977 
election was marked by a vicious expression of sufferings of the people against the 
state of emergency and the party in power. There were more occurrences of political 
violence in the 1970s, in different forms- agrarian conflict, caste conflict, class 
conflict, communal violence, electoral violence, inter-party conflict, intra-party 
conflict, language conflict, regionalism, student unrest, Trade Union conflict, etc.27 
Because power was transferred from the Congress to Janata Party but by 1979 Janata 
party breathed its last and again the country faced Parliamentary and Assembly 
election.28 Political violence29 such as agrarian conflict (since Bihar is an agriculture 
based economy) and electoral violence (as there was conflict for power between 
forward caste and backward caste, and emerging upper OBCs) had made situations 
severest in Bihar. Agrarian conflict was mainly caused by land disputes, minimum 
wages dispute, share cropping and Naxalite30 activities. And the immediate causes of 
violent disputes were the land laws and minimum wages Acts were passed by the 
Government of Bihar, were quietly favoured landed classes. And electoral violence in 
the rural Bihar was mainly caused by violent conflict between the members of the so-
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28 Singh, Political Violence in India, pp. 51-52. 
29 By 1977 and 1980, out of 284 cases of political violence in Bihar, about 35% had occurred in Patna 
division, 17% in Tirhut division, 17% in Chhota Nagpur (north and south), 15% in Darbhanga, 11% in 
Bhagalpur and 5% in Kosi division. In the period 1977-1980, except for Patna and Chota Nagpur 
(north and south), all other divisions had shown greater number of political violence, thus there seems 
to exist inter-regional variations in the occurrences of political and communal violence in the state., 
see, Singh, Political Violence in India, pp. 63-64. 
30 The important reason for the Naxalite movement in India was the threat form Soviet Union to China 
and India was the main ally of the Soviet Union, thus to weaken their power on the 100th birthday of 
Lenin on 22 April, 1969 the CPI (ML) was born, since it came into being at Naxalbari in West Bengal 
it came to be known as Naxalites. The most fertile ground for the movement in Northern Bengal and in 
Northern Bihar. The movement started from the Naxalbari fight of landless labour and the poor from 
1967. This movement spread like bush-fire from West Bengal to Bihar to areas of U. P., Punjab, 
Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu etc. Although the Movement was disappeared in 1977 with the 
symbolic death of Charu Majumdar (the ideologue of Naxalite movement in India) in police custody on 
28 July 1977 but the idea was still alive because the indian polity gave no relief to landless labourers 
and the poor. The exploited poor in rural areas of Bihar and in other parts of the country continued this 
movement till today., see, N. S. Saksena, Terrorism: History and Facts in the World and in India, 
Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1985. 
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called forward caste and backward caste. The immediate cause of such violence was 
the reservation policy of Janata government that created reservation for backward 
caste in government jobs. Thus people from both caste (forward caste and backward 
caste) got mobilized around this issue like forward caste against the reservation policy 
and backward caste in favour of this policy.31 But the Mandal issue had the 
advantages for the the Janata Dal because no political party, even the BJP could dare 
to oppose the ‘Mandal proposals’ for the reservations for the minority community. 
BJP32 came with the Ramjanmbhoomi (Ram Mandir) issue33 thus it took the form of 
Mandal vs Mandir34 that projected the BJP on to centre-stage. Mandir-Masjid 
controversy resulted in riots all over India in wake of rathyatra by Advani35, like riots 
in Meerut36 in 1987, where local political leaders, instead of helping local authorities, 
exploited the situation. However the promise of BJP to built Ram Mandir at place of 
Babri Masjid remained in pending; therefore it is that the BJP’s commitment to built 
Ram mandir was only a way to gain electoral advantages.37 This move of BJP was 
angrily responded by the Muslims, as Syed Shabuddin stated, “Till the title is decided 
any such allotment will amount to official support and patronage to an unlawful 
activity and prejudging a subjudice matter.” Further, Ahmed Bukhari, son of the 
Imam (prayer leader) and leader of Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC), said 
that the opening of the lock had already done irreparable damage which had sown the 
seed of perennial conflict between two communities.38 
                                               
31 Singh, Political Violence in India, pp. 52-53; also see, Zaidi (ed.), The Annual Register of Political 
Parties: Proceedings and Fundamental Texts, 1990, Part- 1, pp. 216-217. 
32 BJP wanted to spread militancy through 4 point programme- (i) bring Hindus under one manch to 
fight for Hindu causes, (ii) ban proselytisation, (iii) promote Sanskrit as a uniform Language, and (iv) 
back political candidates who support Hindu interests.,see, India Today, 31 October, 1989, p. 27. 
33 Since in India especially in Bihar caste and class wars were rampant and votes were divided on the 
caste and class lines. In fact every minority has been divided, socially, politically and economically., 
see, Moin Shakir, “Electoral Participation of Minorities and Indian Political System” in, EPW, Vol. 
XV, Annual Number, February, 1980, p. 221; In such situation BJP startred popularisin the Babri 
Mosque and Ram Mandir issue Because BJP wanted to earn the whole Hindu votes for them by 
creating emotive and religious issue before them (the Hindus). 
34 Thakur, The Making of Laloo Yadav: The Unmaking of Bihar, p. 70. 
35 Although, in 1989 in Bihar it was Satyendra Narain Sinha (of the Congress the then ruling party) 
who was the then CM of Bihar, on 22 October, 1989, Laloo Yadav dispatched a team of two members- 
Raj Kumar Singh, then a Secretary-level Official of the Bihar government and Rameshwar Oraon, 
Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Bihar police- to Samastipur to arrest Advani, to put a stop on 
Advani’s Rathayatra with least upheaval and report him back. See, Thakur, The Making of Laloo 
Yadav: The Unmaking of Bihar, p. 80. 
36 For more details on Meerut riots 1987 see, Hari Jaisingh, India Between Dream and Reality, Allied, 
New Delhi, 1989, pp. 134-136. 
37 The Poineer, 15 April, 1992, C.f., Harbans Mukhia, Issues in Indian History, Politics and Society: 
Selected Newspapers Articles and Book Reviws, Aakar, Delhi, 2009, p. 114. 
38 India Today, 31 October, 1989, p. 33. 
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These conflicts between the communities were produced by the political 
conflicts. Between October, 1977 and December, 1978 as many as twenty-one 
political murders had been committed.39 Such as in Pupri (Sasaram), Saryu Ram40 a 
member of CPI, was attacked by 10-12 men (Kurmi-farmers) armed with guns, 
pistols, swords, lathis etc., on 28th August, 1978 and was shot dead while he was 
heeding towards Gogri (a village situated in the west of Pupri). Ramkrit Ram was also 
chased when he intruding in the matter, thus he took refuse into the nearby house of 
Bhagirath, another Harijan, but he was not spared out from the attackers (rich farmers 
of the Village). The assailant broke open the door and open fire on him even after that 
they dragged Ramkrit Ram to the nearby peddy fields and chopped hid head.41 Such 
atrocities were done by the rich farmers to the Harijans. And the reasons were purely 
economic.42 After the atrocities on lower OBCs, in Belchi43, Pupri, Dharamapura, 
Agra, Villupuram, Marathwada, Kalia etc., the question posed that whether the Indian 
Left had to pay enough attention to “caste-war” whether they have done enough to 
organize and came to the defense of the depressed class.44 Even on 3 March, a team of 
6 members of the Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) from Delhi went to 
                                               
39 Data India (weekly), 5-11 March, 1979, p. 115. 
40 Saryu Ram was a member of CPI and had joined the party rally on 27th August, 1978 at the district 
headquarters at Rohtas district. Jamuna Ram, one of the beneficiaries of ‘the landless programme’, was 
a leader of local Khet Majdoor Union. Although there was seviour attacks on Harijans but such 
labourer organizations provide the strength to the labourers to live in the villages. Nathuni Ram only 
one Harijan who facilitate himself to go to collage, was able to understand the intensions of the farmers 
that they only create all these havoc so that the Harijan, to get rid, leave the villages and they occupy all 
the land without any hurdle., see, Hamendra Narayan, “The Pupri Killings”, EPW, Vol. XIII, No. 37, 
September 16, 1978, pp. 1580-1581. 
41 Narayan, “The Pupri Killings”, p. 1580. 
42 The killings of the Harijans had its root in economic issues and lust for land. In 1976, a land of 1.7 
acres was allotted by government to landless Sukhvilas, brother of Ramkrit Ram and Jamuna Ram but 
the land was allegedly and illegally occupied by the farmers. Thus landless Sukhvilas filed case against 
the farmers but no actions were taken against them even they did not care to appear in court on the due 
dates. The farmers were not willing to evacuate the lands on contrary they even boycotted the local 
labourers and brought labourers from the adjacent villages even they paid them higher wages in 
comparison to the local labourers. Even farmers also dig a channel just by the side of Harijan tola that 
endangered the Harijans’ huts and Harijans closed the channel thus, on 13th February, 1978, farmers 
percher on their roofs and started firing towards the Harijan tola and asked the Harijans to withdrew the 
case. Then on 25 March, at Bishrampur, under the adjoining police station of Dinara, Kurmi farmers 
collected from the nearby villages and set fire to huts of Harijans and killed 4 labourers., see, Narayan, 
“The Pupri Killings”, p. 1580. 
43 Since the Belchi massacre in the year 1977, scores of such deadly clashes had been taken place in 
several parts of Bihar. to put it bluntly, in a good part of rural Bihar law and order was totally 
collapsed., see, Zaidi (ed.), The Annual Register of Political Parties: Proceedings and Fundamental 
Texts, 1987, p. 381. 
44 George Kristoffel Lieten, “Caste in Class Politics” EPW, Vol. XIV, No. 7 and 8, Febuarary, 1979 
(Annual Number), p. 314. 
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Singhbhum district to investigate into the matter of atrocities45 on thre Harijans, were 
trrorised and beaten with lathis and rifle butts by the police. A member of the team 
was kept into custody from 5:30pm of 7 March to 3 am and on 8th March 1978 that 
member was accused as a Naxalite. Even the members of PUCL were sought to be 
implicated a number of cases. However the PUCL team visited Ichahatu and Serengda 
village where the police atrocities had occurred in November, 1978.46  The Inspector-
General of Police R. Lal claimed that there was an overall improvement during 1978, 
although the anti-reservation agitation and the panchayat elections had pushed up the 
number of cognisable offences from 102,323 in 1977 to 106,963 in 1978.47 Murders, 
loot and rioting showed an upward trend, while crimes against property (theft, 
dacoities and burglaries) decreased in 1978. In 1978, there were 1,867 cases of 
murders, 1,408 case of loot and 9,019 cases of riot incidents had been filed. Sixty 
percent people were killed during the panchayat elections and twenty percent people 
were allegedly killed by Naxalites.48 These atrocities by the police and landlords were 
conducted on landless labourers demanding prescribed minimum 49wages, humane 
behaviour from landlord and stoppage of replacement of sub-plantation by more 
commercially valuable teak since the sal seeds were a source of subsistence to them. 
Incidents involving extremists and atrocities on Harijans declined. 47 Harijans 
were killed in 1978 against 62 were killed in 1977.50 Bhojpur, Rohtas, Monghyr, 
Nalanda, Begusarai and Dhanbad reported most of the murders and incidents of 
atrocities against Harijans.51 R. Lal (the then IG of Police) said that the orders had 
been issued, preventing the use of ‘Crime Control Ordinances’ also known as ‘Anti-
Goonda Act’ that was only used against students, trade unionists and political workers 
                                               
45 Atrocities on the SCs, STs and other section of the society, were the result of the active involvement 
and deliberate encouragement of the dominant communal and chauvinist forces like RSS and by the 
rulers of the Janata Party. The grave situation  resulted in loot, arson, rape and murder on large scale in 
Belchi, Agra, Marathawada, Muzaffarnagar, Pant Nagar and many other places., see, Zaidi, Zaidi, 
Zaidi, Alvi and Ahmed (eds.), The Annual Register of Political Parties: Proceedings and Fundamental 
Texts, 1979, p. 94. 
46 Data India (weekly), 26 March- 1 April, 1979, p. 153. 
47 Data India (weekly), 5-11 March, 1979, p. 115. 
48 Data India (weekly), 5-11 March, 1979, p. 115. 
49 Data India (weekly), 26 March- 1 April, 1979, p. 153. 
50 Shri Bindeshwari Prasad Yadav, Shri Purushottam Mishra and Shri Arvind Nath Mishra (eds.), 
Karpoori Ka Sansadeeya Jeevan, 1967-1988, Part. 2, Pustakalya Evam Shodh-Sandarbh Shakha, Bihar 
Vidhan Sabha Sachivalya, Patna, 2003, pp. 674. 
51 Crime investigation figures revealed that of the 34,153 pending cases as of January 1, 1978 and 
106,963 cases added during the year, 106,151 had been disposed of by the police and only 34,965 cases 
were pending on January 1, 1979. Since the Janata Party assumed office, 1,050 Naxlites had been 
released, while 114 remained in jails. C.f., Data India (weekly), 5-11 March, 1979, p. 115. 
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only when they indulged in crimes. R. Lal admitted that this legislation has not been 
used even once against people committing atrocities on Harijans.52 
Besides the killings of Harijan there was also another kind of developmet, 
there was ghastly killing of men, women and children of seven families of Rajput 
caste of two villages, Dalilchak and Baghaura in Aurangabad district of Bihar on 29th 
May 1977 by a mob of 700 people from Yadava and other communities, it was quite 
shocking and alarming. It was reported that 45 to 50 were killed. Although killings 
and counter killings were assumed as retaliation in caste war but behind this, there 
exist socio-economic factors such as antagonism between landlords and the landless 
and land poor, as the root cause of these killings.53 
In Bihar, corruption assumed such scandalous proportions that Central 
Intelligence was constrained to made confidential enquiries. The enquiries revealed 
corruption on a colossal scale and yet, again, no action was taken. In Haryana, even 
Conress(I) leaders had exposed the corruption of the Chief Minister. But the latter was 
non-chalantly bribed central leaders with gift plots.54 
Even Dr. Jagannath Mishra was charged with abusing his official position as 
public servant and committed communal breach of trust with dishonest intention for 
furtherance of his personal, political and party gains. The charge-sheet, against 
Jagannath Mishra, said that Dr. Mishra maneuvered to purchase the jeeps out of the 
Legislative Council’s fund in disregard of objections of the council and that 
investigations had established that all the jeeps were bought only for the Congress 
poll campaign on the eve of and during the 1977 Lok Sabha elections.55 
The Bharatiya Janata Party was born in 1980. Many, including Jayprakash 
Narayan (1902-79) genuinely believed that the members of the Jan Sangh, after 
merging with the Janata Party, had shed their communalism totally.56 Be that as it 
may, the members of the Jana Sangh were either broad-minded or tactical enough to 
change their ideological stance. However the political destiny had something else in 
mind. The Janta Party collapsed, perhaps inevitably, and in the catastrophic political 
event, four new parties were born. In 1980, neither Janata rhetoric nor Gandhian 
                                               
52 Data India (weekly), 5-11 March, 1979, p. 115; also see, Rajni Kothari, Communalism in Indian 
Politics, Rainbow, Delhi, 1998, pp. 29-30. 
53 Zaidi (ed.), The Annual Register of Political Parties: Proceedings and Fundamental Texts, 1987, p. 
381. 
54 Zaidi (ed.), The Annual Register…, pp. 546-547. 
55 Data India (weekly), 29 January - 4February, 1979, p. 58.  
56 Kumar, “The Roots of…”, P. 10. 
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Socialism came to the rescue of the anti-politicians. It was in the political vacuum of 
this decade that the ideology of communalism spread. “It took various forms. But the 
most virulent was that of Khalistani movement.”57 The collective Hindu psyche was 
first mobilized by Rajiv Gandhi, not by the BJP. Perhaps the Congress and Rajiv too 
felt that the Hindus needed a boost against the backdrop of growing Muslim and Sikh 
assertiveness.58 
In Bihar, political elites, who dominated the Congress party, were always 
factionalized thus there was faction within Congress party. Growing conflicts over 
power along both caste and party lines added to the political fragmentations. State’s 
bureaucracies, including police were also not remained unaffected by this intra-elite 
power politics, thus intrusion of politics undermined their professionalism, and in 
Bihar they became least effective. All these processes disintegrated the state’s 
legitimacy and cohesiveness and less political leaders came to the power, with their 
policy of favourism,59 to deal with political and socio-economic conflicts.60 
Growing socio-economic conflicts in Bihar can be best understood as products 
of Bihar’s relative underdevelopment.61 Thus issues of social and economic 
inequality, however, need to be studied in a more comprehensive manner.62 Although 
Bihar is rich in mines and minerals but Bihar is the poorest and densely populated 
state of India.63 Almost 90% of the population of this state lived in the rural areas. 
Agricultural production between 1969 and 1984 grew at annual compound rate of 
around 0.5%. There was continuous increment in population at the rate of 2% and 
rural incomes declined. Thus most segments of Bihar’s economy had failed but 
increment in population was continued. Likewise, people’s level of consciousness and 
political organizations had not remained stagnant. Political development under 
strained economic condition has had perverse and possibly led to gain political 
                                               
57 Kumar, “The Roots of…”, P. 10. 
58 Kumar, “The Roots of…”, P. 10. 
59 Favouring the community to which a politician belongs, intrude in politics of independent India. 
Perhaps it was also remain keen to politics in pre-independent India. 
60 Francine R. Frankel, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State: Bihar” in Atul Kohli, Democracy and 
Development in India: From Socialism to Pro-Buisness, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009, p. 
254. 
61 Francine, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State…”, p. 254. 
62 Rajnish Kumar, Satendra Kumar and Arup Mitra, “Social and Economic Inequalities: Contemporary 
Significance of Caste in India”, in EPW, Vol. XLIV, No. 50, December 12-18, 2009, p. 57. 
63 Per capita income of Bihar was 1000 rupees in early 1980s. That contrast with more than 3000 rupee 
for Punjab and nearly 1800 rupees for India as a whole. According to the 1981 census, only Kerala and 
West Bengal were more densely populated than Bihar. Bihar’s figure of 402 per square kilometer, 
contrast with the all India average of 216. Cited from Francine, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State…”, 
p. 255. 
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position for power and economy. Attempts by new emerging groups were met by 
force. The landowning castes, especially the middle castes, have sought to maintain 
their exactions by attempting to impose something like ‘second serfdom’, enraged the 
lower castes. Incapacity of the state in mediating such conflicts has further 
encouraged the formation of private armies, thus this also create tensed atmosphere in 
the society and led occurrence of periodic violence and the vicious cycle of 
retaliations.64 
Caste identities deeply embedded the social, economic and political life of 
Bihar.65 The Bihar Brahmins, although own considerable amounts of land, were rarely 
the agriculturists. Kayasthas were a very small minority within Bihar, over prolonged 
period, however, they became educated elite and acquired the status of an elite caste 
and started claiming themselves Brahmins. They tend to own fair amounts of land and 
were definitely an elite caste. Unlike pure Brahmin they also cultivated lands they 
own. There was another cast, the Rajputs who also owned a lot of land and lower 
caste peoples were employed over the land.66 
By the time the Muslim vote concept shifted towards Hindu vote it can be 
accepted as electoral formula.67 Proponents of the notion were likely to argue that 
even if the Hindus, not regarded as a largely cohesive electoral entity, any attempt to 
cater to their common religious susceptibilities in a bid to cut through divisions of 
caste and regions amount to wooing the Hindu votes.68 The Muslim leaders and the 
Muslim organizations did attempt to confuse the Muslim voters. The main role was 
played by the Jamat-i-Islami which has been friendly to the RSS. Mslim Majlis, the 
National Muslim League, the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and the Maharashtra Muslim 
Democratic Forum, unitedly established as Natonal Muslim Front under the 
leadership of Zulfiqarullah.69 
                                               
64 Francine, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State…”, pp. 254-255. 
65 Francine, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State…”, pp. 255-256. 
66 Francine, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State…”, pp. 255-257. 
67 There was no such thing as Muslim vote bank, neither does the largest minority community exercise 
its right to vote en bloc; but in fact, with the social and economic reforms steadily taking roots among 
the Muslims and with the emergence of diverse political options by the time Muslims votes had 
distributed among different leaders and political parties., see, Asif, “Image of Muslims” in, A. U. Asif, 
Media and Muslims in India Since Independence, p. 29.  
68 Muslim India, June 1989, Vol. VII, No. 78, p. 279. 
69 Moin Shakir, “Electoral Participation of Minorities and Indian Political System” in, EPW, Vol. XV, 
Annual Number, February, 1980, p. 223. 
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Zulfiqarullah, the leader of the National Muslim Front, asserted that the Janata 
Party was the only political organization which commanded the confidence of 
minorities and restrain the restive communal forces.70 
The real problem there was that there was no evidence of Hindu’s communal 
response.71 In fact, over the years, political parties’ need to cultivate distinct electoral 
bases has led to steady fracturing of the Hindu community. This has resulted in the 
stagnation of overtly Hindu organizations such as the RSS and its political arm, the 
BJP. 72 It is important here to explore this fracturing process. With the spread of 
Green Revolution in North India, there was emergence of Other Backward Castes 
(OBCs) as a powerful and broadly cohesive political entity.73 
Chaudhury Charan Singh, who happens to be from Jat community, was among 
the first leaders to recognise the electoral potential of this development and worked 
assiduously towards consolidating it. This, more than anything dents the Hindu vote 
theory. In this saga of the decline of the RSS’ ideological-cultural influence, it is often 
forgotten that, ironically Charan Singh was himself a staunch Arya Samaji and so 
were most of north Indian thinkers and activists of this time. Despite its overt 
abstention from the political process, the Arya Samaj sowed the first seeds of political 
activism in large parts of north India in the 1920s and 30s. Most freedom fighters 
came to the Congress via Arya Samaj.74 
But somewhere down the line the Samaj lost its thrust. And the RSS which re-
emerged, especially after partition, as the principal defender of so-called Hindu 
nationalism, failed to espouse the democratic doctrine with its earlier effectiveness. 
An anti-Brahmanical thrust, on the other hand, could have paid rich dividends to the 
RSS had it championed this as an article of faith in the mid-sixties when the green 
revolution bagan. The main grievance of the OBCs, something that has resulted in 
their determined electoral opposition to the Congress, was that they had not received a 
fair deal from the urban (read Brahmin) leadership independence. They will not go so 
far as to wage an all-out war on Brahminvad, because of their sharp contradiction 
                                               
70 There was gap between the minorities, majority of whom were rural dwellers and illiterate or least 
educated, and leaders of minority community, who were urban dwellers and highly educated. Thus the 
the real issue of the minorities were never solved and the so-called Muslim politics was dominated by 
all sorts of non-issues like, the protection of Muslim Personal Law etc., see, Shakir, “Electoral 
Participation of Minorities and Indian Political System”, pp. 223-225. 
71 Muslim India, June 1989, Vol. VII, No. 78, p. 279. 
72 Muslim India, June 1989, Vol. VII, No. 78, p. 279. 
73 Muslim India, June 1989, Vol. VII, No. 78, p. 279. 
74 Muslim India, June 1989, Vol. VII, No. 78, p. 279. 
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with the land-labourers and agricultutural workers who were mainly harijans.75 The 
OBC's or the Shudras are clearly divided into 2 groups: “Forward” Shudras e.g. 
Yadavs, Koeris and Kurmis forming 20% and the “Backward” Shudras, who are as 
backward as the SC's and ST's, totalling upto 30% of the population but divided in 
many sub-castes on occupational basis and widely scattered.76 Considering that the 
OBCs constitute the second largest caste bloc, accounting for 40 to 60 percent of the 
Hindus in most north Indian states thus these lower castes, taken together, composed 
the largest within Bihar. However it was extremely assorted group. The Yadvas, 
Koiris and Kurmis were the most significant and generally the elite among the 
backward castes.77 Among the backward castes, Yadavas were politically the most 
significant and Kurmis were reputed as being hardworking agriculturists78, it was next 
to impossible to visualize a coordinated “Hindu” electoral response. This was a 
constituency both the Congress and the RSS-BJP have lost.79 
During 1971-1981, political parties were searching for new strategies to 
dethrone the ruling Congress party. Thus caste and religion based politics started 
surfacing. Populist slogans and religious considerations became common to woo the 
minorities. The watershed in the history of India's administration, both the civil 
service and police, was the national emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi in 1975. The use by her government of emergency powers under the 
Constitution of India to suppress the opposition through indiscriminate arrests of 
prominent leaders and censorship of the press contributed to an unprecedented fear 
psychosis. The call by Mrs. Gandhi and her associates for a "committed" civil service 
compounded the situation by eliminating the thin line between government and 
party.80 Muslim Law Board was formed to protect the personal law based on Shariat. 
Hindus started demanding the Uniform Civil Code. Shah Bano case, the judgement 
upheld Shah Bano's contention under the secular law that she was entitled to 
maintenance for life and not for only the iddat (waiting period before re-marriage 
                                               
75 Muslim India, June 1989, Vol. VII, No. 78, p. 279. 
76 Syed Shahabuddin, “A Plan for Revival of Indian National Congress in the Hindi Belt”, in Milli 
Gazette, Vol. VI, No.08, April 16-30, 2005, p. 126. 
77 Shaibal Gupta, “Socio-Economic Roots of Peasant Movement in Central Bihar” in, Kaushal Kishore 
Sharma, Prabhakar Prasad Singh and Ranjan Kumar (eds.), Peasant Struggles in Bihar, 11831-1992, 
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78 Francine, “Breakdown in a ‘Backward’ State…”, p. 255. 
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80 R. K. Raghavan, “The Indian Police: Problems and Prospects” in Emerging Federal Process in India 
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after the divorce which is three months) period. This judgement delivered in 1985 was 
thought to be another attack on Islam and Muslim identity in India. The Muslim 
leadership across the political parties and sectarian divide unitedly opposed the 
Supreme Court judgement and launched an aggressive movement to reverse it. This 
added to already aggravated communal situation and went a long way to further 
intensify hostility between two communities.81  Meenakshipuram82 conversions, 
opening of Babri Masjid for Hindus etc. all these issues communally charged the 
atmosphere of whole India. The RSS which provides ideological direction to Hindu 
communal forces was quite unhappy at the Jan Sangh renouncing communalism and 
adopting secularism which is perceived to be anti-Hindu. The Jan Sangh members 
were forced, by their RSS mentors, not to renounce their RSS membership. All the 
top leaders of the then Jan Sangh were also members of RSS and the socialist leaders 
like Raj Narain in the Janata Party raised this issue - known as the duel membership 
issue - and asked the Jan Sangh members in the Janata Party to resign their RSS 
membership. The RSS made it plain to their members not to resign and planned 
several communal riots in Aligarh, Varanasi, Jamshedpur etc. to display its strength. 
The Janata party Government fell apart on this question in 1979 and replaced by the 
government led by Charan Singh which also lasted for few months. In the ensuing 
elections in 1980 Mrs. Gandhi came back to power though with less popular vote.83 
Bengali Muslims were completely different from their brethren in North 
Indian Muslims (mainly from Bihar) who were settled in West Bengal, especially in 
Calcutta. And this separate entity of Bengali Muslims stands out of the concept of 
pan-Islamism that advocated by Jamaat-e-Islami-e-Hind (JIH), and preached by the 
Tablighi Jamaat (TJ). Both Jamaat-e-Islami and Tablighi Jamat did not appeal to 
Bengali Muslims they only to Calcutta where Muslims from North India lived and 
Claim Urdu as their language. Except for a few pockets of Bihari Muslims that live in 
                                               
81 Asghar Ali Engineer, “Islam and Muslims in India: Problem of Identity and Existence”, in Orient 
Moderno, Nuova Series, Anno 23(84), 2004, p. 79. 
82 Throughout the 1980s overt political utilization of communal identities grew dramatically as political 
parties attempted to come to grips with socio-economic change and developed new political 
costituencies. When a large number of low-caste Hindus of southern village of Menakshipuram 
converted to Islam in 1982 and the cry ‘Hinduism under threat’ was raised by the BJP, RSS, VHP., see, 
Russell Hocking, “The Potential for BJP Expansion: Ideology, Politics and Regional Appeal- The 
Lessons of Jharkhand” in, Jhon McGuire, Peter Reeves and Howard Brasted (eds.), Politics of 
Violence: From Ayodhya to Behrampada, Sage, New Delhi, 1996, p. 222. 
83 Engineer, “Islam and Muslims in India: Problem of Identity and Existence”, p. 78. 
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the Muslim ghettoes84 of Kolkata- like Rajabazar, Matiaburuz, Park Circus, and the 
Khiddirpur dock area- the rural Bengali hardly stand out as different as their rural 
Hindu counterparts. Hindu communal parties were visible in North India and rich 
Marwari-owned business houses were open friends of them. Not many Muslims from 
the Indian side, meaning West Bengal, migrated in 1947 to East India, Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh). The Hindus from East Bengal, on the other hand, have moved over not 
only during the time of partition in 1947 but in another major wave in 1971, and they 
continued to do so till now. The feeling of insecurity among the Hindu citizen of 
Bangladesh made them to leave their ancestral homes thus with their sorrow they 
carried along the feeling hatred for the Muslim community. The CPI(M) provide them 
security and ration cards in return for sure vote, and these refugees become one with 
the rest of the plaint Bengalis. In fact there existed subtle animosity between the 
Bangals and the Ghotis (East Bengal immigrants were called Bangals, and the 
resident Hindu Bengalis are called Ghotis) because of economic problems that had 
been arose out of unprecedented demographic change due the unchecked crossover as 
jobs and economic opportunities had became scarce due to a sudden increase in the 
population.85 In 1971 Communist Party of India engaged in provoking the peasants by 
land grab bhoomi-harap movement (which earliest has been seized by the landlords 
by placing their flag on the desired land), thus relation between landlords and peasants 
strained as result 47 people were killed.86 In 1971 twenty-two riots occurred in Bihar 
in that 43 cases were filed, 574 people were arrested. On 23rd February, 1971 at 
Chatra (in Hazaribagh) a communal disturbance took place over the issue that a non-
Muslim used the field adjacent to a mosque, for latrine. This disturbance was seized 
by 24th February, 1971. In that disturbance 4 Muslims and 4 Hindus were injured.87 
On 3rd March 1971, during elections, communal riot occurred in Laheriyasarai 
(Darbhanga). In that 5 huts of Muslims and 3 houses of Hindus were set on fire. As 
many as 13 Muslims and 12 Hindus were injured. Riots were seized on 8th March, 
1971.88 Riots occurred on 4th April, 1971, in Chataniabagh-Sadam village Gomiyan 
(Giridih) Police station, when Ramnavami procession taking before a mosque and that 
was objected by Muslims thus situation was strained. Stone and arrows were thrown 
                                               
84 Densely populated area by a particularly community termed as ghettoes. 
85 Farouqui., Muslims and Media., pp. 134-135. 
86 Bihar Sarkar, Arakshi Varshik Prashasnik Prativedan- 1971, pp. 4-16. 
87 Bihar Sarkar, Arakshi Varshik Prashasnik Prativedan- 1971, p. 4. 
88 Bihar Sarkar, Arakshi Varshik Prashasnik Prativedan- 1971, p. 4. 
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on Hindus. As result of riots 3 Hindus were injured, 5 shops of Muslims, 1 truck and 1 
shop of Hindu were set on fire. Police open 8 round (chakra-goliyan) fire.89 On 20th 
June, 1971 at Sadam (Police Station- Gomniyan) there was bomb blast in a Hindu 
hotel that resulted in death of 3 Hindus and 2 Muslims. Shops and house of 5 Hindus 
and 2 Muslims were looted. In Avapur Muslims opposed Hindus for using cemetery 
land as grazing land, thus riot occurred on 11th July, 1971 in that 1 Hindu was dead 
and 8 Hindus were injured.90 
Bihar During the 1980s 
The 1980s witnessed considerable change in the dimension of communalism. 
Events in earlier decades had been sporadic, spontaneous and short lived. Firm and 
concerted action on the part of the Government and police invariably brought the 
situation under control. Citizens were united in their resolve that communal conflict 
be contained and eradicated. During that decade, however, riots took place in Assam, 
Mahrashtra, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar. There was an undercurrent of simmering 
communal discontent. Communal issues increasingly gained political flavour and it 
appeared that the old value attached to communal harmony was evanescing.91 
The decade of the 1990s will perhaps be regarded as the watershed in the 
history of communal politics. It began with massive communal mobilization and 
polarization of an order hither to unknown. The events leading to and arising from the 
demolition of Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid Complex even now continue to cast 
their shadow. Institutions that were expected to uphold the ideals of national 
integration and communal harmony suffered serious debilitation until their efficacy 
became suspect in the public mind. In later years there was even evidence of the 
machinery of State either turning a blind eye to the travails of individuals at the hands 
of marauding mobs or at its worst it was found to have played a willing handmaid to 
communal oppressors.92 
The Mandalisation of politics in the late 1980s effectively mobilised the 
backward castes in the state. It all began with the then prime minister V. P. Singh’s 
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91 Report of working Group of National Integration Council to Study Reports of the Commission of 
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decision to provide 27 per cent job reservations to the backward classes as 
recommended by the B. P. Mandal Commission. The decision was bound to provoke 
reaction from the upper castes and it did. Thus protests against reservation policy, 
enveloped the whole of the rural Bihar which further polarized the tension between 
pro-reservationists and anti-reservationists. Bihar appeared to have gone through a 
serious anti-reservationism of 1978, with the upper castes taking to the streets, 
rampaging, with arson and looting of government property and shops and property 
belonging to backward castes began to be resulted in stray incidents.93 The backward 
castes saw it as an opportunity to capture power decisively as the political ‘moment’ 
during the ‘Mandal’ phase was in their favour. Following the Bhagalpur communal 
riot towards the end of 1980s, Muslims too had fallen sick of the Congress and 
deserted it. The dalits were uncomfortable with the patron-client relationship with the 
forward castes during the Congress regime and had been waiting to break the 
shackles. The coming together of backward castes, dalits and Muslims was now ready 
to script a new chapter in the political history of the state. The results of Lok Sabha 
elections held in 1989 and assembly election in the following years corresponded to 
this new script. The Con- gress had suffered a major setback.94 
In 1968 (on 17 June 1968, there occurred a riot in Nagpur in Patna)95 and in 
1969, incidents of communal nature took place in almost all months of the year. But 
none of them were serious in nature. It was again in 1970 that a serious communal riot 
takes place in Chaibasa (Singhbhum District), now in Jharkhand. These riots were the 
result of odd developments in politics and economy, which we have already discussed 
in this chapter, of the country in general and in Bihar in particular. 
Chaibasa Riots, April 1970 
Chaibasa was situated in Singhbhum district (now in Jharkhand). West Singhbhum 
district was full of dense forests and hills and harbors a variety of flora and fauna. 
There was also Maganese Ore mines in Chaibasa.96 Economy of Chaibas depended on 
                                               
93 Zaidi (ed.), The Annual Register of Indian Political Parties: Proceedings and Fundamental Text, 
1991, Part- 2, pp. 284-285; also see, Indu Bharti, “Survival Against Heavy Odds” in, EPW, Vol. XXVI, 
No. 3, 19 January, 1991, pp. 19-93. 
94 Mohd Sanjeer Alam, “Can Lalu Prasad Reclaim Lost Ground?” in EPW, Vol. XLIV, No. 17, April 
25, 2009, p. 13. 
95 Bimal Prasad, Jaiprakash Narayan: Selected Works, Vol. IX, Manohar, New Delhi, 2008, p. 267. 
96 Maya Dutta, Jamshedpur: The Growth of the City and its Regions, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 
1977, p. 109. 
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these natural resources. Chaibas provided timber to the saw mill in Jamshedpur97 and 
iron-ore and manganese were also brought in Jamshedpur from Chaibasa.98 
A serious communal riot broke out at Chaibasa on April 15, 1970, when few 
bombs hurled while a Ramnavami procession was passing through Bari Bazar, a 
predominantly Muslim area. The processionists retaliated. More explosions, gun 
firing and cases of assault, loot and arson followed. In these incidents 23 Muslims and 
one Tribal were killed. 42 Hindus and 14 Muslims were injured. The trouble also 
spread to Chakradharpur on April 17, 1970, where 2 houses of Muslims were set on 
fire and one Hindu was fatally stabbed. Stray incidents were reported till April 20, 
1970.99 
At Chaibasa, in the first two hours, the riot was an affair between Muslims and 
Hindus but the policemen of lower ranks took the field and resumed the riots thus riot 
riot turned into its more devastating and brutal phase. Because a false rumour was 
spread by the rioters’ squad that a constable was slain by the Muslims, this rumour 
spread like wild-fire that abruptly changed the behaviour of policemen thus, a 
communal riot turned into a war waged against the Muslims by the police. Though the 
fact came to the light that the constable was only injured but a false rumour destroyed 
everything in Chaibasa.100  
Although in Chaibasa peace was restored but again a major riot occurred in 
1979 in Jamshedpur. But in between many riots took place all over the country like in 
Bhiwandi101 town of Thane district in Maharashtra, communal riot broke out on 7 
May, 1970 when Shiv Jayanti procession was brick-batted. Between 7 and 12 May, 
1970, and 17 Hindus were killed. On 8 May, 1970, in Jalgaon (Maharashtra), again an 
anti-Muslim riot took place over the trivial argument and dispute between some 
Hindus and Muslims at a betel shop.102  
After Maharashtra riot of May 1970, there was lull in recurrence of the 
communal riots on account of colossal political development in the sub-continent, viz. 
                                               
97 Dutta, Jamshedpur: The Growth of the City and its Regions, p. 77. 
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99 Home Department (R&P Divison), F. No. 5/12/1976, pp. 20-21.  
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102 Sahai, South Asia…, pp. 120-121. 
 164
the Indo-Pak war of 1971, and liberation of Bangladesh, intense political agitation in 
India culminating in the Emergency regime. But the Emergency regime (Congress 
Party under the leadership of Indira Gandhi) was voted out of power in 1977 and lull 
in communal occurrences was broke out with riot in Sambhal103, a sub-divisional 
town of Moradabad district in Uttar Pradesh, on 29 March, 1978 over the tussle 
between rickshaw-pullers and betel shopkeeper. Unlike Bhiwandi and Jalgaon of 
Maharshtra, in Sambhal, the  riot was provoked by the Muslim communalists.104 
After Sambhal riot, relatively a less destructive, riot occurred at Aligarh (U.P.) 
on 5 October, 1978.105 During this period 1971-81, the political parties looked for new 
strategies to dethrone the ruling Congress party.106 But here we shall only focus on 
Jamshedpur Riots that broke out in 1979. 
Jamshedpur Riots (1979) 
The growing assertiveness of the low castes107 in Bihar in the 1960s was 
largely a by-product of the socialist strategy. Christophe Jaffrelot has analyzed it in 
terms of quota politics. Thus the Upper Backward class became more powerful with 
the rising demands for the Backward Class. It made 27% reservation in government 
                                               
103 Like Bhiwandi, Sambhal was also a pre-dominantly Muslim town. But unlike Bhiwandi, here riot 
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for bazaar bundi to press their demands but a Hindu betel shopkeeper denied to close his shop ans riot 
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November, 1978, pp. 1869-1870; In Aligarh there was also riot in December, 1990 over the false 
publication in Agra edition of Aaj (Hindi daily), from 11 to 13 December, 1990 that the [Muslim] 
doctors in Medical college of Aligarh Muslim University had been killed 32 Hindu patients by giving 
them injection of poison. Thus an anti-Muslim riot broke out which covering the campus area. But it 
was later revealed that the news was fabricated., see, Shahid A. Chaudhary, “Difficulties in Tackling 
Muslim Issues” in, Asif, Media and Muslims in India Since Independence, pp. 35-36; also see, Brass, 
Production ofHindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. 
106 Vibhuti Patel, “Communalism, Imperialism and Economic Profile of Women”, in Vatsala Shukla 
(ed.), Communalism in India: Reach, Ruse and Remedy, Hope India, Gurgaon, 2008, p. 
107 There was change in politics; at the Ministerial level there was shift from Forward caste to 
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Legislative Assembly. During the 1977 election there was visible decline in the Forwards’ 
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heavily; see, Harry W. Blair, “Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social Change in the Late 
1970s” in EPW, Vol. XV, No. 2, 12 January, 1980, pp. 67-68. 
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jobs for them.108 Thus violence erupted over the reservation of jobs and due to the 
foundation Jamshedpur as an industrial city there was jobs for each section of the 
society and more than half of the employees in TISCO and TELCO were Muslims.109 
The economic prosperity among the Muslims was contested by the competitors of the 
majority community which we have discussed in the riot of Jamshedpur in 1979. 
A communal riot broke out on 11th April, 1979 in Jamshedpur. The Jhanda of 
Sonaram Manjihi of Dimna Basti Akhara was taken out at about 8:00 am and New 
Purulia road at about 9:15 am. Procession further moved up to Yadava Petrol pump 
and stalled there and demanded release of B. K. Trivedi and other persons who were 
arrested. District Collector not made any effort to get the procession moved and 
cleared through the New Purulia road, procession was held up which resulted in one 
of the worst communal riots in the industrial city of Jamshedpur. It was caused when 
a Hindu religious procession led by members of Janata Party of State Assembly halted 
near a mosque.110 This exactly justify the views of Sandria Freitag’s, “taking out 
religion in public sphere” and Paul R. Brass’, “violence is production of elite 
manipulation”. 
TISCO was founded in August 1907 and steel began to be produced in 1913 but it 
was named as Jamshedpur in 1919 by the then Viceroy Lord Chelmsford.111 Although 
this city does not have a municipality, it provides its employees and workers better 
residential facilities and paying and stable jobs. TELCO was established in 1945112 
(present TATA) and has its companies all over Jamshedpur thus all economic 
activities directly or indirectly linked with TELCO. Timber brought from Chaibasa to 
the saw mill in Jamshedpur113 and iron-ore and manganese were also brought in 
Jamshedpur from Chaibasa.114 Business and job opportunities here open for all, and 
this also facilitated the growth of the Muslims but there existed comunal biases within 
the management of TISCO during 1940s which we have been discussed in the second 
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chapter of this work.115 Muslims prosperity and success in the city reflected in the rich 
and colorful designs of the mosques116 that they built up over the years.117 This city 
also developed culturally and attracted the awesome talents from all over India.118 
Jamshedpur, the Steel city, witnessed large-scale communal riots which 
started on 11 April 1979. It was alleged that the riots were triggered off by Hindu land 
lords bent on injecting their Muslim tenants. The saddest part of the whole affair was 
that the carnage could have been avoided altogether if the local administration had 
stuck fast to its earlier decision not to allow the Ramnavami procession on April 11 to 
pass by a mosque. It was a matter of great shame that the local administration was 
unprepared, cowardly and the substantial section of the intelligentsia alleged that the 
local police and the BMP (Bihar Military Police) were partial on one stage or 
another.119 
There were various reasons behind communalism in Jamshedpur which we 
have discussed in the previous chapter. There were the memories of 1964, when 
Muslims were butchered by Hindus, excited by torture of the Hindus of the East 
Pakistan. On that occasion the adivasis took active part in attacking and killing the 
Muslims. And the deserted land and property of the Muslims wrere looted and 
exploited for so many generations of adivasis. Deserted lands of he Muslims were 
sold out at cheap rates to every community that settled down in Jamshedpur. Thus 
Muslims (minority) decided to move out and they settled in large groups. Thus 
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Muslims started buying up lands120 on cheap rates from the adivasis in Mango area 
and Muslim bastes Azad Nagar, Azad Bastee, Sabrinagar (two hundred yards away 
from Dimnabasti, an adivasi colony) etc. emerged.121 
Jamsshedpur also witnessed many riots between 1975 and 1978, which 
occurred on the occasions of Hindu religious festivals. In 1977 a communal had arisen 
because a Muslim had kidnapped a Hindu girl. The incident had occurred over the 
construction of a mosque at Sabrinagar.122 
Law and order have two enemies: the full truth and complete lie. When people 
realize truth, they start revolutions and in case if they are fed lies they begin 
meaningless riots.123 Businessmen, traders, politicians, goondas, leaders of ‘cultural 
organizations’ (like the RSS) feed the people with lies that enraged the people and 
then these leaders actually set up the events which provoked conflagration. After the 
Jamshedpur riots, The Hindu correspondent wrote on April 14, 1979 that, “One thing 
is clear and established beyond doubt: 
The conflagration, clashes, carnage and widespread arsons 
were not a sudden eruption…. Contractors, goons and musclemen who 
inhabit the densely populated and squalid areas, which have sprung up 
on fringes of the industrial township, dominate Jamshedpur. That the 
whole operation was meticulously planned is established by the grim 
fact that gangsters, goons, musclemen and sophisticated arms were 
being smuggled into Jamshedpur, days and weeks before the holocaust 
began.”124 
There is also an interesting and important point that the Muslims of 
Jamshedpur city form one of the richest Muslim communities in the country.125 They 
were in jobs and more than half the employees out of 50 thousand workers of TISCO 
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and TELCO were Muslims.126 Moreover just as in other cities of southern Bihar (now 
Jharkhand) of Ranchi, Dhanbad, etc., there was also the stronghold of lumpen 
proletariat and goonda127 elements make this city heaven for the anti-social elements. 
The Thakurs control the Hindu underworld and Muslims’ underworld is controlled by 
Muslim traders.128 
Two roads marked the boundaries of Sabrinagar, Road No. 14 and Road 
No.15. The Road No. 15 went  up to Dimnabasti and the Road No. 14 ended on the 
side of the fields separating the adivasis from the Muslims. On the Road No. 14 there 
was  a thatched mosque which the Muslims  constructed and there was a madarsa on 
the premises of the mosque.129 
On behalf of the Dimnabasti Akhara Samity, Sona Ram Manjhi (the organizer 
of Akhara procession through Road No. 14) claimed that the Jhonpra Masjid was an 
unauthorized construction and appeared as an obstruction on the route for 
procession.130 
Balasaheb Deoras, the chief of the RSS visited Jamshedpur and while 
addressing a meeting on April 11 mentioned that it was very sad that in their own 
country Hindus were not allowed to take out their religious processions. Both the RSS 
and Jamaat are communal bodies and they often work to arouse tension in their 
respective communities.131 
The Janata politicians, working with the RSS and other, including probably 
the Muslim Jamat-e-Iaslami (the organization which has been and continues to be the 
biggest enemy of the Indian Muslims), had decided to provoke communal riots as 
early as October 1978.132 
A joint meeting of all Akhara Samitis falling under the Mango P.S. area was 
held on 5th April 1979 at 8a.m. in Bajrang Mandir in which it was unanimously 
resolved that unless the Dimnabasti procession is not given a license to proceed 
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through Road No. 14, no Jhanda from Mango area would be taken out nor any 
festivities celebarated.133 
As we know that the Jamshedpur riot (1979) was result of internal conflict of 
ruling Janata party. The Karpoori Thakur (Janata Party) ministry included members of 
erstwhile Jana Sangh that has merged itself in Janata Party in 1977. The MLA from 
Jamshedpur belonged to Jana Sangh group and was known to be extremely 
communal. Ramnavami procession of Jamshedpur had been taken out for years and 
its route was well established. Except Ramnavami procession there were many othe 
factors that agitated the people of all section of Jamshedpur and atmosphere was 
communally charged.134 
In 1978, for the first time, taking advantage of being the member of ruling 
party, the local MLA and various Hindu Organizations trough pressure on the district 
administration to permit a deviation from the established route so as to take 
procession and its accompanying ‘Akhara’ (a group of wrestlers usually armed with 
lathis and spears), along the Road No. 14. Taking out procession through such route 
created tension. The tension increased as the armed processionists began to shout 
provocative slogans. Somehow the Administration succeeded in the procession 
peacefully.135 
Next year (in 1979) wanted the same decision from the administration but 
administration refused to permit any deviation from the traditional route. The 
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Jamshedpur, where Devras Balasaheb in his speech expressed pity on the construction of the mosque in 
the country and also asked Hindus to stake their life for the protection of the religion. All there 
culminated in 1979 riots of Jamshedpur., see, Sharma, Dahshat (Hindi), 1995, pp. 40-42. 
135 Report of Three-Members of Inquiry, p. 19; also see, Udayan Sharma, Dahshat (Hindi), Prakashan 
Sansthan, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 36-37. 
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controversy over the route of the procession was utilized by the Hindu organizations 
to communalize the atmosphere in the city.136 
On 7th April, the Shri Ramnavami Kendriya Akhara Samiti issued a pamphlet 
which can not be called anything but utterly communal in character: indeed rarely do 
the investigators of riot display their hands so openly. This pamphlet is headlined ‘An 
appeal to religion-loving public of Jamshedpur’. Two shoulder headlines said, 
“Dharma ki Jai ho, Adharma ka Naash ho.”137 This pamphlet contains: 
… Ab tak yahan ki janata ne shantipoorn dhang se har zulm ko 
bardasht kia hai lekin shanty ki ad me yahan ke Hinduon ko kuchla ja 
raha hai. Unka daman kia ja raha hai. Dhatiadih me Hanuman ki 
moorti ko police dwara tora gaya, Jugsalai lathi charge aur ashru gas 
ki versa ki gayee, Mango me Hinduon ko alpsankhyak bana dia 
gaya…138 
… aur jab tak ye bhrast aur Hindu drohi S.P. yehan rahega tab 
tak yehan moortian tootti rhengi…139 
 At the back of this controversy was the strong action taken by the honest and 
strict superintendent of police against the Hindu and the Muslim Mafia operating at 
that time. Both the mafias were interested in creating a communal problem to 
discredit and oust this officer from Jamshedpur.140 
The Ramnavami orders dated, 27th March 1979 by the DC (affidavit, 
annexure,3) and the one dated 3rd April 1979 issued by S.P.(affidavit, annexure,4), 
both mentioned about the delicate situation that had arisen in the wake of the death of 
Anwar in a police encounter, affidavit by D.C. is as follows: 
Dinank 25/26th Farwary 1979 ki ratri men Jamshedpur ke ek 
apradhkarmi Anwar ke police ke sath muthbhed me mare jane ko lekar 
sthiti bari hi bhavpravan ewam najuk ho gayi thi (.) Abhi bhi is ghatna 
ko lekar katipay vyaktiyon ke dilon me badle ki bhawana vyapt batlai 
jati. Uprokt ghatnaon ke pariprekshya men yeh avashyak prateet hota 
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hai ki Jamshedpur shahar me sthiti par bara hi kada niyantran rakha 
jaye.141 
According to the leaders of RSS, Anwar was looked upon as a protector of 
Muslims and hence his death was viewed as a threat to the safety of the Muslim 
community. Thakur Prasad further said that the dispute over the grant of the route was 
secondary event and that even if there had not been any dispute, the anti-social 
elements amongst the Muslims must have perpetrated the riot.142 
The above evidences suggest that Muslims looked upon the mafia as their 
savior. Anwar a mafia man was shot dead and this led resentment among the Muslims 
(according to the sources).  So the subsequent analysis of the incidents provoked that 
the underworld played a major role in outbreak of the riot. We also see that the Hindu 
underworld was controlled by the Thakurs and Muslim mafia was run by Muslim 
traders.143 
A mob of about 100 people, including the people like Shri B.K. Trivedi, 
Rajendra Singh, Janardan Sharma, Jogendra Kumar and two others were, among the 
mob, were arrested on the spot and others fled away according to relevant FIR the 
mob was raising following slogans-144 
Sale Musalmanon ko ujar kar rahenge. Koi shakti hum logon 
ko rok nahin sakti hai. Yeh hum logon ki dharma aur pratishtha ka 
prashn hai. Is ke liye mur kar rahenge. Plice Musalmanon me shamil 
hai aur hum logon ko daba rahi hai.145 
Even Hindus argued: how could the Muslims prevent them from taking out a 
legitimate Ramnavami procession? After all Hindus never stopped the Muslims from 
taking out their Moharram procession: Muslims, on the other hand argued that the 
Hindus were deliberately establishing a right of way where none had existed before, 
and this route, once established, would be an annual insult to the pride of the 
Muslims.146 
The disturbances were pre-planned because the way of attacks that was made 
on the procession on the New Purulia Road from Road Nos. 7.5, 3, and to the 
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throwing to the brickbats, bombs, bottle-bombs explosive etc. from the western side 
of New Purulia Road from the house tops and the mosque. According to magistrate 
Shri R. D. Ojha (GOW/14), the numbers of bomb thrown would be about 100 and to 
manufacture or prepare the kind of bombs that had been hurled at the procession, 
sufficient must have been taken. Magistrate Shri V.N. Mishra had noticed 300 to 400 
bombs exploding. Magistrate Shri R. C. P. Sinha was for half an hour near Hanuman 
Mandir and he saw 40 t0 50 bombs and inflammable materials and bottle-bombs 
being thrown continuously on procession (Ext. GO/174). According to FIR (Ext. 
GO/174) 30 or 35 bombs were found on the road and taken charge of by a police 
officer. It also mentioned that the police had taken charge of 4 bombs containing 
wicks. The Magistrate had given out the number of bombs and bottle-bombs thrown 
on the procession. The number, in its very nature, can not be accurate but existence of 
such a large number of missiles in a particular locality indicates pre-planning.147 
There was a deliberate attempt to delay the passage of Dimnabasti Jhanda 
Procession on New Purulia Road so the exhortation made to the religious minded 
persons of Jamshedpur convinced.148  
Initially the administration denied the appeal for the use of Road No. 14 for 
procession and began making preventive arrests. The Samiti- many of whose 
members found themselves behind the bars, called off the Akharas scheduled for 
April 5. Instead they planned to collect the entire city’s Akharas. The morning of 
April 11 was mooted as the day for all the Akharas to unite and take out a combined 
procession through Road No. 14. Dinanath Pandey (who became infamous as 
Jagannath Pandey), the local MLA, was directly involved in organizing combined 
procession. On April 10, a local peace committee was formed in the Maango area, a 
locality of the town of Jamshedpur, consisting of Hindus and Muslims, to attempt a 
compromise and solution for the route. But the Hindus were insistent.149 
Those involved in taking out procession on the 11th April, 1979, made their 
intensions clear from the very beginning. While they announced that the time for the 
departure of the procession was 2 p.m. (after the Zuhar prayer, i.e., the afternoon 
prayer) it started at 12 noon sharp. In about an hour there was a crowd estimated at 
about 50,000 people, who poured in across the bridge from the other side of the river 
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to join the Akharas. The call had gone out and Hindus began assembling carrying 
weapons in their hands. The procession progressed very slowly. In the lanes of Mango 
particularly in Azadbasti and Azadnagar, the Muslims began collecting. Both sides 
were prepares for battle.150 
The processionists started shouting anti-Muslim slogans and before the police 
had achance to stop them, the procession changed route and proceeded along the 
banned Road No. 14. Members of the Akharas participating in the procession, openly 
displayed their weapons like lathis, swords and spears. It was then that the critical 
incident occurred which will help us to understand that myth built up around the 
starting of a riot. The procession was halted in the midst of a densely populated 
Muslim locality, just as it came in front of an important mosque of the city. The 
leaders of the procession put forward some very illogical demands before the 
administration further as a condition to move the procession further.151 
But it was in such sensitive time that the Janata MLA and old Jana Sanghi, 
Dinanath Pandey ensured that riots did take place. He announced that the procession 
would not move until the Hindus, arrested earlier, were released. The local MLA 
(Dinanath Pandey) and others started making provocative and fiery speeches to add to 
the atmosphere of tension. The processionists made menacing displays of weapons 
and shouting objectionable slogans for several hours. The efforts of the leadership to 
incite the processionists and at the same time the efforts of the administration to move 
them, continued for hours. The spots where procession halted were surrounded on all 
the four sides by the Muslims’ houses. Finding themselves in the close vicinity of an 
armed frenzied mob bent on rioting, the Muslims also started collecting on their roofs 
with stones, boiling oils, lathis and spears. Many Muslims had collected in the 
mosque as well.152 
If we analyse the behavior of the processionists, it becomes clear that they 
behaved like a group of people determined to provoke those whom they considered as 
their antagonists to caste the first stone. After several hours of trying, they finally 
achieved their objective. At about 11:40 a.m. a stone was thrown and a bomb was 
exploded. The riots spread. But according to official sources rioting in the steel city 
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started at 2:30 p.m.153 The Muslims of Mango were prepared for the violence; they 
had obviously been instigated by their communalists. At the same time as the Muslim 
attacks all over Jamshedpur, as if one cues, mobs of Hindus began attacking Muslim 
areas. And this time the police, instead of defending those who here being attacked, 
joined the mobs and looted and destroyed Muslim homes. The Bihar Military Police 
(BMP), a paramilitary troop of the provincial government, packed with caste Hindus 
from Arrah, Ballia and Chapra, wrote their names in the history of shame. The 
pamphleteers were not wrong apparently, when they said that the constables and the 
havildars were on their side. They would help smash open closed Muslim doors with 
the familiar abuse on their lips: sala, yehan Pakistan bana raha hai! They were not a 
peace making force; they became the armed wing of the RSS. Only the Gorkhas of the 
company, were the one behaved with any partiality; they went berserk.154 
After twelve hours of violence on 11 April, some time after one at night the 
administration was able to arrange for vehicles to pick up Muslims surrounded in the 
school and the mosque in Bhalubasa. The Army had been called out and had begun 
restoring order. Tata Medical Hospital’s ambulances, buses, trucks and sundry other 
vehicles passed into service.155 
The area where the worst scenes of brutal riots had taken place were spread far 
apart from Mango in the extreme North across the river, to Jugsalai in the South 
outside Tatanagar railway station to Sakchi (Where an entire shopping market was 
raise to the ground) and Bhalubasa in the centre of the city, which altogether covers 
an area of roughly 25 sq. miles. The outburst took place almost simultaneously, 
beginning on the early afternoon of April 11 and continuing through the night to grip 
most of April 12 as well.156 
The saddest incident took place during the evacuation of an ambulance load of 
Muslim refugee to a refugee camp.157 Ambulance number BRX6112 was part of the 
second convoy, and was carrying about sixty people (estimates vary, but this is 
probably the most reasonable figure). It was being driven by an adivasi and was in 
middle of the convoy, which was being escorted at the head and at the back by the 
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police jeeps. Two police guards were actually inside the ambulance, in order to 
provide protection in case of any mishap.158 
As convoy was crossing a bridge over Kharkai river, in the Kashidih mohalla, 
this ambulance suddenly veered off into a side lane. None of the vehicles following 
bothered to stop and check. The driver immediately behind later said that he thought it 
was part of ambulance’s planned route. The police vehicles also did not bother to 
investigate.159 
Then ambulance was driven a short distance into the lane and the driver and 
the policemen decamped. On cue, a mob attacked the ambulance and set fire to it. The 
commissioner was a little behind the convoy. When he reached the lane he saw the 
ambulance burning and heard the cries for help of women and children trapped inside 
burning to death. In a similar crime, a bus with six Muslims was burnt; all died.160 
According to PTI curfew was imposed on Mango near Jamshedpur. After 
police fired to disperse a violent mob which attacked a Ramnavami procession with 
bombs. The attackers also fired shots into this procession. Six people were killed and 
80 injured in the clashes and firing.161 But according to an official source, more than 
100 people were injured in police firing and mob violence.162 
Jamshedpur has been divided in three zones for effective control of the 
situation. A three-tier control system is under operation at Thana zonal and district 
headquarters level with heavy deployment of troops BSF and CRF.163 
Mr. Singh (the commissioner of Chotanagpur division Mr. Kumar Suresh 
Singh) said that the taking out of a ramnavami procession was not the main cause of 
trouble in Jamshedpur. He maintained that the allegation that the procession was first 
attacked from a mosque was wrong.164 
The general secretary of the Communist party of India Mr. C. Rajeshwara Rao 
has said that, “Jamshedpur carnage” was a continuation of the ghastly Aligarh events 
of last year.165 Mr. Rao said in a statement; “it was unfortunate that the Prime 
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Minister and the Janata party President, instead of taking effective measures against 
this menace, are still seeking to defend the RSS- Jana Sangh”.166 
Union Home Minister (H. M. Patel) took serious note of complaint by local 
newsmen about the refusal of Inspector- General of police Rajeshwarlal to provide 
security to them in covering the incidents.167 
Asked about the Congress-I allegations that the RSS was behind the incidents. 
Mr. Patel said that RSS was always in the head of Congress-I.168 
To matter worse, even as the members continued to flicker, the communalists 
returned to their game, their lust for blood undiminished. In the third week of April, a 
rumor swept the city that the Ramnavami procession would be taken out again as it 
was interrupted the last time and the puja could not be completed! Any sane person 
could have seen this was madness but there was revenge and blood in the eyes of too 
many people.169 
At 5 p.m. some unknown persons set fire to the huts situated near Sheetla 
Mandir in which one Muslim was burnt to death. At 8 p.m. Sakchi Bazar was set on 
fire in which Sabzi Market was completely burnt. These shops belonged to both 
Hindus and to the Muslims. At the same time houses of Muslims near the Congress 
office were set on fire by the rioters.170 
Under Telco P.S. the first incident took place around midnight of 11th/12th of 
April, 1979 when a case of arson in the house of a Muslim of Laxminagar was 
reported.171 
Under Sidgora Police Station at 3 p.m. on the 11th April, 1979, it was found 
that there was confrontation between members of both communities on Road No. 1, 2 
and 3 and cross roads of Agrico colony. The rioters were indulging in brick batting, 
arson and loot. Out of the 125 Muslim houses, 115 had been burned.172 
The Hindus were evidently attacking the Muslims in their residential areas and 
the Muslims were resisting the attack by throwing brickbats, shooting arrows, 
throwing lukaris (fire-bolls) and firing guns. Some of the shops near the Masjid, 
which mostly belonged to Muslims had also been set on fire. The police force opened 
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fire to control the situation and finally the Army reached the spot with Magistrate 
K.N. Das. The Army was engaged in controlling the situation for nearly one and a 
half hours. After the disturbances were quelled, a large number of Muslims of Munshi 
Mohalla, numbering about 2,700, came and surrounded before the Army, along with 
fire arms.173 
Some Gumtis were also set on fire by a mob at the Bus Stand. At 8 p.m. on 12 
April, 1979, a strong Hindu mob armed with deadly weapons attacked Abdullah 
Mansions and Tanga Lines as a result of which one Muslim was killed. At 9 p.m. on 
the same day, rioters set fire to abandoned houses of Muslims on Kalimati Road, 
Gandak Road, Hampipe Road and Sand Line Road. At about 4 a.m. the same night on 
hearing some sounds an armed force rushed to the Birupa Road. Two Muslims were 
found killed and one quarters of a Muslim was found burnet.174 
On 12 April communal fire did not spare any police station. Almost all police 
station witnessed incidents of communal violence. Even after 12 April flames of 
communal fire continued leaping up and seriously threatened peace at Jamshedpur. 
Many incidents took place on 13 April, 1979. On 13 April, 1979 at about 9 a.m. a 
Hindu mob tried to attack Mohammedan Line and fire had to be opened as a result of 
which the mob dispersed.175 
On the same day (13th April, 1979) at 10 a.m. information was received about 
the confrontation between the Adivasis and Muslim mob.176 
The above mentioned incidents on 13 April were of serious nature. Apart from 
these incidents several other incidents also took place during this period at 
Jamshedpur. It was after the 13th April that the situation could be brought under 
control. As a result of this, major incidents were not reported from any part of the 
Jamshedpur area since then.177 
Jamshedpur riots were the culmination of many incidents and reasons and the 
prominent one is political cause. We see that by this period political leaders played 
this dirty game only to gain and satisfy their lust for power. According to Kailashpati 
Mishra, the then Vice President, there was nothing new what Deoras had told the 
audience. So there was no relation between the riot and his speeches at Jamshedpur. 
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But the Chairman of the commission, Justice Ansari, alleged in an interview on the 3rd 
August, 1979 in Madras that “RSS elements were indirectly associated with the Riots 
178 But the speech Deoras itself speak about their involvement in the Jamshedpur riots. 
The Commission quoted Deoras extensively and said: 
“… The speech of Shri Balasaheb tended to encourage the Hindu extremist to 
be yielding in the demands regarding Road No. 14. Secondly, his speech amounted to 
communal propaganda. Thirdly, the Shakhas and camps held during the conference 
presented a militant atmosphere to the Hindu public. In the circumstances, the 
commission could not but held the RSS responsible for creating a climate for the 
disturbances that took place on the 11th April, 1979 and thereafter…” The commission 
also believed that the Akhara Samitis in Jamshedpur were controlled by the local RSS 
leadership (various Commissions have commented on the RSS’s link with 
organizations which are floated for specific causes, and which have played dubious 
roles in communal riots).179 
The Commission concluded that, Dinanath Pandey was a member of the RSS; 
and he acted accordingly for the fulfillment of the general scheme of the Hindu 
communalists of Jamshedpur, and they were also aimed at achieving the plan 
announced in the leaflet circulated by them. His conduct had thus directly contributed 
to the outbreak of the riot.180 
Significantly the commission said the riot was fomented to consolidate the 
political objectives of the Jana Sngh, forerunner of the BJP, on the page 103 to 104, of 
its report make a detailed analysis of the “true intensions” of Jana Sangh in the 
context of the collapse of the Janata Party and emergence of BJP. The Commission 
concluded that, the RSS played their role in this matter, motivated by the long term 
political objective of gaining strength foe their political wing, simultaneously with 
propagating their doctrine.181 
Apart from all these causes we find that Jamshedpur riots were the result of 
Administrations’ lethargies as we see in a report in the Navabharat Times, dated; 14th 
April, 1979: 
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Jamshedpur me hua sampradaik danga is bat ka saboot hai ki 
kanoon aur vyavastha ke rakshakon ki neend durghatnayen ho jane ke 
bad khulti hain. Yeh prashn sahaj hi mastisk me kaundh jata hai ki 
Ramnavami ke juloos ke samay itna tagda inizaam kyon nahin kiya 
gaya ki juloos par patthar phenkne walon ko usi samay ya pehle se hi 
giraftar kar liya jata? Jamshedpur ki police nahin keh sakti ki juloos 
par pathrao ki ghatna aksmat hi ho gayi. Donon smpradayon me tanao 
pehle se tha aur juloos ke raste ko lekar pehle hi chunautiyon ka 
aadan-pradan ho chukka tha. Yeh prashasakon ki kami hi mani jayegi 
ki juloos ke samay danga ho jane ke bawajood bandobast itna kamzor 
tha ki Jamshedpur me dusre din bhi hatya aur aagjani ki ghatnayen 
ghatin. Yadi ab police aur fauz ki sakhti ke karan danga ruk jaye to 
ganimat hogi. 
… bharat ke prashasak pichhli ghatnaon se koi sabak nahin 
sikhte. Dangon ki roktham ki kala me hamari police ab bhi nipun nahi 
ho payi hai, jabki aaye din dange hote rehte hain aur dang eke 
karanon tatha tariqo par har samay lambi-chaudi khojbeen bhi hoti 
rehti hai. 
Jahan tak danga karne wali janata ka sawal hai bhavnatmak 
prashnon par kuchh samoohon ko uksana kathin nahin hota khaskar 
unke liye jo vighn santoshi rajnitigya hain aur vidambana to yeh hai ki 
in logon ke sath samaj virodhi tatva bhi shamil ho jate hain. Dange ke 
samay in tatvon ko khulkar khelne ka mauka milta hai…182 
                                             
Not since the 1967 Ranchi riots has Bihar witnessed such an outburst of 
communal violence as the one rocking the steel township of Jamshedpur for three 
days. Triggered on Wednesday (11 April, 1979) afternoon by a dispute over a 
religious procession, the riots have claimed nearly 100 lives so foe in clashes and 
intermittent firing by the police army personnel. More than a third of the 120 people 
hospitalized were said to be in a critical condition. The situation was tense all over the 
township, particularly the 12 business and commercial localities badly were scarred 
by the riots. 
                                               
182 Navabharat Times, 14 April 1979, New Delhi, p. 4. 
 180
For, tension has been mounting for nearly a week over the Ramnavami 
procession, the route fixed for it originally was objected to by the members of the 
minority community. Though an agreement was hammered out finally, altering the 
route of procession to avoid “sensitive” areas the authorities seem to have overlooked 
the need for precautionary steps like deploying more policemen. This was all the more 
necessary, considering the background of the events and the surcharged air that led to 
the procession being taken out one day later. In the event, when brickbats and bombs 
came raining down on the procession as it approached a mosque, clashed erupted and 
spread like wildfire. 
The Bihar Government has done well in deciding to institute a judicial inquiry 
into the riot. But nothing will console those who have lost their ones. The 
administration also failed to arrest communalists and anti-social elements in adequate 
number before the outbreak of the riot. Muslims were not only economically 
oppressed by the bourgeois-landlord but were also discriminated in the sphere of 
language, culture and jobs.183 
During the course of inquiry by the commission there were wide ranging 
complaints by the CCC, JUH (Jamet-Ul-Ulema-I-Hind) and CPI regarding the anti 
Muslim behavior of the BMP. Although CPI (M) had always defended the Muslim 
Minority and raised its voice against the discrimination and oppression of the 
Muslims, a overwhelming section of the Muslims remained alienated from the 
common class and democratic movements. And, of these weaknesses, advantage was 
taken by the Jamat-i-Islami with an appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in order to 
disrupt the democratic and working class movements.184 
The Inquiry Commission held that the administration and the Police, having 
failed to provide protection to the minority community. The Administration also 
failed to provide protection to women and children of the minority community while 
carrying them to safer places by an ambulance van.185 
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Whether the disturbances were pre-planned? In this context we find many 
evidences. According to Magistrate R.D. Ojha a number of bombs were thrown on 
procession. Though the number may not be accurate but the existence of such a large 
number of missiles in a particular locality indicates that the riots were pre-planned. 
The editor of the ‘Aryavart’ also maintained, “The use of arms and 
ammunitions against the procession supported the theory of pre-planning.186 
Communal riots again reared its head in Jamshedpur, the steel city, between 
28th and 29th August, 1979. According to the official record 10 people were dead and 
according to unofficial records 18 people were dead. 50 people were injured during 
these riots. Record about the reason behind the riots and the communities involved in 
the riots are not available.187 
The Ram sundar Das government was failed totally to contril the situation in 
Jamshedpur. The BJP leader, Dinanath Pandey, was considered as the mainaccused of 
the Jamshedpur riot.188 According to the report of Balasubramaniyam, Jamshedpur 
riot was confined to the urban areas and the Janata Government controlled the riots 
within three days.189 
After Jamshedpur riot there were a series of comminal riots in Purnia, Giridih, 
Biharsharif, Phulwarisharif, Ranchi, Hazaribagh, and others.190 
Communal Riot in Purnea District, Bihar (1979) 
Riots broke out in twelve villages of Purnea district on 4th July, 1979, which 
continued for three days (up to 7th July). In which 30 were dead, 100 were injured. 
There is no record available about the immediate cause of the riots and the 
communities involved in these riots.191 
Communal Riots in Giridih in February, 1980 
Communal riots broke out in Giridih on 12th February between two 
communities over the quarrel between two boys of the involved communities. During 
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this riot 2 people were injured and 6 shops were burnt. But the exact records regarding 
the cause and the communities involved are involved.192 
In 1980-81, the political situation was very different. The communal riots 
related to overall economic changes that had taken place in the country. Hence, 
economic interests and allied political interests, apart from purely business 
compulsions of higher sales through sensationalism, determined the role of the 
newspapers. Even some of the leading so-called national newspapers were failed to 
show their sense of responsibility. Reporting in many cases was tendentious and local 
rumors were passed off as news that magnified the tensions and violence and given 
credibility to unconfirmed figures of casualities. Even analytical articles and editorials 
spread communal hatred, at times more balantantly.193 Beside this, there were 
atrocities on the lower caste people, their homes, looting of their property and rape of 
Harijan women by  upper-caste landlords, their hirelings and the police had became 
common occurrence in Bihar and other States.194 
Since Indira Gandhi’s return to power, over 50 Harijans had been killed in 
Bihar alone, and a dozens of places their bastis had been burnt down by the landlords. 
Congress(I) hoodlums had played a major role un committing these atrocities and this 
was also happened countrywide.195 In the Kanas area of Puri district, a Congress(I) 
state minister personally instigated, along with some MLAs and gangsters, the attack 
on Scheduled Castes fishermen villages with guns, bombs and other lethal weapons, 
in the presence of the police on several occasions.196 
The root cause of these atrocities on low castes people was the failure of the 
Congress rulers to giving the lands to the low castes people, guarantee them decent 
wages and set-up an effective machinery to protect their rights.197 
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In the eleventh Congress of the Communist party of the India (Marxist) 
expresses its grave concern over the periodic occurrences of communal riots in 
various parts of the country. The Muslim mass becomes the object of incendiary and 
murderous attack by Hindu chauvinist with the convenience of administrative 
personnel during the riots. The RSS was involved in organizing such riots as exposed 
by many reports of enquiries. The Muslim minority was also discriminated against 
and ill treated under the bourgeois-landlord rule notwithstanding constitutional 
proclamations. Apart from being economically oppressed, they were discriminated 
against in the sphere of language, culture and jobs. Even in states where their 
population was substantial, the Urdu language had not been given status of second 
language.198 
Communal riots broke out in Sambhal in U. P. on 15th August, 1980. Riots 
broke out when procession was taken out in protest against the Muradabad riots.199 
The Biharsharif Riots, 30th April to 4th May, 1981 
Though the riots occurred between the Muslims and Hindus (Yadvas) over 
skirmish for toddy but the real cause was a dispute between the yadvas and Muslims 
over a cemetery land. Towards the end of 1980, a dispute over a piece of cemetery 
land was going on between the Muslims and Yadvas (a dominant agricultural 
community) at a place called Gangadivan.200 
Biharsharif is situated on the Patna-Ranchi road, about 50 miles away from 
Patna. Biharsharif now is the district headquarters of newly created Nalanda district 
created in 1976 when it splited out from Patna. Biharsharif constituted 48% of 
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Muslims of the whole population of the town during those days. Because of large 
population of Muslims there were a number of cemeteries in Biharsharif.201 
“There is no doubt that historic memories as well as contemporary socio-
economic upheavals play their part. The underlying hostilities, the age-old repression 
and the revanchist tendencies, fanned by the ideologues of communalism exacerbated 
the social tendencies generated by the economic restructuring and find explosive 
release in such orgies of violence”.202 
The town of Biharsharif was dotted with a number of cemeteries most of 
which have been shown in records as ghairmazrua (uncultivated government owned 
lands) lands. There were dispute over all of those cemetery-lands and cases were in 
pending in court of law. A section of other community claims as field or khalihan. In 
that situation there were 23 such places in the town where people living since long in 
the state of strife and mutual distrust.203 
The town has also religious significance. There are mausoleum of Makhdum 
Sahib204 (a Muslim religious saint) and Mani Baba (the Hindu saint). Because of these 
shrines thousand of believers from the respective communities were attracted from all 
over Bihar. Anniversaries of both saints celebrated every year with great fanfare. 
People coming from nearby villages in search of livelihood, most of them settled 
there. The town thus expanding fast with drastic growth in land prices day by day. 
This factor played crucial role and help us to understand the nature of the present 
conflict.205 
Another importance of this town was its bidi (is a kind of country cigarette, 
tobacco rolled in leafs) industry and a large number of Muslims and low-Caste 
Hindus were employed in the Bidi industry. According to Abdus Samad206, nearly 
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15000 laborers most of whom were Muslims were employed as bidi workers. 
Generally bidi manufacturing units were owned by the Muslims.207 The traditional 
residents of the town were engaged in weaving. The Sonis and Telis were business 
communities while the Yadwas (who were mainly embroiled with the Muslims in 
communal holocaust) were cultivators. Biharssharif is also known for potato 
cultivation which is quite profitable that also needed land to grow.208 Thus, many 
people had their eyes the cemetery lands. Towards the end of 1980 a dispute over a 
piece of land was erupted between the Yadwas and Muslims at a place 
Gangadiwan.209Gangadiwan was a predominantly Muslim village on the Southern 
outskirt of Biharsharif.210 
Apart from land dispute, which represents an economic factor, there was a 
political dimension also of Biharsharif riot. And this dimension was equally, perhaps 
more, important. Due to the high ratio of Muslims in population, the town was a hot-
bed of politics. About 32 ward commissioners were elected in municipal elections, of 
which 50% to 60% were Muslims. And it was quite sure that, there in Biharsharif, 
either Chairman or vice-Chairman was always a Muslim.211 However, in fourth 
general election a non-Muslim got elected with Muslim votes but CPI’s policy 
regarding the Bihari Muslims in Bangaladesh, CPI212 lost its influence among 
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Soni and Teli castes. And to combat and dwindled the power and influence of CPI, the RSS always 
made determined efforts to heighten communal consciousness among Hindus. Thus, the RSS were 
aware of it that, communal riots will also made Muslims conscious of their religion and derive them 
 186
Muslims thus in 1974, Jan Sangh candidate won213, obviously with Muslim support 
but CPI gained the power again in 1977 elections.214 
Communal riots of Biharsharif took place on 30 April, 1981 and in the 
following days, according to the Government figures, as many as 47 persons were 
killed and 68 were injured. This riot enveloped the rural areas and took a heavy toll of 
life and property during next four days. While the starting point of this riot was the 
issue of cemetery but the fire of riot was lit after quarrel between the two Muslim 
boys and toddy taper. In which Yadwas interrupted and spread false rumors against 
Muslims thus riots spread.215 
On the afternoon of, 30 April, 1981, around 3:30 pm. Chotan Pasi lowered 
down a pot of toddy, two Muslim (Matin and Gama) hoodlums asked him for toddy216 
but Chotan denied to give that to them without payment. But Matin and Gama simply 
snatched the pot and began to walk off. Hearing the dispute two Yadwa youths 
arrived and forced Matin and Gama to give back to toddy. This enraged Matin and 
Gama and they brought small crowd of their Muslim supporters. The Yadwas too 
gathered and battle-lines were drawn.217 Gangadiwan is only 15 minutes walk from 
police station on the Ranchi-Patna highway but police took more than an hour. 
However, the police officer in charge (O.C.) of the Muradpur police station (P.S.) 
turned up with his men and prevent violent clash between the two groups. The crowds 
were dispersed but a section of Muslims set fire to a haystack, a hut and buvrnt a 
buffalo to death and 15 Hindu families in panic left the village. Thus rumor stated 
spreading that Muslims had massacred Hindus.218 
A serious riot broke out in Biharsharif. It was not on account of land disputes, 
though this problem had been creating tension between the two communities for a 
long time without leading to a show down. The immediate cause was a brawl between 
some drunkards in a liquor shop. In no time the trouble spread and hell was let loose, 
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leading to cases of arson and general mayhem. At its wits end, the administration 
clamped curfew over the entire city. The peace loving people had to remain behind 
the doors but lot of thing happening outside the city and it environs were the mischief-
mongers had a free hand and arsonists were on the rampage in the countryside. 
Conditions in the village were even worse. Only those who had been forewarned 
about the shape of things to come escaped with their lives. One special feature of this 
riot was that the high caste Hindus took no part in it. On the other hand they went to 
the extent of saving lives of the Muslims while the backward class Hindus 
wholeheartedly participated in the riots. The fact was that it was those people who 
were made of the cat’s paw by the rich in unleashing riots during 1946.219 
According to Azmat Husain Khan, a lecturer in history from Biharsharif, this 
land on a hillock belonged to the Muslims but the Yadwas were claiming it as their 
own. According to Mr. Husain, the Yadwas came in sizeable number secretly in the 
dead of the night in the cemetery and constructed there a small temple and covered it 
with the cow dung to hide it from others. The plan was to discover it few month later 
in order to claim the land.220 However, the Muslims noticed it a month later and a 
pitched battle was fought between the two groups using bombs and bullets. 
Fortunately there were no serious casualties and the police brought the situation under 
control. Tension prevailed for about four months.221 
According to Azmat Husain, a deputation on behalf of the Anjuman-i-Mufidul 
Islam222 met the District Collector on 25th April and persuaded him to settle the 
question amicably to avoid the further fury among these two groups. Agreeing on the 
proposal of Azmat Husain, the Collector called a joint meeting on 1 May to survey the 
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land under dispute. He also agreed to settle the dispute in respect of other cemetery 
plots.223 
According to the members of the Anjuman the news of assurance by the 
Collector (District Magistrate) to Muslims, disturbed the Yadvas who were also not 
sure about for testifying their claims.224 
Political dimension of the conflict is important to discuss because of high ratio 
of Muslims in the population, the town was a hot bed for the politics.225 
In Municipal elections 32 ward commissioners were elected of which the 
Muslims shares 50-60 percent. In the I (1952), II (1957), and III (1962) General 
elections the area was represented in the provincial legislative Assembly by the 
Muslim candidates. In the IV General elections (1967), a communist (a non-Muslim) 
candidate was elected with Muslim votes.  
But due to this policy towards the Bihari Muslims in Bangladesh which we 
have already discussed in this chapter, the CPI lost much of its influence and in the 
1972 elections a Jan Sangh candidate had won, obviously with Muslim support. 
However, the CPI resigned its seats in the 1977 elections.226 The CPI had strong 
position in Biharsharif because of its Trade Union for bidi workers. No need to say 
that the CPI owed this election victory largely to the Muslim votes and this fact had 
also been submitted by the members of Anjuman-i-Mufidul Islam.227 
The RSS, on the other hand, was trying to acquire strong position in the area 
and strongly resent this all pervading sway of the CPI especially among the 
Muslims.228 In this order RSS finds its support among the business communities 
which comprises mainly Teli (oil pressers and sellers) and Soni (goldsmiths) castes. 
They were making determined efforts to induce communal consciousness among the 
Hindus in order to combat the CPI’s control among the said community and area.229 
Due to recurrence of communal riots Muslims became over conscious of their 
religion and drive them into the fold of conservative forces. Research paper of 
Abddus Samad throw light on, they have their share in trade and commerce. They 
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have their own markets, cold storages and shares in cinema halls. They have started 
two high schools and one college. This growing social mobility and greater ability for 
economic competitiveness on the part of Muslims creates resentment among the 
section of the Hindu community aspiring for a greater share in economic 
development.230 
No diligent spectator of Biharsharif could deny the role of RSS in the 
Biharsharif riots because the lead role was played by the RSS in imbuing communal 
consciousness and tension in Biharsharif.231 Dr. Jagannath Mishra, the then Chief 
Minister of Bihar, himself in a press statement unequivocally blamed the RSS for 
fomenting the communal trouble.232 On the other hand, while addressing the press 
persons on the evening of May 16, 1981, the RSS Chief of Bihar criticized the attitude 
of some political parties to blame the RSS for communal riots.233 
While in the Bihar Legislative Assembly in an adjournment on the Biharsharif 
riots Nath Prasad brought it to the knowledge that on May 1st, 1981, R. N. Singh, the 
magistrate, and Fisheries Extension Officer, Biharsharif, had brought to the police 
station 34 persons who were from Bangalore were the members of Jamait-e-Islam and 
came there with the aim to violate the communal harmony.234 
The fight between the Yadvbas and Muslims over the issue of toddy just a 
tactics (of Yadvas) to disrupt the district authorities’ attempt to settle the graveyards 
disputes came in conflict with the Muslims and the RSS was waiting to start the 
massacre. On 1st May 1981, Alinagar, where mostly poor Muslims lived, was attacked 
by a mob during the curfew hours. Akhtar Husain (a victim from a relief camp who 
had witnessed the scene) told that when Muslims went to the mosque for Juma 
prayers, it was then, between 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm an organised mob from Teli 
mohalla came with bomb and guns and other weapons and attacked the Muslim in 
Alinagar ans 12 houses completely burned. The maximum numbers of people were 
killed in Alinaga an most of the killed were women and children.235 Accordingly 
Akhtar Husain mob was led by Rajkishor and Pannalal (the RSS activists). The area 
                                               
230 Engineer, “Case study of Five Major Riots: From Biharsharif to Pune”, p. 241. 
231 Engineer, “Case study of Five Major Riots: From Biharsharif to Pune”, p. 241. 
232 Engineer, “Case study of Five Major Riots: From Biharsharif to Pune”, p. 241. 
233 Narayan, Communal Riots in India, p. 141. 
234 Bihar Legislative Assembly Debates, Patna, Part 2, Section 8, No. 1-6, 29 June to 6 July, 1981, p. 
37. 
235 Engineer, “Case study of Five Major Riots: From Biharsharif to Pune”, p. 242; also see, S. R. 
Goyal, “RSS Role: Biharsharif” in, Mainstream, Vol. XIX, No. 37, 16 May, 1981, p. 8. 
 190
said to be the stronghold of RSS. In other areas where non-communal parties were 
strong (the CPI had several strong pockets) attacks were not attempted or were given 
up.236 
In the villages, Alinagar, Rupaspur, Rohini, Chorsua, Muslims were killed in 
large number than that of Hindus. In village Gulni out of total population of 500 
Muslims only 100 were alive. Muslims took shelter in the mosque and resented for 
long hours. But the Hindu mob attacked the mosque with lukaris237 and Muslims were 
trapped inside had hardly any option to escape, if the did not came out they would be 
burnt alive. Here 4 Muslims were killed.238 
Asghar Ali Engineer in his ‘Case Study of Five Major Riots From Biharsharif 
to Pune’ give the report that, during riots it was a common complain that rioters and 
goondas were abetted by the military police in looting, burning properties and killing 
of the people.239 The victims testified us but before the arrival of the BSF and CRP 
the toll of life and property in Biharsharif town would have been much higher. The 
BSF and CRP displayed remarkable impartiality in handling the situation, and saved 
many lives and properties. The Collector also had admitted this fact. The BMP, on the 
other hand, made no bones about its anti-Muslim bias.240 In Biharsharif itself the loss 
of the life was not more than 20. But the actual catastrophe took place in the adjacent 
villages. And that happened because the RSS mechanism worked efficiently to spread 
false rumors in those villages. The local CPI MLA itself told that the RSS activists 
visited the rural areas in jeeps and scooters equipped with loudspeakers to announce 
that 200 Yadwas have been killed by the Muslims. 
From 1 May 1981, the authorities had clamped round the clock in Biharsharif 
town. In the day time the rumor mongers did their dirty job.  The RSS organized mobs 
from the town went to attack the Muslims. On 2nd May 1981, a mob equipped with 
bomb, rifles and other lethal weapons attacked the village at 5a.m. while another 
victim insisted that the time was 6 a.m. when they attacked the village. Other villagers 
mainly Paswans (a Harijan caste) and Gwalas (Yadwas) joined the attacked. 
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The victims of this riot were not the upper class businessmen who had 
established themselves, but those at the bottom of the socio-economic level and had to 
depend on their daily wages for their survival. It would be near to truth to ay that the 
vested interests among the communal elements from the both communities look out 
for an occasion to trigger off a riot. And the selfish members of the both communities 
do this for their own sake and taking advantage of their (the lower class and poor 
people) ignorance.241 It is understood that the vested interests were fanning the flames 
of religion, communal, linguistic, regional susceptibilities for their own partisan 
ends.242 
According to official records 47 people were dead but unofficial records 
shows the figure of 150 to 200 people were dead. 68 people were injured. 550 people 
were arrested out of which 5 were well known office-bearers of the Rashtriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh, this made it clear that behind the riots RSS played well. 12 
houses were completely burnt down. And affected areas were Alinagar, Teli Mohalla 
and Gulni village.243 
The Biharsharif riot had occurred within less than a year of Moradabad riots of 
western Uttar Pradesh in August 1980. In Moradabad, riots were between PAC 
(Provincial Armed Constabulary) and a section of Muslims in which 80 odd persons 
lost their lives. As many as 52 had died in panicky stamped in Idgah caused by PAC 
and 20 killed in Police firings. In Biharsharif, however, casualties had occurred 
almost entirely in attacks by the Hindus and Muslims on each other in which Muslims 
were the sufferers.244 
The inhuman events underline the grievous fact that the pious preambulary 
prescriptions about secularism and democracy have not prevented the communal 
elements from organizing themselves systematically for large-scale killing, maiming, 
arson and loot on the slightest pretext.245 
There was prolonged debate in Bihar legislative Assembly had gone in which 
political leaders of different parties accusing one another. Issue of Biharsharif riot was 
raised by the Munshi Lal Rai (leader of JNP (SC)) that, on April 30th  the riots broke 
out which continued without any break off till 4th May, 1981, which took more than 
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100 lives and administration was a total failure in seizing the riots. In response to 
Munshi Lal Rai, Karpoori Thakur (a Lok Dal leader) assumed this riot as a revolt in 
which Muslims were butchered. Karpoori Thakur agreed that administration was 
failed in preventing the riots but the riots in the villages of Nalanda district were only 
the result of pre-existing tensions. Like a wagon of bomb was sent to Vyas from 
Panagarh Army Headquarters in October 1980, anyhow, that reached to Biharsharif 
and ironically on the same day when riots flare-up, radio and newspaper reported that 
a wagon of bomb have been reached to Biharsharif. This made both communities 
suspicious for each other and it was the biggest reason for the rioting. On the next day 
of the riot, there was widespread rumour that the poison has been poured in the water 
tank and this rumor was testified by the patrolling corpses of Bihar, unfortunately this 
news were not curbed by the administration. Another reason was that specifically 
among the Hindus of rural areas that, students (Hindu) were killed in a large number 
even Dr. J. K. Sinha and Kamta Babu were killed by the Muslims. Thus riots were 
ignited  on 30th April, 1981 and on the very next day curfew was imposed but the by-
pass were remained open. In rural areas Muslims were killed on larger scale than that 
of Biharsharif. Muslims were killed by identifying them and their houses were set on 
fire. Even in confusion son of Lieutenant Carnal J. N. Sahay who has little beard, was 
killed.246 Although Biharsharif is very close to Patna but not even a single MLA or 
CM bother to visit the riot affected areas till 4th May, 1981. Only they visit the area 
when Prime Minister came to visit.247  
Karpoori Thakur charged the Government for being completely responsible 
for the riots and demanded dismissal of Jagannath Mishra, the Chief Minister, while 
Ramashray Rai (leader of INC (I)) stated that government had ably controlled the 
situation as well as accused Karpoori Thakur that during the Jamshedpur riots (1979) 
there was Government of Karpoori Thakur but riots had occurred for months and here 
riots had been seized within a four days.248 Ramashray also said that behind all this 
opposition was involved to blemish our party. They hired some professional goondas 
for igniting the riots. Debnath Prasad said that skirmishes over toddy were only a 
spark to the prolonged clash over the cemetery land. Gagandiwan, where riot had 
been occurred, was only at the distance of 100 yards from the Police Station. It was 
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not true that Collector and S. P. were not present on 30th April but I assert that both of 
them were present there and on 1st May curfew was imposed. I have asked for a jeep 
and curfew pass to brought the situation under control.249 
On May 5th 1981 in Lok Sabha, George Fernandes criticized Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi for her irresponsible attitude as she had gone abroad, while there was 
widespread rioting.250 
As ever administration was again failed in handling efficiently and ceasing the 
Biharsharif riots. George Fernandes (a Lok Dal leader) in his statement to press stated 
that, the Union Home Minister, Gyani Zail Singh has admitted the failure of 
Government in preventing the occurrences of recent communal riots at Biharsharif 
and its adjoining villages in Nalanda districts.251 
Instead of arrest of communal elements the power hungry politicians pulling 
one another’s leg by accusing incapable in ceasing the riots. For instance we see that 
Kailshpati Mishra, the then vice-president of the Bharatiya Janata Party of Bihar, 
demanded dismissal of the Ministry of Dr. Jagannath Mishra for its ‘incompetence 
and ineffectiveness’ in tackling the law and order problem.252 Kailaspati Mishra cited 
the example law and order problem as: A wagon-load of 120 m.m. unclaimed bombs 
were seized at Danapur, 11 persons were killed in communal riots, one student died of 
injury inflicted by police in Patna, 18 trucks were set on fire at Bengusarai and 
Bihpur, and a milkman (Rajaram Yadav) was killed in Madhupur.253 Thus Kailashpati 
in his press statement insisted upon that, Jagannath Mishra had no moral right to 
remain in power as had failed in preventing riots.254 
Chaturanan Mishra (the then President of the All India Trade Union) and 
Naqui Mohammad (the General Secretary of Bihar Pradesh Yuva Janata) described 
the Biharsahrif Riots as pre-planned. They appealed all secular parties and trade union 
organizations to maintain peace and haemony in the society and also wanted the 
Government to crush the anti-social elements of Biharsharif. Ganesh Shankar 
Vidyarthi (the then Secretary of the State Committee of CPI (M)) and Mr. Chandi 
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(General Secretary of Bihar Democratic Youth Organiztio) appealed to the people of 
Biharsharif to restore peace.255 
Jagadambi Prasad Yadav (the then President of Bhartiya Janata Party, Bihar) 
accused in a press conference on 9th May 1981 at Patna, accused Jagannath Mishra 
responsible for Biharsharif flare-up. His gave his statement to the press: 
It was surprising that the Chief Minister, Dr. Jagannath 
Mishra, did not care to visit Biharsharif after the incident 
for four days while Mr. Chaturanan Mishra, a CPI leader, 
was allowed to move freely in the affected area during the 
curfew hours. It was also distressing, he [Jagdambi Prasad 
Yadav] said, that the BJPleaders were not given the curfew 
passes despite repeated request to the State 
Government…256 
Jagadambi Prasad and Kailashpati, demanded the immediate dismissal of 
Jagannath Mishra Government and setting up of an inquiry committee, they also 
demanded dismissal of the Superintendent of Police (S. P.) and also referred to 
punitive tax257, otherwise BJP would launch an agitation on May 25th (1981) in 
support of their demands. They accused Jagannath Mishra that he only raised the 
bogey of RSS to conceal the fact.258 They also complained of police terrorism that 
made indiscriminate arrests. Thus we see that it was nothing but complete failure of 
administration. 
Except, April-May, 1981 riots in Biharsharif there was control on communal 
situation. All important festivals of both communities were performed peacefully. 
There were only sporadic disturbances had occurred that only limited to the specific 
places like Madhubani, Ranchi, Patna, Giridih etc. but these communal disturbances 
were not so horrific.259 Riots in Moradabad, Aligarh, Allahabad, and Delhi etc. did not 
affect Biharsharif it shows that Government took stern action to maintain peace. In 
Biharsharif riots government shows some responsibility that riots were seized within 
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5 days by imposing curfew, raids were made, arms and bombs were recovered. Many 
culprits were punished. Riot victims were kept in relief camps.260 Though sporadic 
riots occurred in Narpatganj (in Purnia),Araria, Kisanganj etc. but were seized by the 
government. Peace committees were organized from panchayat level to district 
level.261 
There was total chaos in Biharsharif and in the riot not only low rank officials 
but high officials were equally responsible for the spread of the riot.262 Even the State 
Government was slow in reacting to the first outbreak as usual.263 The District 
Magistrate, Nalanda was on “French leave” when the communal conflagration broke 
out in Biharsharif town in 1981 and took a heavy toll of life and property264 thus V. S. 
Dubey was posted as special district magistrate who imposed curfew to curb the riot 
but his efforts were unable to check the rumours.265 Spread of those riots was 
checked by the visit of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, even though as many as 19 
Muslims were done to death.266  V. S. Dubey said that four companies of CRPF, eight 
Border Security Force, six BMP force and district police had been moved in the 
interior of Biharsharif and the situation in the town and in the rural areas brought 
under control. V. S. Dubey also accused that it was local leaders of Congress-I who 
were involved in provoking the riot and protecting the rioters.267 The Chief Minister 
Jagannath Mishra had been advised by his Chief Secretary P. P. Nayyar and 
Inspector-General (IG) of police S. K. Chatterjee not to visit Biharsharif.268 Jagnnath 
Mishra compensated for his lapse by two historic actions: (i) He set up a historic court 
of trial to punish the culprits. In the history of free India Biharsharif’s was the first 
riot for which about two dozen culprits have been sentenced to life imprisonment; (ii) 
An ordinance was issued for imposing collective fine on the area wherever riot 
occurred. That bridled the occurrence of communal violence.269 
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Again riots broke out on 29th May, 1983 in Nalanda. There was a clash 
between the two communities near a religious place but the riot broke out when a 
posse of armed policemen, led by District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police 
(Nalanda), were attacked by the clashing mob while tried to disperse the clashing 
group. 
Although in Biharsharif, peace was restored, but communal riots continued in 
various places of Bihar but the major one was riots in 1986 at Lohardagga, a tribal 
area. Riots in tribal areas were quite common. Ranchi was still considered as a 
sensitive spot as far as communal riots were concerned. In November, 1986 there was 
a widespread riot at Lohardagga which originated out of anti-peasant attitude of the 
Mahajans (moneylenders). Although tension at Lohardagga was arising out of 
economic reasons, it eventually took a communal colour. The Oraon tribals were in 
majority in Lohardagga which was a backward area and there had been no planned 
development in Lohardagga. This economic tension turned into communal rivalry 
because, many of the Adivasi peasants had taken loan from a Muslim money-lender 
and as security of the loan the helpless and poor adivasis had to mortgage their 
land.270 They complained against it but they did not get justice. Thus this turned into 
Adivasi unrest in Lohardagga and some communal minded politicians271 took 
advantage of it to spread communal frnzy.272 
The Local BJP and its recently formed ‘Vananchal Jagran Parishad’ 
communalized the tribal movement by organizing a massive rally of Adivasis on 13th 
November, 1986, where provocative speeches were delivered in which they mention 
that the group, who had cutting the forest and forcibly occupy the lands of the 
Adivasis, as vidharmi. By calling a group of people vidharmi was a direct hack on the 
Muslim money-lenders. Thus atmosphere was communally charged. And finally a 
spark was provided to the communally strained atmosphere on 16 December, 1986, 
when Muharram (a Muslim festival) and Karma (a festival of Adivasis), fell on the 
same day. Both communities taken out procession and a skirmish during the 
procession was resulted in the death of two Adivasis, thus riot started and Jharkhand 
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Mukti Morcha273 supported Adivasi movement to secure political advantage from the 
situation. Thus, the Lohardagga riot of 1986, illustrated that how communal politics 
turned a genuine mass movement, arising out of economic discontent, into communal 
riot.274 
It was not only politics alone that communalise all aspect life in Bihar. There 
was another dimension that also played in communalizing the atmosphere that was 
publication of a Hindi book in 1983 titled, “Boya Ped Babool Ka” by Mahabir Prasad 
Akela, contained derogatory references to Prophet Mohammed and another paper  
named “Madhyakaleen Arab Ka Itihas” byProf. Dhanpati Pandey, who was a Reader 
in Bhagalpur University, raised the communal heat. Mahabir Prasad Akela, was a 
political activist and member of the state executive of Communist Party of Inadia 
(CPI), came to the criticism by his own party-men as well as by minority community. 
Muslims decided, to celebrate Muharram by taking out black flags instead of taking 
out procession.275 Although Mahabir Prasad Akela was expelled by his part bosses, 
there was anger among the Muslims. At Aurangabad, Gaya, Jehanabad, Sasaram, 
Ranchi and many other places, Muslims protested against the book. The agitation was 
strong at Aurangabad because it was the home-place of Mahabir Prasad Akela. 
However the Administration became alert and started negotiating with the Action 
Committee and put the writer behind bars because the writer was only safe behind 
bars. The Left Government put an end to the agitation by banning the book. But it was 
too late it strained the relation between two communities.276 
Even telecast of some serials (soap operas) on the television by late 1980s 
telecast of Mahabharata and Ramayana and serial Tamas also aroused communal 
atmosphere in the country and in Bihar in general. In this serial it was shown that a 
dead swine was thrown in front of a mosque and a cow was chased by a Muslim lad. 
A Muslim boy was killed by a Hindu boy who was portrayed in RSS uniform, khaki 
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short pant all these arouse communal feeling during it’s telecast days. Anyhow it was 
demanded to be banned in Bihar in 1988 by Satanarayan Dudani.277 
Bhagalpur Riots, October, 1989 
 Bhagalpur has a long history of communal riots in 1924, 1936, 1946 and 
1967. The Bhagalpur riots of October, 1989 were different in nature because for the 
first time riots spread to the rural areas of the district and 88% of the population of 
Bhagalpor lived in its rural areas and some of the worst riots took olace in the rural 
areas like in Logain village, led by ASI Ramchander Singh of Jagdishpur thana and 
other policemen278, which we shall discuss later. 
Bhagalpur constituted 3.25 of the total land of Bihar where 4% of total 
population of Bihar resided. Upper caste (Brahmins and Bhumihars) who were only 
10% of the total population of the district owned 85% of Agricultural land and 95% of 
commerce and industry was in the hand of Marwaris and Gujratis.279 Muslims 
comprised 13.93%, Harijans comprised 10.98% and non-Harijan backward castes 
comprised 65.50% (peasant cultivators were 38.56%, agricultural labourers were 
41.42% while 4.78% population were engaged in household industry) of total 
population of Bhagalpur.280 
Bhagalpur town is the most important silk weaving and silk dyeing industry in 
which a large number of employees were Muslims and was a highly congested town 
with narrow lanes and by lanes.281 Most of the land282 was owned by the upper castes 
who dominated both bureaucracy and politics. Muslims were mainly craftsmen but 
many of them were engaged in other activities, most of the better off among the 
ordinary Muslims, Harijans and those belonged to other backward caste were masons, 
motor drivers, bus conductors and also engaged in many other menial jobs. Thus 
tension among them was perpetual and was stimulated by the growing polarization 
between the rich and the poor.283 There had been a increasing communalization of the 
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polity thus the caste and community differences had been used to unit the exploited 
haves-not among the Harijans and non-Harijan OBCs and also to vanish the secular 
features (to whatever extent it was existed) of the district and extricate the Muslims 
from the silk craft and other profession even based on self-employment.284 
Bhagalpur also was the scene of bloodiest285 communal riots in 1946286 and 
saw some exodus of Muslim population from this district.287 But by the time there 
was sizeable population of Muslims from Dono (Amarpur) toTatarpur (Bhagalpur) 
that was a belt of 20 km. long which irritates Hindus. The post-independence period 
had seen the Hindu leadership pass from the idealistic Bengalees to Marwair. 
Marwaris of Bhagalpur were not only militant but some of them were criminals also. 
Most of the Marwaris were moneylenders, and also engaged in other trades. 
Bhagalpur earned in famous notoriety for a variety o reasons instances in support of 
this fact was available from the manner the convicts were punished in Bhagalpur jail 
like getting their eyes blind. But the communal carnage of Bhagalpur in October-
November, 1989 added new dimension in barbarity in Bhagalpur.288 The communal 
violence that broke out in and around Bhagalpur in October 1989 continued for 
months. It was sparked off by processions carrying bricks for Ram temple in Ayodhya 
during BJP’s movement against the Babri masjid. Approximately 1070 people lost 
their lives. 
Bhagalpur riots occurred against the backdrop of the Hindu move to construct 
Ram Janmbhoomi temple at Ayodhya by demolishing Babri Mosque, by mobilizing 
the support of devotees of Lord Ram under various forms and various stages. Ram 
Janmbhoomi-Babri Mosque dispute came as an opportunity that the vested interests289 
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bent on enhancing communal tensions exploited to the extent possible with disastrous 
consequences for the polity and country. According to a top secret Intelligence 
Bureau (IB) study, in 1989, mutual distrust between the communities remained at a 
high level290, though in order to gain support of the devotees they started Rath-yatra 
all over India. The Hindus claimed the place as birth place of Ram. One of their 
moves was Ramshila Pujan291 and its procession throughout India and abroad. And a 
Ramshila procession was also taken out at Bhagalpur on October 24, 1989, which 
sparked off the communal riot there.292 
The riots started on 24 October, 1989 and not controlled for the next fortnight. 
Tatarpur was the main center of communal activities because it was a Muslim 
dominated area and they did not want a Hindu procession to pass through their area. 
On 23 October the District Magistrate Arun Jha and Superintendent of Police had, 
reportedly detailed discussion with the Muslim leaders who had assured that the 
procession would be allowed to pass peacefully. The only condition was applied was 
that there would be no slogan shouting. But suddenly Muslim changed their decision 
and were willing not allow to pass the procession. DM tried to bring negotiation 
between them. As a last resort the DM tried to change the rout of procession but 
processionists were also not ready to budge even a single inch. Through the approved 
rout procession was taken out under heavy police guard as stopping it would have 
mean more trouble (Muslim India, December, 1986, New Delhi).293 
As it was decided, the procession was moving and near the Muslim school, 
bombs started raining hurling on the procession. They were in large number. The DM 
ran but he fell in a ditch and S.P. Dwivedi hid himself under the jeep. The security 
forces started running. The processionists dispersed immediately. Meanwhile police 
regrouped and asked the Muslims to disperse who were squatted on the road and 
shouted slogans. Both D.M. and S.P. tried to reason them but they failed in between 
there started another round of bomb and brickbats. The police open fire and S.P. 
himself started firing from his revolver. Two people were died on the spot. Suddenly 
entire town was closed down and Muslims started fleeing from the area. Hindu and 
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Muslim started attacking each other by the evening in the areas such as Parbatti, 
Laharitola and Urdu Bazar.294 
According to some reliable sources, the riot was a result of old rivalry between 
two deadly criminal gangs. Laloo Prasad Yadav as a Member of the Lok Sabha, in the 
Lok Sabha, on 29th December 1989, in his speech stated: 
There are two groups of Muslim criminals at Bhagalpur, 
namely, Sallan and Ansari and the Bhagalpur riots were 
started by them. Bomb was thrown on the S. P. of 
Bhagalpur and many police personnel were injured. Bombs 
were thrown on the occasion of Ramshila Pujan and these 
two criminals have not been arrest yet.295 
 The rivalry between criminal gangs, Ansari gang and Sallan gang, was well 
known in Bhagalpur.296 It is alleged that Sallan group is patronised by Bhagwat Jha 
Azad and Ansari group by Shiv Chandra Jha, both former chief ministers of Bihar. 
There is intense rivalry between these two factions of the ruling Congress and this 
rivalry is reflected in the conflict between the Sallan and Ansari gangs.297 Sometimes 
earlier to the riot, 6 members of Ansari gang were killed by the police party led by the 
Superintendent of police, K. S. Dwivedi. And Ansari gang blamed Sallan gang for 
acted as the police informers. As result Ansari gang decided to take revenge by 
attacking the Sallan gang and killing of Dwivedi. Therefore this gang decided that on 
24th October, 1989, during the Ramshila Pujan procession they would kill Dwivedi. 
As planned, on that day there was a fatal attack on Dwivedi. It is not clearly known 
far how such local analysis of the riot is true, but this is true that the two rival gangs 
existed as parallel rulers and they received political patronage. And this was the 
reason that the authorities of Bhagalpur were incapable in controlling the riots and 
curbing the crimes. It is said that during the riots the Hindus were provided with arms 
by a local muscleman and an owner of cinema hall. In Chanderi and other villages, 
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the Minority community was under attack, while in Jamalpur, Khera the minority 
community which was attacked.298 
On 24 October, 1989 about 3000 Hindus prepared to take Ramshila Pujan 
procession from Nath Nagar locality but a group of 300 Muslims attacked the 
procession. And the riot occurred at Tatarpur with the police remaining mute 
spectator.299 
The procession which turned back from Parbatti, Tatarpur junction turned 
quickly into a violent mob and was determined to take revenge of its humiliation. 
They attacked the shops and garages owned by the Muslims on the lower Nath Nagar 
Road recently named as Lord Mahavir Panth. Hindu mod attempted to seize the 
locality of Assandpur but the Muslims fired from the roof tops to keep rioters away. 
Then mob entered to Parbatti where the massacred 40 Muslims. There was attack and 
counter attack. Curfew was imposed but that was not effective.300 
On 25 October the situation took a serious turn when Muslims attacked on 
Hindu students on the last day of their examination one was kidnapped and another 
was stabbed to death. On October 25, an 8,000strong mob looted and destroyed 
Madaninagar, a Muslim settlement, turning it into a ghost town. They also attacked 
Kanjhiagram, a nearby locality. Bhatoria, a Muslim dominated village was attacked 
on October 25 and killing several Muslims. In Hasnabad, the Shahi Masjid built 
during the Aurangazeb's reign was damaged.301 Paramilitary and army had to be 
called to control the situation. On 26 October 155 up trains were stopped and several 
of the commuters traveling in the train were dragged and killed by the villagers at 
Naharipur.302 The alleged police atrocities further ignited the violence. The army was 
called in on 26th October 1989. K. S. Dwivedi, the Superintendent accused of being 
anti-Muslim, was asked by the chief minister to hand over the charge to Ajit Datt on 
the same day. However, during a tour of the riot affected area, the Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi overruled the transfer of Dwivedi303 on the demand of a mob composed 
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of policemen and Vishwa Hindu Parishad supporters. Again on October 27, Bhatoria 
was attacked. The attacks and counter attacks continued for days and casualties on 
both side kept on increasing. Army was also called out after a considerable delay and 
was not able to bring the situation under control. A curfew was imposed by the state 
government immediately in the afternoon of October 24, and all the civilian 
assemblies were declared illegal but imposition of curfew did not improve the 
matters.304 
After the Friday prayers on 27th October, 1989, Chanderi village was attacked 
from three sides by the people from the adjoining villages.305 The Yadavs of the 
neighbouring villages had opposed the construction of a mosque in the village. Thus 
the rioters set mosque on the fire, along with some houses, and killed 5 people. A 
Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry regiment, led by Major G.P.S. Virk and stationed 
at the Sabaur thana, was overseeing Chandheri and the neighbouring settlement of 
Rajpur.306 When Major Virk arrived at Chanderi, he noticed that Muslims were fled to 
the neighboring villages and a large number of Muslims were hiding in a large house 
belonging to one Sheikh Minnat in order to save their lives. The same thing had 
happened in 1940s, when Qudratullah Shahab, ICS, was posted there as the 
Subdivisional Magistrate. He observed that Muslims were fleeing silently.307 Major 
Virk entrusted them to the local police which had arrived in the meantime.308 Major 
left soon after assuring Muslims for their safety but on the next morning they were 
attacked by a large number of Yadavas, Dusadhs and Kurmis accompanied by the 
local police arrived at Sheikh Mannat's house and claimed that they had come to 
evacuate the Muslims to safety and when Muslims came out, they were attacked by 
them, some of them were killed on the spot, while the others were paraded to a 
hyacinth pond before being attacked. In Chanderi village 65309 Muslims were hacked 
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with machetes and their bodies were thrown in a pond.310 At the pond, he found 
Malika Bano of Chanderi, a survivor whose right leg had been chopped off.311 61 
mutilated dead bodies were recovered from the pond. The police later filed charges 
against 38 people in the case, out of which 16 were convicted and awarded rigorous 
life terms; The other 22 were acquitted. 
On the political arena in 1989, the difference was the quest for new vote bank, 
a consolidated Hindu vote bank, cutting across caste lines and extending into rural 
areas where voting had been along caste rather than religious lines.312 Thus it was for 
the fist time a disastrous riot occurred in Bihar in Logain village of Bhagalpur district. 
On 27th October, 1989, 116313 people (Muslims) were killed by a 4000 strong 
mob led by the police officer Ram Chander Singh of Jagdishpur314 in riots in Logain 
village of Bhagalpur district.315 It was one of the worst communal riots, with more 
than a thousand killed in the district.316 The rioters in Logain buried the bodies in a 
field, and planted vegetables (cauliflower) there, over the mass grave to hide the 
evidence.317  Officer in Charge of Jagdishpur Police Station and the Block 
Development Officer allegedly helped in burying the bodies.318 14 people, including 
the former police officer, were convicted and sentenced to rigorous life imprisonment 
for the killings, in 2007.319 
Evidences reveal that these riots were, by and large, planned and operated by 
the mafia gangs and with support and encouragement of local rival political leaders. 
Even Bhagwat Jha Azad former [Congress] Chief Minister of Bihar and also former 
MP from this area was accused of patronizing Muslim goondas who had helped Azad 
in wining the elections. A gangster, Ansari happened to be the leader of the Muslim 
goondas. Political dimension of this could not be denied. Surya India of December, 
1989 reported that, in Bihar politicians and criminals were the two sides of a coin. 
During the elections the criminals were hired by the politicians and in return they 
fetch them power by capturing booths. In between elections they are both busy 
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looting. Politicians robed the Government in the name of serving the poor and 
criminals robed the rich, the middle class and the Government through their 
Government contracts.320 
On October 26, at least 11 Muslims were killed in the Brahmin dominated 
Parandarpur village. The same day, 18 Muslims including 11 children were killed in 
full public view, in the Nayabazar area of Bhagalpur. Around 44 Muslims, including 
19 children, were provided refuge by some local Hindus in the Jamuna Kothi 
building. At 11:30 am, a 70strong mob entered the Jamuna Kothi with swords, axes, 
hammers and lathis. Within 10 minutes, 18 Muslims were killed. Some of the 
children were beheaded, some had their limbs cut off while the others were thrown 
off the third floor. Violences were so horrified that a woman named Bunni Begum 
had her breasts chopped off. Some other Muslims who had been provided refuge by 
the Hindus in the neighbouring buildings, managed to survive. In Assanandpur, 
Muslims also escorted several hostel resident Hindu students to safety. According to 
the official records loss of lives was 396 but unofficial estimates are reported to be 
thousand. The police pointed out that due to the indifference of State Government 
communalism has been growing in the state and as a result communal riots occurred 
frequently.321 
The typical development of the riots can be clearly illustrated in light of what 
occurred at Bhagalpur which was most violent and horrible riot took toll of 1000 
people dead out of which 900 were Muslims.322 In October, 1989, the V.H.P. 
organized a Ramshila Pujan procession which was to pass through the rural parts of 
Bhagalpur for a period of five days before the converging on 24 October in the town. 
On that day the procession initially comprising the number of processionists upto 
1000 to 3000 persons,323 but after a some kilometres it swelled upto 10000, shouting 
provocative slogans like ‘Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan, Mullah bhago Pakistan’ (Hindi, 
Hindu for India; Muslim clerics must flee to Pakistan). Procession was stopped by  
300 Muslims at Tatarpur, as this rout was not sanctioned by official license issued to 
the procession. The Processionists, comprised the members of V.H.P., B.J.P. and 
R.S.S., started shouting slogans such as ‘Long live Mother Kali’ (a Hindu Goddess), 
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‘Tatarpur will be empty’ and ‘We will avenge the insult inflicted by Babur on her 
children.’324 
After the terrible riots in Bhagalpur in 1989, Vishwa Pratap Singh visited the 
riot affected areas in connection with Parliament elections. But people of Bhagalpur 
were surprised because V. P. Singh did not react publicly against the Bhagalpur 
riots.325 
Criminal activities in on such a large scale that once in a report on Bihar by 
Trevor Fishlock in The Times of London during the early 1970s, commented, ‘Bihar 
is a dirty drain’326 but  Bhagalpur riot was so devastating that Bihar had become a 
grave-yard of India. Some say that the 1989 riots in Bhagalpur occur due to the 
communal politics of Vishwa Hindu Parishad, though the V.H.P. denied of having 
any hand in the riot. According to V.H.P. sources it was criminal factors that were 
responsible for the riots and criminal services were utilized by the politicians during 
the Parliamentry elections.327 Communal tension eased gradually due to the 
forthcoming Parliamentary Elections of 1989.328 
A meeting was held at Imarat-e-Sharia at Patna on 1st November, 1989, 
presided over by Maulvi Minatullah Rahmani (1912-91). Almost all important 
personalities of minority community were present there. At this meeting, the Muslim 
leaders came in for sharp criticism for not resigning from office in the wake of the 
massacre of the minorities in Bhagalpur. As a follow up action another meeting of the 
Muslim Ministers and agitators, was called by Hidayatullah Khan, the then Speaker of 
the Bihar Legislative Assembly, at his residence on 2nd October, 1989. In this meeting 
the Muslim Ministers said that in spite of their repeated request the government and 
administration failed to check the communal frenzy effectively. Therefore it was not 
sensible decision to hold the office any long by the Muslim leaders and legislators.329 
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Thus Deputy Minister asked Chief Minister to postpone the Parliamentary Elections 
but Chief Minister was opined that if the elections were postponed in Bhagalpur then 
communal flame engulfed the whole state.330 
Although the Chief Minister refused to postpone the Parliamentary election in 
Bhagalpur, however, in such tensed circumstances Bihar Ministry took bold step by 
banning religious processions. Unfortunately their effort was proved a failure. On 6th 
November, 1989, when Rajiv Gandhi, the then Chief Minister, was addressing the 
public rally at Muzaffarpur, he was informed that Sasaram engulfed into the riots331 
and administration had imposed curfew and there was Flag Marching of the B.S.F. in 
Dehrion-Sone, close to Sasaram. Riot broke out because Ram Shila Pujan procession 
was taken out inpite of restriction on procession by the Bihar state Government.332 
The Prime Minister asked Bihar government to ban all religious processions, 
particularly in 12 riot-prone districts- Bhagalpur, Chaibasa, Gumla, Gaya, 
Hazaribagh, Purnea, Muzaffarpur, East Champaran, Darbhanga, Aurangabad, 
Nalanda and Rohtas.333 But even after the communal violence, as many as 60 people 
lost their lives, Mr. Satyendra Sinha, the then Chief Minister, maintained that banning 
the procession was not possible at that stage due to technical reasons.334 
Result of Bhagalpur riot was an unprecedented carnage. Thirty bodies were 
recovered from a well. Decomposed bodies were strewn all over the town and the 
                                               
330 Jha, Bihar: Criminalization of Politics, p. 220 
331 The Sasaram riots were not sudden occurrence, communal tension was building up in Sasaram since 
August, 1989. Prior to 19th August, 1989 Sasaram was quite free from communal tension except caste 
and class war and killigs, like in Pupri there was inhuman atrocities in 1978; see, Narayan, “The Pupri 
Killings”, pp. 1580-1581.; The genesis of the riot on 19 August, 1989 was age-old ‘mahaviri 
Jhanda’issue. There was an old Idgah  to the south of the Sher Shah Tomb and adjacent to Idgah there 
was field used as wrestling centr by both (Hindus and Muslim) communities for wrestling, which 
became a bone of contention when a ‘Mahaviri Jhanda’ was planted by some Hindus thus Muslims 
vehemently objected to this act of Hindus and this issue was brought to the district administration by 
the Muslims and claimed that the land belonged to the both communities. Thus district administration 
called a meeting of Peace Committee, comprising members of both communities. On the assurance of 
District administration that they would release the wrestling centre Muslims decided to participate in 
Muharram and Muharram was passed off without any disturbance. Howevere, after Muharram the 
situation was communally charge, when district administration denied Muslims to visit the mosque 
adjacent to the Tara Chandi Temple in August 17th, 1989 on Rakshabandhan (a Hindu festival ). Thus 
already agitated Muslims became more agitated and communally charged atmosphere required to ignite 
the riots and this spark was provided by a minor incident, when two vehicles accidently dashed against 
each other and the owners of the vehicles were of two communities. This led to the skirmishes between 
two communities that turned into riots which engulfed Sasaram., see, Jha, Bihar: Criminalization of 
Politics, p. 220; also see, Recalling Bhagalpur: A Report on the Aftermath of the 1989 Riots, People’s 
Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi, February, 1996, p. 1. 
332 Jha, Bihar: Criminalization of Politics, p. 220. 
333 The Times of India, 28 October, 1989, p. 1. 
334 Indu Bharti, “Bhagalpur Riots and Bihar Government”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXIV, 
No. 48, December 2, 1989, p. 2643. 
 208
countryside, their stench pervading the entire area. What the police did this time was 
far worst. They even did not lift their finger to protect the honor and properties of the 
citizens, their life, but in fact they clouded with the killers, the rapists, the looters and 
the arsonists.335 BMP, the general police and the Home Guard played dubious role 
and they joined the marauders instead of providing protection to the panicky families 
moving to the safer places.336 
The BMP personnel actively encouraged the rioters and they themselves were 
busy in attacking and killing the Muslims. Approximately 150 Muslims were rescued 
from Chanderi village by the army and handed over to the BMP in a protection were 
also killed. Despite president demands, including, Azmat Husain, a minister in the 
state government, BMP units were not removed from the riot affected areas. For thee 
days it was the BMP, well known for its communal bias against the minority 
community and held responsible for the may riots in Hazaribagh even by the ministers 
of the state government which was in command in the worst affected districts of 
Bhagalpur.337 
At places entire families of minority community were burnt alive in their 
houses which were set to fire in the dead of night. Rehmanpur, Mansuragnj, 
Nathnagar, Champanagar, Nayabazar, Sahebganj, Parbatti, shaqchak and Jogsar 
localities have been devastated beyond recognition. Villages like Chanderi and 
Sandehri were entirely wiped out.338 
The extent and nature of Bhagalpir riots, in 1989, that it continued from 
October 22, 1989 to January 15, 1990 affecting almost the entire town and 
approximately 250 villages around, in which 960 persons were killed339 out of whom 
93% were Muslims.340 
The Congress, still struggling to reclaim its Muslim vote bank in Bihar, is 
faced with the embarrassment ahead of coming Assembly polls with former Chief 
Minister Satyendra Narain Sinha accusing his predecessor as also a former Assembly 
speaker of having “fanned” communal riots in Bhagalpur in 1989 which left over 
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1000 people, mostly Muslims, dead. Satyendra Narain Sinha, was the Chief Minister 
at the time of Bhagalpur riots, wrote in his autobiography Meri Yaadein, Meri 
bhoolein (My Memories, My Mistakes) that, the Bhagalpur communal riots were an 
unpleasant chapter of his life and of his tenure as Chief Minister. Because of personal 
jealousy and ill will, some of his political colleagues fanned these riots. He also 
reveals that, though, some of the politicians were present at Bhagalpur during the 
riots341 instead of bringing them under control, they added fuel to the fire names of 
Bhagwat Jha Azad, then the Chief Minister and former speaker Shivchandra Jha were 
worth mentioning in this regard. Nikhil Kumar (son of Satyendra Narayan Sinha), a 
former Delhi Police Commissioner, a Congress MP from Aurangabad, alleged the 
then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi overruled his order to transfer the Police 
Superintendent of Bhagalpur K. S. Dwivedi that was not only an encroachment of the 
Constitutional right of the state government but also a step detrimental to ongoing 
efforts to ease tensions.342 
Administration failed in preventing the riots. Though the administration 
sensed of the strained relations of the two communities, they allowed taking 
procession through a Muslim locality besides it was opposed by the Muslims.343 This 
act of administration sensed us that riots were pre planned. Police played dubious role 
during riots. They were merely acted like a member of their religion and community 
and were involved in looting and atrocities on Muslims with the rioters and goonda 
elements. Police shows communal bias and beaten and killed the Muslims. There 
were several such cases for example in case of Bibi Shahjahen Khatoo (an eye-
witness) of Bhikanpur (T)344, Police Station Mojahidpur, and police behaviour 
extremely brutal345, as she stated: 
The gang consisted by police came to my house and broken 
the door. He struck the door where we shifted the room. 
My husband shut the door and police drag out and beaten 
bitterly. One Officer told that ‘Saale ko goli mar do.’ 
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Continued they beaten my husband then I opposed him. He 
also beat me by kunda. I fell then down. Five minutes latter 
heared firing then I fully determined they killed my 
husband. In my mohalla police beaten many people 
[Muslims]. I knew that policemen killed my husband and 
also killed electric Mistry Nayeem. This is the false 
allegation that Muslim attack on police…. No 
compensation received because police would have been 
affected.346 
Many other eye-witnesses like Banarasi Das Gupta (Noorpur), Malika Begum 
(Chanderi), Md. Qasim (Mojahidpur), Md. Khatibur Rahman (Bankipur), Shekh 
Usman (Pirpanthi Bazar), Shekh Ibrahim (Pirpanthi), Md. Bashiruddin (Kajra) etc. in 
their statements accused Police for their brutalities on Muslims.347 One witness Bibi 
Sakina of Logain village (Jagdishpur Police Station) stated that, “Ram Chandra Singh 
came with a mob and told- ek bhi Musalman ko zindz nahin rehne dena hai taki koyi 
gavahi nahin rehne paye.”348 
 The riots at Logain were extremely horrific that those who had migrated from 
Logain, after the massacre, never mustered courage to return, even though strangers 
had usurped their lands.349 
In all 811 FIRs had been filed after the riots. The Police filed 302 
chargesheets, and the lower courts have disposed of 152 cases, acquitting the accused 
in 119 cases. In the remaining 33 cases, the District Session Court punished many 
with life imprisonment.350  
The state government gave compensation of 1 lakh each to the families of 634 
victims. Some also got 10,000 from Prime Minister Relief Fund. The administration 
rejected 169 pleas for compensation though the Session Court had directed the district 
administration to pay compensation in some of these cases.351 
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Most accused got bail while others are persuading the appellants to withdraw 
their cases. All the accused involved in Chanderi were released on bail. The hearing 
in these cases is yet to begin.352 
The inquiry commission should have taken serious note of that example 
because Bhagalpur riot was the most horrible riot which affected most the rural 
people. Although Indira Gandhi’s visit to Biharsharif had stopped the violence but 
violence rather stepped up and 19 Muslims were done to death, while her son was 
present in Bhagalpur and for a month after his visit there was a massacre.353 
The commission also failed to note that in Bhagalpur, the then Chief Minister, 
Satyendra Narain Sinha, reached in a closed car and remained in it with napkin 
stuffed in his nose. His ineptitude encouraged the rioters.354 
Communal organizations of Hindus have had not only extended influence 
over common Hindus but also on police personnel and district level administration. 
Most crucial aspect was that Muslim intelligentsia came to believe that civil as well 
as police officers betray the VHP mentality when dealing with Muslims.355 Former 
Chief Minister, Bhagawat Jha Azad, and former Speaker, Shiv Chander Jha, have 
been held largely responsible for the Bhagalpur tragedy. The then Chief Secretary A. 
U. Sharma had recommended transfer of the then D.M., Arun Jha. and S. K. Dwivedi, 
the then S.P., but the Chief Minister stopped it under pressure from Bhagwat Jha 
Azad.356 
The Muslims in Bihar had traditionally served as a Congress (I) vote bank, but 
after the 1989 violence, they drifted their loyalty to Lalu Prasad Yadav, who became 
the Chief Minister of the state in 1990.357 However, the subsequent governments were 
also accused of not meting out the justice. The survivors accused Lalu Prasad Yadav 
of not punishing the rioters because many of them belonged to his own caste. Later 
half of the Laloo-Rabri regime had became a replica of ‘jungle raj’358 but Jagannat 
Mishra’s or of the Congress rule was also not less than ‘junglr raj’.359 
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On 12 May 2005, a Bhagalpur court sentenced 10 people to life imprisonment 
on May 12 for the murder of five Muslims in Kamarganj village of the district in the 
riots.360 
When Nitish Kumar became the Chief Minister in November 2005, he set up a 
conference on ‘Rule of Law in Bihar’ and pleaded for speedy trials. Since too many 
criminals were getting off because of loose investigation by the police, too many were 
beneficiaries of loopholes in the law and too many were patronized by the leaders. 
Thus two officers were brought in- Abhayanand an IPS officer, and Afzal Amanullah 
an IAS officer. As result of this initiation of Nitish Kumar, notorious bahubalis of 
Bihar, criminal-politicians were sentenced life imprisonment. This also led to the 
retrial of Kameshwar Yadav361, who had led manslaughter against the Muslims in 
1989 Bhagalpur riots,362 had earlier been acquitted and given a citation by the state 
police for maintaining communal harmony, was convicted for killing of Mohammad 
Qayyum and was put behind the bars.363 In 2007, 14 more people were convicted for 
their role in the Logain massacre.364 A number of victims were compensated in 2012 
by the State Government.365  
Sitamarhi Riot, October, 1992 
Sitamarhi (a subdivisional headquarters of Muzaffarpur district till 1972, and 
subsequently district headquarters of Sitamarhi) had a Muslim population of about 
30%, according to the 1981 census. According to 1991 census population of district 
was 22 lakh which comprised 8.50 lakh Muslims out of which 4 lakh were lived in the 
rural areas of Sitamarhi district. There were 15% muslims in the district out of which 
only 8% Muslims were economically in better condition and majority of the Muslims 
were rikshawpuller, vegetables vendors and labourers. Rate of literacy was 20% of 
total population, 40% population was agriculturists and 48% population was 
unemployed. All the economic transaction of the town was controlled by the upper 
                                               
360 “Tedious road to justice” in India Today, 30 May 2005, 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/1989bhagalpurriotcaseverdictinvitesrecriminationsaboutdelayedjustic
e/1/193563.html, accessed on 30th December, 2014. 
361 In 1985, Kameshwar Yadav also grabbed land to install an idol of Durga in Parbatti, thus 
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caste Hindus.366 Sitamarhi had a long history of riots, i.e. since 1895. In 1948 a 
communal violence brokeout in Belsand, then in April 17, 1959, over the Mahabiri 
Jahnda procession in which 50 persons were killed, mostly were the Muslims. Agan 
on 13th October, 1967 riot ignited in Sursand took 40 lives and 400 houses were 
burnt.367 This riot occurred over the language issue. However riots kept taking place 
sporadically like in 1968 in Revasia, in 1969 at Pupri and again riots brokeout in 
Sitamarhi in 1989.368 
Riots broke out on 6th October, 1992369 in and around Sitamarhi due to the 
tension created by Durga pooja procession. Sitamarhi has a history of riots and a 
number of riots have taken place in this small town. In 1948 a riot occurred there in 
Belsand and was followed by riot on 17 April, 1959 over the issue of Mahaviri Jhanda 
(flag). This riot occurred on large scale in which 50 people were killed. Most of the 
killed people in riots were Muslims. Again a riot took place over the issue of cow 
slaughter. There was a false rumour that a cow has been slaughtered by the Muslims. 
But later the said cow was discovered at Jankyosthan (Janki Asthan). In 1959 another 
riot took place here and the issue was also of cow slaughter, at place called Balminiya 
Akhta and this riot about 11 people were killed and 200 houses were turned to the 
ashes.370 Most of the killed people were Muslims. Riot broke out in 1967 in Sitamarhi 
along with Ranchi over the issue of Hindi-Urdu controversy. There was a coalition 
Government in Bihar at that time. The riot which took at Sursand claimed about 50 
lives and 400 houses. Mostly, Muslims were affected. Again in 1969 riot erupted at 
Revasia and Pupri.371 
Laloo Prasad Yadav, the then Chief Minister of Bihar, assured the country that 
there would be no communal riots in Bihar as long as he was in command. That is 
total irony because circumstances of that time were not so lucid, there was thorough 
communalization of social and political life in India and even a Chief Minister can not 
prevent the riots alone. He needs the cooperation of entire administrative, police and 
                                               
366 Sajjad, Contesting Colonialism…, p. 163. 
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intelligence machinery to prevent or effectively control riots in time.372 As Mr. M. M. 
Jacob blamed the Government agencies for the riot and said that because of lack of 
co-ordination between intelligence agencies, the local administration and the state 
government led to the recent communal riots in Sitamarhi.373 The economic 
dimension of this riot was that in Riga (a village in Sitamarhi), a section of local 
Muslims of this region, revolutionaries their economic condition by producing fiddle 
and biris.374 Better economic condition made them autonomous and made them able 
to break off with the feudal agrarian set up.375 They sold bidi and fiddle regularly in 
wholesale market in neighboring Nepal. Some of them had even taken to the 
profession of tailoring.376 With the assistance of nationalized Banks and economic 
institutions has made them (Muslims) autonomous and prompted them to break off 
with the feudal agrarian set-up.377 However, Riga riots had strong economic roots, 
ignited by break from feudal set-up.378  
Simultaneously it spread to Riga, a nearby village on 8th October, 1992379, 
Mariam, the fiddle seller, was an old lady, while she was at the tailoring shop of her 
son when marauders struck and pulled down the shop. They also burnt the nearby 
houses and start chasing the villagers. Anyhow, the villagers took shelter in cane 
fields and undergrowth. Later crowd throw the old lady into the leaped flames and her 
son Siraju watched this dreadful act of frenzied mob helplessly from a cane field 
where he took refuge.380 Mob started arson and looting in the villages and their main 
target was rich village mukhiya (headman) Illyas, who acquired money by selling 
flutes and fiddles and other musical instruments in Nepal and Bihar. In fact he 
organized village Muslims and training them in fiddle and other instrument 
manufacturing.381 
The same incidents had happened in Ganeshpur and Kusmpur Bakri villages 
where marauders indulged in brutal killing and destroy the property of lakhs of 
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rupees. Six people were killed including a six year old girl.382 This shows that the 
genesis of these communal occurrences in the rural areas lies in the agrarian 
imbalances existing in Bihar. Religion has nothing to do with this round of riots.383 
This suggests us that the rural areas were already incensed with anger, 
intolerance and frustration which emanated from the economic backwardness of the 
region.384 
When riots started in Sitamarhi city on 6th October, 1992, it only served to 
ignite the tinderbox in rural areas where the killing took place in large numbers. 
Rumors spread like wildfire about the breaking of idols of Durga, people were 
mobilized in the name of religion to take revenge. The administration reacted with 
characteristic delay, giving rioters enough time to continue an orgy of violence 
against the helpless people.385 
There was a marked difference in the pattern of violence and arson in rural 
areas and that in urban areas. While the trouble started initially from the city and 
subsided within 12 hours, it took almost three days to contain violence in rural areas. 
In urban areas, the casualty figure shows that numbers of both the communities 
indulged in violence and attacked one another ferociously. In riots in rural areas only 
Muslims bore the burnt of mobs frenzy.386 
Bihar had produced several secular Chief Ministers but no one could match 
the efforts so far as nipping in the bud the design of the communal forces is 
concerned. During the Patna city riots he literally took to the streets and worked day 
in and day out to ensure confidence in the minds of the Muslims. He visited almost all 
the nooks and corners of the walled city area of Patna and the riots stopped within 
hours. 
By the time communal riots hit Sitamarhi town on the border with Nepal in 
October, 1992. Mr. Yadav was much matured politician and had learnt the ropes. He 
was now well aware of the role some of the bureaucrats and police officials play in 
fomenting the riots. 
The surprising aspect is that he landed in Sitamarhi from a helicopter minutes 
after the first shot was fired. The district officials were completely stumped by the 
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alacrity with which he acted as they had till then not even informed him in Patna. He 
flew to that place on the information from a private source and continued to visit it for 
ten continuous days. He pulled up the district officials no end for not preventing the 
riots from occurring. In one of the localities he even slapped a policeman for 
dereliction of duties. He visited all the affected villages to calm the atmosphere and 
warned his party-men and own caste men, Yadvas, feom being carried away by the 
emotion. 
This was in total contrast with the response of those former Chief Ministers 
who were known for the secular credentials not to speak of others. When the steel city 
of Jamshedpur was rocked by communal riots in April 1979, the state was ruled by 
Mr. Karpoori thakur (1924-88), an ardent crusader of secularism. He went to that 
place to quell the riots but did not succeed. In fact more than 120 Muslims going to 
the refugee camp on a bus were burnt alive by the rioters when he was, physically 
present, in that very city. The “secular” Chief Minister appeared helpless. 
A. K. Biswas387 later on, in one of his essays, retrospectively argued that 
“communal violence rarely erupts without a warning or foreshadow which, if 
overlooked or ignored, can cause misfortune to the people of the district without fail. 
In such cases the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police are caught 
offguard. Intelligence inputs, if at all, are either vague or inadequate or nebulous to 
pre-empt the erruption of violence.”388 
When the procession carrying idols of the deity Durga for immersion at 
Lakhandei river was diverted from the route under pressure from some political 
bigwigs including a Union Minister of State belonging to the district. This ignited the 
communal disturbances. The presence of the DM and SP on the spot could have 
prevented the riots but the saddest part of the Sitamarhi riot (1992) was that the when 
the riot broke out the DM and the SP fled from the scene leaving the emerging 
situation to their junior officers who were not capable in preventing the riots 
successfully.389 
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Conclusion 
Caste and communal politics are distinguished from each other though at 
certain times caste does take on communal overtones. By the l960s the industrial 
infrastructure (backed by the Green Revolution) was created that was also favourable 
to the upper classes and also there were atrocities against the Harijans and the OBCs. 
STs., etc, and administration was failed to fulfill their promises made to the lower 
class, thus there was breakdown of administration.390 Though the RSS, Shiv Sena, and 
Jamaat-i-Islami, such organizations declared that they have nothing to do with politics 
but they go on spreading their tentacles, thus there was change in political scene that 
the indirect and masked use of communalism and communal appeals in politics was 
moved to more open and blatant calculation and appeal on communal lines. 
Political parties with communal leaning played dangerous roles in taking 
advantages of situations and in fabricating the communal riots in this context we see 
that the proposal of communist party for the creation of a Special Riot Force, as there 
was communal elements in the services391, was opposed by Bhartiya Janata Party 
(BJP), reason was the ongoing communal carnage in the various parts of the country 
in which manslaughter had not been spared because that had direct link with the 
atmosphere of hatred, created by the vicious communal propaganda by the BJP and its 
allies VHP, Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena.392 
And the unfortunate aspect is that over more than last sixty years the rioters 
had focused their communal attacks on the economic life of the Muslims as they had 
been able to establish themselves in traditional crafts. According to the economic 
historian Amiya Bagchi393, the predatory commercialization created such an 
atmosphere in which communal riots had uprooted a large number of Muslims from 
even the marginalized livelihood that sustains them. Thus, the flourished power-loom 
sector of Muslims were severely undermined in Bhiwandi riots (1970), in Jabalpur 
their bidi industry was destroyed, in Moradabad riots (1980) undermined their brass-
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based crafts, in the Aligarh riot (1978) Muslim importance in the lock-making 
industry was badly affected, in the Meerut riot (1987) Muslim’s livelihood from 
weaving and brassware were destroyed and Muslim weavers were affected in the 
Bhagalpur riots (1989).394 
Anirban Mitra and Debraj (2014) also suggested that all around the world 
there is an economic component to Hindu-Muslim riots. They also asserted that the 
Hindu group have largely been the aggressors in Hindu-Muslim violence and also that 
the Hindu-Muslim violence is often driven by instrumental, specifically economic 
considerations. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study analysed the causes and pattern and administrative handling of the 
riots and criminal justice in Bihar during 1946-92. Thus the colonial and post 
independence eras came into the ambit of this study. This study also focused on the 
role of anti-social elements, religious and political leaders, and the role of the political 
and other organizations in those communal disturbances. In the Indian milieu, 
communal philosophy has been perceived as reflecting an entire range of beliefs and 
sets of ideas. In Indian context, politics based on those beliefs, communalism 
identifies the socio-economic and political interests of an individual or a group on the 
basis of its association with a particular community. In Bihar, different stratum of 
castes, communities, administrative and patronage networks have had played crucial 
roles in communalizing the social spaces and in nurturing the communal violence. 
Administrative dishonesty/partisanship and failure of criminal justice system have 
been the reasons that invariably led to the recurrence of riots with impunity and 
fearlessness.  
Most of the riots broke out in the towns and villages where the Muslims were 
economically well off as Anirban Mitra and Debraj1 demonstrates that the Hindu 
group have largely been the aggressors in Hindu-Muslim violence and also that the 
Hindu-Muslim violence driven by instrumental, specifically economic considerations.  
This study also elaborated that a number of the riots broke out on the occasion 
of the religious festivals of the Hindus, when Muslims prevented the processions from 
passing through Muslim locality or halting before mosque. Through whatever routes 
the processions passed, these must pass without any halt and peacefully. Jai Durga, 
Jai Ma Kali and other slogans can be tolerable but divisive, incendiary and 
provocative slogans like ‘Hindu, Hindi, Hindutan Mulla bhago Pakistan’, ‘Muslman 
jao Pakistan Ya kabristan’, ‘Hindustan me rehna hai to Vande Mataram kehna hoga’, 
‘Hindustan Hinduon ka, Nahin kisi ke baap ka’, ‘Saugandh Ram ki khate hain hum 
Mandir wahin banayenge’, ‘Bachcha-bachcha Ram ka Janamabhoomi ke kaam ka’, 
‘jis Hindu ka ka hkoon na khaule, khoon nahi vo pani hai; Janamabhoomi ke kaam na 
aye, vo bekar jawanee hai’, ‘Abhi to ye jhanki hai Mathura Kashi baki hai’ these 
provocative slogans show their deliberate designs in instigation of riots. Though 
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initiation fell on part of Muslims but they were enraged by the either community. In 
these, nuisance situation both communities (Hindu-Muslim) were befooled by the 
communally conscious groups and politicians. Halting the religious processions 
before mosques, shouting provocative slogans, and sudden hurling of stones, brick-
bats and of bombs on such processions, insufficient police forces, inadequate action of 
the security forces, and at times partisan roles of the state agencies, etc., all these 
show that the riots were pre-planned and well organized. Because if the riots were 
only goons’ activities, then a question would arise as to from where did they get 
enough money for bombs, missiles (it is mentioned in Raghubar Dayal Committee 
Report on Bhagalpur riots of 1989, that besides guns, even missiles were also used by 
the rioters), guns, etc. Mobilization of such weapons needs huge financial aid and 
adequate support (unscrupulous) from the state agencies. 
By 1930s and 1940s, the relation between the Hindus and the Muslims was 
communally polarized over various issues such as, the Hindi-Urdu controversy, singin 
vande mataram (which was objectionable for the Muslims thus the Muslim League 
demanded vande mataram as national anthem must be dropped and Urdu should be 
adopted as national language2, League’s demand for Pakistan etc., and with the call 
for the ‘Direct Action Day’ on 16 August 1946 riots broke out in Noakhli which 
spread to the many parts of the country. Communal tensions and riot between the 
1946 and 1947 led to the partition of the country. During 1950s riots were very fewer. 
Muslims who choose to stay in India left leadless thus they supporte the Congress. 
The Congress ruled the country unchallenged till the beginning of the 1960s, 
By mid 1960s there was chaotic situation in political arena of India in general 
and Bihar in particular. There was transfer of [political] power from the Congress to 
other new emerging parties, comprising upper OBCs, other lower section of the 
society and other emerging parties which used the sensitive issues, viz., atrocities 
against Harijans, quota policy, mandir-masjid issue etc., as a ladder to rise to the 
power. In all these, anti-social elements played very crucial role in engineering and 
escalating the disturbances. Anti-social elements were patronized by the politicians 
and capitalists (trading communities) of the society. Thus there was linkage between 
the political leaders and anti-social elements. They do not generally act on their own; 
rather they act at the behest of their political and religious leaders. In Bhagalpur riots 
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(1989) this study saw that Sallan group (a criminal group) was patronised by Bhagwat 
Jha Azad and Ansari group (also a criminal group) was patronised by Shiv Chandra 
Jha, both former chief ministers of Bihar affiliated to the Congress Party. 
Most of the enquiry reports into post-partition communal riots in India 
exposed that the Union or provincial governments have instigated the police for its 
anti-Muslim communal bias since independence. The prejudice reflect itself in their 
aggressive treatment against the minority and shielding of the aggressors belonging to 
the majoritarian communal organizations through the altering or scotching of 
evidence so that the guilty went scot free. 
The British ruled India by their ‘divide and rule’ policy as Monstuart 
Elphinstone in his minute of 14th May, 1859 stated that, “Divide et impera was the old 
Roman motto, and it should be ours”, thus it is clear from Elphinstone’s minute that 
British Government adopted the policy of Divide and rule by switching their favours 
from Hindus to Muslims and from Muslims to Hindus3 and they passed many Acts, 
such as Act of 1909, Act of 1919, Communal Award(1932), Act of 1935 etc., on 
communal lines.  The same policy had been adopted in India by those who wanted to 
accumulate the economic and political power in their hands. In these they got foreign 
assistance (aid). Rioters are basically the agents of capitalists and feudalist groups.  
Incidences of communal riots can not be checked   until stern action would be 
taken by the state apparatuses. The ruling Congress, despite its theoretical 
commitment to the idea of pluralism, secularism, and protection to vulnerable 
minorities, was not effective in handling the riots. During four decades of its   rule, of 
the Congress, a number of communal riots took place in Congress ruled states, e.g., in 
Maharashtra, in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and in Bihar. Many of these were horrible in 
terms of the loss of lives and properties. If Congress, or that matter any other political 
party would truly be concerned about this specifically recurrent problem, many riots 
could have been prevented quite effectively. 
These riots also made it clear that if small-scale riots would not turn into large-
scale and into horrifying riots, possibly it would not have benefited the politicians or 
the elitist groups like the trading communities. Because most of the time the 
politicians and the elitist groups were found to have fabricated the riots. Even they use 
minor issues to ignite the riots, e.g., cow slaughter, music before mosques, taking out 
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processions from specific routes, language (Hindi-Urdu conflicts) issues, economic 
issues, etc. Though these problems would be tackled by the ruling and leading class 
efficiently but they used these issues to ignite the riots in order to accumulate 
economic and political power in their hands. Involvement of these groups turned into 
horrible riots like in the Jamshedpur riots (1979), Biharsharif riots (1981), Bhagalpur 
riots (1989), Sitamarhi riots (1992), etc. 
Justice Raghubar Dayal agreed in his inquiry report, on riots in Sursand, 
Sitamarhi subdivision (Muzaffarpur district, October 13-15, 1967, that such violence 
was largely ignited by the political parties.  
There was feeling of distrust among both communities also might be 
responsible for riots. After partition, Muslims who choose to stay in India were being 
suspected by the majority community (Hindus) anassumed as the pro-Pakistanis4 thus 
there was feeling of distrust between the two communities and this feeling of distrust 
was used by the political parties and communal organizations taking advantage in 
fanning the flame of communalism that resulted in riots. 
These parties often use communal feelings and riots to gain vote bank of the 
communities. For example, on 14th July 1967 a non-official Bill was moved in the 
Bihar Legislative Assembly by a Congress member, Nasiruddin Hyder Khan for 
making Urdu second official language of the state. In reaction to this private member 
bill, violent anti-Urdu procession came out in the streets. The Ranchi incidents started 
when stones were allegedly thrown at this procession near a cinema hall and 
communal riot broke out which continued over nearly a week and took a heavy toll of 
life. Here we can see how politician in fact administration played with emotional 
attachments of Muslim with Urdu. Although the demands for recognition of Urdu as 
second official language going through various organizations and movements 
launched in the 1960s and 1970s in U.P. and Bihar. But it was only in 1980s Urdu 
was granted the status of second official language (by ordinances, rather than formal 
legislation) for official purposes in 15 districts of Bihar and in Western districts of 
U.P., but the U.P. ordinances later lapsed.5 
This study finds that these groups also used religious procession and symbols 
for propagating and spreading their suffocated outlooks. Either communal 
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organization should be banned or the leaders of these organizations should express 
their views very carefully. Almost all inquiry committee reports accused Hindu-
Muslim communal organizations. 
The District Magistrates/ Collectors and the Superintendent of Police are 
expected to be always in mode of readiness to combat with the riots. But during the 
riots quite often, few of them showed their communal bias such as during the 
Bhagalpur Riot of October 1989. K. S. Dwivedi, the Superintendent of Police accused 
of being anti-Muslim, was asked by the chief minister to hand over the charge to Ajit 
Datt on the same day. However, during a tour of the riot affected area, the Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi overruled the transfer of Dwivedi.6 
It has been observed that, even after being informed, quite often the police 
reached with considerable delay the areas where minorities were attacked. What we 
see in case of the Jamshedpur riots (April 11, 1979) that after twelve hours of 
violence, administration was able to arrange for vehicles to pick up Muslims 
surrounded in the school and the mosque in Bhalubasa. Though police shows 
communal bias during riots, often it has been noted that police often act under the 
pressure of influential, power-wielding politicians. It is irony as to t why do police act 
under pressure of the politicians. Possibly, they act according to the whims of the 
politicians either in greed of handsome bribes or in compulsion of being suspended or 
transferred. It is a bitter truth that the police was itself in the grip of communal bias. 
It has been also observed that most of the time victims accused police that they 
did not allow filing/registering of the reports of the witnesses whatever they told.  
Contents of the charge-sheet were in sheer contrast to the reports filed by the victims 
and witnesses. Instead of protecting them, police beaten them up bitterly.7 
The Press played both positive and negative roles. The national newspapers to 
an extent played neutral role. Vernacular press played crucial role by using overtones. 
Here we see how economy ride on communalism. In news reporting and articles, 
more sensational news means more growth in distribution of news paper and 
magazine. Means readers and buyers were attracted by their sensational news. 
Even telecast of some serials (soap operas) on the television also impacted 
upon the people’s mind communaly. By late 1990s telecast of Mahabharata and 
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Ramayana and serial Tamas also aroused communal atmosphere in the country and in 
Bihar in general. In this serial it was shown that a dead swine was thrown in front of a 
mosque and a cow was chased by a Muslim lad. A Muslim boy was killed by a Hindu 
boy who was portrayed in RSS uniform, khaki short pant all these arouse communal 
feeling during it’s telecast days. Anyhow it was demanded to be banned in Bihar in 
1988 by Satanarayan Dudani.8 Communally prejudiced news papers played decisive 
role in igniting the riots but police did not take action against those papers. Though 
there was report against some news papers, no action were taken. 
Police and administration never (perhaps) took stern action against the 
communal marauders like the RSS, Shiv Sainiks though it has been proved that they 
were real guilty of all heinous communal occurrences. Wherever RSS and Shiv Sena 
were involved, police seems to believe that the Muslims were the culprits. Police and 
administration were aware that RSS leaders were involved but they were unwilling to 
arrest and take action against them. 
This game of communal provocation and riots were not one sided, many 
Muslim bodies were equally involved in communalizing the people’s mind. Although 
Muslims were left leadless in India due to the exodus of Muslims (leading class) to 
Pakistan, the new emerging Muslim elite class, subsequently came to be dominated in 
substantial measure by conservative ‘Mullahs’ and ‘Ulema’ as the custodian of the 
Muslims’ interests. The ‘Jamaat-e-Islami’ and the ‘Tablighi Jamaat’ opposed the 
Muslims’ participation in democratic politics.9 
During the riots lawlessness spread everywhere; one may call it goondaraj, 
virtually a criminal takeover of the state. Situations were so worse that even police 
either behaved like goondas or seemed to have got scared of goondas. They got scared 
that if they take action against them they might be attacked by them. What we saw 
during the Biharsharif riots (1981), that in many villages the village police, e.g., the 
dafadars and the cahukidars (watchman) of the villages helped the rioters in 
identifying the houses along the lines of religious identities’. For instance, the victims 
of Biharsharif riot (1981) accused Rajkishor and Pannalal (the RSS activists) 
responsible for the riots. In Bhagalpur riots (1989) mob of the rioters were openly led 
by the police. 
                                               
8 Bihar Legislative Assembly Debates, Patna, Part 8, No. 8, 19 January, 1988, p. 19. 
9 Subhash Shukla, “Communalism in Indian Politics since Independence” in Vatsala Shukla (ed.), 
Communalism in India: Reach, Ruse and Remedy, Hope India, Gurgaon, 2008, p. 230. 
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The most deplorable aspect of these incidents (Biharsharif riots, 1981) is that, 
during the riots police did not took any stern action against the rioters. Firing was out 
of question. Not even Chief Minister or any Minister visited the riot affected area. 
Then Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India declared to visit these riot 
affected areas. Even relief camps for the riot victims were also not efficient and good.  
Almost in all major riots after India’s independence, number of Muslims was 
highest among the killed; in fact more than 80% were Muslims out of the killed. 
Property loss faced by Muslims was also high. Unfortunately in most of the riots 
sufferer were Muslims, though Muslims were arrested in large number and ironically 
houses raided by the police was of Muslims. Even curfew was also imposed strictly in 
Muslim areas. But it does not mean that Communalism was provoked only by the 
Hindus, in fact both Hindu and Muslim communalists were equally involved in 
making their respective communities communally conscious. Muslim police were also 
communally biased as we can see that during 1947 riots the D.M. of Muzaffarpur 
accused the Sub-Inspector Razak Khan for creating communal trouble while he was 
officer-in-charge of Lalganj police station during last Bkra-Id.10 
Like a typical Hindu a police also believe that usually Muslims are cruel and 
violent. The police were of the opinion that it is Muslims who initiate riots. But when 
Rai remind him that, during riots it is Muslims who is being killed in large number 
then why they would start riots? And they (police) replied like a typical Hindu. They 
believe that riots broke out as result of Muslims’ mischiefs and the only way to curb 
the riots is to crush the Muslims. In Bhagalpur riots Muslims suffer severe losses 
though police not hesitating in accusing Muslims responsible for the riots. And this 
psyche or mind set resulted in brutalities on Muslims. 
In case of the Bhagalpur riots we saw that how police and rioters connived 
with each other. Sometimes, after the riots broke out, as in the case of  Bhagalpur, 
many Muslims took refuge in a house but after a while, a policeman told them to take 
shelter elsewhere because, ‘now you all are not safe here’. At his assurance they left 
for a ‘safe place’ where they were attacked and killed by the rioters. Some of them 
took refuge in the nearby field where due to the standing crop they could escape the 
prying eyes of the killers and thus they were able to save their lives. 
                                               
10 PS, file no. 2665/1947, p.7. 
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It is a fact that during the Lalu Prasad Yadav’s rule (1990-2005) no major riot 
took place but it is irony that why the accused of Bhagalpur riots were not punished or 
arrested though Lalu was assumed as benefactor of Muslims. This has been strongly 
asserted by Mohammad Sajjad in one of his press interviews, “I believe that keeping 
the rioters unpunished has been the biggest failure of the Indian state and of its 
criminal justice system.”11 Bhagalpur riots also revealed that it not only erupted 
against Ramshila Pujan12 procession, which taken out throughout India and abroad. 
And a Ramshila procession was also taken out at Bhagalpur on October 24, 1989, 
which sparked off the communal riot there, but the riots were ignited to capture the 
Muslims land. In Bhagalpur Koeri was another community besides Muslims who had 
small land holdings in comparison to the Muslims. Koeri’s were also employed under 
Muslims. There was discontent among Koeris because of this inequality. Thus this 
riot also had economic tension as backdrop of eruption of the riots. 
 This study further reveals that the roots of the problem lie in the past history 
of the country. From the very beginning when the Muslim invaders set their feet on 
the Indian soil they created a general atmosphere of hatred and hostility among the 
Hindus for the Muslims. Later Muslims were portrayed as the foreigners and 
aggressors who demolished the Hindu temples. Later Hindu-Muslim relations were 
further polarized by the British Government through their so-called ‘divide and rule’ 
policy. During his tenure Jawaharlal Nehru adopted secular policies to tackle the 
communal problems such as, when in Jan Sangh campaign against cow-slaughter 
demanded ban on cow slaughter Nehru had set himself firmly against such a course 
and in 1955 a committee of experts had decided that such a ban would not be in the 
best interests of the country, many other secular initiative were took up by Nehru. 
After the death of Nehru (in May 1964), Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime 
Minister of India, and his behaviour towards communalism and communal forces was 
liberal many other politicians defended or provided shelter to the communalists and 
fascists, where these sections of politicians, enjoyed the full liberty to do whatever 
they wanted (Blitz, 26 December, 1964, p. 2) After Lal Bahadur Shastri’s death in 
1966 Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. Initially she took serious 
                                               
11 Mohammed Sajjad, India's Muslims: Waking up to change? (An interview), Published on 5 March 
2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/indiamuslimswakingupchange2014331328721691
7.html; accessed on, 2 December, 2014. 
12 Ramshila Pujan refers to “sacred” bricks to be used for construction of Ram Mandir. 
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steps against communalism. She banned RSS during the Emergency period (1975-77), 
but her behavior towards communalism changed, before the Loksabha elections of 
1980. Hereafter political leaders use this instrument for gaining power. Irresponsible 
behavior of political leaders is also not negligible. We see irrational decisions by 
political leaders also may have culminate in riots such as in case of Shah Bano, Rajiv 
Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, passed new laws to pacify the protest from Muslims 
and also he ordered to open the door of Babri Mosque/Ram mandir to pacify the 
Hindus. 
If India’s infrastructural shortages of water and power continue, populace 
impatience can continue to be expressed by public protest which could include 
violence.  Economic liberalization is bound to lead to increased migration to urban 
centers, further straining their infrastructure, burgeoning their slums, building bigger 
vote banks which heightening social tensions. These economic and social tensions are 
used by the leading class to rose one section against the other section to divert masses 
attention from the exploitation by the elite class itself, which led to increasing crime 
and communal violence. 
Objective of the politics being power which is often the ultimate power, the 
stakes of the political players are high; where stakes are high, principles and means do 
not matter. Independent India’s electoral history has been an account of unbridled 
bloodshed because to capture booths and rig votes, the politician unabashedly started 
taking the help of criminals who adopted the violent means to capture the booth and 
terrorized the people to vote for the leader by whom they were hired, thus politicians 
soon enough adopted the trade of politics to seek power for themselves. Today, no 
political party is free from the shame of criminalization and no one seems to be 
bothered. As Mohammad Sajjad in his article, “Muslim Pride at all Cost”13 wrote, 
“During the Laloo-Rabri era (1990-2005), there was emergence of a new type of 
criminal venture in the Bihar countryside viz. vehicle snatching and kidnapping”. 
Anirban Mitra and Debraj (2014)14 elaborated as the encounters such as an accident, 
an assault or confrontation, an isolated murder or rape etc., across members of 
different religious groups, are framed as the religious conflict by the power hungry 
section of the society which finally turn into the riots. 
                                               
13 Mohammad Sajjad, “Muslim Pride at all Cost” in The Indian Awaaz, http://theindianawaaz.com 
/articles/muslimprideatallcosts2/, published on 30 November 2001,, accessed on, 10 December, 2014. 
14 Anirban Mitra and Debraj, “Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu_Muslim 
Violence in India” in, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 122, No. 4, August 2014, pp. 719-765. 
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This study also observed that most of the riots occurred either before the 
commencement of the elections or immediately after the elections. Political 
competition horribly used the communal elements to gain the power; parties that 
represent elites within ethnic groups, use anti-minority protests, demonstrations and 
physical attacks that precipitate riots in order to encourage members of their wider 
ethnic category to identify with their party and the ‘majority’ identity to rather than a 
party that is identified with economic redistribution or some ideological agenda 
(Steven I. Wilkinson (2004). As in case of riot of Muzaffarnagar (in western Uttar 
Pradesh in September 2013), Mohammad Sajjad cited that, “the Lok Sabha polls in 
Aligarh [2014] where Muslims decided to vote for the BSP, but just two days before 
polling decided to back SP candidate Zafar Alam, perhaps because of the shadow of 
Muzaffarnagar riots”. However communal violence just before elections always 
polarized votes, thus the atrocities on the Muslims during Muzaffarnagar riot (2014) 
made the Muslims to caste their votes to a Muslim candidate. 
The failure of administration, in preventing and seizing the riots is the most 
crucial aspect of this study. Administration suffers from certain glaring deficiencies, 
viz., it did not have an efficient machinery to apprehend impending trouble well in 
advance. Administration also suffers from some sort of demoralization caused by the 
partisan attitude of the political parties, in power at the time of riots, and frequent 
interference by politicians in administrative functioning, thus under the pressure from 
political powers, administrative bodies became paralyzed and became unable to take 
strong preventive action including arrest of the suspects in advance thus the threat to 
communal peace and harmony it can be said that it is badly ill-equiped. There was 
also lack of coordination among the different authorities in dealing with communal 
disturbances also seriously impedes its effectivity. Even sometimes administration, 
too acts in a partisan manner favouring one community against the other. 
Thus we see that there was biasness in dealing with the riots by the 
administration. Though relief camps were established but that were not efficient in 
blurring their scars. Even these issues were kept burning. Like, Nitish Kumar, the 
Chief Minsiter, in his election manifesto (2005), promised justice and compensation 
for the victims. He formed a judicial commission in May 2006 to review the 
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compensation awarded to the victims of the Bhagalpur riots, 1989.15 The commission 
met with the victims and their relatives on 31st May and 1st June 2006, in Bhagalpur. 
In 2007, 14 more people were convicted for their role in the Logain massacre16, where 
rioters, led by the police officer Ram Chander Singh of Jagdishpur, killed 116 people 
(Muslims) and buried their bodies in a field, and planted cauliflower there, over the 
mass grave to hide the evidence17; in burying the dead bodies Officer in Charge of 
Jagdishpur Police Station and the Block Development Officer allegedly helped the 
rioters.18 
As Anirban Mitra and Debraj (2014)said that, behind the Hindu-Muslim riots 
have always been driven by the instrumental, specifically economic consideration. As 
we can see that the many of the riots broke out in the towns and villages where 
Muslims were economically well off because of their engagements in other business 
and inflow of petro-dollars and Gulf money. Many of the riots broke out in the 
Muslim economic centre, such as Jabalpur riot (1961), Bhiwandi (1969) riot, 
Bhiwandi riot (1970), Jalgaon (1970), Sambhal riot (1978) Aligarh riot (1978), 
Jamshedpur riots (1979), Biharsharif riots (1981), Bhagalpur riots (1989) etc., these 
riots affected the Muslims economy in the country.  
Moreover in case of failure in handling the riots firmly, no commissions were 
instituted to inquire into their role during the riots in handling the riots. If the 
commissions were made, there were no evidences that any official was penalized. 
Rehabilitation and relief works were often carried by the non-governmental 
communal organizations to assert their strong base among their respective 
communities. 
This study also revealed that the in pre-independent India though there was 
involvement of criminal elements in the riots but we could not find any evidence of 
their political patronage. While in post-independent India criminal elements were 
thoroughly patronized by the politicians who were engaged in igniting the riots, what 
we see in Bhagalpur riots (1989) that the two criminal groups- Sallan group and 
                                               
15 Sankarshan Thakur, Single Man: The Life and Times of Nitish Kumar of Bihar (Biography), Harper 
Collins, India, 2014, pp. 194-196. 
16 Sankarshan Thakur, Single Man: The Life and Times of Nitish Kumar of Bihar (Biography), Harper 
Collins, India, 2014, pp. 196-197. 
17  Muslim India, September, 1995, Vol. XIII, No. 153, p. 405; also see, Muslim India, January, 2000, 
Vol. XVIII, No. 205, p.37; also see, Warisha Farasat, “The Forgotten Carnage of Bhagalpur” in EPW, 
19th January, 2013, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, p. 35. 
18 Muslim India, January, 2000, Vol. XVIII, No. 205, p.37 
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Ansari group- were patronised by Bhagwat Jha Azad and Shiv Chandra Jha, both 
were former chief ministers of Bihar of two factions of the ruling Congress. 
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Glossary 
 
Amil Government official, local revenue collector or revenue farmer 
Amla (estate) Official or retainer, rent collector 
Azan Call for namaz is termed as azan 
Bhadralok Bengali Hindu middle class, Gentleman 
Bidi Bidi is a kind of cigarette, tobacco rolled in leafs 
Chowkidar Watchman 
Dashara Hindu festival at beginning of agricultural year 
Fatwa A fatwā is an Islamic legal pronouncement, issued by an expert in 
religious law (mufti), pertaining to a specific issue, usually at the 
request of an individual or judge to resolve an issue where Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh), is unclear. It is an Arabic word, and it literally 
means "opinion". 
Hat Periodic marketplace (once or twice in a week) 
Khas Direct system of rent collection 
Lukari 
 
 
Laathi  
“Lukari” term is commonly used in villages. “Lukari” is lighted 
cloth balls soaked in kerosene oil which is used as firearm in order 
to attack the enemy from a distance. 
Baton/stick 
Malik Proprietor 
Namaz 
Panchayat 
Muslims’ prayer 
Panchayats in India are basically the institutions that are also 
referred to as the local government in the country and are self-
sufficient. As per Article 40 of the Constitution of India, the 
Government of the country has to set up Panchayats in the villages 
so that they can act as local self-government.  
Podar Cashier 
Qanungo Registrar 
Raiyat/Ryot Tenant, cultivation 
Rais Respectable Persons 
Sabha Organisation 
Sangathan Voluntary organizations 
Tablighi Jamaat Tablighi Jamaat ("Conveying Group") is a Muslim missionary and 
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revival movement. Their activities are not limited to the Muslim 
community. The Movement's main aim is to bring guidance to the 
world's Muslims. 
Taraweeh Namaz performed with recitation of the Quran during the month of 
Ramzan 
  
Thikadar This term generally used for rent collector or men of wealth and 
power 
Thikadari System of rent collection by thikadars. 
Toddy Juice of the palm tree which becomes intoxicating when it is 
ferment 
Toddy taper Toddy manufacturer called as toddy taper 
Taluqdars Holder of an Estate or a taluqa 
Zamindars Landholders 
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